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Abstract
The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of ecological issues as 
among the most important problems in the global political agenda. The aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that the challenge of ecology is larger than it initially appears to be. It argues that 
ecological problems represent a deeper problem in the way that the relation of human being to 
nature is conceptualised in International Relations.
The structure of the thesis works through three layers. In the first layer, chapters 1 and 2, 
the problems in the oceans’ ecosystem are presented, with particular emphasis on ocean 
management system in the south Pacific Cooperation. The impact of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of The Sea ID (UNCLOS HI) in the region and on the ecosystem is 
analysed with particular emphasis on the species of Tuna. In this analysis the focus is the newly 
formed Exclusive Economic Zones and the concept of sovereignty.
The second layer, chapter 3, begins with an overview of the importance of the concept of 
sovereignty for the discipline of International Relations. The analysis of the deployment of the 
concept in UNCLOS III constitutes the middle section. The last section presents the concept of 
sovereignty in terms of its operational aspect. It argues that sovereign decisions always decide 
about an exception on life. This move opens up the philosophical constitution of the concept by 
pointing to the deeper relationship between human beings and nature.
The third layer, chapters 4 and 5, engages with the philosophical discussion of the human 
subject and nature. In chapter 4, the particular anthropocentric constitution of human being 
through Cartesian and Kantian philosophies is critically analysed. In chapter 5, a Heideggerian 
formulation of human subjectivity is presented as a new ground of thinking about nature. The 
conclusion, then, seeks to outline more precisely the implications of the thesis’ argument with 
respect to International Relations.
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Introduction: Method and ‘Prefacing’1
On Thursday June 12 1997, most of the British national newspapers carried coverage of 
the Greenpeace occupation of ‘Rockall’ accompanied by photographic images of the barren rock 
which lies 289 miles off northwest Scotland. A Greenpeace spokesman announced that ‘[w]e 
have asked the Government to stop oil exploration in the Atlantic Frontier region and when they 
do they can have their rock back’ (The Times). And one of the protesters added that ‘[b]y seizing 
Rockall we claim her seas for the planet and all its peoples. No one has the right to unleash this 
oil into our threatened climate’ {The Independent).
The follow-up to this coverage came on Thursday July 24 1997, when The Guardian 
reported that ‘[t]oday in London, Greenpeace moves from a symbolic to a legal challenge, and 
will take the Government to the High Court, arguing that Britain has acted unlawfully by issuing 
licenses while not applying two European directives, in place since 1988’. The newspaper also 
reported that ‘the Government is being supported by 15 of the world’s largest oil companies’.
The Rockall case is one example of environmental politics. I use this case, in the 
introduction, to locate the question of the present study through the conceptual incision it opens 
up in international politics. The following questions are the means for this incision. What is the 
issue at stake here? Is it important at all or is it one of those radical Greenpeace actions? If it is 
important, why is it so? What does it point to?
The situation created by the Greenpeace protest can be analysed on the basis of two 
different claims. The first is the claim of Greenpeace against the Government decision, and the 
second is the Government response and the grounds of legitimation used in this response.
The reason for the occupation of Rockall as expressed above carries a very important 
challenge. The idea that Greenpeace was working for the benefit of the planet and all its people 
indicates a relationship of a different kind between those who take the decision and the rest. Its 
call on the British Government to stop licensing oil exploration is also a call for responsibility. In 
this call, a national government is asked to consider the impact of its sovereign decision on the 
planet and other people living on the planet. In this move, connections between people are not
1 For a discussion on ‘Prefacing’,see Spivak, 1976, pp.ix-xiii.
considered on the basis of their divided state identities. Furthermore, the identities of people 
living on the planet are linked with the identity of the planet; a link with other species living 
therein is also implied.2
The response of the British Government can be discerned from two different sources. The 
first one is the direct official response to the protest and occupation of Rockall by Greenpeace. It 
is reported that a spokesman from the Foreign Office stated that ‘[r]ockall is British territory. It is 
part of Scotland and anyone is free to go there and can stay as long as they please’. It is clear that 
the Government is acting on a territorial claim which enables it to legislate within its sovereign 
control. So, the concept of statehood is invoked to evade the responsibility call and divert the 
attention from the ambit of the call to the fact that that decision is within the state’s territory, 
hence authority.
The second source is the Prime Minister’s declaration in relation to the British 
commitment to the Climate Change politics in the United Nations. At the very same period, 
during the United Nations General Assembly session on the environmental change assessment, 
the PM(Tony Blair) declared the wish of the United Kingdom to become a world leader in 
Climate Change politics by promising a radical reductions program in carbon emissions by the 
early next century. Although in this statement there is a sign of responsibility in relation to a 
global issue area, it seems to be based on a very interesting differentiation. It is a curious 
question, how it is that the British Government is allowing further hydro-carbon extraction while 
at the same time, commits itself to the Climate Change politics. The area under discussion, 
according to a British Petroleum (BP) spokesman, is supposed to replace declining production in 
the North Sea, and the first of these sites in the area is expected to produce up to 95 000 barrels 
of oil a day.4 It might be true to argue that the commitment to Climate Change is located in a 
different dimension than the domestic political discourse. Both discussions are fundamentally 
related, but dealt with through contradictory moves.
Although the response and the grounds of this response by the British Government seem 
to be valid, the challenge by Greenpeace targets a deeper dimension. It is clear that the language
2 The idea o f claiming rights for nature is dealt in terms French practice in Luc Ferry 1992.
3 The Independent, 12 June 1997.
4 The Times, 12 June 1997.
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used in the Government’s defence is based on concepts o f ‘state’, ‘territory’, ‘interest’, ‘the 
international’ and ‘international law’.5 What is being challenged is the relevance of these 
concepts in understanding the ecological situation. Through the claim of representing the eco­
system around Rockall and the rest of the human population who would be influenced by hydro­
carbon extraction, Greenpeace allows us to attempt to think of moral relations, ethics, in terms of. 
ecology. ‘Ecology’ can be defined, tentatively, at this stage as: an awareness of the interrelation 
and interconnectedness among the species of nature themselves including humanity; and between 
species and the physical components of nature where species are located and on which their 
existence depends. Hence, ecological understanding means to consider issues at stake with the 
awareness of existential relationality among species, and between species and the earth.
Therefore, the call for responsibility is about an ecological call.
In the context of the ocean space under consideration one needs to see the possibility of 
justification provided to the British Government in international relations and conditions on 
which the Government action is justified. The authority of the Government to utilise a section of 
ocean space around Rockall derives from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
ITT (UNCLOS III), concluded in 1982, which established a new zone of sovereign rights for 
coastal states and islands, i.e. an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The UNCLOS HI process was 
initiated to formulate an Ocean regime which would both deal with the environmental problems 
and benefit coastal states. The most innovative and important change was the establishment of 
EEZs and the regime it establishes on the basis of rights given to the coastal states. These rights 
were expressed in relation to ‘exploration, exploitation, conserving and managing the natural 
resources’(Art. 56, la)6 of a certain area of the ocean adjacent to the coastal state’s territory. By 
relating these rights to state sovereignty the convention has created national spaces out of a 
global common. As a consequence, those national jurisdictions have become legally isolated 
from the larger context in which they are located. The implication of this move is the possibility
5 Lord Justice Tucker, who sat in the High Court hearing in relation to the legal challenge against the Government by 
Greenpeace, said that ‘[t]he case was o f considerable importance, high sensitivity and national interest for all parties 
concerned’. The interest o f the state is invoked against the call for responsibility. The reason o f state is, in this case, 
related with economic concerns. The Observer, 3 August 1997.
6 Article 56, la; The Law o f  the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea-Final Act o f  the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law o f  the Sea, 1983, p. 18
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of spatial differentiation between state and international in the way we try to understand 
international relations. By this move the international law also describes the content of these 
spaces. In the case of Rockall this means that the British Government can isolate the case within 
its internal, ‘state’, systemic conceptualisation and can respond by transforming the case into 
what can be discussed on the basis of national-interest. It also means that the assimilation of the 
call for responsibility into national-interest is mediated by the international law.
It might be argued that the relationality and interconnectedness of human beings and 
nature suggested by the Greenpeace action is not addressed in the Government response. My 
intention, then, is to find an intellectual orientation for the critical analysis of this juncture 
between the Greenpeace and the Government. The juncture can be spotted between the official 
response and the ecological interconnectedness of species, that is, their relationality invoked in 
the protest; as well as in the meaning of the non-response to the ecological call for responsibility 
beyond official understanding of responsibility in terms of state interest. The ‘critical’ in the 
critical analysis means that the analysis will attempt to reveal the limits of knowing7 in terms of 
ecology within the discourse that is framed by concepts o f ‘state’, ‘territory’, ‘interest’, and ‘the 
international’ as they are deployed by the Government. It is, therefore, important to conceptualise 
the nature of the problem between the call for responsibility and the location of the official 
government response within international relations.
In the context of this study, the discourse is the study of International Relations as studied 
by the discipline of International Relations (IR).8 The study of International Relations is taken to 
be a discursive practice insofar as it produces and forms the knowledge in relation to
7 Spivak, 1993, p.25.
8 Within the IR discipline there are varied traditions based on different perspectives in relation to what the nature of  
international relations is all about. It is possible to analyse the major debates o f the discipline pace  Michael Banks 
(1985) in order to have a coherent classification. According to Banks, the debates among ‘realist, pluralist and 
structralist paradigms’ provide the groundings o f the discipline. Although this view is accurate, there are other 
classifications such as Kal Holsti’s (1985) ‘Classical Tradition, Global Society and Neo-Marxism’ or R.D. McKinlay 
and Richard Little’s (1986) ‘realist, liberal and socialist’ schools o f engaging with international relations. All these 
different perspectives employ different analytical methods to understand international relations. According to 
Friedrich V. Kratochwil ‘[tjhose who denied that norms are important for international interactions called 
themselves-with typical modesty-“realists”, and those who were interested in norms were labeled “idealists’” (1995, 
p.45). Despite all the differences they share the conceptual frame work provided by the concepts o f sovereignty, state 
and the international. In other words differences are contained within the disciplinary boundaries provided by the 
concepts.
international relations.9 In this productive mode it applies discursive rules and categories such as 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘the international’, without which the discipline of International Relations 
cannot explain the international relations; nonetheless, in the statement of ‘the international 
relations’ these rules and categories are always already assumed.10 The response of the British 
Government to Greenpeace’s actions reflects the discourse of IR which is based on territorial 
sovereignty claims through the means of international law and claims of priority of national 
interest over international responsibility—in other words the discourse of International Relations 
through its rules and categories enables spatial differentiation between international and national. 
It creates two sides of political action where the basis of action is based on different ethical 
relations. Put differently, this spatial differentiation also differentiates the mode of political 
concerns and agents. Through this structure the state becomes the agent of political discourse in 
‘the international’ under the assumption of representing its territorial unity and unified will of .its 
citizens. In this enabling rests the question of how it is that concepts o f ‘sovereignty’ and ‘the 
international’ create the conditions of the discourse.11 The ecological call as expressed in 
Greenpeace attempt destabilises the disciplinary moves that are based on the framework of 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘the international’. As R.B.J. Walker suggests, the increasing importance of the 
problems arising outside traditional sovereignty claims such as ‘those involving the law of the 
sea, space law and speculative claims about a global commons or planetary habitat’ make 
traditional belief that ‘here is indeed here and there is still there’ (Walker 1993, p. 174) rather 
difficult to sustain. The politics based on ecological relationality exposes the inner tensions of the 
concept of sovereignty. The image of sovereignty as reflected in state action becomes unstable as 
these actions have larger consequences that cannot be assimilated within the boundaries of 
sovereign decision making.
9 Foucault 1977, p. 199.
10 This argument is based on Foucault 1972, p. 107 and Foucault 1977, p. 199.
11 Foucault argues that ‘discourse is constituted by a group o f sequences o f signs, insofar as they are statements, that 
is, insofar as they can be assigned particular modalities o f existence’(1972, p. 107). This makes more sense when 
read together with ‘all the discursive rules and categories, assumed as a constituent part o f discourse and therefore 
knowledge,.. .they remained unvoiced and unthought’(1977, p. 199). It is the fact o f deployment o f concepts, such as 
sovereignty, as a disciplinary practice which keeps the values within the concepts hidden, unquestioned.
The ecological understanding defined as a holistic relationality between species and earth 
presents an important discursive problem to International Relations.12 Of course, there is an 
attempt to locate ecological problems as an environmental problem within the discourse, as 
demonstrated by the British Government’s response. This prompts a question of how it is 
possible, in the face of an invocation of ecological responsibility, to manage the environment in 
terms of ‘sovereign’ spaces? Stated differently by Michel Foucault, in his attempt to locate the 
conceptualisation of sex in relation to the general discourse of sexuality, ‘[w]hat is at issue, 
briefly, is the over-all “discursive fact”, the way in which sex is “put into discourse’” (Foucault 
1990, p.l 1). It is important to realise that transformation of ecological problems into 
environmental issues is a discursive move. International Relations might explain the issue of 
Rockall through environmental management terms based on British sovereign rights and its 
international obligations, and by bringing this explanation imposes its own discursive structure 
over the issue. Nonetheless, this precise juncture of transformation reveals the anthropocentric 
prejudice of the discourse. Although there are those theories, or schools, of International 
Relations that are receptive to the environmental problems, they remain within the 
anthropocentric framework.13 The ecological call raised by the Greenpeace allows us to see the 
inadequacy of the rules and categories of the discourse. Or, from a Foucauldian perspective this 
inadequacy represents the internal unvoiced and unthought existential values and norms in the 
discourse. In other words, to bring the concept of ecological into perspective is an attempt to 
uncover power14 reflected in the possibility of the conditions of knowledge framed in the 
discourse of International Relations.15
12 This problem is addressed by Jurgen Habermas as well. His response, nonetheless, follows a different path. The 
problem created between the ecology and the human response can be solved, according to Habermas, or rather 
avoided, through the transformation of ‘latent class structures of advanced-capitalist societies’ (Habermas 1975, 
p.93). He considers these problems essentially as a problem in the steering mechanisms o f the capitalist societies. 
Therefore, the ecological understanding has reduced to an epiphenomenal issue which would only arise as a result o f  
a legitimation problem in the steering ability o f the system.
13 Various levels o f receptivity within IR and their anthropocentric frames are analysed by Laferriere and Stoett in 
their study o f ecological thought and different schools of IR: Realist, Liberal and Critical. See Laferriere and Stoett 
1999.
14 The Foucauldian definition o f power does not consider power in relation to hierarchical imposition o f power by 
the strong superior structure. It is more about ‘the multiplicity o f force relations immanent in the sphere in which 
they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and 
confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them;...’ (Foucault, 1990, pp.92-93).
15 ‘[t]he discourse o f sexuality’ (Foucault 1990, p.92).
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The relationship between power/knowledge and discourse is extremely interesting and 
important one. In considering a discourse as the reflection of deeper, internal, values and norms, 
and their relationship, it is possible to dissect the knowledge claim of a discourse in relation to 
the underlying conditions of its production. In the privileged norms and values, those norms and 
values that are silenced can be observed as well. The silenced relations in the production of 
certain truth claims within a discourse represent where the resistance can be located. In terms of 
the juncture between ecology and International Relations, the location of this resistance can be 
the discussions of environmental management within the discourse of International 
Relations(insofar as this location allows us to see the power relations and ethical values deployed 
in the disciplinary parameters of sovereignty and the international).16
Through this understanding one can analyse the discursive production of ‘environment* 
and can also analyse its inclusion in politics. What are the power relations reflected in this 
knowledge? It does not mean that the challenge is external to the discourse. The location of 
resistance is clearly within the discourse as an oppositional power relation, that is silenced, which 
can be mobilised to reflect the contingent power relations underpinning the possibility of 
discourse. By showing the contingency of the discourse not only to what is being confidently 
expressed but also to the silenced power relations, the knowledge claim becomes disrupted, and 
the possibility of a new space can be opened. With this move, the explanatory power of the 
discourse of International Relations based on spatial differentiation between ‘sovereignty’ and
1 7‘the international’ and the very legitimacy of this explanation are questioned.
The ecological call, of which Rockall is only one manifestation, presents International 
Relations with a fundamental challenge. What we see in this example is very important. The 
Government’s response to the issue of Rockall revolves around the disciplinary matrix of
16 Foucault argues that ‘[discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more 
than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and effect o f power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for 
an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power;...but also undermines and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, p. 101).
17 In other words the disciplinary response based on the spatial framework is not accepted insofar as it does not 
address the ecological call, but it transforms the ecological understanding in terms o f its own ontological framework. 
By this refusal the question, then, can be carried to a deeper level where the conditions o f possibility o f non­
response, whereby the ecological understanding is transformed, can be questioned. By this process the assimilation 
of the call through discourse can be resisted.
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International Relations. However, one of the main arguments in the discussion, that is the 
ecological claim, urges us to stretch our vision provided by the discourse. The claim that the 
state, and hence the domestic government, has a responsibility to people beyond its boundaries, 
attempts to disintegrate the image of responsibility only based on state relations in the 
international, which is not concerned necessarily about people. Moreover, by bringing in a 
concern for species that are not able to vocalise their dissent from the practices threatening their 
existential space, and therefore, their being, this ecological politics of contestation is pointing to 
a discursive anomaly in International Relations. The knowledge produced within the discourse in 
terms of ‘the international’ does not reflect what it is that we perceive to be international, the 
larger context implicated in the concept becomes obscured. Its knowledge claim remains 
restricted with state behavior and interests. The present study claims that the discourse of 
International Relations is paralysed by ecological problems. As it tries to overcome this state of 
affairs through its traditional discourse, the situation becomes worse. In other words, one can 
observe a rupture in the discipline through which power relations behind it can be dissected. The 
internal constitution of the concept of sovereignty and the power relations implicit in it create the 
rupture, so far as the ecological issues at hand are always already discounted internally in the 
discipline. Therefore, the allure of theories of regimes and institutions structured on the basis of 
established concepts such as state, sovereignty, and the international, used as analytical tools of 
engagement seems outdated. They obscure the possibility of understanding the ecological call 
and the implied responsibility therein. The question of this study, then, is: can IR understand and 
address the ecological call? This question will be expanded and located at a deeper philosophical 
level as I present how I engage with the question through the thesis.
A reminder, before I continue further, is required. The concept o f ‘international’ in this 
study will be used to present a space of social relations that is not captured by International 
Relations. In other words, I will use the term to mean a space which is beyond and more 
dynamic/fluid than what is indicated in ‘the International’ as relations among states. The definite 
article ‘the’ will not be used unless the term is used to indicate the limitedness of this term within
12
IR. In this way, the attempt is to disrupt the naturalness of the international space within 
International Relations, and always pose it in relation to a larger context of dynamic relations.18
The Methodology of Questioning
One is obliged to follow when one is in search of the ‘singularities’ of a 
matter, or rather of a material, and not out to discover a form; when one 
escapes the force of gravity to enter a field of celerity; when one ceases to 
contemplate the course of a laminar flow in a determinate direction, to be 
carried away by a vortical flow; when one engages in a continuous variation of 
variables, instead of extracting constants from them, etc. And the meaning of 
Earth changes: with the legal model, one is constantly reterritorialising around 
a point of view, on a domain, according to a set of constant relations; but with 
the ambulant model, the process of deterritorialization constitutes and extends 
the territory itself (Deleuze-Guattari 1996, p.372).
The present study takes up the challenge to IR presented in the ecological call. It concentrates on 
the oceans, their problems and the solution to those problems prescribed by the discourse of IR. 
This choice of the oceans is not an arbitrary choice of an ecological disaster. The oceans and the 
way IR conceptualises oceans presents the disciplinary rupture very interestingly—as shown even 
in a very limited example of Rockall. Also, the attempt to find solutions to the problems of the 
oceans has dominated traditional international relations, that is, international diplomacy, 
negotiations-bargaining, strategy, economic development, regime building, during a large part of 
the last fifty years. The final result of all this activity was/is the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea —UNCLOS IE—that entered into force in November 1994, the effect of 
which is demonstrated in the Rockall case; The UN Secretary-General in his speech to the 
inaugural session of the Seabed Authority described the Convention as one of the ‘greatest 
achievements of this century’, one of the most ‘definitive contributions of our era’ and ‘one of 
our most enduring legacies’ (Bouthros-Ghali, November 1994). In this ovation the Secretary- 
General is not alone. The literature of institutions and regimes, as well as the literature on
181 will also refrain from using globe or global to indicate this particular space. This is intended to avoid any 
misunderstandings that might occur in relation to the discussions o f globalisation and the political space articulated
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environmental problems, is very positive and, probably, overemphasising its role.19
The method of facing the challenge in this study is based on ‘questioning’ the success 
story of UNCLOS III arid its application under the South Pacific Cooperation. This questioning is 
the first step in an attempt to think about and understand the meaning of the oceans and the way 
we deal with them. The process of questioning takes place at two different levels. The first level 
of questioning establishes the existing situation, the success story, as it is a ‘Delusion* that 
‘believes that it sees, and that it sees in the only possible manner, even while this its belief robs it 
of sight’ (Heidegger, [1954] 1968; p. 164; emphasis added). The success story based on the 
values and categories of the discourse of International Relations transforms the ecological 
problems into environmental concerns by treating the ecological concern as either irrelevant or as 
incomprehensible. As shown in the Rockall case, the ecological call and the responsibility 
implied therein were ignored through the only possible way of understanding the issue, i.e. 
through the state/international divide. In understanding the issue through this divide, international 
ecological responsibility is discounted by the higher concern for the individual state’s 
responsibility within its sovereign territory. While this level establishes the conventional analysis 
of the problems of oceans in the South Pacific, the second level of questioning is based on the 
anxiety created by the conventional explanations, and tries to inquire about another possibility, 
another space:
There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think 
differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely 
necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all.. .what is philosophy 
today—philosophical activity—if it is not the critical work that thought brings 
to bear on itself? In what does it consist, i f  not in endeavour to know how and 
to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead o f legitimating 
what is already known?’ (Foucault 1992, pp.8-9;emphasis added).
While the first level sets the scene, the second level carries the issue to a different depth by 
bringing a new dimension to the equation. This new dimension is provided by keeping the
rather ambiguously within this particular discussion.
19 See Caldwell, 1990, pp. 125-27,277-78. Bimie and Boyle, 1993, pp.252-59, 514-42. Vogler, 1995.
14
ecological call as a constant in thinking, that is, as a spectre. This spectre of ecology is a reminder 
of the fact that the conventional analysis, based on primacy of sovereign units acting in the 
international, is only one side of the story about international.
The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis develops through three layers. With each layer, the engagement with the initial 
question takes place at a deeper level. This layering allows the thesis to move from the empirical 
case of ocean management in the South Pacific to the process of producing knowledge about this 
empirical case in the discipline of International Relations. From this point it moves to 
understand, how in this knowledge the possibility of the environmental regime is ontologically 
implied. Then it moves to a deeper level of analysis in order to unconceal the ontological binds 
implicit in the grounding concepts of the discipline, that is ‘sovereignty’ and ‘the international*.
In the centre of the argument stands the discipline of International Relations and its approach to 
the environmental problems.
The first layer is established through chapters 1 and 2 with the analysis of the case study 
of the South Pacific Cooperation(SPC) and their ocean management system under Forum 
Fisheries Agency(FFA). The regime formation and the impact of the international law of the sea 
(UNCLOS HI) are analysed. The creation of Exclusive Economic Zones globally changed the 
understanding of ocean management. Out of all applications of EEZ and subsequent cooperation 
schemes around the world, the South Pacific case has been hailed as the most successful of all on 
the way to sound cooperation,20 despite the fact that some scholars argue that because of the size of 
the member states , cooperation is unlikely to have any important consequences. Chapter 2
20 The account o f the success seems to be taken on the basis o f Stephen D. Krasner’s definition o f regimes which is 
accepted with some criticism(see F.V.Kratochwil 1995, p.57) as the consensus definition. According to Krasner 
regimes are: ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area o f international relations. Principles are beliefs o f fact, causation, and 
rectitude. Norms are standards o f behavior defined in terms o f rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action’ (1983, p.2). The explanations o f regimes are based on a nearly realist stand in relation to 
the naturalness of states and the international. States and the way they act as rational egoists are accepted as the 
theoretical grounds o f this line o f thinking (Keohane 1984, p.27).
21 See for example Johnston, 1990.
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juxtaposes the ecological context of the oceans with the South Pacific regime. In this chapter the 
discussion of tuna species, insofar as they are the most important part of the regime put together 
with their ecological life, is inserted into the conventional institutional regime analysis. This 
insertion provides a critical understanding of the South Pacific ocean regime.
Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the second layer. Chapter 3 follows from the conclusion about 
the impact of the concept of sovereignty in terms of ecological concerns about oceans. In the first 
section of this chapter, the importance of sovereignty/the international juncture for the discourse 
of International Relations is critically analysed. The aim is to show that the disciplinary bind 
makes IR uneasy about ecological concerns. The target is the crucial position of ‘sovereignty’ 
in this method.24 As the grounding assumption the concept is not questioned on its own 
possibility. The section explores the way the concept is thought in IR, in order to show that it is 
always taken as a fact even within the critical discussions of international relations.25 Once the 
constitutive importance o f ‘sovereignty’ is established, the second section, the conceptual 
dissection of the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS HI) follows in order to understand the 
particular deployment of ‘sovereignty’ in the context of ecology. The section aims to show how 
methodologically fixed deployment of the concept, in order to secure the objective analysis of 
international, cannot understand the ecological concern that arises from the oceans and produces 
a truth claim about environment at the expanse of an ecological understanding. In the third
22 See Gubon 1993 and Fong 1993; Kimball, 1989; van Dyke 1989; Schug 1993; Munro,1993.
23 John Gerard Ruggie discusses that although ecological problems require epochal thinking, discussions in IR 
‘invariably focus on negotiation processes and the dynamics of regime construction, as opposed to exploring the 
possibility of fundamental institutional discontinuity in the system of states’ and he argues that ‘they do so 
because....prevailing modes o f analytical discourse simply lack the requisite vocabulary’. Ruggie, 1993, p. 143.
24 According to Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger realist and neoliberal theories of  
international regimes share a ‘commitment to rationalism, a meta-therotical tenet which portrays states as self- 
interested, goal-seeking actors....Foreign policies as well as international institutions are to be reconstructed as 
outcomes o f calculations of advantage made by states’(1998, p.23). Neither realists nor neoliberals bring the issue of 
grounds o f possibility o f actor’s perceptions and values in to their questioning.
25 Chappell’s philosophical dissection o f the concept o f personhood in terms o f its linguistic deployment is very 
important. He argues that by defining a concept and referring to this definition later to explain what the concept is 
does not, in real terms, explain anything at all. It would only register definitional connection. The discussion of  
"sovereignty’ in the IR discourse has the same circularity. The definition of the term in terms o f authority and 
opposition to ‘the international’ always already presupposes existence o f ‘sovereignty’ therefore, it does not explain 
anything but reaffirms the definitional connection. See Chappell 1997, pp. 103-106.
26 It frames the range of questions that can be asked in IR. An interesting case is discussed by Daniel Warner in his 
analysis o f the Advisory Opinion o f the International Court o f Justice on the legality o f the threat or use o f nuclear 
weapons. Warner shows the difficulty o f the International Court of Justice(ICJ) to arrive at a decision in terms of
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section, the concept of ‘sovereignty’ is taken into a different level, it is analysed in terms of its 
workings. The formal [naturalness] understanding of the concept in international is questioned on 
the basis of what sovereign claim produces in relation to what it decides about. In this section the 
important concept is ‘life’ insofar as the invocation of sovereign decision creates an exception on 
the basis of some perceived normality.
The following chapter, chapter 4, aims to analyse the constitution of exception in relation 
to ‘nature’ within the concept of sovereignty. The main claim of this section is that at the level of 
constituting ‘sovereignty’ an exception was created in terms of human beings superiority over 
nature. Therefore, the concept of sovereignty ipso facto discounts the nature from the 
consideration when it is applied. In order to understand ecological problems sovereignty 
automatically deploys the human beings superiority over nature.27 This argument leads the 
chapter through two important Enlightenment28 philosophers, namely, Rene Descartes and 
Immanuel Kant. Descartes is analysed because his understanding of nature and its relation to 
human subject represents the threshold of modem understanding of subject and its location in 
relation to nature.29 Cartesian subject was further radicalised and abstracted from nature by 
Kantian philosophy.30 In particular Kant’s work on Critique o f Pure Reason which is the focus of 
analysis in the chapter, provides the grounding of his understanding of human subject and its
responsibility and ethics o f using nuclear weapons, and the I d ’s comprise to keep with the conventional 
conceptualisations of international relations. See Warner 1998.
27 As argued by Zygmunt Bauman: ‘[wjestem civilisation has articulated its struggle for domination in terms o f the 
holy battle o f humanity against barbarism, reason against ignorance... It has interpreted the history o f its ascendance 
as the gradual yet relentless substitution of human mastery over nature for the mastery o f nature over man. It has 
identified freedom and security with its own type o f social order: Western modem society is defined as civilised 
society’ (Bauman 1991, p.96).
28 The Enlightenment, according to Zygmunt Bauman, initiated the modem world ‘that was distinguished by its 
activist, engineering attitude toward nature and toward itself. Science was not to be conducted for its own sake; it 
was seen as an instrument o f awesome power allowing its holder to improve on reality, to re-shape it according to 
human plans and designs, and to assist it in its drive to self-perfection’. Bauman 1991, p.70.
29 According to Luc Ferry ‘[t]he essence of modernity, since Descartes, is nothing but Ratio, which can be defined 
either as the functional rationale o f capitalism in its quest for economic possibility or as “the world o f technology” 
devoting man’s energies to the domination o f the earth. This vocation, which emerged with Cartesianism, came to 
fruition with the ideology o f the Enlightenment and its belief in progress. Thus there is “an irrevocable ontological 
complicity between the founding subjectivity and the mechanism,” since, once the subject is established as the sole 
and unique pole o f meaning and value, nature can no longer be conceived as anything but a gigantic reservoir of 
neutral objects, or raw materials destined for human consumption’. Ferry 1992, pp.47-48.
30 Kantian undertaking is, as Bruno Latour points out, that ‘what was a mere distinction is sharpened into a total 
separation ....Things-in-themselves become inaccessible while, symmetrically, the transcendental subject becomes
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location. This chapter, then in general, discusses at a philosophical level the ontological grounds 
for/of the possibility of a methodology that cannot respond to the ecological question. Finally, 
this chapter exposes the ethics of existence that is internally assumed in and operationalised
' i  1
through the application of the concept of sovereignty. This, therefore, responds to the normative
discussions within the discipline.
The next layer, then, takes issue with the possibility of thinking about a different
formulation of human subject and therefore, articulates a different ethicality. The aim is to show
that differently located subjectivity would produce different methodology to understand
something like international. In this, the subjectivity is thought through ecological life. Stated
differently, the human subjectivity under consideration in chapter 5 is located in nature as a part
of it. The discussion can be seen as aimed at two important contesting strands at the same time.
The first is the objective gaze of the human subject over nature. The second is the discussion of
whether nature is real or it is a social construction. The idea that there is no ready-made world
(Putnam 1983, pp. 205-28) is an important understanding which questions their grounds and
possibility of understanding something like nature.32 It challenges the idea of authentic nature.
The focus of the chapter is Martin Heidegger’s thought in relation to Being and being-in-
the-world-with-others. Heideggerian philosophy represents one of the major ruptures in the
western thought in this century. By questioning the western metaphysics he dislocates the
abstracted-sovereign-subject based thinking. Through this, objective gaze of human subject over
nature is dislocated. The response through rethinking of both nature and human subjectivity,
then, is an important one. It argues that we cannot talk about nature on the basis of fixed truth
claims. At the same time it does not agree with the idea that nature is a text and beyond it we
\
cannot know.
It argues that nature can be comprehended in a given context as it reveals—unconceals 
itself, but in this, a given appearance—unconcealement must be thought as always already 
located in a larger existence and therefore unconcealing as a part of it. This cautions human 
beings to arrive at a quick truth claims about an appearance. The idea about fixing truth about an
infinitely remote from the world’ (Latour 1993, p.56).
31 For the discussions of normative theories of IR see Neufeld, 1995, Frost, 1996 and also see Dyer 1997.
32 Holmes Rolston III 1997
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appearance is always related more with the perception of the human subject rather than what is 
really reflected in the appearance.
The main focus, then, is the Heidegger’s book Being and Time from which I discern a 
possibility of ecological being. There are two outcomes from this chapter. The first is the 
substantial discussion about ecological formulation of human subject as relocated in nature. In 
this relocation nature becomes comprehensible as life. Neither nature nor human subject within it 
have fixed roles definitions, or fixed relationally. The second is the methodological reorientation. 
This new perspective underpins the methodological approach applied in the thesis as a whole. 
The aim is to change the perceptions in the way we think and try to see the grounds of what we 
perceived to be environmental and political problems by denaturalising concepts based on 
human progress without considering its ‘finality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1996, p.119).
33 Human being’s ‘decontexualised’ position, see Toulmin 1992, p.21.
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Chapter 1
A Case of ‘Environmental Management’ in IR
The theoretical concerns of the study, as explained in the introduction, derive from the field 
research undertaken in the South Pacific in relation to ocean management cooperation. This 
chapter looks at three aspects of the ocean regime. The first one is the international law 
framework through which oceans are reterritorialised, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari (1996), 
according to a set of constant relations in relation to ecology. The second one, then, is the 
explanation of the particular case of the South Pacific. The third one is about the specific 
reterritorialisation of identities and the relations in the region on the basis of institutionalisation 
which is, also, a function of the new international law of the sea. This approach is informed by an 
understanding that the socio-political context is an undeniable component in thinking and 
articulating a conceptual framework for any discussion.
These steps will be taken through the perspective of conventional IR. Therefore, this 
chapter attempts to see the successful application of the new law in the South Pacific region. This 
aim, nonetheless, should be read through the theoretical framework discussed in the introduction. 
It is, therefore, imperative to keep the theoretical framework in mind all through the empirical 
work.
A New Step in the International Law of the Sea
The 1960s witnessed a rapid deterioration in the global fishing grounds in spite of the increased 
production. One of the central reasons was the unprecedented technological developments and 
investment which asked for new measures and norms in ocean governance. The other important 
issue was the political change in international as a result of de-colonisation resulting in a large 
number of newly independent states in international. Territorial claims of these new states 
created an important challenge to the fisheries of the major metropolitan states. It was necessary 
to accommodate both the needs of de-colonised coastal states and the needs of metropolitan 
states without losing the economic viability of already established fisheries in the oceans.
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After long discussions and negotiations the process for establishing a new ocean 
governance was initiated under the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1972. It covered a 
very large number of marine issues (UNCLOS III Official Text). The most important result of 
this has been the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). An EEZ is geographically 
described as an area whose breadth shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from which the 
breadth of territorial sea is measured (art. 57). Article 56(1) defines coastal states’ sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction; it allows the coastal state rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living , of the 
waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil. It does not, however, create 
sovereignty as such. It is qualified through the convention ( art 56[l]b, art56[2], atr58[l], art60, 
art70).
Division of the ocean space to facilitate coastal state control over the resources adjacent 
to their land territory was the main starting point. Environmental protection, however, is added to 
the responsibilities of the coastal states. This environmental protection is conceptualised as 
protection from accidents caused by vessels that is only a part of marine pollution in general. 
Conservation of the marine environment is mentioned frequently throughout the articles and, 
especially the EEZ system puts strong stress on conservation and protection. Article 61 obliges 
coastal states to ensure that the zone’s living resources are not endangered by over-exploitation 
(Art.61 [1]) and allows the coastal state to determine the total allowable catch (TAC) of the 
EEZ’s living resources (Art.61 [2]) on the basis of best available scientific data (Art.61 [3]). 
Coastal states are required, also, to co-operate regionally or globally through the competent 
organisations over management measures only as appropriate (Art.61 [4]). Maximum sustainable 
yield (MS Y) was chosen as the criterion for the exploitation of the resources. The fourth 
paragraph of Article 61 brought the issue of the conservation of associated or dependent species 
but does not really define the potential relationships between the species. Although EEZ regime 
recognises coastal state jurisdiction over vast areas, it guarantees access rights to new areas for 
third parties i.e. mainly for distant water fleets. Article 62 obliges coastal states to open their 
EEZs to third parties after they have taken their share. However, the decision about the amount of 
the resource that is to be offered is left entirely to the discretion of the coastal state. Attard points
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out that there was a general understanding that the recognition of the access principle was 
essential to the widespread acceptance of the EEZ (Attard, 1990,p.l64). Therefore, it is clear that 
the conservation measures expressed in UNCLOS HI Part XII, Section 2, ‘Global and Regional 
Cooperation’ are designed to give precedents to the management of EEZs based on the state 
interest. It is expressed that cooperation is qualified by ‘to the extent possible’ (Art. 199). This 
conceptualisation of cooperation considered to be feasible through competent organisations (Art. 
200). There is no definition, or standard of competence, as well as no qualification for what 
should be considered as direct cooperation in that there is no clear requirement for establishing 
new cooperative schemes.
The grounding, or locating the possibility of cooperation as motivated by the concept of an 
Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) (Art. 5 6) is based on some peculiar reasoning. If one considers the 
concept of EEZ it is clear that the imperative behind it is about extending coastal states control 
wider than they had previously. Also, the rights and obligations expressed in the convention make 
this wider remit very curious indeed. The cooperation system which would derive from the EEZ can 
only be articulated because of the inability of individual states to deal with vast patches of ocean 
space. In other words, cooperation is based on a negative relation between coastal states’ ability and 
the size of its EEZ. The high cost of collecting data, evaluating it, maintaining surveillance over the 
zone and actively enforcing the required measures in these vast zones have become problems that 
can obstruct the exercise of rights recognised in the convention. Therefore, some coastal states have 
resorted to cooperation in managing the zones that have been established. One of the most common 
forms of this, particularly in developing world, is the invitation of distant water fleets (DWFs) into 
individual zones in the attempt to benefit from their technology. This fact reflects the reality about 
the contingency of sovereign rights given to coastal states in EEZ regime, as it is clear that the 
ability of developing coastal states to utilise their new zones is dependent upon the involvement 
of the industrialised fishing countries. It could be argued that this fact underpins the EEZ regime 
to the extent that it was clear from the beginning to the developed world that productive 
displacement was not a viable political option. If this was not the case, in parallel to the Attard 
argument above, a means of leverage could have been given to the developing world which could 
have changed the structure of the existing system by changing the market relations in favour of
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the developing world. The language of the convention reflects these considerations as well. 
Throughout the convention, marine living resources are recognised as an agent of development in 
the developing world. Therefore, the industrial world has become a ‘partner’ in the development 
process of those developing countries. This enables industrialised countries to keep their access 
to the natural resources of developing countries due to their comparative advantage in technology 
and finance. The rhetoric of being ‘partners’ does not change the subtext of the industrial world 
becoming the main beneficiaries of the new regime. On the other hand, one cannot readily deny 
the advantages of this situation for the developing coastal states that have benefited, usually in 
terms of hard currency input to their national incomes by capitalising on their marine resources.
These linguistic formulations of marine resources as ‘agent’ and the new relationship 
established are the means through which an EEZ area becomes functional as the industrial zone 
that has become the engine of development. By definition the ecological identity, that is based on 
ecological life, of the resources is subsumed under the raison d ’etat in relation to ‘development’. 
Furthermore, a problem of spatiality has been created. By conceptualising a special zone that has a 
different and exclusive legal status from the rest of the ocean, the attention has been diverted to the 
immediate interest of the coastal states in their zones. Therefore, the high seas have either been left 
alone or have been considered under different measures. Two different systems of cooperation 
have emerged: one for the high seas and one for the EEZs. The first system is based on the 
traditional freedom of fishing on the high seas which is a function of voluntary catch limits based 
on voluntary involvement of fishing fleets that reflect the interests of all the parties involved. This 
structure, in relation to marine resources, has no obligatory conservation or protection measures. 
Each fishing party can establish its own limits and enjoy them without answering any legal 
consideration. The second system is internal to EEZ areas as a stock management exercise based on 
external bargaining strategy with DWFs. The system allows individual coastal states to assess their 
own zones and then make it available to the third parties. In relation to neighbouring zones of 
coastal states sovereign considerations only facilitate consultation among the neighbouring zones 
rather than integrated policy (apart from the EU Common Fisheries Policy). Since coastal states are 
granted exclusive rights on the choice of protective measures that are to be initiated in their 
EEZs, it is difficult to maintain uniformity of measures of any kind through the borders, an issue
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which is crucial in the ocean system. At the end of the day, the final decision about any policy is 
usually/has to based on ‘national interest’ given that resources are established as central to a coastal 
state’s development.
If one considers the ecological call and the relationality expressed in that, it becomes rather 
clear that the logic of UNCLOS in does not allow the ecological relationality to appear as integral 
to the understanding of oceans. The structure of UNCLOS HI as a structure of spatial differentiation 
by radical materialisation of life forms, that is reducing life of species to economic material forms- 
into agents of development, is problematic to say the least. Given the complexities of the resources 
that are meant to be managed, this allows life forms to become distanced from ecological 
considerations as part of a life world. One, then, could argue that it is highly questionable how a 
system based on political divisions of individual interests could deal with a biological and 
physical whole.
Although UNCLOS HI presents an innovative law making process that has been 
instrumental in redefining the relationship between nature and humankind, albeit implicitly, it 
could not manage to escape from the grounding constraints of its location as a result o f which 
redefinition, hence the reterritorialisation, takes the shape of re-positioning within a certain 
framework of beings. This repositioning is located within the fragmented idea of human and 
externalised environment. The convention augments this fragmented understanding by 
establishing a possibility of thinking about environment on the basis of divided sovereign 
spaces. The epidomization of this idea can be seen as ‘assessing one’s own zone to decide about 
external access.’ Reterritorialisation, therefore, is a move for further distancing in terms of 
ecological relations. It can be seen both in relation to the spatiality of the ocean space and the 
relations among beings implicated therein. The species of the fragmented EEZ space are, now 
related, or considered to be relevant by the fact that they belong to a certain coastal state while 
other species become irrelevant by distance and by belonging to a different coastal state. In short 
ocean space and the species have become materials that ‘belong’ to some one, thus, can be 
utilised at the owner’s decision and needs.
UNCLOS III has left the world with a recognition of the necessity for conservation and 
protection of the marine ‘environment’. This necessity is based on the material importance of
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resources to the developmental effort of the coastal states. Although this might have some 
important effects on the general conservation measures of the oceans, it is far remote from 
acknowledging any ecological relationality among species. Nevertheless, it can be argued that by 
initially creating such divisions at a time of realisation of the ecological complexity, it has 
prompted a response that it is not possible to manage oceans through unilateral means based on 
rigid political formulations. This conjunction of reterritorilisation based on UNCLOS DI and the 
spatiality implied within it become a very important concern as a result of very wide application 
of this form of relationality. In the reminder of this chapter I will analyse and assess the impact 
of the application of UNCLOS m  in the South Pacific. This assessment process is, also, an 
attempt to uncover a disruptive moment in the discursive structure of IR. The narration of a 
success story in terms of the discourse of IR allows the location of an instability in the structure 
that creates the narrative of success. Mostly a success story is based on the functional assessment 
of the regime rather than its impact on the subject matter of it. In this, there is an implicit 
grounding of what can be seen as the relevant subject of concern. In the remainder of the chapter 
the attempt is not to deny the functional story, but to show that it does not provide the whole 
picture when ecological concerns are juxtaposed with the functional understanding.
The Case of The South Pacific
One of the most accepted sections of UNCLOS HI has been the part about the EEZ. Well before the 
convention was ratified in 1994 the sections on EEZ were already a part of customary international 
law. Many cooperative schemes have been established to accommodate the new changes and the 
extension of sovereignty into new spaces. Out of all these experiences, the South Pacific case has 
been hailed as the most successful of all on the way to sound cooperation, even though some 
scholars argue that because of the size of the member states,1 cooperation is unlikely to have any 
important consequences.2
1 See for example Johnston, 1990.
2 See Gubon 1993; Fong 1993; Kimball, 1989; Schug 1993.
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This section will try to analyse the success story through a close reading of institutions and 
forms of ocean management created on the basis of UNCLOS IE in the region. Particularly the 
deployment of territorial extension of state sovereignty is an important consideration in these 
analyses insofar as it establishes the conditions of possibility for the new system. Thus, it can be 
considered as the central concept in the analyses.
The Area, People and The Politics o f the South Pacific
The first striking characteristic of the area under consideration is probably the huge size of the water 
mass. In this huge mass of water, there are around 10,000 islands, the size of the islands is 
extremely diverse from 21 sq. km Nauru to a continent like Australia. The area comprises 22 island 
states or dependent territories: nine are independent states, namely, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, 
Tonga, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea; five are self-governing 
in free association with former administrative states: the Cook Islands and Nieu with New Zealand, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau with the United States; the 
remaining eight countries are administrated by the metropolitan governments — the Northern 
Marianas, Guam and American Samoa by the United States; New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna 
and Tahiti by France; Pitcairn by Britain and Tokelau Islands by New Zealand. This collection of 
states is located in such a way that “the South Pacific” becomes a term of convenience rather than 
representative of the real situation. Three of the twenty-two states are above the equator: Palau, the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia while the islands of Kiribati lie between 
four degrees north and 11 degrees south latitude (Profile p.31). The total land mass of 22 states, 
apart from Australia and New Zealand, is approximately 550,000 sq. km. In this, Papua New 
Guinea accounts for 84 per cent. The population of the area is around 6 million of whom 3.8 
million live in Papua New Guinea.
Overall, these islands control approximately 30 million sq. km of the ocean space as a result 
of international law of the sea (UNCLOS m). For example, Tuvalu, which comprises nine islands 
of 26 sq. km in total, controls an ocean space of 757 000 sq. km. while the federated States of 
Micronesia through its 607 islands — 700 sq. km controls an ocean space of nearly 3 million sq.
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km. The land resources of the islands are usually very scarce. There are only a few economically — 
viable agricultural resources. Apart from some limited tropical products like banana, pineapple and 
pawpaw , and copra which is limited to some of the islands, the ocean is the actual resource base for 
the islands in their livelihood.
In terms of culture and social differences, the area is made up of three central groupings: 
Melanesia is the largest group of all and includes New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and 
Papua New Guinea; Polynesia stretches from New Zealand in the south to Hawaii in the north and 
Easter Islands in the east and includes American Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Nieu, Tahiti, Tuvalu 
and Western Samoa; Micronesia is composed of island groups straddling the equator. In this group, 
Fiji represents a location where different cultural groups meet. It is usually considered as having 
both Melanesian and Polynesian characteristics as a result of centuries-old interaction between 
different groups (Crocombe 1983, p. 10-11).3
Notwithstanding these major differences and the huge geographical distances between the 
islands, there are reflections of a variety of practices in totally seemingly-isolated locations in 
modified forms as a result of centuries of communication among different groups throughout the 
region. Usually, despite the three different cultural groupings, people from Australian aborigines to 
Hawaiian natives are all considered as belonging to the same area and to the same understanding of 
human-nature relationship. In this, long-established relations through and with the ocean are the 
uniting, or grounding factor in the relations of the region. The ocean has been an indivisible part of 
these cultures and the human existence there.
This is not to say that there is no western influence in the region, nor that the cultures in the 
region are all authentically preserved without change over time. Although the history of contact 
with West dates back to 1520s, the time of Magellan’s expedition (Maude 1968, p. 134), the impact 
of the West became important in the nineteenth century through the colonisation. Given the vast 
space under consideration these contacts and colonisation of the region did not happen uniformly. 
The contact was brought about by the logic of trade in the first instance. The whalers and coconut
3 Different people consider distinct animals as deities such as a group in Espirutu Santos of Vanuatu which believes in 
white gods which are actually barracudas and consider fishing of them as a taboo while some other groups believe in an 
ancestral relationship with sharks and perform ceremonies for them at certain times o f the year (the Malaita region in the 
Solomons and in some northern island of Fiji). Personal Communication—Francis Hickey, Fisheries Department—  
Santo, Vanuatu.
27
oil traders did not frequent the islands on necessarily friendly terms, and the few Europeans out of 
these relations that chose to live on those islands on the basis of native customs became what is 
known as ‘Beachcombers or Castaways’ (Maude 1968, p.239). The substantial influence, on the 
other hand, that was to be exerted came with the missionaries. The aim of religious conversion was 
to cause a radical change in the inner life of people, and determine all the principles and impulses of 
their future actions (Buzcott 1866-rel985, p.ix). The transformation has been seen as ‘from 
barbarism to civilisation, from heathenism to Christianity’ (ibid, p.viii). The impact of Christianity 
has not erased the traditional practices that are practised under the term of ‘custom’. Combining 
usually conflicting practices of Christianity and individual ‘customs’ can be seen as the reflection of 
the cultural adaptability within the region. Despite all the different practices throughout the region, 
the important point is the similar state of mind that exists beyond the differences, that even helps to 
shape differences in various locations, as an attitude to life or existence. It is summarised by 
Waddell as ‘the individual-the self — does not exist. One exists only in reference to others. Hence 
the practice is of always consulting, meeting, talking matters out, such that all decisions are 
fundamentally collective ones, based on a remarkable degree of consensus’ (Waddell 1993, p.xv). 
The same referential existence holds in the way people relate to nature and particularly to the ocean. 
In other words logos of life can be located in to-be-a-part-of-larger-whole in which the nature and 
particularly oceans occupy a large part. To be a part of “ocean” is considered to be an important part 
of the regional culture and identity.
The reflection of this disposition in the politics of the area, to the international relations of 
the region, is named the ‘Pacific Way’ by the islanders. It has developed through the region in order 
to enhance regional cooperation and protect their independence. This phenomenon will now be 
examined.
Although most of the area gained independence, the effects of colonialism are still visible in 
legal and economic terms. Britain, France, Germany and the United States were and some still are 
colonial powers. Haas argues that through colonialism the area was somehow incorporated into the 
international economy and thus people lost control over their destinies (Haas 1989, p.6). 
Nevertheless, this linkage did not happen because of the non-existent economic production of the 
area. It happened because of the administrative culture that was brought by the colonial powers. The
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Western bureaucracy with its heavy burdens of finance was imposed on the area. Needless to say, it 
was incompatible with the resources that were supposed to sustain such a system. Instantaneously 
there was a necessity for financial support from the colonising powers which was to become the 
colonial inheritance of the area to this day.
The impact of a new understanding in matters of political administration required some sort 
of re-structuring of the society. The political formations at the time were rather diverse and very 
much based on decentralised power relations among different groups and shared on the basis of 
traditional chief rivalries. Therefore, a form of centralised government was introduced. It was 
probably tantamount to an opening of a new world. All cultures evolve through time in ways 
peculiar to individual forms whereby social coherence and continuity of relations are maintained. 
However, by the introduction ofan alien political discourse, it seems that native practices have been 
modified in a manner that is inconsistent with their own cultures. It is argued, for example, that 
democracy had been practised in Kiribati and the highlands of Papua New Guinea long before the 
arrival of foreigners (Crocombe 1992, p. 10). And therefore it was applicable but not without 
cultural adaptation (Deklin 1992, p.32). It was not possible to disregard ‘fa Samoa* — Samoan way 
(Meleisea 1987) or ‘Papua New Guinean ways’ in the new system (Deklin 1992, p.35).
In Western Samoa, they kept institutions that were compatible, such as the traditional 
system of election where only family heads, matai, have the right to vote and the decision-making 
process, soalaupule. where any decision has to be taken in consultation with all concerned parties 
(Le Tagaloa 1992, p. 119-26). In other societies, based on rigid hierarchies like Palau or Fiji, the 
new system gave some privileges to the higher-ranking strata in terms of voting, guaranteed 
parliament seats or created a council with high powers. Although an attempt was made to protect 
the cultural relationship, the relationship between the people and the administrators was, somehow, 
dislocated from cultural embeddness and forged into Westem-style bureaucracies, as a result of 
which most of the people were distanced from the process of decision making. In this process, 
according to Hau’ofa, a culturally homogeneous ruling class emerged across the region (Hau’ofa 
1987, p.3). The impact of this can be seen as an regional attempt towards creating a regional vision 
based on cultural sensitivities formulated by this ruling class.
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With de-colonisation, national bureaucracies expanded to take over sections of government 
which had been under the control of a metropolitan power. Obviously, the question of returning to 
pre-colonial formations was nonsensical, particularly after long-established Western oriented 
educational forms. The educated strata was to become more supportive of Western values without 
giving much thought to their feasibility. And thus, they followed the system brought in by the 
Westerners. There was no question of self-sustainability of these administrative ways through their 
subsistence economies. As a result, some islands preferred to continue their dependency 
relationships with New Zealand and the United States. Through them it was, and still is, easier to 
get funds from the national budget rather than being a part of ‘not-so-big and ever-diminishing* 
foreign aid budgets. The so-called regional metropolitan powers, Australia and New Zealand, have 
always maintained connections with the islands through internal migration with the economic 
consequences of these relations have becoming much more significant than anything else.
It is argued that it is more logical to talk about a single economy in the region rather than the 
opposite (Hau’ofa 1987, p. 2). This situation is very much supported by the financial institutions of 
the region that tend to be Australian-based institutions working all over the area. One 
characterisation of the island economies called MIRAB societies (Watters 1987, p.34) in order to 
indicate the fact that the island economies are a-migration, b-remittances and c- bureaucracy- 
dependent. Autonomous economic development of the island states has been ruled out as an 
unattainable target (Bertram and Watters 1984, Bertram 1985, Bertram and Watters 1985).
The area and people, nonetheless, are fairly dynamic in nature. They are able to follow 
global trends together with traditional adaptations. Although they seem strangled by the fact that 
they are highly aid-dependent, they are very much able to make decisions according to their own 
concerns, even in creating international political agendas. In this, two substantial developments 
have helped the region. The first is probably the establishment of the South Pacific Commission, 
which helped metropolitan powers withdraw while creating self-government in the region, and 
which transformed into the institution of the South Pacific Forum during the early 1970’s. The 
second is UNCLOS HI and the creation of EEZs as a result of which the islands have evolved into a 
‘continent of the sea*. There are different views about the connectedness of the area. Veitayaki 
argues that today’s mobility is misleading in the sense that it happens only among the areas that
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offer services. He also stresses the limitations presented by the terrestrial environment and the need 
to be aware of these limitations, while Hau’ofa supports the idea of more integrated relations 
among the people and stresses the resourcefulness of the area by arguing that the probably 
misleading ideas are a result of the colonial legacy.
It seems that both scholars somehow have parallel views. They are trying to find regional 
orientations that are realistic about the internal potentialities of the region rather than external 
solutions to problems that are prescriptive and designed outside the region. The first one stresses the 
limitations and suggests solutions accordingly created, while the second one emphasises the great 
dynamic tradition of the region and the need for a revival of regional values to replace the 
implanted Western ones (Hau’ofa 1987,135-39). Actually, these views are representative of the 
new era of regionalism that has been evolving for a couple of decades around the idea of the 
‘Pacific Way’. The strong point expressed in both views is the importance of the Ocean and its 
resources for the development of the islands. In this line of argument, the role of the EEZ regime is 
undeniable. It has rightly become an important way to the development in the region.
It is clear that many different cultures have formed through the region that do not present a 
uniform structure. The impact of colonialism as a kind of new social engineering is, however, a 
unifying and even centralising experience in the region. The negation of local cultural perceptions 
about the human condition as a result of inscribed Western values in the politics of colonisation is 
central to the regional change. According to Serge Latouche, this process is an attempt to 
‘standardising the imagination’ (Latouche 1996, p.22). The history of Western (developed, 
industrialised) societies seems to suggest a momentum to standardise their understandings of the 
world during the past 200 years (Wagner 1994) and, also, through which they socialised and 
standardised nature accordingly (Giddens 1990). In this, they distinguished their societies from 
those that did not follow the same attitude by categorising the latter as traditional (Wagner 1994, 
pg. 114-119). Traditional cultures usually meant, in this context, backward, underdeveloped, 
unscientifically-based societies. However, traditional societies are considered as capable of 
developing their societies if  they apply Western structures (Wagner 1994,pg.38-42). It is believed 
that the West started to see other societies from its own perspective without paying attention to 
the ways in which people perceive themselves (Habermas 1976). There are two important paths
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to channel this so called civilising move. The first is already discussed as a change in political 
relations. The second can be seen as related with this political move but in a different area that is 
through the education system. This leads to the dissemination of Western perspectives on 
knowledge and ways of thinking. I consider this move, in the context of South Pacific, to be 
based on removing different levels of rationalities through which different groups or people in 
the same group used to conduct their relations. In other words it is a move which fixes the 
political relationality to the rationality of sovereign statehood. Reflection of this move in the lives 
o f people can be followed with the introduction of education system located in the western ‘self. 
By this turn, the claimed cultural relations in the region are based on the logos of sovereignty. 
Coupled with the sovereign western ‘self, a set of new political identities, based on sovereign 
political coherence, fixes the form of relations. Therefore, analysis of the political structures 
within the region is, necessarily, about structures that are based on western models with cultural 
overtones. To which I will turn to in the conclusion of this chapter.
South Pacific Cooperation
The grounding of politics in terms of western frameworks can be easily observed in the post-WWII 
discussions of regional cooperation. In this section both the emergence and establishment of the 
regional politics will be discussed.
The first move towards regional collaboration came from the metropolitan powers after the 
Second World War. In 1947 six metropolitan powers — Britain, France, the Netherlands, the 
United States, New Zealand and Australia — established the South Pacific Commission (SPC) with 
a view to promoting the economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the region 
(Preamble of the Founding Canberra Agreement). Although this was seen as an attempt to 
consolidate their power in the area to deter foreign interference (Gough Whithlam 1986, p.21), it 
seems more related to the economic conditions of the metropolitan powers, particularly of those 
heavily involved in the Second World War. Colonial relationships seemed at a turning point. It was 
imperative to minimise the economic burden on the metropolitan powers while holding onto
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political power. Also, there was regional centralisation. For example, Britain created the Western 
Pacific High Commission in Fiji to control all of its colonies in the region.
The islands were not members of the SPC but of another organisation created in association 
with it in 1950, namely the South Pacific Conference. The conference was a triennial meeting of 
Islands and metropolitan powers where discussions of a political nature were not allowed. Under 
these conditions the SPC became a non-political arena, political discussions being, practically, 
considered as outside the purview of the system. The essence of the issue was the fact that there was 
no independent Island state at the time. Therefore, smooth operation of the system was maintained 
up until the mid-1960’s.
The challenge came as a result of the independence movement in North Africa. It may seem 
indirect but considering the colonial connections, the impact of a change in one area on to another 
one under the same colonial rule can be likened to the extremely fast computer highways of today. 
France had to stop its nuclear tests in the Sahara because of Algerian independence in 1962 
(Ogashiwa 1991, p. 1). The immediate alternative was the South Pacific French Colonies, where 
Tahiti was the ‘lucky’ one. This rather unhappy development created the first strains in the SPC 
system. In 1965, during the sixth South Pacific Conference, the delegation from Cook Islands tried 
to pass a resolution to ask France to re-consider its decision to detonate a nuclear bomb in the 
region (PM , August 1965, p. 30). Not surprisingly, it was rejected on the basis of the political 
bearingsmftlie resG-ltitio:ii’.Hbwever, ibfaspafo vf.t-egioiiakcoincferri was^'b^oome aflame by the1 
I end of the 1960:s. The first truly regional organisation was the lPacific Islands Producers 
Association j(P!PA) established by Tonga; Fiji,, and Western Samoa to get a. better price for their 
banana experts to New Zealand. However, it was to become a discussion platform for other 
regional initiatives. As a result of decoConisition, there were independent island states in the region 
so vh« leyd of critipisjmiagainstAFrarioe mdreiishh at the rime of the meeting of the Conference in 
1970 (Nauru 1.96$, Tonga regained re^pbn^ibility for foreign policy in 1970, Fiji was. on the way)., 
Thu Fijhm delegation?asked Trahce ii£ a$ -it?had been ’argued by France, 'the tests were harmless, why 
they,' shbiild no! bhye thorn ah the Afiantib (Fhf 24 September? 970): .it was
quite: clear that criticisms were fhreatening;the existence of SPC which was, the. only regional
platform and it was not the intention of any island to break up the system of collaboration 
(Ogashiwa 1991, pp. 2-3).
The need for a regional organisation for the benefit of the region where discussions would 
have no limits had become very clear, particularly in the eyes of the independent island states. The 
organisation was intended to cushion the individual vulnerabilities of the Islands rather than 
working in the opposite direction. According to Ratu Mara: ‘When we were considering our 
constitutional evolution from our colonial status through to self-government and eventual 
independence, we realised that with our small size and relative isolation, independence could not be 
entirely viable without some sort of association with our neighbouring Pacific Island territories’ 
(Mara 1982, p.4).
From this general understanding, sparked off by the problems experienced in the SPC 
because of the nuclear test issue, a new system was established that was to become the South 
Pacific Forum. The political leaders of Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands 
jointly decided during a regional meeting of PIP A in 1971 to have a regional conference in which 
they ^ anfed Australia/and New Zealand/ to, attend as well (Fiji Times, 24 April,, 1971/). Ratu Mara 
of Fiji w as. given the role of organiser. The first conference was held in Wellin gton, New Zealand 
on 5-7 August 11971. Through the final communique of the conference, the structure of the SPF was. 
initiated. It was stressed that the initiative of the gathering came from the leaders of the independent 
and self-governing Island States. The range of issues discussed varied from telecommunication to 
national parks. A pattern of relationships was emerging from the decisions. In most areas, Australia 
and New Zealand guaranteed to assist technologically and scientifically, as well as through trade 
relations while Island leaders gave their support for investment from the Forum states. However, 
the main issue was the French nuclear test, against which many protests were made through New 
Zealand’s diplomatic missions. This was made possible by another decision in relation to 
diplomatic relations ‘Considering the ^ expense, of foreign, representation the island leaders agreed 
that there, would be advantages in joint representation where appropriate, and that those interested 
could pursue the matter wiith each other’ (Comm. 1971). By the virtue of this act, Australia and 
New Zealand had become representatives of the interests of the Island States in, the international 
fora.
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Instead of accepting Nauru’s proposition for the establishment of a regional organisation, 
the Forum decided that ‘recognising the value of the frank and informal interchange of views and 
opportunity for planning for future regional development afforded by the South Pacific Forum, the 
meeting said they would like to see its continuation on an annual basis. It was considered premature 
to institute a formalised arrangement (for time being) ’ (Comm. 1971).
All these decisions represent the main structure of the SPF that is described as the ‘Pacific 
Way’. Above all else, informality at the annual meetings is of great importance. In each meeting 
there is a day called ‘leaders retreat’. They isolate themselves from the outside world and, of all the 
discussions held during this period, only the end results are made public. The other important 
component is the status of the two developed country members. Australia and New Zealand are 
considered as indispensable and yet equal to all the others. Before the first meeting in 1971 the 
Prime Minister of New Zealand expressed this point as follows:
If there is something which the Islands can learn from New Zealand experience 
in fields of vital concern to them, there is also much that New Zealand can learn 
and gain from her Pacific neighbours. This will be a significant exercise in the 
sort of mutual co-operation which is coming to assume an ever greater 
significance in the South Pacific (as cited in Ogashiwa 1991, p.7).
Apart from regional connectedness which occurred primarily through the mobility of local 
population and economic interests, the fact that the independent Island states wore also a potential 
source of support in the international arena was an important point for the two developed partners 
of the SPF as well.
After this initial start, the Forum increased its members by accepting through the new 
independent Island States in the 1970’s. New members included Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall islands, Nieue, Tuvalu and the Federated states of 
Micronesia. The Forum became a fecund regional platform. Since its inception, many different 
programmes have been established to deal with the. various areas that represented a crucial interest 
for the Pacific Islands. These include the South Pacific Bureau of Economic Co-operation (SPEC) 
formed in 1973 to deal with the economic activities of Forum members which took over the role of 
PIPA as well (Canberra Comm. 1972), the Pacific Forum Line to provide shipping services among
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the members, and the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) to assist the members in their dealings with 
foreign fishermen. Another area where the Forum has also been working is the Nuclear Free Zone 
concept. Although Forum members signed, and most of them ratified, the South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone treaty, it does not seem to be functional because of the lack of commitment from the 
actual nuclear powers themselves. However, it has been very important in creating global public 
awareness of such issues and even stopped the Japanese nuclear waste dumping programme 
(Ogashiwa 1991). While these developments were undertaken by the SPF — the other system, the 
two levelled system of SPC —  was changed. Now, all the members, both former metropolitan 
powers and Island states, are incorporated at the same level. Through this change it has become 
much more of a consultative body. Real policy-making power has increasingly transferred to the 
SPF. Nevertheless, some issues, like environmental protection in the South Pacific has seemed 
inconceivable without the contribution of all related parties-without discrimination. Therefore, the 
SPC is seen as the right regional organ to deal with those questions. For example, the South Pacific 
Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) which is supported by the UN Environmental 
Programme aims to solve regional environmental problems in a coordinated mariner. Initially, it 
was set up under SPC control, and became an autonomous organisation in 1991 (1991 SPREP 
Annual Report). The region also has a tertiary educational body, the University of the South Pacific 
(USP), which is supported by all the regional governments. All these regional organisations work in 
coordination with a committee which facilitates communication among the various organisations.
The image of the region that emerged towards the end of the 1970's seemed to reflect 
considerably innovative, productive, and at times even resurgent regional intercourse. The nature 
and dynamics of the relations are probably the definition of the ‘Pacific Way’. To begin with, there 
is no fixed institutional centre where organisations meet annually. Every year the venue of the 
meetings shift in the region together with the presidency of the organisation. Since the economic 
resources of each member are not enough to support such travel or organisation, special funds have 
been created to guarantee the participation of such members as Tuvalu. Consensus and attendance 
of all members are the rules of the game. Also another fundamental factor is the ad hoc policy 
solutions. The peculiar structure of the area would not allow for unnecessary institutions or 
programmes. This rather unprofessional way of conducting business, from a Western perspective,
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seems positively successful for the people of the region particularly in creating a regional identity. 
Nevertheless, the regional identity is clearly the production of ruling elite based on perceived 
cultural similarities. The reason behind this can be seen as an attempt to ground regional politics on 
some shared characteristics of the region, rather than a move to think anew political formation. 
Therefore, it is clear that politics in the region has been modified on the basis of global trends.
Arguably, regional relations in the area evolved into a complex structure, the impact of 
which, however, was negligible in the international arena. The creation of new concepts in ocean 
management through the UNCLOS HI process whereby coastal states are allowed to extend their 
jurisdiction outwards up to a limit of 200 nautical miles has changed the position of South Pacific 
cooperation in the international arena. In 1977 at the Port Moresby Forum, the member countries of 
the SPF agreed to adopt 200 mile zones and decided to establish a regional fisheries agency 
(Comm. 1977). The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency was established in 1979 in Honiara. The 
aim of the agency is described as ‘to promote the rational exploitation of all living resources in the 
region for the benefit of the Forum member countries’ (comm. 1979). Since then, ocean 
management and FFA have become the backbone of regional cooperation as well as becoming ah 
important component of the international ocean management field.
Before proceeding to evaluate the success of the new ocean management in the region, one 
can argue that the claim of difference in handling the political through cultural exclusivity does not 
represent any different form of understanding or thinking than any other inter-state relations. It is 
clear that cultural discussion is a layer added on top of Western understanding of state and inter­
state relations. This will be established in the next section.
Ocean Management and the Forum Fisheries Agency
The narrative in this section will give the conventional reading of the case. It is, however, 
imperative to keep the critical understanding of ecology and the cultural particularities in mind.
The ocean space under consideration is highly important for global fisheries. Tuna resources 
of the tropical zone waters account for approximately 80 per cent of the landed value of all tuna 
harvests around the world (FAO 1993 a). In this, the tropical tuna fisheries are dominated by the
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Pacific which accounts for 65 per cent of the world’s total tropical tuna harvest (FAO 1990). The 
catch of the species of tuna is distributed among three sub-regions in the Pacific: the Pacific Island 
Nations region, Southeast Asia, and the eastern Pacific, from the southern tip of California to the 
northern tip of Chile (Munro 1990). However, in this distribution the share of the Pacific Island 
Nations accounts for approximately 50 per cent of the total harvest (Munro 1990).
According to the estimates of FFA, the tuna fisheries of the western Pacific, i.e. the Pacific 
islands with the addition of Indonesia and the Philippines, constitute the most important tuna 
fisheries in the world. It is estimated that they yield harvests in the order of 1.4 million tonnes per 
annum, having a landed value in excess of 1 billion US dollars (FFA 1992).
The utilisation pattern of these resources particularly in the Pacific Islands region has been 
determined by the Distant Water Fleets —  DWFs of major fishing nations such as Japan, Taiwan 
and the United States. The relationship between the islands and these resources was negligible in 
terms of fisheries economics. The resources were targeted for the necessities of subsistence living 
conditions. Nonetheless, the situation was altered by the formulation of EEZ in the process of 
UNCLOS m.
The new concept has recognised the sovereign rights of the coastal states with regard to 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of their EEZs (UNCLOS 
HI, Art.56a). Immediate satisfaction with the new territorial expansion was followed by the harsh 
realities of the inbuilt challenge of the system. It was not quite possible for the Island states to 
utilise their given zones via internal resources because of the lack of technology and scientific 
information. Moreover, the difficulty of surveillance and enforcement of vast parts of the ocean was 
notoriously expensive, requiring technical assistance and sometimes restrained by population 
dynamics. In addition, the fact that the most important resource, i.e. tuna, is one of the most highly 
migratory species, travelling over great distances through many different zones and high seas, 
regional cooperation had become the sine qua non for ocean management in the area.
Although cooperation in the management of highly migratory species was required by 
UNCLOS HI in Article 64, it was not the general opinion of the international arena that all the 
measures drawn by UNCLOS HI in relation to EEZ were to be accepted as customary practice in 
international law. The only-accepted-norm seems to be the extension of limits to create such zones.
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Therefore, the initiation of the FFA as a regional fisheries management organisation was more 
likely to be based on the peculiarities of the region. This position is, significantly, embodied in the 
legal framework of the FFA. While declaring the establishment of the FFA, the South Pacific 
Forum decided that no DWFN would become a member of the new organisation (SPF, 1979). 
Thus, DWFNs were isolated from the decision-making process regarding the management of an 
area that had been central to their economies. At first glance, this exclusion of an important 
component seems, to a great extent, to be contrary to a sound management system, particularly in 
an environment where the utilisation of resources is only possible through the DWFNs access 
agreements with the island states. Nevertheless, it has proved to be much more beneficial for the 
Island states in comparison to the Latin American experience where the membership of DWFNs 
made the cooperative management system obsolete4. Through this arrangement the Island states 
were able to maintain a reasonable rate of capital flow on which several member countries are 
substantially dependent (FFA Report 90/14). This legal framing of the FFA has been considered as 
one of its strengths(interviews). The FFA is directed by the founding Convention to:
a) collect, analyse, evaluate and disseminate to Parties relevant statistical and 
biological information with respect to the living resources of the region and in 
particular the highly migratory species;
b) collect and disseminate to the parties relevant information concerning 
management procedures, legislation and agreements adopted by other countries 
both within and beyond the region;
c) collect and disseminate to parties relevant information on prices, shipping, 
processing and marketing of fish and fish products;
d) provide, on request, to any Party technical advice and information, assistance 
in the development of fisheries policies and negotiations, and assistance in the 
issue of licences, the collection of fees or in matters pertaining to surveillance 
and enforcement;
e) seek to establish working arrangements with relevant regional and 
international organisations, particularly the South Pacific Commission; and,
f) undertake such other functions as the Committee may decide (FFA CONV:
Art. VII).
It becomes increasingly clear through these paragraphs that the FFA is a functional organisation in 
coordination of relations with DWFs. The only mandate it has is related to research and report
4 See Peterson, 1994; Haas et al.1994.
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publishing. It is not given any mandate in policy formulation itself or involvement with a member 
country in formulating policy without the request of a member or the Committee. Furthermore, 
even if a member requests assistance or advice, it is up to the member to apply what is 
recommended. Also, in most cases relations with the member countries are conducted through the 
foreign ministries rather than direct contact with the related agencies of the government.
One of the first important developments was the creation of the Regional Registry to which 
all foreign fishing vessels working in the area were required to register each year. It works on the 
basis of negative screening. If a vessel evades the terms of its licence, the FFA blacklists the vessel 
and informs the members about the particularities of the vessel to which further licensing can be 
denied on those grounds. However, once more, the process begins with a demand of a member in 
whose waters the problem arises. It is usually seen, rightly, as an important innovation but in reality 
parties prefer settlements through financial subsidisation as a result of which they do not go to the 
FFA for screening.
Having no political power substantially dwarfed the FFA’s involvement in relations 
between the DWFNs and the members during the early years. Behind a facade of aid relationships, 
the DWFNs tried to manipulate individual states to have tete-a-tete negotiations in the pursuance of 
securing more favourable terms of access for their tuna fleets in the EEZs of Forum member 
countries(FFA report 88/58). In this, the main strategy has been playing one country against another 
with the same resource potential. Besides these management attempts, individual countries were 
hindered by the uncooperative DWFNs because they were reluctant to share catch statistics and 
other related information with the coastal states. Another issue was the United States approach to 
the management of highly migratory species. It was argued by the US that because of the highly 
mobile nature of the resource, jurisdiction of the coastal state over such resources was. rejected. This 
was one of the major confrontations between the Island states and the US.
Boosted by such conditions, a sub-group of the FFA members, through whose zones tuna 
passes, concluded an agreement to collaborate more closely in the management of tuna. The group 
named itself after the agreement as Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) — The Nauru Group. It 
was concluded in 1982 and members include Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, 
Kiribati, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. One of the main
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reasons for this step was to stop the deceitful approach of the DWFNs while creating economically 
viable relations with them i.e. maximum economic benefit for FFA members. The extent of the 
success in preventing negligent practices of DWFNs is still questionable. However, the measures 
for prevention created by the PNA with the assistance of the FFA have been extremely innovative 
for ocean management in general.
The Nauru Agreement (FFA report, 92/37) is a framework agreement through which the 
parties agreed to establish a co-ordinated approach to the fishing of the common stocks in the 
Fisheries zone by foreign fishing vessels (Ibid., Art.2) by establishing minimum, uniform, terms 
and conditions (MTC) of licensing. These would include the necessity to obtain a licence or permit, 
accept onboard observers, provide day-to-day log keeping, timely reports of entry, exit and other 
movements to the competent authorities, standardised identification of foreign vessels and to supply 
the competent authorities with the complete catch and effort data for each voyage. Moreover, there 
was an attempt to standardise licensing procedures (Ibid., Art.3).
The formulation of the above aims is a reflection of the substantially problematic areas of 
ocean management. The implementation of these aims has been achieved through some 
arrangements and subsidiary agreements. The harmonised minimum terms and conditions have 
been incorporated by all in their negotiations with DWFNs through the immediate follow-up to the 
agreement and so far it has been applied with some success. Two fairly comprehensive and 
important developments for the enhancement of the economic gains of the PNA were undertaken 
during the early 1990’s. The first one was the ‘Palau arrangement for the Management of the 
Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery’. The aim was to put a limit on the number of both foreign and 
domestic purse seiners licensed to fish in the area through which sound economic management 
might be maintained. One of the important reasons was overproduction that had been causing 
unstable global market conditions at the expense of the region. When this rigid arrangement was 
combined with the already meticulously-defined MTCs, the problems of surveillance and 
enforcement became exorbitantly expensive and thus difficult. To maintain those services over an 
extensive area of ocean was/is very difficult and in most cases impossible; the new arrangements 
required much closer and constant effort. A solution of some sort came with a new treaty. The Nieu 
Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law enforcement in the South Pacific Region
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came into force in 1993. The Treaty is based on bilateral arrangements among the signatories in 
surveillance and enforcement. One party may authorise the use of a patrol boat and surveillance 
officers of another party to act on its behalf in its zone (FFA report, 92/51).
The first part of the treaty was used as an enhancement of regional measures on the basis of 
maintaining MTCs in DWFNs relations (Art.III, IV, V). The new surveillance and enforcement 
framework is formed in Art.V. It has become possible for two or more countries to use a single 
structure to maintain surveillance and enforcement. However this does not mean the regulations are 
necessarily united as well (Art.V(l)). It is stressed that
the conditions and method of stopping, inspecting, detaining, directing to port 
and seizing shall be governed by the national laws and regulations applicable in 
the state in whose territorial sea or archipelagic waters the fisheries surveillance 
or law enforcement activity was carried out (Art.V(l)).
In parallel to this, the second paragraph stresses that the seized vessel shall be passed to the coastal 
state authorities as soon as possible. All these formulations seem to have a basis in a definition of 
surveillance that appeared in the FFA report in 1988:
Surveillance is the assertion of a coastal State’s sovereign rights over its EEZ. Its 
broad objective is to ensure that foreign vessels are complying with any treaties 
or arrangements in force and all relevant laws, acts and regulations of the state 
(FFA report, 88/42).
The last component of the success story is the highly-regarded Treaty on Fisheries with the US. The 
conduct of the US in the region has been fairly notorious. On the basis of the 1976 Magnuson 
Fisheries Act, the US rejected any coastal state claims on highly migratory stocks and supported its 
fishermen with all means available to maintain their fisheries even if  they happened to be in some 
other state’s EEZ. Two incidents in the South Pacific reflected the concerns of the inhabitants of the 
region in a rather confrontational form. Confiscation of two US-registered fishing vessels, ‘Danica’ 
in Papua New Guinea and ‘Jeannette Diana’ in the Solomon Islands, triggered a diplomatic war of 
endurance particularly between the Solomon Islands and the US.
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The US government, in response to the Solomon Islands’ compensation claims, put an 
embargo on the import of fisheries products from the latter. The action of the Solomon Islands was 
supported by all the other Pacific Islands throughout the crisis. Also, it was clear that the US 
embargo was not as influential as they thought it would be. The most likely reason for that was the 
fact that the fish-related products of the concerned Islands were put into the world market indirectly 
in any case. The Solomon Islands was, in a way, the provider of raw material to the others who had 
the means to produce and, in that, Japan was important. Even if Japan had not been helpful, it 
would probably have been Australia and others that mediated for the markets. Together with this, 
the realisation that the adverse consequences of widespread discontent in the region, particularly 
increased by the disturbance of the fisheries, made the US to take a step towards good relations. 
After long negotiations, the US and, in the name of the Islands, the FFA concluded the Tuna Treaty 
in 1986. This was the first multinational treaty signed by the Islands but negotiated by the FFA on 
their behalf, and the result was, and still is, very successful, an agreed amount of fees for a given 
amount of vessels paid through direct payment and in terms of assistance. The distribution of these 
fees present a model which might be seen as the culmination of the ‘Pacific way’ in action. The 
Pacific Island parties have agreed to divide the access fees on a 15/85 per cent basis: 15 per cent for 
being party to the treaty and 85 per cent according to where the fish are caught (FFA report, 88/4). 
The area includes FFA members’ EEZs and high seas pockets surrounded by those EEZs. 
Obviously these arrangements are very helpful for both sides. By means of the treaty, the US 
obtained guaranteed access to the resourceful region and it was obvious that good conduct meant 
prolongation of this relationship while the Island parties would be able to maintain substantial 
amount of constant financial flows as well as political credibility that was brought about by the 
acceptance of their recognised control over highly migratory stocks in their zones, as well as in the 
high seas pockets, by the US. In the context of the high seas, the US agreed to give reports of its 
practices. However, this last point was a highly difficult one for the US to declare as a practice 
without any hesitation because of its international ramifications. Therefore, as a matter of goodwill 
on the part of the Islands towards the US, the Treaty did not include any phrase which would make 
clear that the US agreed to give certain advantages to the coastal states in regard to the high seas. 
With the help of such useful support, the US continued its harassment of Latin American states by
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ignoring coastal state rights and obtaining time to amend its national policy on the issue in early 
1991.
During the review of the Treaty in 1991, co-operation among the parties was enhanced 
through new measures. One of the issues of contention was the trans-shipment of the catch at the 
sea. The FFA wanted to stop such practices. Therefore the member countries included those related 
regulations into their national laws. Furthermore, the FFA asked the US to stop such practices on 
the high seas as well. After long discussions, the US accepted with the condition that FFA members 
should pursue the same regulation with other DWFNs as well. If they failed to do so, the US would 
change its approach on this specific issue (FFA Report 91/80). However, in the related Articles, no 
specific status was considered for such a ban. It is expressed that
no fish on board shall be unloaded from the vessel at sea, except in a designated 
area in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the 
operator of the vessel and the Pacific Island party in whose zone the trans­
shipment is to take place and catch shall only be transhipped to a carrier vessel
duly licensed in accordance with national laws (FFA 91/80, Anne.l, Part3.1).
In return for this ambiguous language, which might be interpreted as the coastal states controlling 
all related transhipments, the Islands agreed to extend the period of the Treaty for ten years. As an 
important enforcement mechanism, the vessels belonging to the US are considered to be bound by 
US laws as well. The treaty strongly supports flag state responsibility and, in that, flag state 
prosecution. Besides these legal requirements, there has been co-operation by the US fleet in 
monitoring other DWFN fleets which has been very helpful for the efforts of FFA members (FFA 
Report 91/80).
This treaty, through which the FFA obtains important measures at least for the control of a 
fleet in the region, must be seen as a success in the field of diplomacy as the US ultimately changed 
its long-standing position in matters relating to highly migratory species. Although some argued 
that the US had been acting on the basis of UNCLOS m, which urges related countries to act in 
cooperation in the management of such resources mentioned above, the relationship does not seem 
to point to cooperation that involves concerted decision-making and application. In the case of the 
US Tuna Treaty, one party, i.e. the US, negotiates on already decided measures. In other words, it is
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not a process of creating a joint management scheme. Therefore, if one tries to find cooperation, it 
would probably be in relation to the cooperation of the Islands rather than all related parties.
Nonetheless, it is argued that the US contribution in the form of fees is not more than 2 per 
cent of the total value of their catch (FFA Report, 90/80). This view is not surprising in the general 
context of the economic gain of the area which is said to be not more than 4 per cent of the total 
value of the catch (Veiteyaki 1993, p.120). Of course 4 per cent is not a small amount of return 
considering there was none at all previously. However, the mechanisms that have been created 
seem to have higher targets in terms of the economic benefits from the resources. Also, the image 
of such a low level of return seems to point to the fact that the relationship between the region and 
the DWFNs is one of exploitation of the former.
The important issue is the different applications of the measures agreed on regionally in 
national legislations. Considering the fact that only the US Treaty is multilateral and others are 
concluded on a bilateral basis, it seems difficult to impose MTCs and other regionally-accepted 
measures on DWFNs on bilateral grounds. It is pointed out that the combination of problems, such 
as a lack of exchange of information and data between member countries in regard to foreign 
fishermen, an absence of a common fee structure and negotiating strategies, and a reluctance on the 
part of member governments to agree to terms which may result in short term losses in revenue, 
would have been greatly in favour of concerted action. Also, DWFNs, by being non-party to the 
decision making are not bound by the arrangements unless they accept those through the bilateral 
agreements. Besides, it is undeniable that individual states can be manipulated through aid 
relations, and thus become reluctant to apply MTCs (FFA Report 88/58).
All through the above-mentioned cooperative arrangements, the importance of individual 
sovereignty has been strongly emphasised. Although the issues that have become difficult to solve 
as a result of the sheer physical size of the Islands, somehow led them to cooperate, and while 
innovative measures of surveillance, monitoring and multilateral treaty approaches are very 
important, it was not enough to evade the individualism in the relations of Island states among 
themselves as well as with DWFNs. Usually it is highly likely that, under pressure from its 
neighbours, one member will accept the suggested measures but it does not guarantee their total 
application on a national basis. On a closer examination, the challenge of the arrangements to the
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ecology, and in a way their defects, seems to be originating from the concept of sovereignty and the 
development objectives attached to it.
A rather controversial point is the fact that the cooperation scheme in relation to ocean 
management has been extremely isolating on the basis the regional priorities. It is rhetorically 
decided by some sort of a consensus but applied arbitrarily as it fits the interests of individual states. 
Abo, the definition of the region seems very deductive in the sense that it does not include any 
other involved parties apart from the Pacific Island States. Although this approach is justified given 
the experiences elsewhere (the disconcerting effect of the US in the Latin American Pacific 
fisheries organisations is well documented), it seems the scheme is still questionable on the grounds 
of conservation and larger management concepts.
The idea of having sole control of huge parts of ocean without the interference of others 
who have rather utilitarian interests might sound a well-thought out protective approach, but it is 
nol very clear what the targets of the regional members are in regard to the ocean space apart from 
economic interests as a path for development. Moreover, such a system, based on strong regional 
cooperation that accommodates individual diversion within the system without any responsibility 
apart from providing some access to its zone seems extremely questionable. In short, the major 
concerns of the members of the regional scheme with regard to the practices of the DWFNs have 
not been reflected internally in their approach to the issue. Therefore, a scheme which has been 
meticulously defined and is exceptionally innovative, but fairly insular, might be a problem 
because, not only is there no way to question their measures of management, but it is internally 
difficult to control each member’s practices. The responsibility factor exists in relation to the over­
arching principle of sovereignty and primarily national interest for development that has been 
supported by UNCLOS IQ.
Assessing the Region
The possibility of narrating this success story can be located in a certain understanding of what the 
success is. The region can be seen as successful only if the understanding of cooperation is based on 
a certain perspective of the ‘International’. In terms of IR this story can be either located in a
46
Realist stance, in which case South Pacific cooperation can be seen as successful so long as each 
member acts in pursuance of their own interest without passing any overarching power to the 
institution. Also, the institution can be seen within the realist concepts of power maximisation 
and security (Stein 1990, pp. 4-7) whereby each member can achieve those aims as well through 
the facility of the cooperative institution. Or it can be grounded as successful in a liberal 
standpoint. As Stein explains (1990, pp. 4-7), cooperative arrangements could emerge as a result 
of exchange i.e. trade. Obviously through the application of a new law of the sea and the concept 
of EEZ, the island states were located into a new set of economic relations within the 
international economic structure. And their response to this new situation seems appropriate, 
reflecting greater international division of labour and interdependence. So the institution is the 
response of states to the requirements of the international market in pursuance of their self- 
interest.
Both perspectives consider the South Pacific cooperation as a success story on the basis 
of functional efficiency of the institutions or as an efficient party to the trade relations. The 
framework which legitimises these stories only perceives the sovereign state as the unit of 
analysis. In this, functional efficiency seems to be evaluated on the basis of individual gains 
among the members of the cooperation or group gains in relation to external actors. Through this 
perspective and understanding the paradoxical spatiality in relation to oceans created by 
UNCLOS m  has been naturalised. The relationality between the institutions and what they are 
supposed to deal with is severed. The success is not based on how far institutions are fitting for 
the issues they are dealing with.
Parallel to this discrepancy, it is clear that in the conventional narrative the subject matter 
of the discussion, i.e. oceans and resources therein, has been disregarded as a relevant concern. 
The concern arises in relation to the contribution of ocean resources into the finances of 
development in each individual state. Although it is an undeniable fact that innovative measures 
developed through the region are important, they are assessed as successful insofar as they generate 
positive financial flow into the individual island states. When there is a danger for this positive 
flow, measures are disregarded. Overall, both in understanding and in application of UNCLOS III 
in the region ecology, as defined in this study, has been ignored. The complexity presented by the
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ocean system is not located as a part of the formation formulated in UNCLOS ID.
The idea of cooperation in ocean management based on UNCLOS HI has caused the 
fragmentation of ocean space into areas of self-interest of individual states. In other words despite 
the fact that UNCLOS HI calls for cooperation, it both expanded and strengthened the impact of 
sovereignty. And the second dimension is the fact that the reflection of strong sovereignty claims 
into regional cooperation has resulted in the enhancement of irony between the high seas and the 
newly-created zones and has somewhat dwarfed any attempt of wider cooperation for ocean 
management that is based on a larger ecology than the individual sovereign zones. It has, also, 
become implicitly obvious that the region would not take part in any formation that gives less 
power to them or more control to others than there is now. It is fair to argue that the region has 
become a closed block while having internal fragmentation of interest with regard to the 
management of the ocean. In this juncture, it is clear that the cultural edifice is nearly cosmetic. The 
relations between member states are based on application of western ideas of sovereign statehood 
and its reason expressed as interest rather deep cultural affiliation. Therefore, relations between 
members begin from this common ground. They are not interested in the question of, for example, 
why these member states have set development and progress targets based on an increase in 
national incomes which are meant to be achieved through capitalising on ocean resources, despite 
the fact that this understanding destabilises their social and cultural systems5.
This chapter explained how the new international law of the sea, UNCLOS ID, has 
reterritorialised both ocean spaces and identities in relation to these spaces. I argued that the main 
reason behind the form of this territoriality is located in the general framework of IR which 
perceives international on the basis of sovereign entities. The aim was to show how the fact of 
international relations and the narration of this factuality inter-constituted each other. Reading the 
case of the South Pacific, it has become clear that within the disciplinary understanding of IR, 
ecology does not play any role insofar as ecology does not function through a logos based on
5 The system o f EEZs has been difficult to apply and adopt for the people because of the existing marine tenure 
systems in the so-called traditional cultures. These application difficulties are the consequence o f different 
motivations embodied in the agreement.
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sovereign ‘self. By reterritorialisation of ocean space and identities, ecological concerns are 
further distanced. The questions, that can be asked, then, are located —  and limited with — into 
this conceptual framework underpinned by the concept of sovereignty.
In a nutshell, the question is not about the success of the structural forms that are created, 
but about how far they are sufficiently articulated and what the possibility of these forms are on the 
basis of the nature of the problems that they are trying to solve. Therefore, the next chapter brings 
in what is disregarded while the success story is being told, as an important part of the 
discussion. Through the introduction of tuna as an ecological component of the ocean system, I 
will attempt to disrupt the above success story as an inadequate way of understanding and 
thinking about international.
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Chapter 2: The Management of Highly Migratory Species 
and the South Pacific Cooperation
In order to locate the analysis of South Pacific cooperation within the cooperation scheme, it is 
necessary to achieve an understanding of all the related ‘parties’ in themselves and the impact of 
their communications on each other’s existence. Deciding who the parties to this interaction are on 
the basis of the cooperation scheme can be a contentious issue, according to different perspectives. 
If one takes the parallel line of argument to the FFA, the parties are those South Pacific Island 
states. The consequences of the cooperation, nonetheless, suggest a different picture. Through the 
relational ethics implied in the ecological call of responsibility, this study considers the species of 
the oceans as one of the major parties to the cooperation, albeit a silent one. Also, it seems 
fundamentally important to consider the fishing industry as an other relevant party to the 
cooperation insofar as the existence of this industry has motivated, and will motivate, the South 
Pacific states to cooperate and capitalise on their ocean spaces.
So, here the cooperation scheme is considered in its ‘multiplicity — multiple meanings’ 
(Heidegger 1968, p.71) insofar as each party affected might bring a new meaning which would alter 
the vision of the cooperation. The implication of bringing all the related and affected parties 
together would be a debasing of the success story that is only based on the interests of the South 
Pacific states and the functional efficiency of the cooperative institutions. This move aims to talk 
about the interests of species that are implicated in the cooperation scheme, but ignored as a 
relevant component in the success story. Furthermore, it is also a contrario demonstration [through 
positive inclusion] of how the absence of a holistic understanding produces a success story wrapped 
in subtle but one-sided truth claims about resources, sovereignty, interests, and eventually about the 
existential location of human beings on Earth. So, this step aims to establish a path towards an 
interpretation which contradicts the established understanding that is ‘negatively related’ (Foucault 
1990, p.83) to ecology.
This relation means that the accepted frame of perception excludes and creates absences of 
things like ocean species. It dislocates them from their natural existential connectedness only to 
relocate them as materials to support human existence. By bringing the analysis of what is excluded
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from the institutional concern in the region, that is the systemic understanding of life in the oceans, 
into the discussion, ‘the natural’ location of species as material support for the development of the 
region is disrupted. At the same time, through this analysis the framework and the impact of the 
new ocean regime are related to the process that considers and reduces the ‘environment’ to the 
limits of a new political/territorial organisation on the basis of which a certain existential normality 
for species is fixed. The possibility of understanding ocean ecosystem and the species therein is 
based on the new politically divided zones. It is argued that new reorganisation allows individual 
zones to be articulated as ‘environmentally’ separate entities.
Before focusing the argument on the nature of the resources important for the region, i.e. 
highly migratory species and the way in which they are utilised, I will locate this methodological 
step within the discussion of ecology. This will show the location of the ecological understanding 
implicit in introducing the species as parties to the international politics of oceans.
Ecology
Many different ecological issues have prompted people to reconsider the interaction between 
humanity and nature. Animal-rights, deep-sea dumping, urban pollution, national parks, forests, 
nuclear power, viruses, whales, chemicals and many more such issues are considered under the 
generic name of ecological problems. Obviously, discussion of these issues is not carried out in 
only one way. Responses are as diverse as the problems presented. Nevertheless, it is still possible 
to group these responses under certain headings. It is important to state that this is not an attempt to 
embark on an extensive review of the ecological literature already available in the area.1
The attempt, here, is to outline the arena of ecological communication. The common 
denominator of all the issues involved seems to be the human factor, either through physical 
involvement or through the theoretical conceptualisation of nature. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that people have been quick to question the human involvement.2 Since the discussion is built 
around the adverse effects of human involvement, the solutions that are suggested deal with the 
withdrawal of such involvement. The scope of these suggested solutions appear to be the important
1 For example see Pepper 1993, Hayward 1994, Gruen-Dale 1994, Eckersley 1992, McCormick 1989,
2 Carson 1962
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dividing line among discussants. ‘ Anthropocentrism’ and ‘non-anthropocentricnT are the terms 
used by those familiar with the literature. The existing system and the conceptualisation derived 
from it is labelled as anthropocentric as long as it places the human being over and above other 
beings on the grounds that it is an intrinsically higher being than the rest of beings which are 
sometimes considered to be like machines — in which there is no differentiation between living 
and non-living beings.3 This approach argues that human reason and sentience places the human 
being on a higher ground. Here, the consequential factor for establishing the case is based on the 
fact that most of the time the exploited material, or what is being seen as inferior, is a living being 
in somewhat, at least biologically, similar fashion to the human being. The other side of the 
discussion is marked with views such as those of Goodpaster and Santayana. They consider the 
existing system as based on a conceited notion of man or human reason, and argued that if 
philosophers could manage to live within nature and suspend their self-importance as man, things 
would have been different (as cited in Fox 1995, p. 18). Thus, this is called the non-anthropocentric 
approach.
The former group usually accuses the latter as being anti-human, and does this by 
emphasising human uniqueness among other beings on grounds of things like reason and 
communication; while the latter responds with the claim that the former is just missing the point. 
The latter argues that anthropocentricism proved to be disastrous4 and unethical as a result of its 
highly instrumental approach to other beings; and in that it contradicts itself in its dealings with 
incapacitated human beings. Non-anthropocentricism adopts the view that the uniqueness 
emphasised is cosmetic5 and a matter of degree6 rather than a matter of absolute differences. 
Communication among anthropocentricists and non-anthropcentricists became rather complex with 
the introduction of the typology of shallow/deep ecology developed by Arne Naess. The concept of 
shallow/deep ecology has captured the imagination of the public probably because of the direct 
implication of the adjectives used in opposition.
3 See Johnson 1984.
4 See White Jr. 1973.
5 See Earman 1987.
6 See Farb 1978, Rodman 1977, Rodman 1983.
7 The best demonstration of this can be found in Naess and Sessions 1985.
52
Warwick Fox approaches Naess by identifying three strands in his ecological thinking. The 
first strand is the ‘philosophical’8 understanding of ecology. The second strand is described by 
Naess as a concept used in relating to the level of questioning, which means that deep ecology 
implies the depth of the question9 asked about ecology that is, according to Naess, established on 
the basis of whether questions are about fundamental philosophical concepts shaping the way we 
understand nature or not (as cited in Fox 1995). The third approach is called Naess’ popular sense 
of deep ecology (Fox 1995, pp.l 14-19). Their starting point is to establish that each ‘life’ has an 
intrinsic value10 independent of human purposes and the realisation of these values is only possible 
through the richness and the diversity of life, so humans have no right to destroy this diversity 
unless there is a vital necessity. The divide between shallow and deep ecology seems more 
plausible when these considerations are taken into account. According to Fox, Naess’ intention in 
formulating the above principles is not to provide a technical articulation about ‘life’ or ‘vital’ but 
to provide a system of guidelines which could be used to make decisions about nature.
The above classification seems appropriate insofar as there are seemingly distinct ways to 
approach ecology. However, Naess is not talking about different, separate approaches. There is only 
one way of approaching ecology. He is formulating a methodology. If the path he admired in 
questioning is being followed and ‘why’ questions posed to his principles, the obvious response 
would be his philosophical stand, ‘self-realisation’, and to do this one has to ask deep questions. 
Otherwise, as individual blocks of understanding, neither of them are tenable. This ingenious 
totality of Naess makes others who are arguing for preservation and conservation through 
stewardship or guardianship appear rather anthropocentric.11
8 And that is epitomised in the concept o f ‘self-realisation’. The formulation arrived at suggests that self-realisation is 
about this world rather than other worldly-sense and also that self-realisation o f the individual is possible through the 
self-realisation o f others. Finally, self-realisation is seen as a process. It is an on-going identification with others through 
which one becomes more oneself.
9 In this approach there is a presumption that anthropocentric stands cannot be substantiated through deep questioning. 
The thrust of the argument seems to be that anthropocentric arguments would not be ready to question (Naess says this 
about the courage to question) their stands as deeply as the concept implies. This argument is shown to be wrong: see 
Fox 1995. It is quite possible to arrive at anthropocentric arguments through deep questioning. Therefore this version of 
the concept does not seem to be plausible as presenting a real difference between eco-centrism and anthropocentrism.
10 Naess argues that in order to avoid questions o f grading he formulated that ‘Living beings have in common a same 
sort o f value, namely inherent value’ (Naess 1999, p. 146). He argues that the source o f this value is ‘largely 
intuitive’(Ibid., p.l47).Here is the problem with this approach, Naess does not clarify where does this intuition come 
from. I will relate to this again in chapter 5
11 Nevertheless, to ask deep questions might bring Naess slight discomfort. The question o f ‘how’ self-realisation is, is
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The term employed by Fox to describe his interpretation of Naess to create his own 
ecological perspective is ‘transpersonal’ ecology (1995, p. 197). He emphasises that the prefix 
‘trans’ implies beyondness as in transcendence (Fox 1995, p. 198). If someone is going to transcend 
something that person has supposed to overcome a stand point that is either true or false, that is, 
there is a notion of change. First, therefore, there has to be the will for such a motion/change to 
happen and a recognition of the way in which it can happen. He accepts that his understanding is 
influenced by developments in psychology (Fox 1995, pp. 199-215). Therefore, the definition 
provided is defined in opposition to the egocentric self. This new way describes self as a sense that 
extends beyond one’s egoistic, biographical, or personal sense of self that is opening to ecological 
awareness by realising one’s wider ecological self (Fox 1995, p. 198).
This view is distinctly non-anthropocentric in the sense that it does not, for example,
1 7compare different beings on the basis of their evolutionary stages to value them. Here, the attempt 
is clearly to overcome moral and ethical formulations deriving from a certain perspective which are 
extremely difficult to resist. The arguments about conservation and preservation in environmental 
discourse are usually based on human interest which considers human interest as superior to the rest 
of nature. Therefore, the value fixed on other life forms derives from their use value to humans. 
They are good examples of what some authors have tried to replace with transpersonal ecology. In 
this perspective, the conceptual tool emphasised is ‘things are’(Fox 1995, p.251) which warns the 
gazing subject about the fact that there is a complex life out there independent of him/her.
The attempt of transpersonal ecology to create a new consciousness has important 
complications for the existing system. It discredits the abstracted image of humankind while 
recognising its potential for change. Therefore, the step taken by this approach is very constructive 
for the next phase of ecology in finding appropriate ground to make humanity at home without fear 
of nature. The discussion about nature is not without challenge. Whether there is a real nature or
i o
not or whether there can be a nature separate from human construction are the questions asked by
not exactly answered in his framework. Self-realisation for all beings is set as a normative principle on the way to 
symbiosis, that is, reliance o f all species on each other, required by the limits o f the Earth that would be strengthened by 
the diversity and complexity o f ‘life’ on Earth. See Fox 1995, p.103.
12 It argues that ‘all life forms are the products of distinct evolutionary pathways and ecological relationships means that, 
at any given point in time, they should be thought of as more or less perfect (complete) examples o f their own kind’ (Fox 
1995, p.200).
13 For example Holmes Rolston III argues that ‘“nature” is a category we invent and put things we meet into, because
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many postmodern thinkers such as Richard Rorty who conceptualises nature as textuality pace 
Jacques Derrida, that is, there is no nature outside-the-text.14 In terms of transpersonal ecology there 
seem to be some obscure, not-so-clear, areas in this discussion which make the conjecture less 
persuasive, in relation to its possibility, when compared with the established system. For example, 
Robin Attfield (1991) is very reluctant to think about a new ethics and moral standpoint in his book 
The Ethics o f  Environmental Concern:
Believing, as I do, that matters of morality admit of truth, I am reluctant to 
conclude that we can devise or invent a new ethic; and, even if we could invent 
one, I do not see how it could establish its credibility unless it were not a new 
departure but an extension, analogical or otherwise, of existing patterns of moral 
thought...then what is required is not so much a replacement of moral traditions, 
or even their supplementation with new principles, as the more promising 
endeavour of developing in a more consistent manner themes to which at least 
lip-service has long been paid (p.4).
As a result of this rather defeatist attitude, Attfield and many others try to survive in the existing 
system by articulating concepts of stewardship and conservation on the basis of future generations’ 
interests which is necessarily anthropocentric.15 It is imperative to see how these concepts are 
played out in the International Relations in order to see the relevance of bringing the concept of 
ecology.
International Relations: Ecology or Environment?
The ecological question can be only answered by the discipline of International Relations after 
the disciplinary framework redefines what is being asked, in other words, it can only respond if  it 
can understand the problem as a failure in the steering mechanisms of international cooperation, 
regimes, or bargaining strategies. The first step is to change the location of the question from
there is a realm out there, labeled nature, into which things have been put before we arrive’ (Rolston III 1997, p.42). 
He also argues that ‘[w]e need to think about language, about the concept o f “nature”. But this does not mean that we 
cannot think with such words about the world. There is always some sort o f cognitive framework within which nature 
makes its appearance, but that does not mean that what appears is only the framework’ (Rolston III 1997, p.43).
14 Rorty 1989, p. 19 and Rorty 1982, p.96-7.
15 Rolston III argues that ‘[t]he epistemic crisis is as troubling as the environmental crisis, and one must be fixed 
before the other can’(1997).
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ecology to environment. By this shift, the problems of an ecological nature can be accommodated 
within the disciplinary boundaries of IR as management questions in relation to use of nature that 
should be regulated through the international system. One important example of this can be 
implied in the contradiction between already mentioned declaration of the British PM in relation 
to the Climate Change and the actual government policy towards Rockall. By considering the 
Climate Change as an international environmental problem the policy makers are able to play 
spatial differentiation, and the nature of internal and external implied within it, to allow the 
obviously contradictory policy of more hydro-carbon production. In other words, formulation of 
the problem in terms of ‘the international environment’ firstly allows them to use the national 
interest argument which silences the ecological call, and the implicit call for responsibility in it, 
that is not based on the social relations of states. Secondly, what can be done has to be 
considered in terms o f what is available as appropriate international norms in IR. The problem 
becomes an issue of adapting proper regime standards that are based on the concepts of 
‘sovereignty’, ‘the international’, and the state behavior derived from this framework.16 In the 
end, the question of ecological call is formulated according to state behavior in the international 
as one of the agenda points which must be considered while a state is acting in the international. 
The clear example of this is given in the chapter 1 through the example of ocean regime 
established in the South Pacific. Here, the knowledge claim of IR in the context o f ‘environment’ 
that is reflected on the state system is what is named as the ‘constitutive model’ by Foucault. He 
argues that those models
which are not just techniques of formalisation for the human sciences, or 
simple means of devising methods of operation with less effort; they make it 
possible to create groups of phenomena as so many “objects” for a possible 
branch of knowledge; they ensure their connection in the empirical sphere, but 
they offer them to experience already linked together (1992, p.356).
Therefore, the empirical, what is experienced, can be seen in the form of an already formulated 
structure. This view clearly is open to a challenge by regime theorists showing the large numbers
16 As discussed by Chris Brown two basic assumptions o f realism, international anarchy and the rational egoism of  
states are accepted by various authors crossing theoretical divides in the discipline including Robert Keohane and 
Robert Axelrod (Brownl997, p.49).
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of international environmental regimes that are functioning in international. By judging through 
the IR literature17 on environmental regimes they might have a point. For example, a very 
important book on this issue edited by Peter M. Haas, Robert O.Keohane and Marc A. Levy titled 
Institutions fo r  the Earth-Sources o f Effective International Environmental Protection is 
representing a strong IR involvement with the issues.
In their introduction, the editors try to respond to a major doubt as they define it ‘[a]s long 
as governments protect national interests and refuse to grant significant powers to supranational 
authorities, the survival of the planet is in jeopardy* (Haas et al. 1994, p.3). Although they 
recognise the problem expressed in this sceptical view they argue that ‘[y]et world government is 
not around the comer: organised international responses to shared environmental problems will 
occur through cooperation among states.. ..Before becoming depressed by this prospect, we 
should note that interstate cooperation has achieved major successes with problems that earlier 
seemed as daunting as UNCED’s agenda does today’ (Haas et al. 1994, p.4). This is a fascinating 
read since(a) it seems to show that regime theorists are unable to think beyond two options of 
interstate cooperation or world government. In other words, they cannot ask a question without 
thinking in terms of their theoretical frame of reference in which states and their behaviour are 
taken to be the relevant means for analyses. And (b) within that theoretical frame they can not see
1 ftwhat was wrong with UNCED: namely that ecological problems considered and managed by 
institutions do not address the ecological dimension as such but correspond to environmental 
agendas in the structure of international (which can be seen as one of the major problems)19 [‘by
17 See Benton, 1994, Haas et al., 1994, Imber,1994, Susskind,1994, Carroll, 1988.
18 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992-UNCED has been hailed as a success 
story against the environmental impending catastrophe. This process supposed to begin to avert the forecasted 
environmental catastrophe. The agenda was very comprehensive including climate change, poverty, biodiversity, 
technology transfer and international trade issues. The story of success must be qualified through the initial 
comments o f George Bush, then the President of the USA. Before UNCED, he commented that ‘the US life-style 
was non-negotiable’ (ThomasT994, p.20). Also, during the conference it become clear that Bush was not alone, and 
powerful states agreed on the definition of ‘development’ as the process o f poor countries getting richer along the 
path followed by the industrialised countries i.e. resource oriented ‘economic’ development (Grubb et al, 1993,p.34).
19 During UNCED, and the final declarations at the end o f it, the centrality o f  economic efficiency as a means to 
environmental ends was clear (Thomas, 1994,p.l3). According to Devlin and Yap ‘the language o f economic 
efficiency and structural adjustment was woven throughout the UNCED documentation. But the compatibility 
between economic efficiency and environmental sustainability remains highly contestable theoretically and extremely 
complex operationally’ (1994, p.66). Principle 12 o f the final declaration stipulates ‘states should co-operate to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable 
development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for
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“institutions” we mean persistent and connected sets of norms, rules and practices that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Haas et al. 1994, p.5)]. Without 
questioning the philosophical and ethical underpinnings of these institutions, they seem to 
suggest that the problem is about institutional cooperation. In this the understanding aims at 
‘[t]he broad question we ask is whether international institutions, thus defined, promote change 
in national behaviour that is substantial enough to have a positive impact, eventually, on the 
quality of the natural environment’ (Haas et al. 1994, p.5).
In this statement it is clear that the reasons behind those environmental problems are not 
real issues for concern. The intention is to test general institutions/regime theory in a new area. 
And this is supported by the strong emphasis on the misleading dialectics between international 
norms and changing state behaviour without asking where those norms originate, and how they 
enter into international in the first place. In other words, the relevance of the international norms 
is not questioned as long as they are the result of state socialisation.20 In the success story, the 
validity of international norms and the values which exist in them as natural conditions are not 
questioned. Hence, the functional success story is being told without thinking about the 
ecological — in the case of UNCED23 even environmental — consequences of these norms. It is 
clear that ‘environment’ is considered in relation to the now familiar international order in its
environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade... ’(Earth Summit’92). It is clear that intention was to bring in the perceived 
environmental concerns into ‘the international’ system without jeopardising the dynamics o f the system.
20 UNCED final declaration, Principle 2 which asserts the existence o f a particular international order-[s]tates have, 
in accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations and the principles o f international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment o f other States or 
areas beyond the limits o f national jurisdictions (Earth Summit’92, p. 11)
21 For example, in the [implied] idea o f ‘our common future’ with the humanity as stakeholders, the questions about 
who defines ‘Our-Us’? and who decides how ‘W e’ live are left unasked.
22 In June 1997, at the UN Review of the Implementation o f Agenda 21 at the 19th UN General Assembly Special 
Session, it was reported that ‘the concept o f sustainable development has come to inform economic planning 
worldwide. The principles of Agenda 21 are being codified into national legislation, and major new conventions on 
climate change and biodiversity are being applied’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin Vol.5 No88. At the same time Alison 
E. Drayton argues that ‘the debate and negotiations that followed UNCED seemed increasingly steeped in a sense of 
futility. We all seemed to lose our sense of urgency in tackling many critical issues, such as poverty and changing 
production and consumption patterns’. She ends by saying ‘[f]ive years after Rio, the linkage that has proven most 
difficult to build is perhaps the simplest, a clear linkage between what is said and what is done’, Linkages/journal/ 
June 1997, Vol.2 No.3.
23 Tom Athanasiou renders this myopia in an interesting way. He translates UNCED as ‘unsaid’. See Athanasiou, 
1998, p.9.
perceived structure. Then what is discussed as ‘environment’ becomes something rather different 
from what is implied in the ecological call. The possibility of national interest based 
environmental policies and control on their spill-over effect on international environment repeats 
the internal/external differentiation of IR by breaking down the idea of ecological connections 
which has nothing to do with abstract political spatial differentiation. As argued by Banks, the 
change in the narrative does not necessarily change the underlying ideas. It also shows that it is 
possible to ignore different questions and formulate questions in relation to the institutional 
wisdom.24
The relationship between analyses and what is being analysed is crucial. One would 
object to the above unfolding of understanding of ‘environment’ within IR, on the basis that the 
analyses of regimes/institutions are based on what is being reflected in IR25 in other words 
through the logic of IR.26 As argued by Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘at the base of all logic lies an 
ontological restriction’ (Gadamer 1994, p. 124). Even if the understanding of UNCLOS HI for 
example, reflects the logic of IR, that takes environment in as yet another issue area, there is no 
attempt to question the possibility of this logic and the implications of this possibility on the 
ecological concerns. Clearly the introduction o f ‘ecology’ as the location of this discussion 
disturbs the disciplinary logic. It brings the following question: is it then possible in IR to explain 
this disciplinary logic without assuming the natural existence of one of the two concepts — 
sovereignty(state)/intemational — that are used to explain the subject matter of the discipline?
By locating the question within an ecological framework and language, the particular 
human/nature relation as an ethical condition, that underpins the objective-functionalist
24 Mark Neufeld. argues that ‘[w]hat is required is not just new analysis, but new ways o f analysing; not merely re­
examination o f global structures and processes, but critical exploration o f alternatives to the dominant theoretical 
traditions and analytical frameworks which have guided our thinking about world politics’ See Neufeld, 1994, p.387.
25 Thomas Kuhn’s perspective on this is very interesting. He argues that ‘one o f the things a scientific community 
acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while paradigm is taken for granted, can be 
assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific 
or encourage its members to undertake’, Kuhn 1962, p.37.
26 For example Steve Smith argues that ‘much o f the academic work on environmental issues depend on the writers 
working within a set o f essentially uncontested concepts and assumptions, and that is these which do much o f the 
work in defining what is practical and even what is theoretically possible’ (1994, p.31)Despite the recognition o f this 
bind and his warning else where(Millennium Vol. 23 No.2 1994) about trying to question without moving beyond IR 
Smith locates or slips to the same situation himself in explaining why environmental problems are marginalised. He 
argues that because ‘within international politics there are many other issues that vie with the environment and for 
the world’s population these are far more important’. See Steve Smith 1993, pp. 28-45.
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understanding of ecology, implicit in the methodology of IR is disrupted. It reflects the lack of 
crucial questioning of the location of humankind in all the discussions of institutions, regimes and
77their success stones. By missing out the fundamental question IR distances itself from seeing the 
problem and, thus, the solution becomes problematic. The ‘transpersonal’ ecology of Naess 
attempts to overcome these limits of thinking from a given ontological position of being human. 
His position, nonetheless, needs further elaboration with which I will engage in chapter 5. At this 
stage it is sufficient to relate the concept o f ‘Ecology’ I use in the context of anthropocentric and 
non-anthropocentric discussion with the concept located in the latter one. In the non- 
anthropocentric ecology framework, the term ecology deployed in this study is trying to think of 
human-self in terms of ecological being. In other words, the location of human-self is situated into 
its ecological space, and henceforth the possibility of understanding international is considered. In 
this the implicit attempt is to dislocate the ethics of personhood, that is defined according to certain 
human attributes. This ethical outlook is used to value and give rights to those members of human 
species that have attributes of being ‘person’. This ethical position of evaluating the value of life is 
clearly inadequate, to say the least, in terms of valuing nature and unlikely to produce an ecological
• * 9 0  .understanding of rights for those non-human, therefore, non-person beings. This move from a 
larger perspective is, also, a polemic with the general tendency in International Relations, hence in
27 An interesting example o f this, what are labeled as ‘Knowledge-Based theories’ o f IR in Hasenclever et al. 1998 
by and large in reference to constructivism represented by Alexander Wendt, Thomas Franck, Friedrich V. 
Krotochwil John Gerard Ruggie and Robert Cox. These theories seek a more cognitive understanding of the 
international, and focus on identities and changes in order to counter realist claim o f ahistorical nature of states and 
the international as anarchic(Morgenthau 1973, and Dougherty et al. 1997, p.63). In this particular group Wendt’s 
arguments hold strong sway. His main focus is the social construction o f world politics and the state identities(Wendt 
1992, p.393 and 1995, p.71). This query is focused on the importance o f change in the international system, self- 
understanding o f  states on the basis o f knowledge which is itself shaped by international system. Wendt assumes that 
‘states are the principle units o f analysis for international political theory’(Wendt 1994, p.385 and 1992, p.396f). 
Therefore, the tenets o f constructivism must be considered as intersubjectivity among states through international 
institutions that are the grounds o f the ‘social’ within this structure. Clearly by explaining behaviour according to the 
social actions in the social environment of states that is the international, this view creates a certain illusion and 
circularity about the grounds o f norms and rules such as customary law based on ‘ascertainable rule underlying the 
behavioural regularity’. It does not answer the question o f if the state does not behave on the basis o f exogenously 
given reasons, and its behaviour is based on its social environment, how is it that the state has a space to formulate its 
self-movement to change the system? Where does motivation for this movement come from? In other words it 
accepts the state as the natural given. All the questioning is based on that level without considering implications o f  
this in terms o f human existence. Therefore, even constructivism cannot explain in and o f itself the grounds o f and 
reasons o f state action beyond the circularity of sovereignty/the international. Hence, it can only witness recurring 
practices and testifies for its acceptance as a rule of practice.
28 See, Chappell 1997.
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‘the environmental’ approach within it, to apply philosophical concepts as they fit questions based 
on the discourse of International Relations. This a posteriori application of concepts and methods 
to already ontologically value-fixed questions limits the possibility of thinking in new ways, and 
stops the dynamic thinking process within a given methodology. The ecological understanding, in 
the following analysis of the resources in the South Pacific, [therefore,] by questioning the 
observing subject’s location and bringing the life of species into the discussion unsettles the 
questions asked by the observing subject. It highlights a different question, and transforms the 
location of both the observing subject and the question asked. It begins with ecology and analysis 
what happens to the analysis produced, that is the success story, by the discourse of International 
Relations when the ecological understanding is not pushed into predetermined formulations of 
sovereignty/the international. By drawing out the ecological components of the ocean system, static 
discussions of territoriality are disrupted, and the complexity of the ocean system begins to appear 
as international concern.
Other Parties
The marine resources of the South Pacific region, both coastal and deep sea-based, are rich. One of 
the most important reasons for this diversity can be attributed to the existence of coral reefs which 
have become the habitat for many different species. The following are some of the many species of 
the region: Beche-de-Mer (Holothurids), Giant Clams (Tridacna and Hippopus), Spiny Lobster 
(Panilirus penicilliatus) and various fish groups such as deep-water demersal fish like Snappers 
(family Lutjanidae) and groupers (family Serranidae)\ small pelagic fish like scad (Carwngidae), 
mackerel (Scombridae),flying fish (Exocoetidae) and marine aquarium fish groups such as 
angelfish (Pomacanthiadae), butterflyfish (Chaetodontidae) and hawkfish (Cirrhitidae).
Although the amount of fish caught in shore is higher than deep sea fisheries, the economic 
importance of the latter might be seen as higher than the former as a result of DWFNs’ economic 
interest in these species. In this connection the species defined as highly migratory are the main 
targets. According to Annex I in UNCLOS HI, there are seventeen different species which migrate 
extensively. And all of them are in existence in the area. However, not all of them are economically
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targeted on an industrial scale. The ones targeted are Albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), Bluefin 
tuna (Thunnus thynnus), Bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus), Skipjack tuna (Katsuwonuspelamis), 
Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) and in southern Australia Southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus 
maccoyii).
The Family ‘THUNNUS’
The species belonging to the family Thunnus occur all over the globe across the oceans. They 
usually present a very dynamic life history. In this section, the peculiar life histories of the above- 
mentioned species will be presented in relation to their interactive life in the South Pacific. The aim 
of this move is to show that species exist in a complex ecological system rather than in single 
species based spaces, as it appears in analyses of species which are based on economic interest. The 
main components of this presentation, or rather juxtaposition, are: the location of occurance occur 
for each species, their migration paths, and oceanographic variances influencing such occurrences 
and paths. The main purpose of this attempt is to present these species in their own space as 
functioning beings. Nevertheless, in the first instance very general components about each species 
will be established and then the complexity will be reached gradually through building up general 
patterns of interaction among species within the ecological system. In all these analyses, data has 
been collected though the catch statistics and tagging operations which again depend upon fishing 
operations.
Bigeye tuna inhabit the tropical to temperate waters of the Pacific Ocean. In the Western 
Pacific it is reported that they live between northern Japan, 40° N, and the north island of New 
Zealand, 40° S. in the west, while in the South Pacific the border of the southern limits shift to 30° 
S.(Miyabe 1991). It is argued that there is a lack of information about these species to determine the 
structure of their migration and make a concrete judgement about the occurrence of different 
populations across the regions. Nevertheless, it is argued that spawning-feeding migration occurs 
between equatorial waters and temperate waters. It is suggested that the migration of bigeye is north 
to south rather than east to west.
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The attention to the water temperature paid by Uda suggests that the optimum water 
temperature for this species is between 17.5-22° C. However, this view has been modified given 
new findings which suggest the optimum is between 10° and 15° C. This was the result of the fact 
that bigeye proved to be in the deep layers of the water column, deeper than other tunas. It is 
observed that bigeye usually mix with yellowfin, skipjack, kawakawa and frigate tuna.
Albacore tuna occur throughout the South Pacific from the equator to at least 49° S (Wang 
1988, Bailey and Ross 1987). It is suggested by Jones (1991) that juveniles move from the tropics 
into temperate waters and then move eastward along the Southern Convergence Zone And he adds 
that albacore may move into sub-tropical and temperate regions outside the normal range of 
existing fisheries. The adult population is considered to be more mobile than the larvae and 
juveniles. The exchange of adults between the South Pacific and Indian Ocean stocks has been 
suggested but no conclusive result has been arrived at. The temperature window suggested is 15.5° 
-20.6° C (Laurs et al. 1987). However, this situation might be subject to slight changes according to 
the level of maturity. It is reported that adults are mainly caught at depths between 100m and 380m 
where temperatures range from 9-20° C. Albacore are considered to be an opportunistic, 
carnivorous species. They feed on a variety of small fish, planktonic crustaceans, and squid (Murray 
1991). Likely competitors of albacore vary with the area and season but are primarily skipjack, 
yellowfin and bigeye tunas, and pomfreds (Murray 1990).
On the opposite side, North Pacific albacore stocks have similar patterns as well. It is 
suggested that after entering Japanese waters as juveniles they move eastward to North America 
along the North Pacific Transition zone. Therefore, it is possible to argue that two different stocks, 
divided by oceanographic conditions, exist throughout the Pacific Ocean.
The distribution of adult yellowfin tuna covers a wide area between 40° N to 40° S latitude 
in the western Pacific with a narrower distribution in the latitudinal direction in the central Pacific 
(Suzuki 1991). It is suggested that the swimming depth of yellowfin tuna is mainly above or in the
*70upper part of the thermocline with a tendency for deep swimming in daytime and shallower
29 ‘The surface waters o f the sea receive heat from the sun; therefore they become less dense and float at the surface; 
therefore they receive yet more heat; and so on. The end result is a body o f hot, dense water floating on top o f much 
larger mass of cold, dense water; the interface between the two, or more strictly the zone o f rapid change in water 
temperature is termed as thermocline’ p.5 and see the following page for the importance o f this —  Bames & Hughes, 
1993.
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swimming at night (Holland et al. 1990). As mentioned above, all this information and analyses are 
based on catch statistics. As far as association of yellowfin is concerned they say there are mix- 
catches of skipjack and bigeye with the same size yellowfin that tends to be the catch of juveniles 
while at other times marlin, rainbowrunners, and triggerfish are caught as by-catch. Also it is 
accepted that association with whales, dolphins and above all drifting objects are important for 
Yellowfin (Suzuki 1991).
The species of skipjack tuna occur continuously from east to west across all oceans, and an 
over wide latitudinal range from about 40° N to 40° S in the west and from lat.35° N to the south of 
40° S (Matsumoto et al. 1984, p. 12). The temperature requirement depends on the location. 
Therefore the temperature line where skipjack tuna have been caught is sometimes between 16° C 
in southern Tasmania and 30° C in the eastern Pacific (Matsumoto et al. 1984, p. 19). Although the 
temperature differential varies between these two points, localisation might be constant for each 
group. The feeding habits are variable depending on maturity. The smaller skipjack tuna rely on 
crustaceans for food while larger species rely on juvenile and small fish (Matsumoto et al. 1984, 
pp.33-34). Therefore, major items of food can be fish, crustaceans, and molluscs. In more accurate 
terms, it is suggested that a wide variety of organisms, representing 11 invertebrate orders and 80 or 
more fish families might be included in the food list of skipjack tuna. The fish group also includes 
juvenile skipjack tuna as a result of which these species may be defined as being opportunistic 
carnivorous as well (Ibid.). The extensive migration of this species has been reported. However, 
considering the existence of more than one sub-population of Skipjack tuna the patterns of 
migration differ in a variety of peculiar ways.
The above information aids the understanding of the large borders of existence of these 
species. However, all those considerations could vary with a change of temperature on the basis of 
global climatic conditions which would alter the life patterns of these species by shifting the 
temperature zones where they are conditioned to live, which in turn, affects the behaviour of the 
species at a different level of maturity i.e. larvae, juvenile and adult differently. The temperature 
level is important insofar as it indicates not only the water temperature itself but indicates some 
other vital signs as salinity, oxygen content and productivity. This is not an horizontal impact 
transmission at all. Obviously the same climatic variations are effective on other species that are
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associated with each other. Therefore, their variance would eventually have an effect on a given 
stock of tuna. Migrations might be affected in the way that they sometimes use the different current 
fronts in order to change vertical direction. If there is a change in the current based on climatic 
conditions, it would be reflected in the mobility of the species.
This vertical configuration is important. Tunas are distributed by depth layers with the 
skipjack tuna occupying the shallowest layer, followed in order by the bluefin tuna, yellowfin tuna, 
bigeye tuna and the albacore (Yabe et al 1963, pp.979-1009) These depth relationships are usually 
dynamic as well. The depth level where most species spend their nights and days vary. Dizon et al 
(1978, p.233-259) showed that the skipjack tuna in Hawaiian waters spends its time during the day 
between the surface and 263 m, while at night it remains in the surface waters of 75m. As 
mentioned before, for yellowfin tuna the depth is usually determined by the thermocline which 
tends to be approximately 150m in the southern ocean (Philander 1990, p.293). In addition, adult 
Albacore tuna, occur at depths between of 100m and 380m. According to the research of different 
species of albacore caught at different depths, the diet of each species differs according to the depth 
(Saito 1973, pp. 107-184). It is also suggested that although there is evidence that bigeye tuna is 
usually caught in the thermocline, the bigeye catch has been more efficient in such deeper waters as 
133 to 245 m around Hawaii and up to 300m around Fiji (Suda et al. 1969, pp.99-114). There is 
also lateral differentiation among the larva, juvenile and adult of a given group of species. These 
different patterns of depth existence are by no means fixed. The most important reason for the 
existence of those patters is due to feeding habits of the various groups. The change in the 
availability of food might alter the depth relationship. The species that are under consideration are 
mobile and have fairly efficient locomotion systems. As a result, they may change location in order 
to compete for food with other members of the ocean.
All these groups are considered to be divided into sub-populations which might be different 
biologically and habitually from another sub-population of the same group. Although most 
population arguments are tentative because of the imprecise data gathered from fisheries, it is 
argued, for example, that there are six sub-populations of skipjack tuna occurring over the whole of 
the Pacific Ocean (Matsumoto et al. 1984; p.9). Suzuki et al. argue that there might be three distinct 
sub-populations of yellowfin in the Pacific without any contact, distributed among western, central
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and east Pacific. Nonetheless they add that there is no substantial evidence for this argument (1978, 
p.273-441). Schaefer, however, suggests that eastern Pacific yellowfin sampled from north of 15° 
N-20° N were different from those sampled from south of 15° N-20° N, so somewhat distinct 
regional groups were considered by the absence of any clinical relationship between characters and 
latitude or longitude (1989, p.389-427). Yet another important defining factor is the age of 
productivity of each species. Each species has a different level of maturity when they become 
reproductive where the age of the fish is determined through its size. Close examination of its 
reproductive parts shows the ability of a fish to reproduce with this capacity of reproduction 
subsequently arranged in relation to its size to estimate the maturity level for a given group. This 
level is different in each species as well as in each sub-population of different species. For bigeye 
tuna, for example, the minimum size of maturity is reported as 91-100 cm (Miyabe 1991). 
According to Matsumato et al., on the other hand, the minimum size of the female skipjack at 
maturity is 40 cm and that first spawning may occur between 40-45 cm (1984; p.92). However, 
Marr (1948, p.206-210) recorded skipjack tuna as small as 40 cm with spent ovaries from the 
Marshall Islands while Wade (1950, p.409-423) recorded a female in the 34.0 to 34.9 cm size class 
having ripe ovaries in Philippine waters.
Miyabe argued that the level of maturity is seasonal (1991, p.3) which indicates that in 
different locations the growth rate of the species will be different, hence the level of maturity. 
According to Wild et al (1991) growth curves in central and the eastern Pacific appear to be similar, 
but the average growth rate is more rapid during the early stages in the western Pacific. Similar 
variations are reported by Bartoo et al.(1991) in relation to Pacific albacore, i.e. fish captured south 
of 40° N have a higher estimated growth rate than fish captured north of 40° N.
What then is the probable relationship between these qualities and migration tendencies? 
Tunas require warm water for spawning and larval survival (Matsumato et al. 1984, p. 17). It is 
probably reasonable to argue that, insofar as the above general assertion about warm waters holds, 
at some point of sexual maturity migration towards warmer waters seems unavoidable. Also, it 
seems reasonable that the migration is not only horizontal towards the tropical latitudes from rather 
temperate ones but vertical from the higher depths to shallower waters as well. Arguably, both 
patterns might even happen at the same time. Nevertheless, because of the individual differences in
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maturity, the time and the extent of migration depends on each population. In addition, there is 
evidence that the spawning of certain species such as yellowfin (Suzuki 1991, p.6) and skipjack 
(Wild et al. 1991, p.7) occur throughout the year over the vast areas of tropical waters while it is 
observed in summer time in the temperate zones, while only evidence of multiple spawning of 
albacore has been found without exact numbers (Batoo et al. 1991, p.3). These schedules might be 
seen as an indication of the movement of different groups and sub-populations of those groups. And 
then, the speculation would be that, if all year-round spawning activity is observed there has to be 
movement from each area of spawning to the other areas, firstly because mature fish move away 
from the spawning grounds and secondly juvenile fish tend to change location as well. Moreover, 
insofar as each group moves in a different direction there should be a rather dynamic structure all 
over the ocean throughout the year. Obviously these movements are strongly and continuously 
influenced by climatic changes. The change in warm water dispersion might necessitate a move to 
lower latitudes as well as shallower waters which means that there would be competition among all 
species including tunas. One such climatic change, known as El Nino, proved to be a global 
occurrence contrary to the initial belief that it was peculiar to the eastern Pacific.
During El Nino periods the south-easterly winds weaken in the eastern part of the South 
Pacific which influence the structure of the tropical current system (IAATC; 1984, and Annual 
Report for 1983:272pp). In the eastern Pacific the sea surface rises in response to the decrease in the 
hydrospheric circulation rate, and coastal and equatorial temperatures also increase which then 
deepens the thermocline (Joseph and Miller 1988, p. 199-207). At the same time in the western 
Pacific, it is suggested that the thermocline tends to be shallower (Suzuki 1991, p. 11). In a nutshell, 
what that means is that in the eastern Pacific fish would disperse into a deeper area while in the 
west the area of fish becomes more condensed. Such a situation is recorded in a Japanese report 
after recent climatic change, as follows:
El Nino still remains in the middle layers of the Pacific Ocean such as in the 
waters of the west longitude fishing grounds. Between January and February, the 
thermocline depth in the equatorial region of the Pacific (2N-2S) was just about 
back to normal in the eastern region but was still very deep in the central region 
(160-170W) and quite shallow in the western central region (150-160E) (Katsuo- 
Maguro Tsushin-KMT April 14,1993).
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‘to a fish, the depths the expanses o f its waters, the currents and quiet pool, 
warm and cold layers are the element o f its multiple mobility. I f  the fish is 
deprived o f the fullness o f its element, i f  it is dragged on the dry sand, then it can 
only wriggle, twitch, and die. Therefore, we always must seek out thinking, and 
its burden o f thought, in the element o f its multiple meanings, else everything 
will remain closed to us ' (Heidegger 1968, p. 71)
As an overall engagement, what has been established thus far is the complexity of the 
system, part of which is exposed to the fisheries. The most important point seems to be the fact that . 
there is no uniform structure among the species under consideration. Each group is influenced by 
various biological and oceanographical changes which might be seen as forming a unit all over the 
globe. Be that as it may, the consequences are not at all uniform. Nevertheless, as it is exposed none 
of the groups live in isolation in its own oceanic patch or its own sovereign EEZ. All species are in 
contact in various ways. The picture has become extremely interactive when all the seemingly 
isolated dynamics of each species are juxtaposed. The locations that they share, the feeding habits 
through which they interact with a larger environment and to which they become a prey as well, 
climatic conditions that change their cycles, and all the other relevant relations make this system 
multi-dimensional.
The common approach in assessing the conditions of resources, nonetheless, has been to 
analyse each single group in isolation. Then, generalisations about the state of the resources are 
arrived at without paying real attention to the dynamics of sub-populations and their larger impact. 
The regimes based on single species, therefore, have become rather complacent about the 
ecological location of the species they are interested in. The material value of the species dominated 
the policy decisions as will be shown below. The consequence of this can be seen in the structure of 
regimes. In other words material interest in and search for a single species shaped the way the 
ecology is perceived — that is ‘environment’ stratified according to particular interests of regimes. 
This can, in fact, be seen as the result of the methods of data collection that have been employed in 
‘marine resource assessment’, that is, catch data. It is clear that these assessments were shaped by 
the interests of regimes. Therefore, it is a inter-constitutive relationship between interest and
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method, and vice versa. In order to see the limitations of this approach, the first step might be a 
brief explanation of the different fishing methods used in the Pacific and elsewhere.
Fishing Methods
The major methods are: (a) the longline fishery, a longline being a horizontal line with side hooks, 
set near the surface for pelagic fish such as tuna, or on the bottom for demersal species; (b) the 
purse seine fishery, a purse seine being a net in a circle around a school of fish such as tuna or 
mackerel. Floats are fastened to its upper edge and weights to its lower edge. A purse line runs 
around the lower weighted edge, and is hauled in to close off the bottom of the net; (c) the bait 
boat(pole-and-line) fishery, which involves the use of unbaited hooks on short lines attached to 
poles; (d) the handline (drop line) fishery, a dropline consisting of a vertical line with baited hooks 
set on short side-lines and may be wound in with the wooden hand reel and finally, (e) drifhet 
fishery now banned but once popular which utilised the gill nets made from almost invisible nylon 
strands which lock behind the gill covers of fish. With the exception of the last one, all the other 
methods catch fish, in theory, at different levels. Thus the size of the fish that they catch is 
considered to be different as well. Considering the diversification of fishing methods, obviously not 
every method is used for every single fishery. In other words there is a target specific diversification 
among the methods. According to Bartoo et al., for example, north Pacific albacore is mainly 
caught by the so-called surface gear i.e. longline and baitboat fisheries. Another gadget that is used 
in catching tuna is called Floating Attraction Device, used in order to capitalise the natural 
affiliation of fish to congregate around a floating object.
The real question, then, is: what is the impact of this fisheries’ structure on the data that has 
been used in tuna management? The catch data from the fisheries is one of the main sources of 
marine resource analyses. The components of this data such as per unit effort in catching a given 
amount of a fish and the average size of the group would give an idea about the state of a particular 
stock. In addition, the location of a given stock would obviously be determined. Apart from this 
direct help, fisheries can be used in tagging operations that are made by putting identifiable tags on
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species and releasing them into the ocean, and retrieving those tags in the future through the fish 
catches. This method helps to understand migratory patterns in given stocks.
With the last point, however, the difficulty or rather the limitations of these data can be 
shown. Since tag recoveries depend mainly on the catch it means that it is more likely to recover 
tags from grounds that are well established, while many other tags remain silent basically because 
they do not travel through fishing grounds or because of natural mortality that might be 
exarcerbated by tagging itself. This argument can be connected to the other methods of data- 
gathering.
The same problem of locating stocks can be seen in the catch data as well. The important 
issue here is the fact that most of the fleets target a main fish group which they pursue in the ocean. 
Therefore, their catch data are usually based on a targeted species and very little attention, if any, is 
paid to the by-catch. This is a ‘good intentions’ situation, but it is not always valid. The important 
thing to remember is the fact that a rich fishing ground is a real asset, so on many occasions the 
catch statistics are modified to divert attention from rich grounds or fishermen prefer not to report at 
all. Parallel to this, obviously a by-catch of any sort remains unreported unless there is a strictly 
enforceable regulation. Even in that case the by-catch that is disposed of [directly] remains 
unnoticed.
Consequently, these events result in one-dimensional analyses of a given stock. For 
example the data about skipjack in the western Pacific, is based on reports of a given fleet the 
validity of which seems questionable. The interactive relations can only become traceable through 
the by-catch report which is not usually presented. Also, the understanding of migration patterns 
seems fairly curtailed. Because collection depends on fisheries, all the migration paths seem to end 
in fishery grounds. First of all this technique, by its nature, does not show the way a given species 
travels. What is seen is only the point at which it starts and ends combined with a usually straight 
line. On top of this, when all the lines are inflated around the fishing ground, it becomes self­
justified to argue that there is no substantial trans-oceanic migration. Moreover, the maps are 
species specific so it becomes extremely difficult to see the interactive relationship among the 
species of a given area, let alone of the whole of the ocean. Also, it seems a fairly self-perpetuating
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system, as it carries on using the same data and method of analysis to assess the stocks which 
would, probably, be endangered by the process itself.
Therefore, although science is helpful in understanding the nature of the marine system, it is 
far from being accurate and should be considered in terms of these limits [over its accuracy]. The 
way through which the scientific analyses are employed in an attempt to facilitate the industrial 
worries by locating itself into the industrial practice of fisheries, which in turn is reterritorialised 
into sovereign patches — that is shaped by unconcerned motivation to produce more results in the 
production of a certain understanding of species that are under consideration —  collapses the very 
space it is trying to understand into fragmented structures of material existence. These can be seen 
as waiting to be utilised, and this fragmented structure somehow becomes coherent in its exclusion 
from the life space of human beings. The dangers of this situation in practice will be dealt in the 
next sections, together with and analysis of the industry in relation to tuna in the Pacific.
The Tuna Industry and the Major Players
The commercialisation of tuna fisheries is not a very old phenomenon in the South Pacific. The 
major fisheries used to be subsistence ones carried on by the locals on the coast or near shore areas. 
Japan was the first country which began commercial fishing in the area during the early years of this 
century (Matsuda et al. 1984; p.232). Japanese involvement with off-shore fisheries began during 
the Meiji era during which interest in the tuna fishery expanded to the distant water practices (Tuna 
and Billfish Assessment Programme-TBAP, 1991). The first resource to be exploited for 
commercial purposes was skipjack tuna around Saipan, Truk and Pohnpei (the Federated States of 
Micronesia, today). Until the 1950s, inclusive of the war period, fisheries in the area were under 
Japanese control. The Taiwanese arrived during the 1950s and the Koreans followed in the 1960s. 
These fishing operations primarily used longlining until the 1970s, when Japan introduced purse- 
seining on a commercial basis. And this method became fairly popular during the 1980s and in the 
present decade when Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines and the United States joined the fishing 
effort in the area. Although there is a relatively short history of drift net fisheries in the region, it
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was enough to cause an uproar in the area that it resulted in the formulation of International 
Moratorium on such fisheries by the UN General Assembly.
This short history of the development of the tuna industry in the area shows that this 
industry primarily depends on the involvement of distant water fleets. Nevertheless, there have been 
new fishery enterprises in the islands whose operations are quite small in comparison to those of the 
DWFNs. The aim to develop a regional fisheries industry as a replacement for DWFN effort which 
seems to be the main target, has to be considered in a rather larger picture of the fisheries industry. 
The industry that is under consideration must be established as a multi-layered system that 
includes: fisheries operations i.e. fishing; storage and process; and marketing. Obviously, in order to 
be active in all these areas requires technology, trained human power, and good connections with 
the global markets. The dominance of DWFNs in fact indicates the dominance of DWFNs in the 
market and in the processing as well. Japan is the major and ever-growing world leader in the fresh 
tuna market. In 1990, Japan consumed 34 per cent of all international tuna production while the US 
consumption totalled 27.2 per cent (Peckham 1991, p.6). In the canned tuna market that comprises 
approximately 65 per cent of all catch, however, the US leads the arena with a total consumption of 
51 per cent followed by Japan with 12 per cent and western Europe with 28 per cent, the remainder 
going to Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Latin America (FFA Report 1990/26).
Therefore, it is fair to talk about two major concentrations in the market: one is that of fresh 
meat that is mainly focused on the sashimi market in Japan and the second one is that of canned 
tuna in which Japan’s role has been determinant. However, there is an expanding market for frozen 
tuna as well. In 1965 Japanese consumption of fisheries products was 5,048,000 metric tonnes 
while national production accounted for 5,547,000 metric tonnes allowing a surplus o f499,000 
metric tonnes that was channelled into exports. This trend of having a surplus out of its own 
production established Japan as one of the important exporters as well. During 1975 domestic 
demand was at the level of 7,552,000 metric tonnes and national production was able to sustain that 
level with surplus production of 3,000 metric tonnes (Japanese Marine Importers Association as 
cited in Bergin et al. 1993). Nevertheless, by the end of 1970s the winds of change were affecting 
Japanese production. In 1980 domestic demand had risen to 7,666,000 metric tonnes, national 
production was not able to sustain this and there was a negative balance o f245,000 metric tonnes
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(Bergin et al. 1993). This is a very important situation for global market trends. Before getting into 
an analysis of further market shifts, it seems essential to look more closely at the Japanese case 
which has established itself as a market pattern since then.
Fish can be seen as one of the most important dietary components of Japanese life. 
Therefore, a gradual increase in domestic demand for fish seems natural. Hence, an increase in 
national production follows. However, this flow chart was altered, in reality, because of the 
development of a new international law of the sea. The new law, although it was not in force, 
became widely applied in relation to the EEZ and the sovereign rights therein. By 1990 domestic 
demand was 8,804,000 metric tonnes while production declined to 6,309,000 metric tonnes causing 
a huge gap o f2,495,000 metric tonnes to be imported (Bergin et al. 1993). As a result of this 
process Japan has become one of the biggest, if not the only, fish importer in the market. A counter 
argument might be put forward along the following lines: any way the level of production might 
have been insubstantial to support domestic demand as a result of a massive increase above 
production possibilities. In the first instance it might seem valid opposition, but the problem is not 
related to such a relationship. While domestic demand has been increasing, production has been 
declining. Also, the importance of the area to which entry has been restricted as a result of EEZs is 
very central to the Japanese sashimi market. So, in the final analysis, what happens is that while 
Japan is not able to sustain itself through its own fishing effort, it uses its financial power to obtain 
its demand from someone else as an import so, that someone else should be considered as fishing in 
the space that is denied to Japan individually. Therefore, there should be a development of new 
industries both for fishing to sustain a fresh meat market and canned fish products market that is left 
by Japan.
The Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia have become important tuna suppliers for 
Japan. In 1990-1991 Taiwan and Indonesia supplied 85 per cent of Japanese fresh tuna imports 
(KMT, 11 May 1992). In 1990 Indonesia became the major tuna exporter and increased its market 
share (Bergin 1993, p. 40). The reflection of this situation in production is expressed as the total 
skipjack catch in 1989 which was 18 per cent higher from that of 1988 and total catch of yellowfin 
in the same year was 55 per cent higher than in 1988 (TBAP 1991, p. 19).
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Another important issue in relation to the Japanese position, and in general, is that of price 
fluctuations on the basis of demand and supply changes. It seems that to influence market 
conditions when national production is sustaining domestic demand is rather straightforward. It is 
up to the national producer to shift their targets according to demand by manipulating the catch 
effort. Hence, they can maintain the profitability of fishing enterprises.
Conversely, when there is a dependence on importing for the stability of the market, it 
becomes very difficult to control price fluctuations. Moreover, the domestic industry might become 
vulnerable. In the particular case of the Japanese fish market, all these trends can be seen. The 
specialised structure of the Japanese market has been mentioned. However, the sheer size of the 
market makes the import of various different fish products such as fresh, frozen and canned easier 
than it seems in the first instance. As a result of the difficulty in controlling imports, the Japanese 
market was oversupplied during the 1980s and that lowered prices. However, by 1990 it seemed 
more balanced because of the government's insistence on the issue of control of the industry by the 
control of the exporting country itself. This situation has been particularly important in the frozen 
tuna market (Bergin et al. 1993, p.38). The frozen tuna import of Japan rose from 118,000 metric 
tonnes in 1985 to 174,000 metric tonnes in 1992. The market share of frozen tuna increased as well. 
Although fresh tuna has been very popular in the sashimi market, frozen tuna began to dominate 
because of its rather lower production cost in yen per kg basis (Bergin et al. 1993, p.39). This brings 
the issue of comparative advantage into the equation.
The operational costs of the fleets belonging to South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and China 
are much less than that of the fleet of Japan. The Japanese fleet has a high technology base with a 
high cost of crewing as a result of national regulations. Therefore, Japanese practice is highly 
efficient and properly regulated but at a high cost (KMT July 7,1994). The fleets of other countries 
are, for a start, in bad shape, and crewing regulations are flexible enough to accommodate the 
cheapest possible crew. Hence, the production cost is lower with a certain efficiency that cannot be 
utilised for the fresh tuna market. The last point leads to the next issue that is important for the 
market, and that is that of production on the basis of different gears.
The fresh tuna market is a highly specialised one. Many different characteristics of the catch 
can change the prices in the market. In general, each fish should be in good condition without any
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damage. Apart from this even, the fat content of a fish can increase its price in the market (KMT 
July 15,1994). So, the fresh tuna catch tends to come from the longline operations in which 
handling of the catch can be done without damaging the fish. The next step is the attempt to send 
the catch to Japan. Here again, the Japanese use high-technology, using specialised air-conditioned 
aircrafts to fly the fish in. In this way, they maintain the quality of the fish for the market. No doubt 
this structure and the products provided by these means are difficult to challenge. Therefore, other 
countries are more concentrated to the markets other than the fresh tuna market. This also reflects 
the type of operations that they are handiing. Purse-seining is the major mode. Through tthose 
means they can challenge the Japanese fishermen through their low production costs. Nevertheless, 
the import of fresh tuna has been increasing as well (Bergin et al. 1993, p.40). According to Bergin 
et al, there is a consensus among fishery circles that fresh tuna is more susceptible to price 
fluctuations (Bergin et al. 1993, p.40). Nonetheless, over-supply does not seem to be causing a 
major problem because of the high demand (Ishida et al. 1992, p.31). Actually, as pointed out by 
Doulman, the expansion of purse-seining during the late 1970s resulted in a crash in the world tuna 
market in the first half of the 1980s (FFA Report 1990/62).
The South Pacific and The Industry
Where the South Pacific fits into this picture is, perhaps, the next puzzling question. Although the 
South Pacific cannot compete in a production-based race in the global market, it has been 
influenced by the market and has an influence over the market. But first, what sort of influence does 
the market have over the South Pacific? On the basis of EEZ applications, DWFNs are licensed by 
the coastal states. In the case of the South Pacific, licence fees are determined on the basis of a 
percentage rate of return of the estimated value of catch per fishing trip. Clearly, there is a close link 
between the market conditions and the fees that are paid. In a situation where the market is over­
supplied, prices tend to decline which means a low level of return from the licence fees. Precisely at 
this point the market might become influenced by the South Pacific. So far as FFA countries are 
controlling vast parts of the ocean on which many of DWFNs depend, through regionally applied
75
management measures, they can control the effort in the fisheries. And this connects the discussion 
with the end of the last chapter where the main management measures were discussed.
In relation to market conditions the Palau arrangement is extremely important. It establishes 
a cap that is a maximum number of fishing vessels that are allowed to be in the FFA area in a given 
period (FFA Report, 1993/28). The attempt is to control the market through production and 
manipulate it if  necessary.
The impact of this arrangement has enhanced the tendency of the FFA to urge DWFNs to 
enter a relationship that is based on a multilateral treaty as is the case with the US. In this, the 
primary target has been Japan. Because of the reluctance of the latter to enter such a relationship, it 
might seem that the Japanese share might be altered. Well this is not quite the case. It is true that 
they cannot fish as much as they want to, but still they have the highest number of purse-seiners in 
the area after the US fleet. At this point, the understanding of the relationship between the South 
Pacific countries and DWFNs on the basis of stock management becomes a key issue.
As is explained elsewhere, the main pattern of relationship has been through the bilateral 
fishing access agreements between individual coastal states and a DWFN. In this pattern, the 
coastal state grants right of access to its resources to a DWFN on the basis of a licence fee and some 
other requirements, such as the ones described by the FFA's MTC. Apart from these criteria, the 
issue of aid has been very important so far, as most of the South Pacific is aid-dependent. One 
important point is the fact that aid does not only include financial assistance but also technical and 
educational assistance which are substantial parts of any aid package. The major sources of aid are 
Canada, the US, Japan, and inter-regionally Australia and New Zealand. There have also been 
contributions from Commonwealth Funds for Technical Cooperation and other international 
organisations such as the European Union and the FAO. Although the literature about foreign aid 
to the South Pacific usually concentrates on development aid in general, it is, by and large, 
considered in terms of the fishery industry insofar as it has been promoted as the most important 
area for development. The main issues are the development of coastal fisheries, together with local 
fish markets and the creation of an off-shore based fishing industry which could utilise, primarily, 
tuna (FFA anniv., p. 179).
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In all these relations not all the donors are DWFNs. Donations by countries such as Canada 
and organisations like the Commonwealth and the FAO can be seen in the framework of 
humanitarian development aid. While Australian and New Zealand contributions are logical to keep 
South Pacific cooperation working, as well as increasing its competence in general, donations by 
DWFNs are not based only on humanitarian development concepts.
The first multilateral management agreement has been important in the context of aid as 
well. According to the agreement, the US government’s aid is added to the fees that are supposed to 
be paid by the industry. So what there is, is a package of financial contributions. For example, in the 
seventh licensing period this package consisted of 14 million US dollars paid by the government 
and 4 million US dollars paid by industry, accounting to 18 million US dollars. The payment 
contribution by industry was calculated according to the number of vessels applying for a licence 
and an adjusted individual payment which was dependent on a positive calculated base price index. 
In short, it could fluctuate from period to period (FFA Report 1994/23). The government 
contribution, however, is not fluctuating; it is a guaranteed amount of payment. In addition, the flag 
state control is full insofar as the US government is a party to the treaty on behalf of the industry. 
Clearly the importance of such control and constant secure revenue at a higher level has been 
central to the South Pacific countries’ intention of concluding more multilateral treaties with other 
DWFNs. In this attempt Japan is the main target because of its heavy involvement with the South 
Pacific.
According to the report on informal consultation between FFA and Japan in June 1990, 
both sides recognise the necessity to cooperate in tuna management because of conservation 
concerns. The discussion, however, focuses on the importance of possible protected access rights to 
Japan (1990/63). The South Pacific side argued that such relations could only be realised under a 
multilateral treaty basis which has been opposed by Japan. Here, the intention, apparently, is to 
derive higher revenue from Japanese fishery operations. In fact, this point is expressed much more 
openly in an early report (FFA Report 1987/26) where it is argued that the expected return from the 
US arrangement is around 10 per cent while bilateral agreements with Japan brings returns of less 
than 4 per cent.
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Apart from this financial consideration, there are some other issues which are considered to 
be absent from the bilateral relations of Japan with the South Pacific as well. Japan has refused to 
give information about its catch in general, and about the high seas in particular. Also, bilateral 
arrangements do not usually provide uniform enforcement and dispute settlement measures. 
Nevertheless, the really contentious issue seems to be development aid. The way it has been dealt 
with in the US treaty proved to be successful and efficient for FFA members. At this very point 
Japan refuses to combine government aid donations with fishery relations under a multilateral treaty 
as is the case in the US treaty. Japan argued that the aid is aimed at economic development, and 
acknowledged that there is a relationship between fisheries development aid and access conditions. 
There is, however, no official link between the two. Japanese government argued that Japanese aid 
is based on inter-governmental requests. It has to be put forward by the government of a would-be 
recipient country to the Japanese government (Interview). In this relationship the major actor is the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance.30
The non-official story about Japanese aid, nonetheless, seems slightly different under close 
examination. For a start it is between governments, so the first level to receive a demand for aid is 
the Foreign Ministry, which is also the last level to inform the recipient of the outcome. Between 
these two points, several political bodies are involved in the decision-making. In this process the 
professional and technical consultant is the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Also, 
the Foreign Ministry holds consultations primarily with the Ministry of Finance whose approval for 
any project is important, as long as funds transferred by JICA derive from the government budget. 
Therefore, in the case of a positive response to a request the Cabinet has to approve the donation. 
Besides, any related ministry or agency is consulted as well. Another interesting issue is the 
required involvement of the Japanese industry. Since the aid is given on the basis of specific 
projects, the execution of the project must be undertaken by a Japanese company. However, without 
any discretion it has to be decided through ‘competitive bidding aimed at Japanese Companies’ ( A 
Guide, p. 11). The other important point is that the aid is not aimed in one direction. In the case of 
the South Pacific it is evident that projects can vary from hospital building to local fisheries 
development projects. So, it seems that Japanese aid is very important for individual countries for
,0 Interview —  Shimura Shigeru, JICA(Japan International Cooperation Agency)Fisheries Advisor in the Pacific, 
Fiji-Suva, 12.08.1994.
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social development. This surface impartiality, however, is misleading. As suggested above, there 
are political considerations behind each contribution. And it is not a coincidence that Japan has a 
real economic interest in the Pacific. This has become very public recently in the case of another 
area.
It was reported in early June 1997 that Japan allegedly attempted to manipulate ‘the votes of 
small Caribbean states with overseas aid in order to block efforts to save endangered species such 
as elephants, turtles and whales’ and furthermore a Lesley Sutty seemed to suggest that ‘[Japan] has 
bought its way into their 200-mile EEZ to get access to the fish and bought their votes at 
international conventions. It is effectively bribing them with aid.. .’(The Guardian June 7,1997). So, 
what is faced here is a centrally-managed global action plan. The Japanese fishing industry is well 
represented in the Diet (the Japanese Parliament) through the political importance of highly 
centralised and strong fishery unions. The links between aid and access, as a result of strong 
lobbying, has been pronounced by the government as well.31
So, what is the importance of this link in the context of the South Pacific? The initiatives of 
the FFA concerning the cooperative management of resources on the basis of MTCs and effort 
limitations depend on the efficiency of coordination among the parties. In the case of bilateral 
access negotiations, it is up to the coastal state to convince the DWFN to accept FFA requirements. 
How far a coastal state can pursue the targets of the FFA when its own development aid is under 
threat seems to be a curious question. There are signs that although all the members accept the 
measures in the regional forums they are usually reluctant to insist on their application in practice. 
Kiribati, for example, expressed its view in the tenth meeting of the PNA in Wellington as follows: 
‘the Cabinet have accepted the MTCs in principle but that the effect of their application on revenue 
generation was being monitored. The MTCs have not yet been considered for incorporation into 
law’ (FFA Report 1991/35). At the same meeting the Federated State of Micronesia (FSM) also 
stated that the requirements for high seas data were proving the most difficult to be accepted by the 
DWFNs but that a prohibition on trans-shipment at sea was also of concern. The concerns of the 
FSM were pronounced as
31 The Guardian report on June 7,1997 argues that ‘Japan consumes 30 per cent o f the world’s fish , and the Tokyo 
fish market has a turn-over £20 million a day’. Therefore it seemed to be absolutely one o f the most important inputs 
for political discourse in the country.
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the representative advised that loss of revenue from agreements terminated with 
Korea and Taiwan (as a result of MTCs) amounted to approximately 4 million 
US dollars and that FSM could not afford to also lose an agreement with Japan 
valued at approximately 12 million US dollars. He advised that the FSM 
Congress may review the financial implications of access fees subject to re- 
evaluation of the MTCs (FFA Report 1991/35).
This reluctant approach in the application of common measures has had an adverse effect on the 
joint management scheme. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a good bargaining tool for the DWFNs, 
as well as for the FFA. In a situation where one DWFN rejects to agree on high seas data 
procedures, another one by agreeing would gain advantages on entering into an agreement. So, in a 
way, what has been created is a ‘take it or leave it’ situation in a highly competitive market.
The tension between the FFA members and Japan escalated with the Palau Arrangement. 
Japan has been a long-time advocate of control on purse seining in the Western Pacific. However, 
by virtue of the Arrangement, Japan has been left out of the process of formulation, and 
subsequently from the decision-making. Considering the importance of the Western Pacific to 
Japanese industry, obviously there was to be an impact on Japan. Nevertheless, the step by the FFA 
seems based on the concept of individual state sovereign rights developed in UNCLOS HI insofar 
as the area under consideration consists of the EEZ's of eight FFA member countries. Therefore, 
consultation with anyone seems unnecessary as long as sovereign coastal states consider such 
regulations necessary.
As has been explained before, by taking this step the FFA attempted to have some sort of 
control over the market to prevent over-supply which would be reflected in the licence fees. The 
Palau Arrangement should also be seen as an internal cooperation measure to increase revenues 
through playing one DWFN off another. The first reason for this is the fact that not all parties are 
included in the formulation of measures. The FFA is the only forum that decides and, in that, has 
power to stop any DWFN carrying out its operations. Therefore, it totally controls a resource that is 
highly mobile. The second reason is more related to the problematic application of the 
Arrangement.
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In the first instance the Parties to the Nauru Agreement at the 1992 Tarawa meeting agreed 
to limit the maximum number of licences for purse seine vessels to 159 including US vessels (FFA 
Report 1993/28). This limit, however, increased during subsequent reviews of the Arrangement. In 
1994 the agreed number was 205 in total. Of this number there has been an increase in the US fleet 
and a reduction in other fleets but the reduction is balanced by an increase in domestic/locally based 
licences. The real target has been set at the level of 205 vessels with a further increase in the 
numbers of the domestic fleet by 1997 (FFA Report 1994/14). What seems problematic here is the 
fact that there is no ecological consideration. If the first agreed maximum number had been decided 
on the basis of scientific data, the subsequent increase could not have been possible. This increase 
shows that FFA members are not acting on concerns about the state of stocks. The main reason is 
that an increase in the effort on a given stock, that has already been stressed, can reduce the stock. 
And the persistence of this increased effort might enhance the long-term adverse effect on the stock. 
Besides, to have a long-term target that is based on a persistent number of vessels seems to be most 
unreasonable from a biological perspective because it shows that what matters is industrial 
restructuring rather than healthy management of the marine ecology. Obviously the counter 
argument would be along the following lines: if the scientific data shows any decline in resources 
we can change our target. It is a flexible approach and if PNA members decide to change it, it 
would be reduced. In real terms the FFA's main objective in limiting the effort of purse-seiners in 
the area was, actually, expressed in 1990, as follows:
The main objectives of management would be to prevent the likely economic 
disaster to the tuna industry and to mitigate any threat to the yellowfin and 
bigeye tuna stocks. The main interest of FFA members would be to maximise 
benefits derived from the regions tuna resources.
And it was added that: ‘This would be achieved by reducing the supply of new material for canning 
below the demand. In addition, assuming other factors such as environmental considerations do not 
severely affect the status of the tuna resource, a reduction in effort would also improve catch rates 
in the medium to long-term with improved prices, vessels would be better able to meet increased 
fees’ (FFA Report 1990/27). Clearly, here, the environment is considered as ceteris paribus. In
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other words the aim of the arrangement is not framed by ecological concern but rather by higher 
licensing fees.
At this point the scientific analysis and the information used in those analyses have primary 
importance. This issue will be dealt within the next section.
The Scientific Input in the Decision Making
The main source of information about the stocks is the catch statistics provided by the vessels to the 
coastal states. A close look at the Tuna Fishery Yearbook 1993 shows that many DWFNs are not 
giving statistics about the CPUE (catch per unit effort) without which any analyses should be 
considered as incorrect. The most complete statistics are coming from the US fleet on the basis of 
the Treaty. The US also provides information about its catch on the high seas which has been 
rejected by the other DWFNs. After the US, Japan is probably the second DWFN that provides 
relatively accurate data, but Japan does not make its high seas statistics public. This situation 
supports the previous point that although the measures are there and the number of vessels is fixed, 
the other requirements of MTCs are not well applied to. In particular, it seems that reporting is the 
main problem.
As analyses in the first section have indicated, tuna species occur all over the ocean, and if 
political division is introduced to this vast area, their location will obviously have to be divided into 
two as high seas and EEZs, if not into individual EEZs as well. There is inaccurate data for the EEZ 
and nearly no data about the high seas. The decision to increase the number of vessels at any one 
time on the basis of imprecise data seems to be dangerous.
It has been recorded that the Japanese high seas catch was 1.63 million tones in 1988 and 
declined to 1 million tonnes in 1990 as a result of a poor catch of Alaskan pollack. Japan, however, 
increased its catch in the West Central Pacific and South West Pacific (Bergin et al. 1993, V). The 
data about the high seas catch of other DWFNs is not available to the same degree of accuracy, but 
it is believed that there is a substantial amount of catch obtained from the high seas.
This situation, nonetheless, does not seem to be influential in the FFA approach. The 
establishment of the EEZ has created some sort of accumulation of data about the resources of a
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given zone. But at the same time the data became nationalised as well, in other words it was 
analysed on the basis of EEZ boundaries. There is a tendency to argue that, in fact, resource 
occurrence outside EEZs is not important. For example, the area covered by the Palau Arrangement 
includes patches of high seas surrounded by the EEZs of member countries. On the basis of the 
legal nature of the high seas, anyone can fish freely. This area corresponds to only 15 per cent of the 
total coverage, and it is believed that DWFNs cannot sustain their operations through the catches 
from these areas and it has been argued that the DWFN effort is concentrated on EEZs out of which 
purse-seine fishery is not economical. This is obviously an idea which does not include ecological 
consideration. It seems that ideas are strongly evolving around the individual zone management 
concept. In this context, what has been misinterpreted is the fact that the fishing operation might be 
uneconomical when it is conducted solely in the high seas patches or at the edges of EEZs, but 
these fleets might fish in those areas in order to decrease their cost by helping themselves freely to 
the stocks. So, if  fishing in those areas is a fact, the impact of those practices on general stock 
dynamics should be taken into consideration and this seems to be a vital part that is absent from the 
analyses.
Another example of this phenomenon of singularity is strikingly evident in the relations of 
South Asians and FFA members. The interaction between the yellowfin tuna of Indonesia and 
Pacific stocks is observed through some limited research in the region. It is indicated that most 
yellowfin tuna migrated from the east (north of Papua New Guinea and around the Solomon 
Islands) to the west (the north eastern part of Indonesian waters) and vice versa (Naamin et al. 1991, 
p. 10). It is suggested that catches in the order of 200,000-220,000 million tonnes are sustainable for 
yellowfin tuna (SPC RTB 1991,19). The annual catch statistics, however, present a totally different 
story. In the area of the South Pacific and the waters of Eastern Indonesia and the Philippines, 
catches of yellowfin were 292,846 million tonnes in 1989 followed by 396,376 million tonnes in 
1991 which declined to 391,000 million tonnes in 1992 (SPC Tuna Year Book 1993). And finally 
in 1993 it was in excess o f400, 000, with a record purse-seine catch o f292,000 (FFA News Digest 
Jul/Aug 1995). The statistic about the purse-seine seemed to show only the South Pacific fishery 
and in that only EEZs.
32 Interview — Tony Kingston, Economics Officer FFA, 23.08.1994.
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Obviously this picture is extremely grim. The catch seemed to be two times higher than the 
sustainable limits. Also there is no indication of interactive management of the resource among the 
related parties. It can be argued that the maturity of fish caught in the Pacific might be different 
from those caught in Indonesia and considering the shown stock relations this would imply that 
yellowfin stock is losing its size through the loss of different age groups. Even if  the age group that 
has been utilised is the same group, which is very unlikely, this does not change the situation of 
collapse in the long run.
At the time of such a situation it was argued on ‘available scientific information that both 
the skipjack and yellowfin surface fisheries appear capable o f ‘accommodating increased fisheries 
effort on a regional basis’ (FFA Report 1994/14). This example implies the biased interpretation of 
what is, in any case, insufficient data. The argument has been supported by another argument that 
the yellowfin stocks have been holding. Nevertheless, this line of argument is biased as well. The 
statistics for this argument show that in reality some purse-seiners report small yellowfin (under 
about 3kg) as skipjack and in the case of almost an equal composition of skipjack and yellowfin, 
that skipjack, irrespective of size, was reported as yellowfin (FFA Report 1991/83). If a translation 
of this situation into biological terms is carried out, the reality might be better reflected. Since the 
existence of yearly groups of species are accepted in the productive cycles (Cushing 1981), what is 
happening now is, in fact, the decimation of future productive capacity. Therefore, the stocks might 
be holding at the moment but it does not necessarily follow that the collapse of the same stocks 
would be unlikely.
The inefficiency of data is widely accepted. And yet, out of tentative analyses of such data, 
very concrete decisions are being taken for the management of resources, the consequences of these 
measures being evaluated on the basis of short-term economical gain. The licence fees are paid at 
the beginning of each season by the purse-seiners and they are allowed to catch anything in the 
zones they are licensed for. They pay on the basis of the presumed distribution of the species in 
their future catch decided according to past catches (Pers.Commn.) which might imply that the 
reporting of the catch is being framed beforehand and the by-catch basically becomes irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, it is expressed that ‘the exploitation of yellowfin remains low to moderate, but close
33 Ibid.
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monitoring will be continued’ (FFA News Digest Jul/Aug 1995). The only way to conduct close 
monitoring is through catch statistics and tagging. The insufficiency of these methods has already 
been explained, particularly the existence of fleets that are re-flagged under the flag of convenience, 
making the catch data particularly less reliable in real terms. Therefore, the estimation of the state of 
yellowfin in such accurate terms seems unreasonable. What is more, such analyses are, probably, 
irresponsible in the sense that they can promote further increases in the catch. But is this important? 
If so, why?
The same report concludes that ‘it appears possible to sustain further increases in the tuna 
catch, leaving Pacific Island countries well placed to extract a better return from the harvest, 
especially by more direct participation’ (Ibid.). What appears to be the important issue is not the 
ecological condition but the rate of returns from the DWFN catch. Also, there is no concern about 
other species of the ocean that are not particularly targetted on an industrial basis.
In all these arguments there is a lack of ecological understanding. It is the incessant 
reiteration of the regional nature of the resources and the importance of regional interests — in that 
interests of individual states — that leads to a situation where the avoidance of ecological reality is 
an imperative. But, this intentional avoidance seemed to stem from unwillingness/myopia caused 
by justifications which are internal to the system of relations that underpins the cooperation. The 
conditions of avoidance of an ecological-systemic view are continually produced at the level of 
certain partial knowledge of species — at the expense of the larger picture. Also, these underlying 
conditions allow the system of cooperation to ignore the industrial structure as an external influence 
on the region which is obviously an important part of the ecological intercourse as well.
In the fishing industry it is not only the resource that is migratory but the fleets are as well. 
The practice of DWFNs is highly international. .The dislocation of a fleet from one region usually 
means relocation to another area rather than the total disappearance of that fleet. The Taiwanese 
fleet, for example, carries its operation even in the Mediterranean sea during the closed season of 
ICC AT (KMT, May 11, 1994). The very large yellowfin catch of the Taiwanese fleet off Pakistan 
was reported as well (KMT March 12 1993). Also, relocation of the Latin American fleet from the 
East Pacific to the West Pacific as a result of the Dolphin-free tuna regulation of the US is a well 
known case. In this context, the Japanese fleet, in particular, works in an extremely coordinated
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fashion. They undertake tuna operations from off the coast of Ecuador and Peru to off the coast of 
the Ivory Coast in the Atlantic (KMT Nov 11,1993) covering practically the whole area where tuna 
fishery is feasible. Japanese operations also include research for new fishing grounds in the Ocean. 
In this attempt, the main target is to find new grounds in the high seas, for example coordination of 
one area is latitude 25°-45° S and longitude 80°-170°W (KMT April 13,1993). This area is, 
basically, the high seas located between the EEZs of the South Pacific and Latin American EEZs. 
According to KMT a large number of tuna longliners have been reported in the area. Strangely 
enough this area does not usually appear to be as rich in tuna on the maps drawn by the FFA or the 
Latin Americans on the basis of tagging. The importance of all these facts is that the fishing 
industry uses the Ocean as a whole. And their methods of gaining access for EEZs seemed to be a 
relevant issue as well. If Japan is taken as one of the major players in global fisheries, this 
globalised behaviour might become much more accurate.
The sober (earnest) policies of the FFA cause relocation of vessels either to the other 
regions such as the Indian Ocean or to the high seas. This situation is likely to create new pressure 
in the new locations. Nevertheless, inter-regional communication is minimal. It is argued by the 
FFA that ‘cooperation cannot be expected from other similar management areas as those are 
dominated by DWFN rather than coastal states interest’ and added that ‘international management, 
however achieved, will always disadvantage coastal state. This generalisation is based on the 
principle that DWFNs participation will be always on a voluntary basis where there is nothing at 
stake’ (FFA Report 1990/27). Although there is an interest in the management measures, such as 
MTCs and the Regional Vessel Registry, innovated by the FFA, cooperation on those schemes has 
not progressed further than limited consultations. It is recognised that South East Asia is important 
for FFA and yet no substantial cooperation has been nurtured. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) has been/seen the only possible arena for some sort of joint work, while the Pacific 
Economic Consultative Council (PECC) fisheries task force is seen as unproductive and the 
Western Pacific Fisheries Consultative Committee (WPFCC) is considered as being slow. Any 
coopertion with Latin America is considered to be an unlikely development in the foreseeable 
future.34
34 Interview —  Andrew Wright, Deputy Director FFA, 27.08.1994.
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The implication of this situation is very interesting in the sense that the FFA has become a 
closed circle with no interests outside its zones. FFA appears reluctant to express any view which 
might be interpreted as a wish to extend its control over the high seas which in turn might require 
some FFA concessions about the jurisdiction of the EEZ. What has happened is that the high seas 
has been, superficially, considered as a distinct entity to enable the regional organisation to take 
measures about its zone, lacking any holistic consideration.
Conclusion
Thus far, the aim and the practices of the FFA have been analysed in order to arrive at a conclusion 
about the organisation’s efficiency. While doing this, the complex structure of the fish group 
Thunnus that is targeted and therefore has become a silent member of the cooperation, is described 
as well. The above analysis puts into question the validity of the image of success attributed to the 
South Pacific cooperation on the basis of its efficiency to generate financial interest for member 
states. The image seemed to fail on different grounds as a result of a re-introduction of multiplicity 
of agents involved —  including different species of Tuna — that is excluded from the decision­
making of related parties. I have argued that FFA is an insular regional organisation based on the 
higher interests of its members. It not only excludes other interested parties from its decision­
making process, but nature and its resources as probable concerned party together with the whole 
ecological context in which they are located have been marginalised as well. In the management 
measures, ecological considerations seem to be the last thing to be considered if they are being 
considered at all.
The establishment of ‘tuna’ as one of the affected parties and thus a party to the cooperation 
shatters the image of success. The realisation of a complex structural existence situated within a 
larger ecological structure locates the perpetrators of ‘effort of catch’ into a larger ecology than the 
one in which they operate. And this possibility of re-locating the perpetrators exhausts the 
underlying ethical viability of the cooperation in its present form as a management tool for 
capitalising on the ocean ecology.
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At this point, it is important to realise that the absence of complexity in the analyses 
produced by FFA creates justification of a certain relational behaviour in the structure of the 
cooperation. In this, the production of disproof of necessity— through the knowledge claims about 
both the single species and the possibility of sustaining national interests for international 
cooperation in relation to industry and the larger ocean ecology —  has become a permanent part of 
the system. The new management measures applied by FFA have reflected this state of affairs.
Also, the net result of this unconcerned approach is an idiosyncratic ethical standpoint very 
much observed in the analysis of industrial relations of the area. This particular problem becomes 
quite apparent in relation to High Seas fisheries and the fleet relocation subjects. Although the 
adverse effects on ecology caused by these practices are obvious, particularly under the 
considerations of the complexity of the ocean system, the FFA is adamant not to engage other 
interested parties in the decision-making process that ‘exacts* the destiny of the silent partners. 
Moreover, there is no real willingness and attempt to even coordinate management measures among 
similar regional organisations in order to play the game as internationally as the DWFNs are playing 
it. It seems that ecological considerations do not come into these processes. Therefore, it seems fair 
to talk about institutionalised and prevalent ethical irresponsibility in ecological matters.
The other ethical problem here is produced in the concept of EEZs by creating the illusion 
of owning a space and resources which become the only concern of a coastal state, and this 
consequently absolves coastal states from wider ecological responsibility. As a result, the ecological 
importance of the ocean is reduced [and suppressed] to a small, supposedly self-preserving, 
independent piece of material interest for the coastal states development strategies. In the process, 
the understanding of species, and their ecological location, has become an issue of independent 
patches of ocean space.
The self-interest-oriented success of the FFA is highly dangerous if its approach to the 
illusion ownership of distinct territorial space becomes a model which is produced in other regions 
as the right approach to ecological intercourse. It is true that the management measures that have 
been developed by the FFA are very important. Their application through the FFA-type structure 
could only enhance the dichotomy between the two spaces of the ocean - sovereign spaces of EEZ 
and high seas — and furthers the suppression of a possibility of ecological understanding.
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To reiterate, it is clear that the dominant approaches to management can be identified as 
unconcerned, irresponsible, non-ecological, suppressive-in relation to other species. Let us have 
pause at this point and look at a piece of international legislation which makes the connection with 
the next chapter easier.
Although the UN tried to address some high seas related problems through the United 
Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the adopted 
agreement in August 1995 draws its recommendations and structure on the differentiation of two 
ocean spaces. Obviously it is a work of compromise, once again, in which coastal states would 
never agree to retreat from their sovereign rights. The agreement requires cooperation regarding 
stock utilisation on the high seas but it does not achieve anything new regarding cooperation that 
combines and includes the high seas and EEZs as one ecological space. The development is the 
requirements about the exchange of scientific data (Annex I) and flag state control (art. 18). The 
structure of the agreement is not a cumulative one geared towards the creation of ecological- 
systemic management in regional or sub-regional-cooperation. The whole ecosystem has been 
considered only on the basis of straddling and highly migratory species, some of which are 
economically important at the moment.
So, FFA is not alone in its approach. It is not alone in by-passing, with a near absolute 
unawareness of, the complexity of ecology for political solutions. After outlining the FFA and UN 
stances, the questions are why people and organisations act in the way they have acted? How is it 
possible to ignore and isolate the fundamentally important parts of ecological communication from 
the practice? Let us not lose sight of the fact that FFA is an organisation bom as a result of a radical 
change in the ocean regime on the basis of UNCLOS HI and its formulation of new legal space — 
EEZ — for the consumption of coastal states. This new formulation of new space has produced 
practically a new understanding of the ocean space. Therefore, what is being witnessed throughout 
this chapter is the reflection of this new discourse of ocean space as it is disseminated and 
normalised through practice. The production of the practices analysed have become a natural fact 
and no longer questioned beyond the procedures of application within the state of ‘normality’.
It is important to unveil the present normality in order to see how that normality was 
produced. To do that it is not enough to analyse individual institutions and try to find out what has
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gone wrong in their processes. It would help, however, to see that the production of certain 
relational behaviour is not genuinely possible within isolated institutions. It is rather created 
through its embeddedness within the system of relations that make those organisations possible. 
This constellation necessitates taking the issues one step further and questioning the possibility of 
UNCLOS El and its regime on the basis of ecological relations. In that, the juncture of sovereignty 
and ecology seems to be the fundamental area of interest insofar as the deployment of sovereignty 
has been the legacy of UNCLOS IE made possible the application of [techniques of] discourse of 
International Relations in creating an abstract political space.
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Chapter 3
The Issue of Sovereignty in
the Context of Ocean Management
Nearly twenty-five years since the concept of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was formulated 
and then applied, the situation in relation to global fisheries still seems considerably uncertain and 
may even be darker. The reasons for the extension of coastal state jurisdiction over an area which 
had previously been considered the high seas still chronically persist. The major issues at stake were 
the depletion of fish stocks because of unregulated fisheries and pollution of various kinds. In short, 
the concern was the unbalanced ecological intercourse between humankind and the oceans.
The other important aspect in this, was the state and the impact of global political change in 
the context of de-colonisation. Considering the utilisation patterns within EEZs, this issue could be 
located in two different but not unrelated concerns. The first of these was the vested interests of 
metropolitan powers in these new countries; and the second was/is the concerns about the 
‘progress’ and ‘development’ of newly-independent states. From a cynical point of view, the latter 
aspect, framed in humanitarian language, might be fundamentally connected to the former insofar 
as the conceptualisation of progress and development is provided in relation to metropolitan 
parameters, which are in turn permeated through the new international law of the sea. So, what is 
the ecological picture today?
The common view among specialists is highly pessimistic. According to them, the situation 
has been deteriorating and there is a vital need to act immediately. Since 1989, the global oceanic 
catch of fish, crustaceans and mollusc has fallen by 5 per cent and stagnated. The productivity of 
major marine regions has shrunk and in some cases this decline has been more than 30 per cent.
Also, another interesting situation has become apparent from the list of countries that have 
highly productive long distant fishing fleets. Apart from a few changes, like the declining British 
fishing fleet and those countries influenced by the decline of the USSR at the end of the 1980s, 
there is no real change in the order of countries. This begs the question whether politico-juridical
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definitions have had any consequence on the intended re-structuring of the oceans to the benefit of, 
in particular, developing coastal states.
The imminent problem of the time was exemplified by the conflict between Canada and 
Spain during the spring of 1995. The problem had even created a new tension between Spain and 
Britain that are parties to the same Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. According to 
some, the problem was based on the excessive fishing effort of Spain on straddling Canadian 
stocks. The Canadian government became determined to stop them in the high seas where Canada 
has no jurisdiction at all. It can be argued that the problem was either related with a non-strict 
application of the relevant parts of UNCLOS IH in other words, a deficiency in the application of 
the regime or related with the very basis on which UNCLOS in  was negotiated. If it is the latter 
then, this, of course, is directly related to the way in which IR as a discourse conceptualises the 
environment.
This chapter argues that, although diagnosis of the problems in the 1960s was largely 
correct, the prescription — i.e. the extension of national jurisdictions and recognition of sovereign 
rights —  was and remains questionable. This invalidated the conceptual prognosis made from 
within the discourse of IR. The issue of sovereignty and the concept of sovereignty, with all its 
ambiguity, is one of the major reasons why the oceans face problems that have increased over the 
last two decades.
In the first section of this chapter, the importance of sovereignty in understanding the 
international is critically analysed. The aim is to show that the international relations as theorised 
by IR obstructs ecological concerns as a result of the crucial position of ‘sovereignty* in this 
theorising/method. As the grounding assumption the concept is not questioned [on its own 
possibility]. The section explores the way the concept is understood in IR.
Once the constitutive importance of ‘sovereignty* for IR is established, the second section 
discusses the deployment of ‘sovereignty’ through the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
IE). This section aims to show how a methodologically fixed deployment of the concept, in order 
to secure the objective analysis of international, cannot understand the ecological concern that 
arises from the oceans. The section also argues that reformulating the concept does not change its
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practical application. By subscribing to the conventional understanding of sovereignty, it does 
not change the major philosophical ground of the possibility of knowing within IR.
The third section takes its direction from the preceding sections. The concept of 
‘sovereignty’ is taken to a different level. Rather than analysing it on the basis of the legal or 
effective form it takes as a norm in the discourse of IR, I discuss its internal constitution in terms 
of exclusionary ethics. In this section the important concept is ‘life’ insofar as the invocation of 
sovereign decision creates an exception on the basis of some perceived normality. In this 
exception what is excluded is excluded in terms of its existential conditions. The decision on 
conservation and utilisation within Exclusive Economic Zones is essentially about the ‘life’ of 
certain species. Therefore, it is important to understand how this dynamics of exception in 
relation to Nature within the concept of sovereignty has been constituted.
The Concept of Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty presents one of the most important analytical tools that is central to 
the discussions of international relations. The changing international political environment has 
stimulated recent debates about sovereignty. Changing boundaries at the end of the Cold War, the 
ramifications of civil wars where intervention by other states was justified as humanitarian 
responsibility, and expansion of liberal market economy over the globe have prompted a debate 
about the concept.1
The concept of sovereignty is difficult to define. There are many interpretations of what it 
means. My aim in this section is not to give an exhaustive analysis of the concept, as this has 
already been done in the literature.2 The aim is to point out a common tendency among numerous 
authors of various theoretical persuasions. The analyses of sovereignty usually concentrate either 
on the legal understanding as this creates the state as a member of the international community, 
or on the substantial sovereignty as a set of rules of effective powers and attributes in terms of 
state’s ‘autonomy, control and authority’ (Litfin 1998, p.8).3 In this section the aim is more to
1 The concept has been considered to be ‘a basic rule o f coexistence within the state system’ (Bull 1977, p.36).
2 See, Hinsley 1986, James 1986, Ashley 1988, Krasner 1988, Jackson 1990,Onuf 1991, Ruggie 1993, Bartelson 
1995, Weber 1995, Biersteker and Weber 1996 and Litfin 1998.
3 It is argued that ‘sovereignty is generally thought to confer on states three specific spheres o f legitimacy and power:
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show that even the critical analysis of the concept that is the analysis of the changing substance 
of sovereignty share entrenched naturalistic understanding of the concept. Realists, for example, 
take the concept ahistorically similar in the Westphalian international order. R.B.J. Walker 
opposes this view on the grounds that ‘the very attempt to treat sovereignty as a matter of 
definition and legal principle encourages a certain amnesia about its historical and culturally 
specific character’ (Walker 1993, p. 166).
This opposition gestures toward a more historically oriented understanding of 
sovereignty. It points out that sovereignty as a concept changes with changes in the historical 
context. Hence, the possibility of understanding sovereignty as a ‘socially constructed, 
reproduced, reconstructed and deconstructed’ concept employed in the discourse becomes 
possible (Biersteker and Weber 1996, p.3). In this methodological unpacking of monolithically 
defined applications of the concept, the attempt to historicise different understandings of 
sovereignty is best exemplified in Robert H. Jackson’s book Quasi States. Jackson’s 
differentiation between positive and negative sovereignties is an important conceptual tool 
towards unpacking the conceptual ahistoricism that has dominated the use of sovereignty (1990, 
pp. 16-31). Through this analytical move, Jackson is able to argue that the legal concept does not 
reflect the substance of sovereignty in terms of its historical conditions. Although, as he 
emphasizes, the oppositional adjectives reflect no value judgment (Jackson 1990, p.l 1), 
‘negative’ means a certain lack of ‘autonomy, authority, and control’ on the part of the state. The 
historical understanding expressed in this approach explains the historically contingent nature of 
what Jackson calls quasi states in the context of Third World.4 This implicitly takes positive 
sovereignty as the conceptual norm to which the negative sovereignty is contrasted. Here, the 
historical context is the post-colonial state and the way it was recognised and hence legitimated 
under the international norm of sovereign equality. Jackson argues that the function of negative 
sovereignty was ‘the only way numerous underdeveloped colonies could rapidly be made 
independent. If conventional criteria of positive international law for statehood ‘had been
1) the ability to control territory and natural resources therein; 2) the right to exploit natural resources, and; 3) the 
authority to develop and enforce environmental regulations, standards, policies, and priorities in accordance with 
specific national interests and values’. See Kamieniecki and Granzier 1998.
4 He argues that ‘quasi-states are creatures and indeed protectorates of the contemporary state-system’, See Jackson 
1990, p .176.
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retained.. .fewer countries would have gained independence and probably many would still be 
colonies today’ (1990, p.25). It is, then, possible to agree with Walker that in Jackson’s account 
the historical condition of negative sovereignty does not go far enough to have a dynamic 
meaning and understanding of sovereignty. By explaining this historical variation as a move by 
the system to incorporate the ex-colonial people into international society, the positive 
sovereignty is, implicitly, set as a fixed norm that is to be achieved, which points to a substantive 
normative discussion in terms of the nature of the international politics.
Another critical reading of sovereignty can be seen in Cynthia Weber’s Simulating 
Sovereignty. Weber makes her aim clear at the outset by posing the question of ‘how does the 
representation assumption affect our understandings of state sovereignty and intervention?’ 
instead of conventional questions of ‘what is represented?’ and ‘what are represented as the 
foundations of state sovereignty?’ (Weber 1995, xii). She further refines her question by asking 
‘how is sovereignty simulated’ (Weber 1995, p. 10). She then engages with three cases of 
intervention where simulation of sovereignty is discussed. Particularly through the different 
historical cases of United States intervention into other countries, she demonstrates how the US 
simulates its own sovereignty whereby it also constructs the sovereignty of state it intervenes. It 
is an interesting way to destabilise a fix idea of sovereignty by showing different postures applied 
in different historical contexts. It allows her to talk about sovereignty as multidimensional and 
definitionally ambiguous concept. But by not acknowledging a certain fixed definition and trying 
to analyse each simulation in its specific historical context, it is not possible to move beyond the 
IR framework. This analysis falls short of demonstrating how a certain fixed definition of 
sovereignty, or how the ontological constitution of the concept of sovereignty, informs all the 
different simulations as long as they try to function within a given discourse that is IR. Even if 
one agrees with the statement that ‘each simulation is a truth effect’(Weber 1995, p.125), this 
analysis does not explain what is it in this ‘truth’ which is simulated. Put differently, it does not 
explain how it is that a simulation has theoretical sway. It is clear that the claim of definitionally 
unfixed sovereignty is in play but it does not necessarily follow that this claim is a challenge to 
the inside/outside structure of IR discourse. For the intervention debate still takes place within 
the overarching framework of the international/sovereignty. Therefore, the analysis presents
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different deployments of the inside/outside binary within the discourse, and does not explain 
conceptually how this binary conceptualisation is possible.
Although sovereignty is released from its fixed Realist grounds, the internal construction 
of sovereignty as it creates ‘the international’ at every moment of its deployment, albeit as 
simulation, remains unquestioned. This points to the fact that sovereignty when analysed is taken 
in the way it is located in the discourse of IR. Even when it is critically analysed the critical move 
is restricted with the use of sovereignty within the discourse.5 This engagement with the 
substance of sovereignty makes it possible to question its legalistic analysis. In other words, 
critical moves show how unstable the concept is in contrast to the Realists’6 ahistorical 
perspective on the concept.
In the critical approaches to sovereignty one can discern a motivation provided by the 
issue of ‘erosion of sovereignty’ that is of authority and autonomy, based on global changes such 
as economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977) and environmental change. These 
perspectives point out that the issues under consideration go beyond the political structure that is 
based on divisive sovereign states. The emphasis is on the global institutions. In this move the 
understanding of IR expanded by bringing non-state actors into the analyses of international. As 
observed by Chris Brown, this particular move did not come up with a new theory but brought 
different agents to the attention of IR scholarship. In their later work, Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye formulated the theory of complex interdependence as a new way of understanding 
international relations. Their account highlighted issues of (1) ‘multiple channels of access’, (2) a 
different degree of importance given to ‘force’ and the (3) possibility of different issue areas are 
being prioritised at different times in international relations (Keohane and Nye 1977, p.24). The 
last point created a space to talk about the agenda-setting capacity of international organisations 
and therefore, the possibility of change in the priority of issues which can shape the international
5 For example see Doty 1996 and Strang 1996.
6 The Realist understanding within IR can be traced to the earlier problems o f  this century. For example E.H. Carr’s 
The Twenty Years Crisis is considered by Steven Smith as one o f the founding texts o f his conceptualisations —  the 
other one he considers is Hans Morganthau’s Politics Among Nations. See Smith, 1989. One has to understand two 
central questions within this perspective: (1) What accounts for state behavior in general and in particular for the 
survival o f states? And (2) What produces and accounts for the dynamics o f the international system? (Dougherty et 
al. 1997, p.58).
96
system. In this move, however, two basic assumptions of realism were accepted7: that of 
international anarchy and the rational egoism of states (Brown 1997, p.49). Both in the early
n Q
formulations of institutions/regimes and in the later challenges to these by Constructivists they 
take ‘state’ and ‘international’ as the only possible grounds of explanation. Although 
Constructivism10 clearly posits the institutional structure as an integral part of international 
relations,11 there is such a thing out there as ‘International’ which corresponds to our 
formulations. This can be seen as similar to that of Realist understanding.
There is no doubt that, on the one hand, Constructivist perspectives of IR/regimes are 
able to trace the reasons of state behavior or reasons of cooperation without resorting to natural 
law or talking about rational games. On the other hand, by explaining behavior according to the 
social actions14 in the social environment of states i.e. the international, they create a certain 
illusion about the grounds of norms and rules such as customary law based on ‘an ascertainable 
rule underlying the behavioral regularity’.15 This ground can not explain in and of itself the 
grounds and reasons of such action. It can only witness recurring practices and testifies for their 
acceptance as a rule of practice. The recognition of non-state sovereign actors is a move towards 
analysing international organisations. This, however, does not mean that they go beyond the idea
7 He affirms that his attempt is to arrive at a ‘critique and modification’ o f realist theory. Keohane 1984, p. 14.
8 Stephen Krasner defines regimes as ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs o f fact, 
causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards o f behavior defined in terms o f rights and obligations. Rules are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action’ (Krasner 1983, p.2). This consensus definition was a matter of 
debate. See for example Kratochwil 1995, p.57; Keohane 1984 p. 57; Young 1986 p. 107; Hasenclever et al. 1998, 
p .14.
9 According to Wendt and Raymond Duvall ‘these institutions constitute state actors as subjects o f international life 
in the sense that they make meaningful interaction by the latter possible’ (1989, p. 53).
10 Wendt assumes that ‘states are the principal units o f analysis for international political theory’(Wendt 1994, p.385 
and 1992, p. 396f). Therefore, the tenets of constructivism must be considered as intersubjectivity among states 
through international institutions which are the grounds of the ‘social’ within this structure. See Wendt 1992, p.393 
and 1995, p.71
11 They argue that ‘the dependency o f state identities and cognitions on international institutions and relates the 
formation and maintenance of particular international regimes to these pre-established identities’ (Hasenclever et al 
1998, p. 157).
12 A similar argument can be developed for the rendering o f the state as well. One interesting occasion o f this kind 
can be witnessed in the conclusion o f the Adler’s Millennium article. See Adler 1997, p.276.
13 For example Barry Buzan talks about the ‘relative intellectual coherence’ o f the realist perspective also adds that 
‘it provides a solid starting point for the construction of grand theory, and as far as I can tell, allows sufficient 
flexibility to integrate main lines o f argument from most other paradigms’. See Buzan, 1996, p.62
14 Wendt 1984, pp.361-69; Dessler 1989, pp.451-558
15 Kratochwill 1995
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\of sovereign actors represented by one voice. Richard Ashley’s observation points to the 
underlying assumption that is always already produced at each deployment of sovereignty. He 
observed that: non-state actors
must be susceptible to interpretation as a well-bounded sovereign identity 
possessing its own ‘internal’ hegemonic center of decision capable of 
reconciling ‘internal’ conflicts and capable, therefore, of projecting a singular 
presence, a coherent voice in an ambiguous and polyvocal world ‘outside’ its 
recognised bounds. It must be comprehensible, in short, as a sovereign 
presence — an autonomous source of meaning — whose coherent ‘inside 
exists in opposition to an indeterminate outside’ which it takes to be an object 
of its rational will (1988, p.245).
Analysis
Sovereignty, as a first (Vincent 1974) or constitutive (Ruggie 1983; Wendt 1988) principle, as a 
legal, absolute, unitary condition (James 1986) or as a simulation, produces meaning and 
identities in relation to an internal coherence. It is this internal constitution of sovereignty, or in 
other words its conditions of possibility as an ontological bind which produces the binary 
understanding of international relations. By not addressing this issue both conventional and 
critical analyses remain within this ontological frame. It is not, therefore, enough to historicise 
the deployment of the concept without considering how sovereignty as a concept came to be 
thought of in the modem times. In the discussions of sovereignty, as is the case with Jackson’s 
negative sovereignty and in Weber’s account of what is being simulated, there is a gesture toward 
what is being described by C.B. Macpherson as ‘[t]he individual is free inasmuch as he is the 
proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the 
will of others, and freedom is a function of possession’ (1962 p.3). This perspective is similar to 
Ashley’s analysis of the nature of agents in the international. Therefore, in the concept of 
sovereignty there is an implicit idea of a coherent and self-sufficient and nearly-unrelated-to- 
anything-but-to-itself identity. Its relation to other things is established through its interests and 
goals as played out through power games. On the basis of this rendering, state sovereignty 
becomes the naturally ethical position and hence its survival is implied as well. In taking
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sovereignty within this framework the important inter-constitution among different identities has 
been disregarded.
The idea of state sovereignty based on control, autonomy, authority over a given territory 
has been challenged by the ecological changes.16 For the problems presented in the 
environmental issues do not correspond to the political borders, as Ronnie D. Lipschutz argues 
‘ecological interdependence, a situation whereby state borders, characterized as “natural” under 
sovereignty and anarchy, fail to correspond to those of physical and biological nature* (1998, 
p.l 19). According to Veronica Ward ‘[e]cological links could make identification of the 
“outside” from the “inside” of the state questionable, if not irrelevant*(1998, p.83). Although this 
challenge is very apparent, the compatibility of two concepts, ‘ecology* and ‘sovereignty’, is 
highly questionable. In particular an ecological understanding of systemic relations contradicts 
the internal structure of sovereignty as expressed by Ashley and Macpherson. When the idea of 
ecological conservation and concern is not divorced from the system of sovereignty,17 the 
internal structure of sovereignty, as a structure aspiring for coherent-individual-self that is about 
exclusion and autonomy, trumps and neutralises the ecological concern based on the idea of 
systemic interdependence. The development of international measures such as institutions and 
regimes are only redefining sovereignty without altering ‘the actual practice of sovereignty’ 
(Mitchell 1998, p. 141). This understanding supports the contemporary practices in the global 
environmental politics. States have been asked to abide with rights and obligations derived from 
the sustainability of global commons such as strastospheric ozone depletion, climate change or
1 Qpollution in oceans. This argument is based on the development of restricted sovereignty claim. 
The conclusion of international agreements in relation to climate change and oceans strengthened 
the belief that there is a move to accept restrictions on state sovereignty. In this, there is no 
attempt to alter the practice of sovereignty, the ethical position remains within the exclusionist
16 This characterization is based on Karen Litfin’s typology. See Litfin 1998. The concept, characterised as control, 
autonomy and authority, has been challenged by many issue areas from financial global markets to the issue of 
refugees that can be seen in this perspective. The ecological challenge nonetheless has presented a very substantial 
problem in constantly questioning the limits of the concept.
17 One important example of this is the Stockholm Declaration where environmental concerns were brought into the 
international relations. Nonetheless this declaration locates itself in the sovereign state system without 
problematising the implications of sovereignty which in turn reiterated sovereignty in terms o f exclusionist authority. 
For more see Lipschutz 1998, p. 128-31.
18 This move ‘seeks a balance between rights and responsibilities, reminding states that, while they have authority
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understanding of sovereignty. The moral action that is being asked as obligation to a larger whole 
can only be responded to in terms of sovereign understanding. There is no over arching moral 
responsibility formulated as ethical relationality to the whole which replaces sovereignty and 
thereby would be able to underpin obligations beyond boundaries. In other words contemporary 
environmental politics as discussed in Wapner (1998) and in Miller (1998) give a story which 
remains in the conventional ethical framework of the practice of sovereign states.
In the next section, the analysis of the UNCLOS HI system as a relationship between the 
concept of sovereignty and ecology will be established. In this, the incompatibility of the two 
concepts will be discussed. The UNCLOS IQ system attempts to redefine sovereign rights by 
remaining in the discourse of IR19 where sovereignty underpins the international system. 
Therefore, reformulation remains rhetorical rather than having any positive impact on the 
ecological questions. The section will argue that the ethical frame internal to sovereignty is 
incompatible with ecosystem understanding. In order to scrutinise this issue, the relationship 
between sovereignty and the ocean eco-system is divided into two areas. Firstly, the economic 
aspects of the relationship will be discussed. What does it mean to have sovereign rights over living 
resources that are economic targets? Secondly, I look at the ecological aspects of the relationship — 
what does it mean to have such rights for conservation and for biodiversity?
The Concept of Sovereignty in UNCLOS III
The new concept of EEZ which was meant to change the then existing fisheries regime m the 
oceans was drafted in the Part V of the Convention (Official Text, Final Act Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea). The issue of sovereignty comes into the agenda in this part also. 
Article 56(1 )a recognises ‘sovereign’ rights of exploiting, exploring, conserving and managing the 
living or non-living resources of the newly created zone. Although the term ‘sovereignty’ has a 
clear dictionary definition, the qualification it gains with the additional term of ‘rights’ necessitated
over their own territories, ecosystems transcend political boundaries and extend obligations’ (Wapner 1998, p.278).
19 ‘[t]he success o f efforts to alter sovereign practice by redefining sovereign rights depends upon the form of  
discourse used to justify the redefinition’ (Mitchell 1998, p. 141).
20 The regime that was seen as problematic was based on the notion o f ‘freedom o f the sea’ articulated and initiated 
by Hugo Grotius. Although it was about four hundred years ago that he conceptualised this issue, ‘freedom of the
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a new clarification of the whole term of ‘sovereign rights.’ In order to grasp the meaning, the 
explanation of the International Law Commission (ILC) given on the basis of the decision of the 
ICJ in the 1958 Shelf Convention (1958 Fisheries Convention, art.29(l)) can be used as 
comparison. ILC held that:
the text as now adopted leaves no doubt that the rights conferred upon the coastal 
state cover all rights necessary for and connected with the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf. Such rights include 
jurisdiction in connection with the prevention and punishment of violations of 
the law. The rights of the coastal State are exclusive in the sense that, if it does 
not exploit the continental shelf, it is only with its consent that anyone else may 
do so (ILC report 1956, p.42).
The situation is rather different in UNCLOS ID, where rights were expanded to the superjacent 
waters. In other words, they are not bound by the limit of sea-bed and subsoil as they were in the 
1958 Convention. Also, the addition of conservation and management components to the system 
expanded the scope of coastal state control. However, there are different interpretations of this 
point. According to Attard, these ‘sovereign’ rights are by no means absolute (Attard, 1987; p.47- 
50), but are subject to the restriction expressed in Art. 56(2) ‘due regard to the rights and duties of 
other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this convention.’ This line 
of interpretation seems logical in the first reading particularly on the basis of Art. 58(1) in relation 
to the recognition of customary rights of freedom of the seas that are expressed in Art. 87.
Moreover, a close study of Art. 62 might show some other repercussions for coastal state 
sovereignty. Art. 62(1) introduces the concept of ‘objective of optimum utilization’ which is 
considered by Attard in connection with global food scarcity and necessity (Attard, 1987; p. 157- 
158). Art. 62(2) creates the obligation of opening up a zone when there is an un-utilized surplus 
with special regard to the provisions of Art. 69 and 70, where the rights of land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged states are protected. According to Attard ‘under Art.62 there exists an 
obligation to give access to a surplus once it has been determined to exist’ (Attard 1987; p. 160). 
However, this direct interpretation seems to be jeopardized by the existence of Art. 297(3) whereby 
any obligation could be by-passed.
seas’ is a topic which is very much alive and supported by many today.
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On the other side, on the side of the argument of real sovereignty, Burke argues that
[w]ith respect to the subject-matter embraced by the sovereign rights, the 
decisions of the coastal state are plenary... The sovereign rights of the coastal 
state are exclusive rights, meaning that they are the prerogative of the coastal 
state alone. In the matters mentioned, exclusive sovereign rights signify that 
other entities, whether international organizations or states with specific 
characteristics, have no right of participation in the decisions to be made (Burke 
1994; p.39). -
This line of interpretation is much more grounded in the articles that are regulating exploitation and 
management of the resources. Although, as mentioned previously, certain disadvantaged states and 
others have given rights in the coastal state zones, those rights depend upon the will of the coastal 
state.
Art.61(l) is clear enough to show that the coastal state has the decision-making power in the 
matter of determination of catch limits. Art.62(2) urges the coastal state to open up its surplus for 
the exploitation of other states but it does not change the fact that it is up to the coastal state to 
decide about the existence of the surplus. Art.62(4) establishes the coastal state’s superiority in the 
matters of management in the case of surplus exploitation by other states. Nationals of other states 
are required to comply with the rules drawn by the coastal state. On the basis of these articles, it is 
obvious that the coastal state has a strong standing in the decisions about the utilisation of resources 
that exist in its EEZ without any legal responsibility to other states.21 If a coastal state decides that 
in its zone, catch limit is at the level of its own catch capacity therefore no surplus exists, other 
states have to take this without any further argument, because their rights only start if  a coastal state 
declares a surplus.
The concept of ‘sovereign’ rights as it exists in the UNCLOS HI seems to reflect or imply 
the control of the coastal state over the marine resources of the new zone without any interference 
from outside. In other words, it has the power to decide at its own discretion.
21 Philip Allott argues that rights under the convention are ‘shared powers, shared between the holder o f the power 
and the community o f states’. See, Allott 1983, p.27. In this view, on the basis o f which mechanism the power is 
shared between the holder and community of states is highly questionable.
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‘When we say that sovereignty is the central problem o f right in Western 
societies, what we mean basically is that the essential function o f  the discourse 
and techniques o f right has been to efface the domination intrinsic to power in 
order to present the latter at the level o f appearance under two different aspects: 
on the one hand, as the legitimate rights o f sovereignty, and on the other, as the 
legal obligation to obey it’ (Foucault, 1980, p.95)
This point creates a new argument about the status of the new zone. One side of the 
argument is the fact that the EEZ is the extension of territorial waters with the moderation of certain 
jurisdictional rights (2 official records (1974-), pp.l08ff; EEZ(1984), p.40). The other side is the 
claim that because of the existence of Art.58(l) and (2), where certain high seas freedoms are 
protected in the EEZ as well, the zone is considered an area of the high seas with redefined 
management rules (Lupinacci 1984, p.98 ff and Schreiber 1984, p. 123 f!).
However, a third view supports the fact that the area is a sui generis zone (5 Official 
Records(1974-), p. 153; 6 Official Records (1974-), pp. 108,110,114). Although the first article of 
the Part V, Art.55, defines the area as an area ‘beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to 
the specific legal regime established (in this part), under which the rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal states and rights and freedoms of other states are governed’, it does not openly locate the 
area in relation to the high seas. It is rather ambiguous on this issue unless the concept of 
jurisdiction is interpreted in such a way that it gains a value on which rights and freedoms of other 
States depend. This issue of the juridical location of the EEZ in relation to the high seas is very 
important. Through Part V it becomes obvious that the ambiguity is rhetorical rather than real. The 
EEZ is a new Juridical area where certain freedoms of the high seas are recognised with 
reservations expressed in Art.58(3). The freedom of fishing and other freedoms in relation to the 
exploration and exploitation are overruled in the EEZ, the last remaining freedom is related with the 
freedom of navigation.
Nevertheless, there is another intricate situation in relation to the existence of EEZ rights.
On the basis of Art.77(3), rights in relation to the continental shelf are ipso facto. In Part V there is 
no relevant argument about the EEZ. Therefore the existence of rights and their use depends upon 
expressive proclamation; otherwise, arguably, freedoms of the high seas could be enjoyed i.e. 
utilisation of living resources cannot be controlled whereas, because of Art.77, non-living resources
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of sea-bed and subsoil are protected. As a result of this intricacy, the 1970s witnessed a bonanza of 
ocean space appropriation by the coastal states in order to stop further abuse of the living resources. 
Therefore, the rights that are claimed to be in the sovereign will of the state derive from the 
application of UNCLOS HI, or its rules, that are considered as Customary International Law. This 
situation is a reflection of the economic importance of the living resources and the regime under 
which they had been utilised i.e. the regime of the high seas.
What happened was the creation of new private/public property rights on the basis of new 
individual state jurisdictions. But this new situation is seen in IR discourse as well as in the 
international community, as the extension of state sovereignty that is already presupposed to being 
party to the negotiations. The new approach, in its creation of a new space under state authority, in 
theory at least, attempted to prevent the alienation of resources from coastal states. This process 
aimed to guarantee the development projects of newly independent states.
From a purely legal perspective, coastal states can be considered as holding sovereign 
control of the area that has been created as opposed to other states enjoying freedoms of the high 
seas. However, from the perspective of or the spirit of the convention, claims to have sovereignty as 
such seem to be very unlikely. One even could establish this interpretation from the convention 
itself. In the preamble, it is expressed that:
Bearing in mind that the achievement of these goals will contribute to the 
realisation of a just and equitable international economic order which takes into 
account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the 
special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land­
locked (UNCLOS HI, Preamble).
Burke argues that a coastal state’s judgement regarding levels of catch is based on ‘the coastal states 
economic and other interests’. Economic factors were expressly emphasised in Art.61(3) and 
Art.62(l) where the objective of optimum utilisation of resources is set as the target. Also Art.62(3) 
gives priority to ‘the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal 
state concerned and its other national interests’ before giving any permission for access to a given 
zone. This last analysis seems to support the contrary argument. However, if the way the national 
interests of coastal states, particularly those of newly-independent developing ones, are shaped, is
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analysed, the picture would be quite different. Economic development and growth have been set as 
important targets in contradiction to the possibility of such changes in regions where people used to 
live at subsistence level by using very limited natural resources. After setting economic targets they 
did not have to look too far to find a means of development, and that was in the area of marine 
living resources. Encouraged by international aid agencies such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), third world governments have sought to create 
modem industrial fishing fleets in order to boost their foreign exchange earnings (Fairlie et al in the 
Ecologist vol.25, n.2/3; p.50); after all, that was/is the measure of growth. Under these 
circumstances, local social structures began to change in order to adapt to the new regime; also the 
relationship with nature shifted to much more materialistic ground where natural resources became 
a tool to generate more capital for so-called development objectives.
‘Just like individual men, [they] must renounce their savage and lawless 
freedom, adapt [themselves] to public coercive laws, and thus form an 
international state (civitas gentium), which would necessarily continue to grow 
until it embraced all the peoples o f the earth’
(Kant 1995, p .105).
‘Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. Andfor 
this reason, we must conceive discourse as a series o f discontinuous segments 
whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable' (Foucault 1990, p. 100).
Under these circumstances, considering the state of technology and knowledge that is 
necessary for the industrial exploitation of resources for the purposes of development in the area, it 
is obvious that the third world was in a hopeless situation without the help of the developed world, 
especially from those who had commercial interests in long distance fishing. Thus, new zones 
automatically became available to the developed world through the language of progress and 
development. Although this strand of argument seems indirect, it has the power to show that the 
concept of sovereignty or ‘sovereign rights’ is spectacularly misleading as soon as one brings real- 
life conditions into the legalistic discussion.
The reason why it was necessary to create a new economic orientation in the newly- 
independent developing states that were to obtain vast areas of ocean, is obscured by the situation of
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the distant water fleets at the time of the negotiations of the Convention. What was happening in 
fact was the creation of new zones in the areas where the utilisation of marine living resources was 
historically based on subsistence consumption. The only practical way to utilisation was to attract 
the fishing activities of distant water. If the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in the convention was to be 
taken seriously by the coastal states, the impact of it on the distant water states would have been 
horrendous.
By the mid-1970's, the commercial fishing industry had reached a monstrous scale. In 1953 
the first long-distance water vessel was built (commissioned for whaling in the Atlantic. It was 
named Fairtry. Sanger 1986, p. 139). As this long-distance fishing technology had become more 
accessible for those who had the capital, the method of fishing altered profoundly. Warner estimates 
the Soviet fishing fleet at 710 factory trawlers, 103 factory mother ships and more than 2800 
smaller side trawlers in 1974 (Warner 1983; p.53). The main attraction for the Soviet Union and 
others such as Japan, Korea and West Germany was the availability of resources on the basis of 
freedom of fishing in the high seas. In 1968, DWFN reached their peak by catching 2,400,000 tons 
in the North-West Atlantic alone. In the following decade the catch in the same area dropped to a 
level of 2,176,000 tons and the size of the fish had been getting smaller and smaller (Warner 1983). 
The solution was to intensify the effort in order to increase the levels again. Between 1970 and 
1990, the FAO recorded a doubling in the world fishing fleet, from 585,000 to 1.2 million large 
boats(Polack 1994). The world catch also increased from 60 million tonnes in 1974 to 86 million 
tonnes in 1989, since when it has declined to about 84 million tonnes (Weber 1994; p. 15). On the 
basis of these figures it is obvious that from the 1960s onwards certain states spent huge amounts to 
build distant water fleets and through these means they capitalised on the marine living resources. 
The new law that was designed for the management of marine resources was a backlash both for 
further capitalisation on marine resources and for the existing infrastructure.
Therefore, the Convention had to reflect the interests of both DWFN and the coastal states, 
if it was to be applied. Also, through the Convention new zones had to be brought into the global 
market as any isolation of fishing grounds would have been considered unacceptable. In furtherance 
of the discussion about sovereignty, the argument of the existence of sovereignty would be 
conceivable as long as it implies some sort of coastal state control over a given marine
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environment. However, strictly juridical analyses or interpretations seem to lose the point that, 
under the given global economy and market orientations, the concept of sovereignty becomes 
irrelevant. The EEZ regime was designed to integrate the area of oceans, where exploitation had 
been going on in a rather disorganised manner, into global market dynamics through legal and 
social legitimisation.
'Peoples who have grouped themselves into nation states may be judged in the 
same way as individual men living in a state o f nature, independent o f external 
o f laws; for they are standing offence to one another by the very fact that they 
are neighbours. Each nation, for the sake o f its own security, can and ought to 
demand o f others that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar 
to civil one, within which the rights o f each could be secured.... [this] federation 
does not aim to acquire any power like that o f a state, but merely to preserve and 
secure the freedom o f each state in itself, along with other confederated 
states....It can be shown that this idea o f federalism, extending gradually to 
encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has 
objective reality’ (Kant 1995, p. 102).
The process of the extension of zones is usually described as the enclosure of the oceans in 
the literature of the international law of the sea, but it seems that it was an enclosure in the sense 
that it created fragmented national patches of ocean; on the other hand, from the perspective of 
distant water fishing nations, it is a legitimised ‘Gold Rush’ for more exploitation. Therefore, it 
should be seen as the opening up of new areas to industrialisation.
‘The idea o f international right presupposes the separate existence o f many 
independent states. And such a state o f affairs is essentially a state o f war, unless 
there is a federal union to prevent hostilities breaking out.. [Thus] nature wisely 
separates the nations, although the will o f each individual state, even basing its 
arguments on international right, would gladly unite them under its own sway by 
force or by cunning. On the other hand, nature also unites nations with the 
concept o f cosmopolitan right would not have protected from violence and war, 
and does so by means o f their mutual self interest. For the spirit o f commerce 
sooner or later takes hold o f every people, and it cannot exist side by side with 
war. And all the powers (or means) at the disposal o f the power o f the state, 
financial power can probably be relied on most' (Kant 1995, p. 113).
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In the report named ‘Our Common Future’ prepared by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development during the second half of the 1980s, in fact, this situation was 
established as the desirable end to remove poverty, protect the ‘environment’ and create healthy 
development that would be sustainable. The statistics given above in relation to the level of catch 
and the number of boats during the last decade show a success story for the EEZ regime in helping 
the orderly and systematic industrialisation of the oceans rather than anything else in the sense of 
bringing intended control and sound management objectives.
The next section will try to outline sovereignty claims in relation to the concept of 
conservation and the probable consequences of such a relationship. The section is divided into two 
parts. The first one deals with the relationship between sovereignty and the concept of conservation 
while the second part deals with the particularities of such a relationship in the framework of the 
Convention —  UNCLOS HI.
Sovereignty and Conservation o f Ocean Resources
The right to decide conservation measures in the new zone is one of the four rights that are 
considered under the concept of sovereignty in UNCLOS m. Through Art.56(l)(a) these rights are 
deposited with the coastal state.
In general, attempts to resolve concerns about conservation were made in Art.61. According 
to this Article, the main measure seems to be the determination of an ‘allowable catch’ (Art.61(l)). 
Moreover, the coastal state is supposed to conserve and manage the living resources of the zone in 
order to prevent over-exploitation (Art.61 (2)). While conserving and managing the zone, the coastal 
state shall act on the basis of ‘the best scientific evidence available to it’. The third paragraph of the 
same article, however, qualifies the target of conservation as ‘to maintain or restore population of 
harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield’ on the basis of 
‘environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities 
and the special requirements of developing states, and taking into account fishing patterns’
(Art.61 (3)). Moreover, paragraph four brings up the issue of considering consequences of catch on 
‘species associated with or dependent upon harvested species’ (Art.61 (4)).
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Art.62(l) further qualifies the target of management and therefore of conservation. The 
‘objective of optimum utilisation of the living resources’ is the main concern and aim. Paragraph 
two of Art.62 designates the right to ‘determine the harvesting capacity of the coastal state’ to itself.
The convention differentiates between management and, therefore, conservation of certain 
species that have peculiar life cycles. Art.64 deals with the highly migratory species and sets the 
‘objective of optimum utilisation of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the 
exclusive economic zone’ (Art.64). In this article there is no openly-expressed conservation strategy 
that is to be adopted both by the coastal state and the other states interested in such resources. The 
only measure that might establish a base is the optimum utilisation criteria.
Art.66 deals with anadromous stocks. In this article, primary responsibility and interest are 
granted to the state of origin (Art.66(l)). Fisheries of anadromous species are allowed in the new 
zone unless it causes economic dislocation for the coastal state or the other states. In the case of 
economic dislocation, consultation with the state of origin is required (Art.66(3)(a)). Although 
Art.66(3)b ensures the rights of traditional fisheries, they are required to agree with the state of 
origin in the enforcement of regulations beyond the EEZ (Art.66(3)d). Again, in this article the 
emphasis on the conservation of stocks is negligible. There are no apparent conservation measures 
required apart from those that are deemed necessary by the state of origin.
As an overall summary of the status of the concept of conservation in UNCLOS ID, it is 
legitimate to claim that it does not exist in an effective, helpful and competent manner.22 It does 
exist, however, in a very matter-of-fact way through vague assertions, most of which should be seen 
as repudiating themselves because of the lack of proper definitions and deliberations. Before getting 
into further analyses of the concept of conservation and its relation with the concept of national 
sovereignty, it is imperative to understand the dynamics of the terrain that UNCLOS ID deals with, 
i.e. the dynamics of the oceanic ecosystem.
The simplest way of beginning to examine the ocean might be to start with its physical 
qualities. Although humans differentiate various oceans on the basis of geographical locations, 
‘they’ present a unit structure of massive water parts which are always in motion from one place to 
another through different mechanisms of transport. The surface currents of the oceans are named as 
‘gyres’ that have a pattern of large closed loops. The main currents are the outside paths of the gyres
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(Press et al.l 986 (4th.ed); p. 291). There are different reasons for the existence of currents: the 
effect of winds and air-water interaction, the heat difference among the masses of water and 
deflection of some masses because of the geological components of the ocean such as deep ocean 
ridges (Barnes et al 1988; pp:4-15). The effect of these causes can produce the vertical movement 
of deep water called ‘upwelling’; if the action is opposite and water is going down it is called 
‘sinking’ (Press et al 1986; p.291). In all these physical actions, the chemistry of the ocean has 
tremendous importance as well. Most of these actions are also influenced by salinity and heat, 
which determine the density of water. Therefore, on the basis of different densities there is a 
movement of divergence or convergence where waters of different density change places vertically 
and horizontally. Here the system starts to become rather complicated because these movements of 
water are the way in which nutrients are carried from different levels to the other parts of the ocean. 
Upwelling areas are particularly important because of the rising of nutrient-rich waters. One of the 
reasons why deep waters are nutrient-rich might be the mineral intake through the interaction of the 
ocean and mid-ocean ridges. Also, the ocean-atmosphere relationship is very important, firstly, 
because of gas interchange and secondly, because of evaporation which balances the heat, both 
atmospherically and in water.
The biological component of this system is highly important as well. The ocean is a lively 
place in which various different life forms exist in constant interaction with each other. It might be 
stating the obvious but, the marine environment is a three-dimensional system where delicate links 
between different levels exist through the animals and plants and usually through the mediation of 
water itself. As expressed before, water is in constant movement, and so are most of the species of 
the ocean. There are those sedentary ones, i.e. benthic species, and most of the plants are rather 
stationary but even they can travel great lengths through means of physical transportation, i.e. 
hurricanes.
The extent of biological life in the ocean varies from microscopic planktons to huge whales. 
However, marine organisms can be located in two large categories dependent on whether they live 
in the water mass (pelagic) or in the bottom sediments or rock (benthic) (Barnes et al. 1988, p. 18). 
These categories are not rigid. There are those animals which could be in either group during 
different stages of their life cycles. For example, 80 per cent of the tropic benthic species have
22 See Ward 1998.
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plankto-tropic larvae (Barnes et al. 1988, p. 87). In terms of large groups one could differentiate 
plankton, zooplankton and nekton. And this order also reflects the development in size where 
plankton is the smallest living organism and nekton is the largest. Nevertheless, all these categories 
have internal divisions as well. According to their sizes there are ultraplankton, nanoplankton, 
microplankton, macroplankton and megaplankton (Barnes et al. 1988, p.20). Nonetheless, the 
phytoplankton is the sole source of the oceanic food web (Barnes et al. 1988, p.20). Through the 
process of carbon fixing they liberate oxygen by using water as the hydrogen donor (Barnes et al 
1988, p.40). This process of fixation is responsible for the primary generation of organic 
compounds in the sea.23. Carbohydrates, fats and protein are all synthesised and the total quantity of 
carbon or energy fixed forms the ‘gross primary production’ (Barnes et al. 1988, p.45). The level of 
primary production is determined by factors like light, turbulence, nutrients, and grazing (Barnes et 
al. 1988, p.46-58). Also, different latitudes have different production characteristics. In order to 
understand what happens to the primary production one should analyse the food consumption lines 
in the system. The predominant model that is used in this sort of analysis is called trophic levels. 
This concept was established on the assumption that different species prey on others according to 
their location in the order of evolution and feeding characteristics. This means that there is a chain 
of plant-herbivore and carnivore species. This line of reasoning was based on terrestrial ecology in 
the first place (Bames et al. 1988, p.66). In terms of marine ecology, it indicates the fact that there is 
a chain of plankton-zooplankton and nekton. However, this concept greatly depends on abstraction 
that has no bearing on the real situation of the marine food web. The organisms in level five are, 
according to the theory, supposed to feed on only level four organisms which is not the case at all. 
Also, the existence of energy flows through the detritus of different organisms makes trophic levels 
less applicable. Therefore, the marine energy flow system through organisms should be considered 
as a web (most of the organisms change their prey on the basis of scarcity or stress) rather than a 
linear chain which shows rigid feeding habits.
The relationship among the species of Benthos that are spending their life on or in the sea­
bed and Pelagic species is also very important. Particularly those species living in anaerobic 
habitats are important for the gas decomposition (Bames et al. 1988, pp.77-79). The species of 
benthos get their food through the detritus from the pelagic area. The differentiation of feeding
23 This process is also seen as the mechanism that triggered life on Earth in general.
I l l
habits as suspension and deposit feeders allow full utilisation of detritus (Bames et al, 1988, pp.79- 
85). It is noted that this food web is not one way at all. Nixon et al.(1976) investigated the 
regeneration of nitrogen by three different shallow water benthic systems in Narragansett Bay, 
Rhode Island, and found that the release of ammonia by benthic animals was responsible for the 
seasonal pattern of ammonia in the pelagic zone.
One of the most important components of the food web is nekton. The important quality of 
nekton is its capacity for locomotion through horizontal space which is much easier than that of 
planktonic species. This quality, in a way, determines the life cycle of the nekton. They change 
locations through their life. The sites of the spawning, nursery and adult populations are different. 
The nursery grounds tend to be closer to the surface, nutrient-rich photic zone. Although this 
structure is usually considered as having a triangular structure, it might be different from one 
species to another. The locations might be different vertically as well. And certain species travel a 
great distance to spawn as is the case for the grey whale that travels 18,000 km for each ground 
(Bames et al. 1988, p.211-214). However, this whole system is not as straightforward as it sounds. 
Given the fact that a fish starts its life as larvae and metamorphoses on the way, it is influenced by 
the other conditions of the oceans, for example, currents, heat, variations of phytoplanktonic bloom, 
zooplanktonic abundance, the abundance of predators and competition for food in its own cohort. 
Therefore, mortality rates are usually very high (Bames et al. 1988, p.217).
The place of nektonic production generally reflects the pattern of the primary fixation of 
carbon, but because they are carnivorous in general, they are one or more stages further away from 
the planktonic algae. However, this is not strict either, killer whales and sharks definitely being in 
this category whereas herring and anchovies are not as long as they consume members of the 
plankton (Bames et al. 1988, p.222), and yet all these groups belong to the nekton.
The other major component of this picture is, without any doubt, the habitat structure. If one 
starts from terrestrial interaction — salt-marshes, mangrove swamps, sea-grass meadows, rocks, 
corals and kelp forests where all this biological life has been established — it is seen that they are 
undeniable components of the system. These different habitats and niches in those habitats are the 
causes of the diversity of organisms in the ocean. The corals and kelp forests have the same 
structure as terrestrial rain forests. They offer a three dimensional habitat in a three-dimensional
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water mass, therefore expanding the space for the existence of different organisms. The life they 
offer is dependent on symbioses. In this context, it is usually difficult to reduce the web of relations 
to linear reasoning. For example, kelp forests photosynthesise and in this, wave action is important 
in providing more exposure to the sunlight and therefore enhancing nutrient uptake. The nutrients 
produced by the kelp enter the food web through the detritus which exist, sometimes as fragmented 
particles, but usually as a result of the release of dissolved organic matter that is flocculated by 
bacteria (Bames et al. 1988, p. 158).
In order to exemplify a community relationship in the kelp forest, Bames and Hughes use 
the case of the Nova Scotia coast where a substantial part of the kelp forest was grazed and cleaned 
out by sea urchins (Strongylocentrotus). This occured when, suddenly, a balanced system was 
changed by the increased population of sea-urchins (for a similar phenomenon see also the case of 
the Aleutian Islands by Estes and Palmisano).24
Moreover, it is a well established case that the removal of keystone species such as the sea 
otter (Enhydra lutris) ( Estes and Palmisano 1974, pp. 1058-60) or lobsters in the given case (Mann 
and Breen 1972; p.603-9) have important effects on such habitats as kelp forests, insofar as the 
mentioned species through their predator status control the expansion of benthic species, which in 
turn at the expense of the kelp forest (Simenstad et al. 1978; Mann 1985; Kitching 1986). 
Nevertheless, in the case of Nova Scotia it is argued that the change in the urchin population is 
much more synergistic, that is, it was not only based on the change in the keystone species but on a 
combination of that and oceanographic conditions such as temperature change (Mann 1985, pp.227- 
46). Therefore, it is argued that changes in the communities are dependent upon various different 
reasons such as a change in food availability or feeding efficiency (Blankley and Branch 1984 for 
starfish); oceanography; and cooperation and competition are also seen as important agents of 
different biological interactions (Buss 1981, pp. 1012-14). All these different variations in 
individual relationships, in social organisation or social density of the species, imply that there is a 
relationship that cannot be simply explained through hierarchical views about the organisation.
24 Although a concrete reason for the sudden change in the sea-urchin population has not been found, one theory is that 
‘[l]obsters feed readily on urchins and normal densities, lobsters would be able to keep a pre-epidemic urchin population 
under check. Over fishing may have reduced the lobster predation pressure so much that the urchin population escaped 
and grew into an unchecked epidemic’ (Bames et al, 1988; p.153).
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Considering this brief exposition about the marine ecosystem, it seems sensible to argue that 
what is out there in the ocean is an extremely complex system of sophisticated biological relations 
among the organisms that are organised into inter-related, multi-layered communities which are 
influenced by interconnected oceanographic conditions.
In the context of UNCLOS HI, the complex ecological structure causes a problem in relation 
to its claim to fame. This problem might be analysed in two ways. The first is the question of 
whether the measures drawn up in UNCLOS HI in relation to the ecological complexity were 
ecosystemically efficient, and should they have been considered as compatible with the concept of 
sovereignty that is the core of the new regime. The second way would question the validity of the 
premises that underpin the concepts of conservation in UNCLOS DL
The ‘Nature ’ by which we are *surrounded’ is, o f course, an entity within-the- 
world; but the kind o f Being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand 
nor to what is present-at-hand as ‘Things o f Nature'. No matter how this Being 
o f Nature ’ may be Interpreted, all the modes ofBeing o f entities within-the- 
world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood o f the world, and 
accordingly upon the phenomenon o f Being-in-the world (Heidegger 1995, 
p.254).
Regarding the first area of analysis, if one considers even for a minute that the conservation 
measures described at the beginning of this section were efficient, the application of them on the 
basis of national sovereignty would have been absolutely illogical. As it is, the ecosystem of the 
ocean represents a complex unity which requires an understanding of the ecosystem as a whole 
rather than superficial, convenient divisions on the basis of unrelated interests. In particular, 
political divisions such as the EEZ have no bearing in relation to natural dynamics and realities 
whatsoever. No single being carries a passport or recognises political divisions in the oceanic 
ecosystem apart from human beings. It is futile to attempt to adopt conservation and management 
regimes based on political divisions, particularly if they are based on individual state sovereignty.
‘Ifpower were never anything but repressive, i f  it never did anything but to say 
no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold 
good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us 
a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces
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pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than 
as a negative instance whose function is repression ’ (Foucault 1980, p. 119).
What is required by the system is a regime based on an understanding of the complex unity 
of the ecosystem rather than one based on inappropriate political fragmentation, since the sound 
existence of the system depends on the responsibility of all human society. Dispersing the 
responsibility to states by fixing it to ‘the national interest’, itself based on the local economic needs 
of coastal fishing communities, as well as the special requirements of developing states and the 
other issues (mentioned in Art.61), seems extremely oversimplifying and problematic. It discounts 
the condition of responsibility to a limited conceptualisation that is based on idiosyncrasies.
Unfortunately, the realities of short-sighted political and economic goals (Our Common 
Future; p.265) are far from being a rare incidence in the international arena. Under the analysis 
given in the first section, it seems more likely that conservation measures will be applied arbitrarily 
and only when they are not opposed to the immediate interests of the states.
Regarding the second area of analysis, conservation measures and the prescribed 
exploitative system have to be considered together. The division that is taken as the structure of this 
chapter, i.e. utilisation and conservation, is artificial. These two things are very important for a 
management regime.
The striking feature of the Convention in relation to conservation is the fact that there is no 
specific measure of conservation — which might imply a total lack of understanding of ecology. 
What there is, is the image of conservation, and recognition that sound management necessitates 
measures of conservation. However, if Art.61 is taken as the culmination of the concept of 
conservation, it becomes obvious that the concept of conservation has been fixed to the utilisation 
of the living resources. The measures of conservation should be able to ensure maximum 
sustainable yield without causing over-exploitation in the zone in order to maintain the objective of 
optimum utilisation. Possibly the only conservation-oriented phrase is ‘the consideration of 
associated and dependent species’. Therefore, the starting point of the next section will be 
conservation measures on the grounds of the concept of associated and dependent species in
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relation to the required pattern of exploitation in the zone. The soundness of the required 
exploitation system will now be questioned.
UNCLOS III and the Measures o f Conservation
What is implied by the term ‘associated and dependent species’? In terms of the biology of living 
resources it means that there are many different direct and indirect relations in the ecosystem among 
its different components. Although a predation-based relationship has an immediate impact on the 
system, it has much more subtle indirect effects as well, such as changing the structure of lower 
trophic levels (Tsumuru et al. 1993, p.296). Patten (1991, p.288-351) suggests that there is an 
overall or ultimate relationship between an organism and others in its environment, defined as the 
entire ecosystem network of interacting components and, he adds, that this network is often 
mutualistic. However, there are also relations based on competition. These relationships of 
mutualism or competition can occur through themany pathways that exist in the system. These 
interactions may occur between species that are separated by one or more intervening species in the 
food web. Also, a change in a given quality of one species such as its population size may have a 
variety of qualitatively different effects on different qualities of different species such as individual 
fitness, population growth rates, long-term population changes (Abrams 1987; p.272-81). One thing 
which should be clarified is that all communities have individual parts, as well as themselves being 
a part of a larger system. Therefore, all these systemic relationships exist for intra-community 
structures as well. Behavioural or other changes, like food habits, have different reasons and 
consequences for a specific group of species and a larger system that they exist within. Also, the 
impact of these changes may be fundamentally different in the long term on some other species at 
the other end of the system because of varied areas of susceptibilities and differences in physical 
living conditions.
It is all too clear that the phrase in the Convention in reference to all these complex 
relationships is inadequate and does not reflect the above relationships of dependency. What it 
refers to, in reality, is profoundly different. It refers to those species of incidental or by-catch that 
have market value and exploitability. The main concern is to keep levels of harvest intact, but this
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short-sighted view of dependency would, in fact, do more harm than good. It puts, for example, 
higher nektonic species apart from their system and considers them on an individual basis. For 
example, it is not at all clear whether coastal states should consider reclamations at the expense of 
mangrove swamps or salt marshes under Art.61 (4) or not. What is the perceived dependency 
relationship between these habitats and the living resources? This sort of consideration seems 
irrelevant in the context of the Convention.
Since the concept of conservation expressed in Art.61 (4) is based on commercial interest, it 
is interesting to see how oversimplifying it is. There is no specific control measure or quality of 
conservation, only a highly ambiguous, even impressionistic, phrase. The above-described 
dependency system works on natural conditions and may be seen as being balanced. However, this 
is not the case when human intervention is added to the system as one of the parts of the eco­
system. Human effort is usually concentrated on harvesting certain species over a period of time on 
a regular basis, not at all due to natural reasons. This means that there may be a huge stress on a 
group of species which is building up and, even if there is recovery of a certain level of stock, it 
does not mean that a sudden change in the stock is impossible. Also, the reflection of this effect on 
the system could be drastic. So what seems to be missing from the convention’s understanding of 
conservation is recognition of the potential cumulative effect of human practice on certain groups 
and the system in general, together with the ability to conceptualise human beings as one of the 
parties within the same ecological space with, for example, fish. The idea of cumulative stress does 
not exist, the consideration in the Convention is based on seasonal harvestable capacity that has 
very little to say about the conditions of the ecosystem.
Furthermore, Art.61 (5) enumerates sources of possible available scientific information. In 
this, the main inputs are catch and fishing effort statistics together with other necessary data 
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks. Once more, vagueness in the second part is confusing 
because it is not clear what is considered as other relevant data and also how it is going to be 
processed. These decisions are also considered under the concept of sovereignty. Other states are 
expected to contribute to data-gathering but there is no indication of a cooperative interpretation of 
gathered data. Therefore, it may be argued that concerns expressed in Art.61 (3) are going to be
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important as long as the available scientific information is used in decisions taken on the allowable 
catch in a given zone.
All these arguments have focused on the conservation of resources in the new zone. 
Considering the species that are regulated by different articles, the conservation measures are very 
loosely defined indeed. There are demands for cooperation in conserving those stocks, but no 
definitive standard has been set, apart from optimum utilisation in the case of highly migratory 
species (Art.64(l)), and a requirement of due regard to the conservation requirements which are 
concerned with the renewal of anadromous stocks (Art.64(3)c) and the needs of the state of origin 
(Art.66(3)a) in this case. It seems there are no guidelines for conservation levels or the level at 
which anadromous stocks are supposed to be renewed. Particularly, on the basis of Art.64, the 
needs of the coastal state expand over an area larger than the EEZ. Furthermore there is the question 
of the high seas. All the states that are utilising the living resources of the high seas are required to 
cooperate through Part VII, Section 2 of the Convention. In Art. 117 this necessity of cooperation is 
openly established. However, it is further qualified by ‘as may be necessary for the conservation of 
the living resources of the high sea’. This qualification creates a byway through which excuses can 
be created. It does not specify under which conditions and upon whose authority such a necessity 
would be claimed. In Art.l 19 the conservation concept that is developed in Art.61 is adopted with 
slight modification for the high seas. Once more, conservation is fixed to the optimum utilisation 
concept. In this connection, again, there is no recommended category for the determination of 
parameters expressed in the article. Since this is an international area, every single state is free to 
qualify itself in one way or another on the basis of self interest to utilise the resources of the high 
seas. This argument is backed up by Art.l 19(3). It is in conflict with Art.l 19(1 )a where special 
requirements and other considerations are asserted. Individual states might take conservation 
measures, but because of the freedom of fishing on the high seas, such an act is prevented by 
Art. 119(3).
Moreover, only those states that are concerned with a given conservation issue on the high 
seas are supposed to use the best scientific data available to ‘them’ (Art.l 19(l)a). In other words, 
data presented in contradiction to certain states can be disqualified, if the best available data does
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not serve to the interests of a given state. Conservation on the high seas appears as an arbitrary 
political decision.
Considering the mismatch of the ecosystem and the Convention, it seems obvious that 
UNCLOS ED is in no way a convention that is designed to be an initiative for sound conservation of 
the ocean that has been exploited indiscriminately. There is no concept of ecosystem conservation. 
As was shown before, there is a need for a system based on holistic understanding. This idea is 
absolutely disregarded and the established system is based on total fragmentation on politico-legal 
lines. Self-interest based zones under the banner of sovereignty were created without considering 
any environmental consequences. Bearing in mind the needs of the ecosystem, it is clear that 
nothing in the present Convention is efficient in terms of conservation of a ecosystem. Moreover, 
creating a highly divided system of administration that tends to manage each species individually is 
yet another adverse factor. The method of this divided management happens to be Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) (Art.61 (3)), which raises question marks about the compatibility of this 
method for sound utilization of the ocean resources.
The compatibility of the MSY concept was challenged even before UNCLOS m. However, 
it seems — or seemed to the negotiators — appropriate for the new zone. Apart from scientific 
doubt about the validity of the concept, to connect it with extra-scientific considerations (Art.61) 
seems most unhealthy. How does MSY work in the management of the fish catch?
Maximum Sustainable Yield means the greatest catch that can be taken for a long period of 
time without any danger to the stock (Kwiatkowska 1989, p.2). In deciding such a limit, it is crucial 
to know the size of a given stock i.e. population, growth rate, natural mortality rate and fishing 
levels of the stock. The way to estimate the size of the stock would be through the measurement of 
‘catch per Unit Effort’. From the growth rates and death rates of the stock, an equation is derived 
which relates catch or yield per recruit to fishing mortality (Cushing 1981, p.95). In this regard 
fishing mortality is assumed to be proportional to the fishing effort. Another assumption is the fact 
that in order to maintain the size of the stock recruitment, that is the magnitude of the cohort, or 
year classes, at the age at which it joins the stock, it must be equal to the total mortality rate 
(Cushing 1981, p.95). In the same manner fish mortality can be arrived at: from the catch equation 
(Cushing 1981, pp.96-117), fishing mortality is the ratio of catch in numbers to the average stock in
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the sea. According to Cushing all the models used to regulate stocks of fish make certain 
assumptions one of which being that natural mortality is relatively low and does not change with 
age (Cushing 1981, p. 196). Therefore, catch-effort statistics are very useful in finding out about 
mortality. The other important component of the analysis is the variation in the rate of recruitment 
of the stock. The variations are usually supposed to be based on previous catch effort on the same 
stock, and the survival of off-springs on the basis of density-dependence mortality. Apart from 
these considerations the economics of the issue created a new derivation of MSY, that is Maximum 
Economical Yield (MEY). This is the level of sustainable fishing that gives the best economic 
returns (Smith 1995; p.82). It is based on the argument that profits are higher somewhere below the 
limit of the MSY. According to Gulland (1968, pp.256-61), the increment of yield for each 
increment of fishing intensity decreases as the maximum is approached with increasing fishing 
intensity. However, it is shown that MEY is also not successful.25
Whether it is directly MSY or in a modified form MEY, both are based on theories of linear 
relationships between a given target stock and fishing effort. Both measures discount the 
complexity of the system in which a given stock exists. All the analyses have scientific grounding. 
However, the scientific method used is to find patterns in given stock through catch statistics and 
reflect them as management guidelines. Through the years this scientific labour produces various 
patterns for different stocks that are seen as accurate, insofar as predictions based on this knowledge 
of patterns are holding. Nevertheless, the pattern should not be confused with the processes that 
actually produce the pattern (Noakes and Baylis 1990, pp.555-83). Moreover, the difference 
between mathematical and statistical processes and the real biological one must be recognised. 
Patterns are changeable under real conditions; statistically and mathematically the relationship 
between the catch and mortality can be shown and used as a justification for certain management 
schemes, but it does not explain a sudden decline in the stock unless the conditions of the system, 
other than mere catch statistics, are integrated into the formulations. Patterns alone can be used as a 
good descriptive tool without having explanatory power and that comes with comprehension of the 
underlying ecological processes.
The relationship, or the conditions, of a single stock are considered in the Convention on the 
basis of MSY as long as it is the main concern of the related industry. So the measures of
25 See The Ecologist vol.l25-n.2/3, p.86 where the Canadian experience is outlined.
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management are deflected by this approach and the end result might be the annihilation of the target 
species as well as different species that have no relation on the basis of linear connections.
Considering the complications of this argument, it is fair to suggest that the fisheries regime 
established by UNCLOS in is an ecologically-inadequate system. The scientific grounding has 
disadvantages for ecology as well as for economics in the long run. The scientific basis of 
UNCLOS lH does not bring the complex ecology into play in establishing the ocean regime. In 
addition, by combining such a system with the concept of sovereignty, the adversity has been 
enhanced by creating a fragmented space not only between states but between states and high seas 
as well. Therefore, the concept of conservation seems redundant in the Convention for the 
individual economic interests of the related parties. On the other hand, it seems UNCLOS IE was 
formulated for the latter objective rather than the former. In the words of Kwiatkowska
[T]he 200 mile zones have the underlying purpose of accelerating the socio­
economic development of states and reducing the inequalities existing between
the industrialised and developing countries the economic potential of living
resources was the main motivation behind the establishment of EEZ by both 
developing and industrialised states (Kwiatkowska 1989; p.2).
Recognising state sovereignty over utilisation/conservation, while not defining the way and manner 
through which healthy management may be maintained, is the real disadvantage of the system. It 
allows individual states to apply what conservation measures they would deem necessary without 
having any consideration other than immediate interests which may not necessarily be good for the 
ecosystem and also, therefore, for humankind in general. Moreover, because of this structure, i.e. 
sovereignty based management, the claim expressed by Kwiatkowska can be contested.
Why Sovereignty?
Thus far I have argued, firstly that, the concept of sovereignty established by the Convention to 
protect the rights of developing states and create equal opportunities for all states, should be seen as 
a failing legal abstraction. It has made possible the integration of massive parts of the ocean into 
world market relations in such a way that political decisions of developing coastal states are shaped
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by the developed world and not necessarily in the interests of local communities which are 
excluded from the decision making process about their immediate ecological relations. Secondly, I 
have argued that fragmented management measures are inefficient for the management of the 
oceanic ecosystem, insofar as the fragmentation of administration on the basis of individual state 
interests creates arbitrary applications that are incompatible with an understanding of the ocean 
system and its inhabitants. In this process, the production of knowledge in relation to ecology is 
limited and shaped by the concerns, again, produced by concept of ‘sovereignty’.
The ocean is considered as a ‘Global Common’ by many people (Cladwell 1990).
Moreover, the issue is considered under the heading of ‘Managing the Commons’ in the Brundland 
report. Although, in the report, international cooperation between EEZs for sound management is 
seen as an imperative, national interest-based exploitation is encouraged as well (Our Common 
Future, p.268). Presumably, it only requires on human ingenuity to consider one thing as common 
and then to try to manage the same thing on the basis of a piecemeal approach. Furthermore, it is 
argued that EEZ management of the developed world has been much more successful than that of 
the developing world when fishing effort in the respective EEZs has been considered. Reading 
between the lines, there is an inbuilt attitude that derives from the needs of the industrial world in 
relation to UNCLOS HI. Given the conditions of the developing world, by drawing development 
plans through which the utilisation of marine living resources were established as targets, the path 
for the industrial world has been opened up. This has allowed the developed world to manage their 
own EEZ strictly, while exploiting other areas on different terms. Therefore, if there is a success 
story to be written it must include the performance of single countries not only in their own zones 
but wherever they fish in the ocean — in other words their behaviour at a systemic level. Otherwise, 
to accuse disadvantaged coastal states seems to be a travesty of the reality, based on the knowledge 
produced through the concept of ‘sovereignty’, whereby individual zones have become fictional, 
self-contained units of analysis.
According to Kaczynski,
implementation of EEZ in this region (sub-Saharan West Africa) late in the 
1970s and early 1980s did not substantially change the ways these (marine living 
resources) resources are used and managed. They are even more heavily 
exploited and depleted now than before and foreign fleets continue to extract the
122
lion’s share in economic value of the commercially important stocks. The coastal 
countries' capabilities to control the exploitation process of these resources and 
use them directly for their own benefit are still low and will remain this way 
many years ahead (1989, p.2).
This situation under the new regime was/is supposed to create at least some substantial revenue for 
the developing countries, but it has not done so.26 Because of the lack of enforcement and 
surveillance measures, aid dependency, and hard currency-based investment in the areas that are not 
related to resource management such as military build-up, the coastal states seem to be getting a 
fraction of what they are supposed to get (Kaczynski, 1989; p.5-10). Apart from this, using their 
sovereign authority to further open up their zones to foreign exploitation, while trying to avoid 
conservationist claims on the basis of the same concept, has been an important way of subsidising 
the hard currency requirements of these countries. Since the revenue has been low, they are trying to 
increase it by allowing less controlled zones and more utilisation.27
In the final analysis, ‘sovereignty’ seems to have been used, whether intentionally or not, as 
a vehicle for expanding and ensuring continuity of the industrialisation of the ocean — at this point 
the example of Japanese fisheries interests in the Caribbean (presented in the previous chapter) is an 
extremely good and relevant example of the situation. The rather loaded ideas about the possible 
meaning of ‘sovereignty’ in terms of autonomy, authority, and control produced and sustained both 
through the discourse and the resulting practice of International Relations have obscured, what has 
been produced, in terms of a path leading to ecological problems. How this is produced has also 
been hidden on the basis of the naturalness of this ambiguous concept.
In order to see what has been produced — in other words the present reality in which this 
study is located — we have to unfold the end result of ‘sovereignty’ in its deployment. The 
application of the concept has created a conceptual schizophrenia that is established in UNCLOS El 
as the new way of understanding ‘environmental’ problems. It is clear that the way conservation
26 Kaczynski adds that the pressure by the global market on these resources is very high. Therefore ‘fishing fleet 
operators are often more interested in immediate benefits from resource exploitation than in long-term solutions 
addressing regional environmental concerns and coastal state systemic difficulties’. See Kaczynski, 1989; p.3.
27 The trend that was created should be seen in terms of market competition. According to Queirolo and Johnston, Japan 
increased its landings by 6 per cent between 1973 and 1985, for the Republic o f Korea, the increase was 59 per cent 
(1989, p. 19). The competitive advantage of resource ownership has been replaced by the competitive advantage of  
developed technologies and diminished operating risks that had existed in the open access utilisation o f the high seas.
See Kaczynski, 1989, p. 18.
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and protection are thought of in the convention is located within a certain understanding of ethical 
relationality between sovereign states and the EEZs. In this relationship the grounding of 
conservation and protection can be found in the economic interests of sovereign agents.28 In other 
words the ideas rest on a certain set of ‘values and beliefs about the relationship between humans 
and the natural world* (Ward 1998, p.94). Therefore, I would argue further, that it is not only the 
incompatibility o f ‘sovereignty* as a norm with conservation and ecological understanding which 
creates an unecological understanding at the level of implementation, it is the internal constitution 
of sovereignty as a concept which permeates through, even, at the level of initial thinking about 
‘environment’ and, therefore, informs the possibility of conservation, is the source of unecological 
thinking. In every application, or understanding, based on the concept of sovereignty there is an 
implied deeper meaning which exceeds the legal and effective understandings of the concept. It is 
this deeper meaning which produces the possibility of applying the concept without due regard for 
the ecology. In other words, it is the thinking in terms of sovereign being which allows us to think 
in terms o f ‘the equitable and efficient utilisation of [their] resources* and ‘conservation of [their] 
living resources’ 29 It is at the level of turning other beings into our resource base, an existential 
level, that the concept of sovereignty must be analysed rather than what it does as a legal 
abstraction.
The impediment that faces any analyses of sovereignty is the danger of reification of the 
concept as if there were a possibility of generic understanding and therefore a generic definition of 
‘sovereignty’ in an a-historical framework. However, the ecological analysis presented so far 
implies a possibility of overcoming this problem . In order to initiate some sort of de-naturalisation 
of the concept o f ‘sovereignty’, the question is not what sovereignty is, for this question limits the 
possibility of seeing different deployments of ‘sovereignty’ and attributes illiusionary ahistorical 
existence to the concept. It is not a problem of definition to which I am trying to respond, but an 
operational problem. Therefore, the driving questions are more likely to be what this concept does,
28 It is clear that UNCLOS III negogiations were based on the idea that there was a resource pool to be shared in 
order to satisfy concerns o f economic and consumptive returns to states and corporations. In this negotiation process 
the absence o f marine ecologists is rather interesting. See Freidheim 1993.
29 In the convention it is stated that the objective is to establish ‘a legal order for seas and oceans which will facilitate 
international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses o f the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient 
utilization o f their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection, and preservation o f the 
marine environment’ (Convention, preamble, parag.4).
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and how it does and probably, and most importantly, why it does what it does at the present in 
terms of ecological understanding.
Sovereignty Revisited
Heidegger suggests that Keeping silence is another essential possibility of discourse (1995, p.208) 
through which a certain knowledge claim could be conveyed. In the present context I argue that it is 
this silent affirmation of the location of human beings in relation to nature within the concept 
sovereignty that needs to be unpacked. Only through the unpacking of the problem with IR in terms 
of ecology, can the silence about nature be exposed and a new space for discussion be opened.
From the conventional IR perspective the convention and the regime of EEZs can be 
analysed in two general ways. The first is the legalistic explanation that would allow us to see the 
merits of UNCLOS HI regime in terms of abstract mles without relating these to the ecological 
context. It would argue that the convention gives rights to the coastal states to control large patches 
of oceans which used to be free for all. So, the issue here is ordering the oceans. The second is a 
perspective which would analyse whether sovereign rights given are effective in terms of their 
exercise or not. The outcome would be based on the difficulty of having absolute control over EEZs 
as a result of global markets and economic interdependencies, which in turn allows analyst to 
conclude that the sovereign rights recognised in EEZs are an erosion of absolute sovereignty and 
therefore an innovation to the understanding of international relations. Once more, ecological 
understanding and what this frame of international/ sovereignty30 do to ecology in terms of its 
application have been ignored.
As the discourse of IR tries to make sense of this system, the concerns are conditioned on 
the basis of what can be known within IR. This conditioning is hinged and maintained through the
30 In these explanations the questioning does not go beyond the naturalness o f the ‘international’ based on mutual 
understanding o f sovereign-states whereby the new law of the sea is reaffirming the system. On the other hand, this 
assurance of an international certify the possibility o f ‘sovereignty’. Here lies the maintenance mechanism o f the 
discourse of IR which normalises itself through the silent affirmation within what seems to be opposite concepts. Judith 
Butler, in her approach to Monique Wittig, uses Wittig’s argument about production o f heterosexuality ‘the binary 
restriction on sex serves the reproductive aims of a system o f compulsory heterosexuality.’ in Butler 1990, Gender 
Trouble; this argumentation can be used as an analogy to the discourse o f IR which through binary opposition and 
restriction on the possibility of knowing reproduces compulsory ‘international’ discourse. And the upshot o f this is 
an obvious circle that is not possible to transgress.
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continuous production of a naturalness of the system based on the spatial differentiation between 
international and sovereign state. This attempt not only makes possible two differentiated spaces 
but it also makes what can be known, that is, what belongs to these spaces possible as well. In other 
words, it is about the limits of knowing/being on the basis of two spaces that are differentiated in 
terms of the binary opposition. R.B .J. Walker argues that ‘[f]ramed within a spatial metaphysics of 
same and other, citizen and enemy, identity and difference, principle of state-sovereignty express an 
ethics of absolute exclusion* (1995, p.66). It has to be remembered that international is defined, by 
traditional IR, on the basis of the absence of central power, as opposed to the existence and 
centrality of the internal power of individual states which reflects the legitimacy of a state31. Then 
the conceptual tool that creates ‘the international’ is the concept of sovereignty. By posing an 
internal cohesion according to a certain criterion, it creates the outside as that which cannot be 
included in the sovereign space. What is implied with this understanding is, practically, as also 
suggested by Walker, the ethics of being — hence Being — in two different spaces based on 
different ethical states. Therefore, it is important to understand what sovereignty32 means in relation 
to an ethics o f absolute exclusion as its operative function. The following discussion will argue that 
what Walker calls exclusion in terms of spatiality is underpinned by exclusion of nature at the 
ontological level. The territorial spatiality then becomes the reflection of the ontologically 
abstracted human subject.
According to Giorgio Agamben ‘sovereign is at the same time, outside and inside the 
juridical order’ (Agamben 1998, p. 15). Sovereignty, therefore, implies in itself the outside, or inside 
is the source of outside that it is based on the prejudice, or existential concern within the sovereign. 
Agamben (1998) describes how it is the sovereign power that creates political life through what he 
termed as bare life?3 The argument is an attempt to show the constitution of political through the
31 And according to David Campbell this equation also maintains the fictional unity o f internal politics ‘The principal 
impetus behind the location of threats in the external realm comes from the fact that the sovereign domain, for all its 
identification as a well-ordered and rational identity, is as much a site o f ambiguity and indeterminacy as the anarchic 
realm it is distinguished from’ (1992. P.70).
32 As it is indicated through the last section ‘sovereignty’ can be taken as a legal and effective norm. In this norm 
there is still an implied deeper meaning which is related with exclusion at an existential level. In order to recover this 
deeper meaning I am using the concept without necessarily identifying it only as a norm. In other words I am taking 
the concept as unattached to a particular definition within the discipline. By doing this I am able to recover and 
discus philosophical meaning present in the concept.
33 The thinking in terms o f zoe/bios is considered to be central to the Greeks. According to Jacques Taminiaux ‘the 
invention o f the polis and o f its bios is concomitant with an overcoming and, therefore, a repression o f everything
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sovereign power to decide between those who are included and those who are excluded. He argues 
that
[t]he fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy 
but that of bare life/political existence, zoe/bios, exclusion/inclusion, There is 
politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes 
himself to his own bare life and, at the same time maintains himself in relation to 
that bare life in an inclusive exclusion* (1998, p.8).
Any discussion of conservation, protection, exploitation, and sovereignty in general and in the 
context of UNCLOS HI as elaborated above in particular are about life. In the context of UNCLOS 
HI the possibility of using natural resources is about the life of the human population. Although this 
discussion takes place at the expense of the life of other species, this fact remains unacknowledged 
by constituting these lives as resources. In terms of this juncture of bare life/political life, the 
context of the present study in terms of ecology and IR, therefore, becomes a site of contestation in 
terms of life. It is, then, imperative to understand what sovereignty is and what happens when the 
claim of sovereignty is invoked. In other words, the analysis has to shift from a focus on how 
sovereignty is underpinned by international and vice versa to what the concept of sovereignty 
implicitly deploys as a relationally in deciding about the possibility of beings.
The discussion of the political in terms of life has been put forward by several authors in 
terms of modem politics. Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault are two important interlocutors in 
this discussion. It is important to sketch their arguments before I return to the concept of bare life. 
For they allow me to show the connection between politics and life. Foucault argues that modem 
politics represents a shift toward biopolitics:
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the 
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be 
able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life 
itself.. ..what might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been 
reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies...; 
modem man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in 
question (1990, p. 143).
that characterizes the belonging to mere life, zoe , with its eternal return o f desires, appetites, pleasures, violence, and 
voluptuousness’ (1997, p. 102).
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This invocation of life as the relevant ground of politics is also discussed at length by Hannah 
Arendt in The Human Condition (1989). Although Arendt does not follow her discussion to the 
concept of life as biopolitics, life exists in her writings as an implicit political concern. Her analysis 
of the human condition in the modem age demonstrates how ‘life asserted itself as the ultimate 
point of reference in the modem society.. .immortality of individual human life had reversed the 
ancient relationship between man and world and promoted the most mortal thing, human life, to the 
position of immortality’ (Arendt 1989, pp.313-14). She further argues that ‘life, and not the world, 
is the highest good of man’ (Arendt 1989, p.318) remains the central argument in the modem 
thinking. Earlier Arendt discusses the relationship between life and politics (1976, pp. 159-84). 
According to her, the development of Darwinian theory in general —  ‘the genealogy of man from 
animal life’ —  brought the biology of human beings as a consideration into the politics (Arendt 
1976, p. 178). Although aspects of the Darwinian theory were out fashion, she argues, as the basis of 
research, the biological life continued to be a political issue. She says that ‘ [t]he most dangerous 
aspect of these evolutionist doctrines is that they combined the inheritance concept with the 
insistence on personal achievement’ (Arendt 1976, p. 180). Her example is located to discussions of 
race relations through the colonial encounters with Africa ‘whose humanity so frightened and 
humiliated the immigrants that they no longer cared to belong to the same human species’ (Arendt 
1976, p.l 85). It was not, in other words, how they conducted their social relations — differences in 
social organisation to regulate their lives — but it was who they were as human species that made 
the difference; and this difference is unalterable insofar as it is about one’s biological condition of 
possibility for life. When this limit is breached or challenged at the expense of a group or an 
individual, the group’s or the individual’s existence comes under threat. The threat, nonetheless, 
cannot be politically countered because the group is not considered within the discourse of politics 
insofar as it represents a discounted and distanced life form that is not ‘human’ under the defined 
terms of what is it to be human in a given time-space juncture of a social context.34
Arendt’s discussion of minority rights under the nation-state system of Europe (1976, 
pp.267-302) brings the issue of politics on life into more focus in relation to the present chapter’s 
subject matter, that is, the concept of sovereignty. Although her unfolding of the challenge posed by
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the stateless people to the nation-states is very interesting, the implication of statelessness and the 
mechanisms that leads to it, and the way it is dealt with, present us the central figure, that is, the 
sovereign state. The establishment of nation-states in the eastern and southern Europe, she argues, 
brought about the minority treaties through which rights of these people were guaranteed (Arendt 
1976, p.270). This reflects a move towards putting minorities under the decision of the sovereign 
state. As Arendt argues this situation was about spelling out what had been implicit in the concept 
of nation-state
implied in the working system of nation-states, namely, that only nationals could 
be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full 
protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed some 
law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced 
from their origin (1976, p.275).
It must be remembered that these arrangements were concluded between nation-states and, 
therefore, the responsibility was located in the sovereign authority of the state. In other words it was 
‘the sovereign’ who would decide the law of exception for the minorities and again decide the 
limits of their difference and levels of assimilation. It was about deciding and locating their 
difference. According to Arendt the international system of states made it impossible for stateless 
people or refugees to claim their human rights beyond sovereign authority of a state ‘there was no 
place on earth where migrants could go without the severest restriction.. .no territory where they 
could found a new community of their own... it was a problem of political organization’ (1976, 
p.293-94). The refugees in the modem times were/are not only prosecuted because of their doings 
but, also they were/are persecuted because of ‘what they were, unchangeably were-bom into the 
wrong kind of race or the wrong kind of class’ (Arendt 1976, p.294). At this juncture it is 
imperative to see the relation between the logic of race [discussions] and the minority rights issue in 
the same context. Considering stateless people, refugees and others are expected to be assimilated 
by divorcing themselves from their origins, the decision to activate a move towards that, is related 
with the way minorities live and in most cases what they are. This issue of refugees and minorities 
allows us to see sovereignty under a stronger light. The sovereign authority that decides the limits of
34 See also Lyotard, 1990, pp.25-30.
129
being a refugee in a given state is also the authority which decides the limits of their integration 
within the system. In other words it is on the authority of the ‘sovereign* that the decision about 
assimilating, excluding, or exterminating is based.
The decision to engage with refugees or stateless people, by and large, involves what the 
people represent as life.35 The sovereign decision represents who can be included in the social and 
the legal network of the society. It creates the outsiders/excluded by deciding on the basis of their 
ability to change their lives. The interesting issue here is the fact that people who are excluded from 
the socio-legal net are not beyond the law, but their exclusion is based on the law and their 
exclusion underpins the social identity of the society. So they are constituted as excluded. This 
exclusion takes away their existence within the society and constitutes them as a generic being from 
the genus of human beings. It is important to realise that life which has been taken out of its social 
context of relationality has no voice and way of appeal to social, it becomes just a mere life. Arendt 
argues that
[t]he great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the 
common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their 
natural givenness, on their mere differentiation. They lack that tremendous 
equalizing of differences which comes from being citizens of some 
commonwealth and yet, they begin to belong to a specific animal species. The 
paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such loss coincides with the 
instant when a person becomes a human being in general.. .and different in 
general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, 
deprived of expression within and action upon a common world loses all 
significance (1976, p.302).
Although this discussion of stripping the social constitution of life and creating mere life outside the 
social through the intentional exclusionary steps is central to the understanding of politics of
35 Here. Life means a certain way o f conducting life within a given society. So Arendt is talking about social/political 
life and exclusion from that sphere. Nonetheless, the exclusion on the basis o f this life could border to an evaluation 
o f  life as a biological category as a result o f which life can be taken out o f the context o f zoe/bios. Then the question 
becomes how one ethically relates to this life which is excluded from the whole existential context? The most 
important example o f this is the way Jews were excluded from German society during the 1930s. This exclusion was 
based on so called social problems that gradually fixed the Jewish identity to the biological category o f being of  
Jewish blood. In other words social exclusion was turned into extermination by biologically determining the meaning 
of life for Jews. Therefore, I would like to keep life as a biological concern, though this might be contrary to the 
Arentdtian reading, as well as a social exclusion. For absence of this particular understanding is the problem in terms 
o f ecology as it will be discussed at the end o f this section.
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persecution, I will attempt to understand the implicit meaning in these decisions in terms of the 
workings of sovereignty.
Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, which explains the concept in terms of its power to 
decide, is pertinent to comprehend the impact of the concept on political action. According to 
Schmitt sovereignty represents the structure of exception:
The exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, 
but it simultaneously reveals a specifically juridical formal element: the decision 
in absolute purity. The exception appears in its absolute form when it is a 
question of creating a situation in which juridical rules can be valid....
A regular situation must be created, and sovereign is he who definitely decides if 
this situation is actually effective.... The sovereign creates and guarantees the 
situation as a whole in its totality. He has the monopoly over the final decision.
Therein consists the essence of State sovereignty, which must therefore be 
properly juridically defined not as the monopoly to sanction or to rule but as the 
monopoly to decide.. ..The exception is more interesting than the regular case.
The latter proves nothing; the exception proves everything. The exception does 
not only confirm the rule; the rule as such lives off the exception alone (1985, 
pp. 19-22).
In the invocation of sovereignty it can be argued that the concept decides and creates an exception 
that has not existed before, but created according to the decision. Therefore, the legal framing 
provided by the sovereignty includes the excluded/outside within its constitution of the possibility 
of regular/inside. According to Agamben ‘the force of law consists in this capacity of law to 
maintain itself in relation to an exteriority [we] shall give the name relation o f exception to the 
extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion’ (1998, p. 18). 
This points out to the fact that the exception or the outside/excluded created by the exception does 
not exist outside the socio-legal frame. It is separated from the regular but it still exists within the 
given legal framework. Otherwise, the exception cannot be comprehended, that is, an exception 
requires a normality to exist. The relation of exception presents a space of politics. If one brings the 
Foucauldian argument about biopolitics into this political space created by exception, it would be 
relevant to discusses the political in terms of capacity of sovereigns to remove regularity from the 
regular existence of life.36
36 In his arguments about the deployment o f sexuality as the juncture between politics and power in the society Foucault
131
At this juncture of biopolitics, the exception created by the sovereign(ty) must be considered 
in terms of biopolitics as well. In other words, whatever the exception created by deciding about the 
limits of law is about the limits of life. As Arendt argues, decision is taken in relation to what 
people represent as life. It cannot be considered anymore as a mere legal decision in managing the 
social space. The sovereignty and the exception it implies are the original constitutive blocks of life 
as included or excluded. From this it follows that the excluded, bare lifey is not beyond the law or it 
represents something in chaos. Far from it, bare life is constituted according to the law and 
therefore has to be considered within the law.37 In constituting bare life as excluded from the 
normality of the society presented by the internal what is at stake is the political. By deciding on the 
exception, sovereign decision removes a certain life from the political. This depoliticisation is a 
move toward the limiting and eventually the removing of the political from social contestation in 
the public. It, however, does not mean that the existential condition of bare life is depoliticised. It 
is particularly interesting to see this in terms of Arendt’s description ofpolis
it is the organization of people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, 
and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose.. .It is the 
space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely the space where I 
appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other 
living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly (Arendt1989, 
p. 198-99).
It is in this context that the exception, by excluding the appearance of life in the arena of the 
politics, moves to take the political to the level of sovereign decision, whereby political space 
disappears at the level of public. This allows the sovereign decision to exclude and reconstitute 
bare life within the framework of what is included. In summary, the decision for the exception, 
and the space created by this decision represents a decision over life. The discussion in this section
spells out the concerns of new politics as health, progeny, race, the future o f the species, the vitality of the social body, 
power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality (1990 p. 147).
37 This is what Agamben calls the paradox of sovereignty. See Agamben 1998, p. 29.
38 See Derrida 1997, p.84.
39 According to Agemben, modem politics is not so much about the inclusion of lzoe in the polis nor simply the fact that 
life as such becomes a principal object o f the projections and calculations o f State power. Instead the decisive fact is 
that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life gradually 
begins to coincide with the political realm.. ..At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, 
the state of exception actually constitutued the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested’ (1998, p.9).
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so far argued that the concept of sovereignty is a decision on life. Therefore, the limited discussions 
of sovereignty as a legal and effective political concepts are not relevant if they do not address what 
happens to life at the end of a deployment of sovereignty.
Having established this perspective, it is clear that sovereignty as decision(exception) on life 
still does not explain how it is that the application of sovereignty in the context of UNCLOS in  can 
function without recognising the life it decides on in the ocean ecosystem. In the testimony of 
Robert Antelme what the camps (Nazi extermination camps) thought those who lived was precisely 
that ‘calling into question the quality of man provokes an almost biological assertion of belonging 
to human race’ (As cited in Agamben 1998, p. 10, emphasis added). In other words, at the extreme 
condition of facing the becoming of bare life, at the threshold of being removed from the context of 
zoe/bios, the question of exclusion/inclusion on the authority of some sovereign appears as the 
existential question. In parallel to this, I would argue that ecological conditions created by humans 
in the manner they are living at the expense of other living beings on earth should bring the way we 
decide to utilise other living beings as resources under scrutiny.
Even the analysis of bare life does not go far enough to question the essential building 
blocks of sovereignty which allows the exclusion of that which is not perceived as normal, and 
constituted as excluded before the political, that is nature. Considering this exclusion is based on a 
certain social relationship of being human, bare life represents being human outside the 
community.401 want to suggest that in the context of ecological concerns the decisions and the 
constitution of sovereignty as the condition of the possibility of creating bare life in the times of 
biopolitics can be dissected to its essentials. In this study, in terms of its ecological context, 
sovereignty decides about other life which is not even bare, if  it is a life at all. From the discussions 
of bare life above it is clear that, bare life can only be related to humans. The rest of nature is 
located beyond this context and, therefore, sovereignty ignores the life on which it decides and 
which it excludes. The way the concept of sovereignty is imposed in UNCLOS HI presents that 
what sovereignty is dealing with is a pool of natural resources. Decisions about what nature is, are
40 As argued by Taminiaux in the context of the Periclean era, the connection between zoe and bios was performed two 
times a year in Dionysian rituals to create an ‘acknowledgement and distancing’ through this process ‘the community 
affirmed itself as human while at the same time expressing the fear o f ceasing to be so’ (1998, p. 102).
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decided over and above already decided relationality between humans and nature imminent in 
sovereignty.
Therefore, the dislocation of nature from politics happens at a very deep level. It is excluded 
even before sovereignty has become constitutive of the political. When sovereignty works in terms 
of life/bare life, nature as a priori excluded is always already located in the move. Also, considering 
the fact that bare life even as an excluded is political insofar as it legitimates the political within, 
nature can be seen as the absolute of that which is outside of the political. The exclusion of nature is 
the existential condition of being human which in turn creates the political. Sovereignty does not 
exclude nature, rather, it does not include it on the area where it creates the political in terms of life. 
Nature does not exist in the arena where life /bare life decision takes place. In this, political 
sovereignty functions through deciding on exception to life, but this decision is never about life in 
nature. In order to utilise the concept of life as the ground where sovereignty acts in the ecological 
system, one has first to destabilise the imminent matrix of human/nature within the concept.
This section has argued that the move to locate sovereignty in a decision about life/bare life 
is an important one. It allows the political in sovereignty to appear in the discussion whereby the 
near-naturalness of the concept can be disrupted. The exception that creates the bare life is a 
politicising move, while seemingly excluding a life from the political. This double movement 
uncovers the nature of the proponents of the political, that is, human beings. As a result of this 
association ofthe political with the human realm, the question about ecology as life must be seen as 
located somewhere outside the political. In other words ecology is not a sui generis political issue. 
Its politics comes from the utility it represents within human society. Any attempt to solve 
ecological problems within this political realm is bound to consider ecology as a pool of resources 
and decide about them not in terms of life but as materials.
This realisation allows me to argue that if the solution of ecological cannot be located in the 
political as a decision on life, the reason for this impossibility and hence the inability to address the 
question is not about the political but an ontological condition. This means that in the way this 
ontology is constructed, nature is distanced in such a way that it cannot be represented as a political 
voice in its own right as life. Therefore, ecological politics becomes excluded from the political 
concern at a deep level of thinking about the constitution of ‘human’ life. The life which is
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represented in the ocean system never appears on the communicative level of political space. This is 
important insofar as nature, hence ecology, has to be reconceptualised in terms of life in order to be 
able to be included in the political. If we take the lead from the Foucauldian terminology of 
biopolitics it might be clear that the essentials of politics is about bio —  in other words life. So 
political is about life on the very basic level.
The analysis of sovereignty in this section leads to the unpacking of the constitution of 
sovereignty as a priori relationality between human and nature where the former is located as 
abstracted from the latter. Although this presents an ethos based on absolute exclusion of nature 
from the human moral sphere, this is ignored both theoretically and rhetorically as a relationality 
between life and material rather than between life and life. The fundamental problem, then, is in 
understanding or engaging with ecology through the conceptualisation of sovereignty/international 
in IR. Therefore, one has to understand the idea of human sovereignty in terms of its existence in 
the context of nature.
Conclusion
Through UNCLOS HI it becomes clear that the concept of sovereignty applied within it as the 
conceptual tool of IR decides on life. In terms of the binary relationship between international and 
sovereignty it allows the sovereign decision to prioritise the internal as opposed to the external 
international. In this, however, the possibility of international only as a counter concept to 
sovereignty is always ignored. The application of the concept within new zones presents the real 
functions of sovereignty. In the political space, it decides on what the legitimate political agent is. I 
argued that in this decision there is always an already decided ethical framework which is based on 
a certain relationship between nature and humans. Therefore, thinking about ecology and ecological 
problems necessitate the addressing of this grounding ethical structure. The ethicality expressed 
here must be understood in terms of
a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain
people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and
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behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging (Foucault 
in Rabinow 1984, p.32).41
Ethics42 can also be thought of as both producing and produced according to some sense of reality 
of being, so there would be a question of the ethos of ethics. I argued that UNCLOS HI represents a 
fundamental ethical relationship between nature and humans which is deployed implicitly through 
the concept of sovereignty. The possibility of this ethical framework, however, remains 
unquestioned. The upshot of this is not asking the question of what sort of moral agents are created 
through the application of sovereignty. In other words the ethos of this ethical position as the 
constitutive of moral agents within the discourse of IR is not dealt with. Instead 
international/sovereignty system is taken to be the neutral ground on which what is called 
international relations is, built.
In connection with the questioning undertaken in this study the ethos of ethicality of 
sovereignty represents a move to question discussions of ‘environment’ as a add-on concerns within 
the general structure of IR. The ecological concerns expressed in this study clearly are not add-on 
extras to the agenda of IR. They are focusing and pointing out a problem at the fundamental level. 
They are a challenge to the ‘assumptions which still seem to underlie far too much post-Cartesian 
epistemology and metaphysics. That these assumptions also underlay nearly all Western ethical 
attitudes to the environment from at least the sixteenth to the twentieth century’ (Chappell 1997, 
P-2).
Broadly, these assumptions might be termed Enlightenment conceptions of the 
human/Nature relationship moulded in a certain way through specifically modem conceptions of 
rationality and anthropocentrism. In the ancient Periclean understanding of zoe/bios, zoe was 
represented in its ‘eternal return of desires, appetites, pleasures, violence, and with its cycle of
41 Foucault in his later work defined ethics as ‘the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport a soi, 
which [I] call ethics, and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject o f  
his own action’ (Foucault 1983, p238). From a conventional Western perspective this is not a change from the 
Kantian moral agent, the change and the importance o f this understanding derive from the Heideggerian 
reformulation o f human subject to which I will turn in the last chapter.
42 An interesting conceptualisation o f ethics in terms of ecology is provided by Thom Kuehls. He reinterprets 
Nietzschean understanding o f nature and man, and argues that ‘Nietzschean ecological ethic can exist that 
understands nature to be chaos and sees no necessity to human existence. This will not be an ethic o f egoistic 
hedonism, or o f anything goes, but instead will be an ethic that highlights the difference and ambiguity o f nature and 
sees a “role” for humans to not divest existence o f these characteristics’ (Kuehls 1996, p. 15). In this approcah, again, 
‘subject’ is the location o f change in the perception o f ethics.
136
alternating seasons and renewing generations’ through which potential for ‘ceasing to be human’ 
was depicted as a potentiality (Taminiaux 1998, p. 102). In the modem understanding zoe/bios 
relationship is located within an already abstracted human dimension which does not consider the 
human/Nature relationship as a relevant concern in terms of the social space. The ideas based on 
Rene Descartes’ conception of the self, and Immanuel Kant’s notion of the essentially rational agent 
and its pure will have created an overriding ethical relationality.43 This ethics was essentially 
between Nature and human-persons and after abstracting the human-person from the irrationality of 
Nature, it arguably allowed gradients among humans and different societies. According to Midley 
‘Enlightenment morality ..strongly tends towards egoism and social atomism’ (Midley 1997, p.89).
Another aspect of this ethical positioning is expressed by Niklas Luhmann. He suggests that 
the conceptualisation o f ‘subject’ has an importance in the production of knowledge. He argues that 
‘not until the end of the eighteenth century was man understood to be a subject in the strict sense, 
and thereby unlinked from nature’ (1995, p.xxxix). And he further argues that
[ujnder the heading ‘subject’, the modem individual conceives himself as an 
observer of his observing, which always operates with self-reference and 
reference the others; thus he understands himself as a second-order observer.
One could then designate the subject as a unity that, as it itself knows, lies at the 
foundation of itself and everything else. Or, if one prefers a dynamic, active, 
voluntaristic version, it lays the foundations for itself and everything else (Ibid.).
This argument points to the fact that it is in the articulation of a certain concept of subject44 one can 
find the ontological limits of possibility of thinking through the concept of sovereignty, and hence 
in the discipline of IR. Unless this critical task is carried on to the ontological level, in its 
application sovereignty can only function at the level of an already constituted ethical context 
thereby producing a knowledge based on resource potential rather than a knowledge in relation to 
other species with which we share the general ecological system. Eventually this ethical
43 See Chappell 1997, pp. 102-117.
44 Luhman argues that one consequence of thinking within the subject was ‘that a concept o f an opposite, relative to the 
subject, had to be invented. This called Umwelt, and later “environment” environnement. Before this time there had been 
no environment. Instead, the world was understood as the totality of things or as the support o f all their particulars. The 
scheme subject/environment dissolved the compactness of this conception o f world. One began to think in terms of 
differences..’ (Luhman 1995, p.xxxix).
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perspective in IR45 becomes neutralised and considered to be reflecting an objective relationality 
on which ethics can be discussed.
The ethical relationship expressed in UNCLOS HI in terms of conservation and protection 
of oceans represents a certain rights based relationality. The right to exploit the resources merely as 
a mean for human ends represents a distinct affinity with Kantian philosophy of free and rational 
human being 46 In this perspective rights of human beings in relation to each other are recognised47 
in organising exploitation of the resources within a given moral system. In this recognition rights 
constitute ‘the status of personality and characterize the agent as different from a thing so that 
he/she is subject to law and a participant in the interplay o f freedom involved in a system of rights’ 
(Mulholland 1990, p. 10, emphasis added) 48 Nonetheless, nature is not included in this morality. 
According to Kant the relationship between rational beings and Nature in terms of morality is based 
on the latter’s position as a ‘thing’: ‘[BJeings whose existence is based not on our will but on 
nature, if they are non-rational beings, have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called 
“things’” (Kant 1959, p.428, emphasis added) 49 Mulholland argues that ‘[t]he term “person” is
45 In the General context o f conventional IR the evocation of Enlightenment takes two different lines of 
argumentation, argues J.G. Ruggie. According to him, two dominant perspectives in IR are deeply implicated in the 
project. They are, (a) ‘realist balance of power’ and (b) ‘idealist institutionalism’ (1993, p.146). According to this 
argument, both perspectives have different locations from which to derive their validity. The former is based on the 
system o f states and their development at the end o f the Treaty o f Utrecht (1713). The latter is based on the 
‘Perpetual Peace’ discourse initiated by Abbe de Saint-Pierre and reached its climax with Kant’s articulation o f the 
subject. In connection with subjects own production o f opposite concept in nature, therefore, IR is firmly located in 
this subject based ontological framework.
461 believe this is an important point which allows us to see the distinctly Western perspective o f turning nature into 
a resource pool by recognising only one relationship between Nature and human society. It is based on an idea that 
Nature is something to be manipulated, controlled, and conquered. At the same time this is not to say that 
conceptualisation o f Nature as resources only exist in the Western understanding. It is clear that in all dependency 
relations there is a concept o f resource, but precisely at that point one can observe other complex relations with 
nature in excess o f this resource based contact. It is this excess which does not happen in the Western understanding. 
See Wilmer 1998, pp.55-78.
47 According to Mulholland ‘Kant’s ethics and doctrine o f rights is a conception.. .which is expressed in the concept 
o f person’ (Mulholland 1990, pp. 1-10).
48 This agent or person who is the subject o f morality considered to have intrinsic value. According to Kant ‘their 
nature indicates that they are ends in themselves’. Moreover ‘[tjhese are thus not merely subjective ends whose 
existence as effect o f our actions has a worth for us, but are objective ends, i.e., things (dinge) whose existence in 
itself an end’ (Kant 1959, p.428). Kant indicates that ‘only man, and with him, every rational creature, is an end in 
himself. He is the subject o f the moral law which is holy, because of the autonomy o f his freedom’ (Kant 1956, p.87).
49 It is also argued that ‘only rational being has the capacity o f acting according to the representation o f laws’ (Kant 
1959, p.412). This is an interesting position if one considers that the rational being’s freedom to will is ‘the property 
of will to be itself a law’ (Kant 1959, p.447), the sphere of law is the locus o f  rational being from which ‘things’ i.e. 
nature is ipso facto excluded. In other words the law is about the rights and duties among rational beings to which 
nature is not included.
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used to distinguish this kind of entity from things or beings incapable of participating as agents in 
the moral world’ (1990, p.131). It is, then, this formulation of ‘person’ —  human subject that 
creates the concept of sovereignty as it is applied in modem times. It is initially the relationship 
between Nature and subject which is established at the expense of the former. After the subject 
appears as the locus or the unified reference point resting at the ground of all possibilities of 
knowledge50 the concept of sovereignty moves to a level of discussion based on the gradation of 
rational beings, as argued in the context of race by Arendt. The subject becomes only possible as a 
sovereign entity, which means a unified structure in itself, whereby the subject reflects the self- 
contained possibility of existence.51 It is at this level52 sovereignty inherently ignores Nature when 
deciding on lifep
It is to the constitution of modem subject that I will turn to in the next chapter. By focusing 
on the process of thinking about subject in Cartesian and Kantian philosophies, I will show how 
nature has been construed as ontologically irrelevant. This move will open a space to rethink the 
constitution of subject.
50 According to William Connolly knowledge ‘is a distinctive tool o f power’ and ‘The will to Knowledge transcends the
will to see the world in particular ways: it emerges as the will to organise the world to become a certain way.......the will
to knowledge is the will to change the world so that it corresponds more closely to human capacities for 
conceptualisation and organisation’ (Connolly 1988, p. 144-45).
51 This also means that for others the self-referentiality becomes an aim to be achieved in order to ‘be’. This process, 
this attempt, might be named as modernisation whereby entities become sovereign i.e. differentiated subjects. This 
idea o f will to become sovereign self allows modem subject to discount Nature altogether as a life to be considered.
52 This can be seen as a process that ‘dissolves’ plural ‘histories into one mode o f being, one temporality and one 
chronology, which then is superimposed upon events’. See Kosselleck 1985, p.31-35.
53 As argued by Mulholland ‘things’ become excluded from the moral community insofar as they can express their 
own ends so their existence depend upon the ends given to them ‘[tjhings cannot will at all. This indicates that things 
cannot give themselves ends. The only ends they have are those given them by rational beings’ (Mulholland 1990, 
p.132)
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Chapter 4: The Possibility of Existence Under The Cosmology of Enlightenment
Through the previous chapters, the story of an ecological problem has unfolded. This problem is, in 
general, related to the manner in which human ocean intercourse, and the human/nature 
relationship, has been structured. As they have been described, the concepts that are being used as 
the framing constellations are inadequate, if not, unintentionally, biased from the start.
In more precise terms, considering the issue under discussion —  the human/nature 
relationship — it is imperative to understand why we act in the way we act at the expense of 
other life. The point here is the way we conceptualise our location in nature, which then directs 
us to act in a certain way. Although the signs of ecological degradation are very apparent, there 
has been no real shift in human behaviour in relation to nature.1
Through the conceptualisation of the subject-object relationship, realities in relation to 
human beings are being produced. Even if one accepts that although this process is continuous and 
dynamic, there are still certain static frameworks in which this dynamic process takes place. This 
framing structure, which gives meaning to the location of subject, humankind, in its relation to 
others and the rest of the nature apart from humankind, is taken to be a ‘cosmological’ framing. It is 
believed that the development of discursive disciplines and actions they prescribe take place on the 
basis of a given cosmology.
In the face of exacerbated ecological problems which present existential questions, the way 
in which these questions are being ‘problematised’ (Foucault 1983, in Lotringer ed. 1996) is 
fundamentally important for taking action and for understanding the consequences of those actions. 
Without doubt problematisations carry in themselves the location of the problematising subject.
The forms of this processes are based on certain relational norms and values in which a given 
‘normal’ is located as a standard of thinking about the problematised issue. This process, also, 
enhances the concept of a given ‘normal’ and therefore becomes self-legitimating. As a next step, 
other possible relations become either invalid or non-issue situations. And the knowledge of them, 
or about them, might be considered as disqualified information as long as it does not fit into what is
1 The change that has been initiated for the protection o f the environment is limited within the concepts of 
sovereignty/international which may have negative implications by their definition. Therefore, it is believed, in this
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considered to be normal. All these situations and locations of ‘normal’, which exist in 
problematisations as an inbuilt component, are based on what is referred to as a cosmology.
The way in which nature is being experienced is articulated and lived out through certain 
relational concepts. Although every individual might independently claim that they have a different 
experience of ‘nature’, the way that they locate themselves in those experiences could produce an 
over-arching common ground. So what is being discussed is not the surface appearances on the 
actual different experiences but the real underlying conceptualisation which allows the subject to 
locate itself in a particular way. This study, then, claims that it is the way we experience the affairs 
outside ourselves as well as ourselves, according to a specific cosmology,2 that gives direction to 
the way we conceptualise and question the political and natural world. In the context of the 
problems faced in the oceans, the response from International Relations has proved to be fairly 
limited3 as a result of its location within a given cosmology.
Ecology, in the following analysis, has the main role. In this, the ecological concerns 
established in the previous chapters lead the analysis. Therefore, I want to state three central 
criticisms developed previously in the text. The first is the constitution of human subject as a being 
distinct from nature, its character as an absolute anthropocentric subjectivity; the second, the impact 
of this anthropocentrism on nature as the problem, it allows nature to become a thing; and the third 
as the consequences of this anthropocentric standpoint in relation to methodology of understanding 
the world, that is, the development of ‘knowledge’ and how it has been applied to understand the 
rest of nature as well as ourselves. These three criticisms rest in the grounds of ecological problems 
that we are facing. Therefore, as the most important proponents laying the basis for an absolute 
anthropocentric ontology, I turn to the philosophies of Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant. In order
study, that the conceptualisation o f nature has a very peculiar impact on these results.
2 This cosmology was developed in 17th and 18th century western Europe and is known as the Enlightenment. Since it 
was a departure from previous ages it is also known as the Modernity. However, there is no one accepted definition o f  
these concepts or agreed content o f them.
3 As a discipline, IR has a certain criterion to evaluate the affairs o f humankind. This means that conceptualisation of  
those affairs are, most of the time based, on a specific criterion as a starting point without any questioning o f the grounds 
of those criterion in relation to the issue at hand. In other words, the discipline o f International Relations does not 
question the way through which the ‘international’ is, itself, conceptualised and conditioned as a social science. The 
analyses o f environmental problems in the discourse of IR , therefore, are experiences based on certain conditions of  
‘normal’ which are reiterated through the discursive process. But the discipline does not seem to be interested in the 
established and disseminated grounds o f experience at all.
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to understand the way we problematise ecological problems today, this chapter attempts to explore 
the roots of the location of humankind in the cosmology of the Enlightenment as a result of which 
the subject recognises itself to be something.4 These three central criticisms will shape the structure 
of the following discussion.
According to Alan Touraine ‘[n] ascent Modernity is dominated by the thought of Descartes, 
not because he is the herald of rationalism, but because he puts modernity on a sound footing and 
his dualistic thought, which would be attacked by the empiricists but extended by Kant, beckons to 
us across two centuries of Enlightenment philosophy and progressive ideology and teaches us to 
redefine modernity’ (1995, p.43). This chapter therefore, focuses on two philosophers in relation to 
their grounding of human ‘being’. In doing so, it also provides a response to the question of 
whether the philosophical perceptions about the being/nature found in theCartesian-Kantian 
philosophical tradition would allow us to ‘redefine’ our ecological intercourse within this 
cosmology without excluding nature.
A New Beginning: RENE DESCARTES
The history of modem European philosophy is counted from the overthrow of 
scholasticism until the present time. Renatus Cartesius, bom 1596, the initiator 
of modem philosophy, a revolutionary, in the spirit of his nation, begun by 
breaking off all connection with earlier philosophy, by rubbing out, as if with a 
sponge, everything that had been achieved in this science before him, and by 
building it up again from the beginning, as if no one had ever philosophised 
before he did (F.M.J. von Schelling; Munich Lectures 1833-34).
These words were uttered for someone who made his contribution nearly two hundred years before 
Scheling’s lectures. Did Renatus Cartesius philosophise, as mentioned above, to understand 
essential existential questions or was his interest actually somewhere else as suggested by Stephen
4 Bartelson articulates the changing meaning of sovereign/international on the basis o f changing Knowledge claims in 
different periods. This periodisation somehow becomes rigid and isolating as a result o f a focus in the way each period is 
analysed as beyond the self-perpetuating modalities o f the knowledge produced by the discourse. It does not allow the 
changing meaning o f being to be seen (1995). So Bartelson takes the manifestation o f sovereign/international in each 
period and studies the given period on the basis production o f Knowledge which allows for a particular 
sovereign/international matrix. Nevertheless, as it is established that the problem is about the perception o f being/nature 
and Other, it is imperative to see a dynamic development of a certain perception that is not locked into the modalities o f
142
Gaukroger (1995) in his biography of Descartes? Although the response to this question is 
important insofar as it might put the works of Descartes into context, it does not change the fact that 
the ‘philosophy’ of Descartes has been extremely important throughout the Enlightenment.5
As the concern in this section is about the impact of Cartesian thinking on ecological 
outlook, Descartes’ later work will be the focus of the study. His later work consists of Discourse
6 Von Method (1637) and Meditations (1641) where the existence of God and the human soul was 
explored on the basis of ‘Cogito ergo sum'\ the statement which was to become the identity of the 
Cartesian dualist philosophy based on the theory of distinctness of soul and body. The constitution 
or possibility of Cartesian dualism abstracts the human being from nature. In order to reach this 
level of abstraction Descartes initially tries to explain the existence of God in terms of the idea of 
God which a human subject has. This first step of thinking in terms of God allows him to isolate ‘I’ 
as the location of certainty. In this isolation ‘I’ becomes abstracted from nature. Therefore, it is 
imperative to see how Cartesian methodology is articulated insofar as on the basis of this method, 
ecology as a knowledge base becomes excluded from the human thinking. He outlines his 
methodology in Discourse Part One.
[t]he first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to 
be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to 
compromise nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind 
so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.
The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as 
many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.
The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing 
with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, 
and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in 
thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not 
stand in relation of antecedence and sequence.
the discourse of IR.
5 Even Newton, whose natural philosophy replaced Cartesianism, was considered to be Cartesian himself in the early 
1660's. See Gaukroger 1995, p.4. Also see Cohen 1985, pp. 146-60.
6 The copy o f Descartes’ A Discourse on Method- Meditations and Principles Everyman’s Library 1992[1912 trans.] 
is used.
7 The copy of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy Trans. B John Cottingham, Cambridge Uni. Press, 1994 is 
used.
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And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and 
reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted (Descartes 
1992, p.15).8
At this stage Descartes is interested in to see how one thinks. He presents through his own 
thought process his interest in the mind of man.9 The aim of this orientation is to bring the 
discussion of God10 as the possibility of certainty for a clear path to knowledge. The methodology 
outlined above is deployed for this end. There is a move towards to individualised, personal, reason 
which would lead one’s quest in life.11 Through these steps, it becomes necessary to eliminate those 
things outside one’s reason to have an effect on one’s life. Nature, then, becomes decontexualised 
as a source of knowledge based on sense experience. So, the question about the existence of God 
becomes a question of whether God exists outside one’s self or not.
It is important to point out that the method outlined is located in Descartes* previous 
scientific studies which are based on mechanical philosophy ‘which sought to explain the properties 
and actions of bodies in terms of the parts of which they are composed’ (Cohen 1985, p. 154). His 
attempt ‘to find ground of assurance’(Descartes 1992, p.22) is based on finding the correct use of 
reason. Therefore, reason has to be resolved into its most simple elements. Relying on his methods, 
it is safe to argue that there is an inbuilt capacity for ‘I’ to become the locus of inquiry as long as 
reasoning is located within it. Considering the situation on this basis it is clear that Schelling is, 
indeed, justified to see this process as a new beginning.
It is a new dimension where the subject, ‘I’, emerges as the focus of discussion. It becomes 
the agent behind the change. Again in this breaking up of the complexity, the proof of the existence
8 This methodology is not merely a distilled structure o f Descartes’ works up to that point but a fairly dangerous claim 
for his time. Three years prior to the publication o f this text, in November 1633, Galileo had been condemned by the 
Inquisition. And one of the main reasons was the fact that he was advocating a doubtful approach to the church's 
discourse and claiming that something was true on the basis o f his own reasoning (Feyerabend, 1994, p.247-64). 
Therefore, it is not possible to consider the attempt of Descartes only on the basis o f an intellectual exercise to spell out 
his method.
9 He argues that to have ‘a vigorous mind’ is not enough unless it is to be rightly applied (Descartes 1992, p.3).
10 He has an important insight: ‘that there is seldom so much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon 
which different hands had been employed, as in those completed by a single master’ (Descartes 1992, p. 10).
11 ‘I could, however, select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy o f preference, and thus I found 
myself constrained, as it were, to use my own reason in the conduct o f my life’(Descartes 1992, p. 14).
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of God and soul occupies centre stage.12 Nonetheless, the way in which Descartes proceeds in his 
approach to the issue of God signifies the point where ‘I* becomes the determinant factor for the 
existence of subject. It formulates the ‘I think hence I am’ in such a way that one could only arrive 
at knowing about God and one’s soul through ‘I*. This implies that one needs no interference from 
outside. Therefore, it seems that God’s centrality is somehow linked to the possibility of T . The 
existence of God and soul were, then, proved subjectively on the grounds of ‘I’ through a nearly 
mechanistic inference. In order to be ‘I am’, T  has to doubt, and in this the existence of everything 
apart from ‘I am’ becomes uncertain. The reconciliation of absolute doubt in continuum in order to 
be ‘I am’ and the attempt to reach certainty is realised in the necessary existence of a Super Being 
which is the guarantee for the potentiality of certainty.13 This inference is provided by his analysis 
of the existence of T  as the only truth on the basis of his condition while dreaming.14
Remembering the fact that doubt15 is the starting point for Descartes, there is no certainty of 
the existence of anything. One could doubt everything including oneself. However, here again by 
means of doubt one arrives at the existence of T*. In order to doubt one has to exist. This does not, 
at the same time, mean T  includes body. As an another important Cartesian factor one has to be 
devoid of senses to arrive at a truth.16 In Meditations he furthers this argument to suggest that doubt
12 Both because o f Descartes’ religious convictions and the times, all due respect was given to the church in order to 
cushion what was to be theorised next. According to Jean-Marie Beyssade ‘the entire methodical structure o f scientific 
knowledge depends on an assured knowledge of God’ (1993, p.85).
13 Nevertheless, it seems that this certainty exists as an impossible potential for everything apart from God as long as to 
reach that means ‘I’ might reach to the same level o f Super Being. And that would have been considered very much a 
blasphemy.
14 Descartes was surprised to realise that in his dream there were things happening as if  they were real. The experience of 
dreams and the experiences when one is awake raised the question o f truth. Which one of these experiences was real?
He thought that the only common thing in the two experiences was himself. So, the subject who dreamed and die subject 
who acted were combined in T . Therefore, truth about the experiences was not important any more; the only established 
truth was about the existence of ‘I’ who thinks.
15 The reasoning which proved the existence of soul is based on his methodology which was set to reach a clear and 
simple truth. The way through which that methodology was evolved was Geometry and Mathematics. So, as a result 
both the existence o f God and soul were proved subjectively on the grounds o f ‘I’ through a nearly mechanistic 
inference.
16 As noted by Dennis L. Sepper, this move to leave the misunderstandings o f senses behind seems to be a very 
dominant orientation in Descartes. His analysis o f Regulae ad directionem wge/ziz(abandoned 1628-29 ) shows that, 
for example, geometric style was aimed to strip everything ’’inessential” to formulate the simplest possible 
discussions. According to Descartes, ‘to distinguish the simplest things from the involved and to follow them out in 
order, it is necessary, in each and every series o f things in which we have deduced certain truths directly from others’ 
(1993 p. 150). Here, Sepper argues that Knowledge comes through comparing things to one another rather than 
considering their natures as such.
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cannot come from God.17 Then, doubt can only derive from deceitful things we encounter in our 
experience with corporeal things.18 Here one arrives at a clear distinction between actual outside 
and one's mode of thinking as different plains of which the latter is considered to be more true on 
the basis of clear apprehension.19 The examples of the clear and distinctly true, about which I 
cannot be deceived are established as arithmetic and geometry. So, as long as one experiences the 
body through the sense it means that it’s existence is doubtful. He argues that
I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists 
only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is 
dependent on any material thing; so that ‘I*, that is to say, the mind by which I 
am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body’ (Descartes 1992, p.26).
We are deceived by outside things if our process of judgement by ‘[my] judging that the ideas 
which are in me resemble, or conform to things located outside me’ (Descartes 1994, p.26). The 
reiteration of this point comes with the meditation four where wrong judgement is proved to be 
caused by ‘I’ passing judgement about a thing of which it has no substantial understanding. Here, 
understanding seems to be referring to the clear truth. So it is accepted that there are errors if ‘I’ 
judges those on the basis of the senses, it makes a mistake. This is an important step, the claim is 
strongly ‘soul’ centric in the sense that ‘I’ cannot be wrong as long as it acts with clear ideas 
derived from itself. This is clear move towards abstracting ‘I’ from sense experience, in other words 
from the experience based understanding of the outside world. Nevertheless, Descartes realises that 
he can not trace the origins of some ideas, such as heat, to himself unless it was given to him by 
someone.
17 Because it was established that God is what ‘I’ is not, in the manner of not having negative aspects, the doubt should 
not derive from God (MED I). It is argued that the universal method processed in Descartes is based on clarity and 
distinctness. And these two respectively mean presence and difference(Beyssade 1993,91). So, certainty provided by 
God, is actually about ‘I’ discovering itself i.e. ‘presence to oneself, and since this happens through ‘I’ itself process 
excludes everything. In the process ‘I’ become the only certainty through which God is certain. But God’s certainty is 
about ‘the idea of it not about the object’. So, the only certain thing about God is its certainty within the self-distinctness 
o f ‘I’.
18 As argued by Hatfield ‘[the eternal truth doctrine] explained the ability o f the human intellect to perceive the 
essences o f things by appeal to thealleged fact that both the mind and the essences were mere creatures o f God, 
placed in harmony with one another’(1993, p.277).
19 Descartes convinced that objects of his senses have no existence out o f him as long as they are ‘mode o f thinking’ 
(Descartes 1994, p.24). It allows the formulation o f the grounds on which most o f the analyses are based ‘whatever I
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This reasoning follows from Discourse that T  depends or necessitates some superior being. 
The obvious next step is to establish the nature of God. Descartes asserts that less perfect cannot be 
the reason of more perfect and this statement is true for appearances and for ideas as well. It follows 
that an objective real idea cannot be derived from a less perfect idea. It is an amazing argument 
through which the objective reality20 of ideas is accepted without any requirement of substantiation 
through actuality. It is, nonetheless, accepted that the objective reality of ideas means there are ideas 
whose objective reality do not derive from ‘I*. So, one arrives at a higher being in order to receive . 
these ideas in the soul-thought. According, to Descartes although we do not need to substantiate our 
ideas with their actuality, it does not mean that they do not have one. Their actuality derives from 
the fact that God is the creator of these ideas and it cannot be reasoned that It created those out of 
nothing insofar as it means deceit from which God is immune. Therefore, the ideas T  perceive as 
clear and distinct but not derived from me are objectively true and have ipso facto actual reality.
This is far more than just finding out about the existence of God. At this point, if one brings 
in how the idea of God is elaborated, it becomes clear that T  is somehow candidly located in the 
middle of things despite the fact that God seems to be implied as the location of essences. This is a 
moment of new beginning where *1* becomes the basis of objective reality as well. The method
• 77 •used in this could be seen as an inference from ones own existence. God exists because ‘I* has to 
rely on a perfect being, as there are other things that depend on ‘I* as superior to them to exist. He 
equates the geometric proof of a square to the existence of a super being ‘that consequently it is at 
least as certain that God, who is this Perfect Being, is, or exists, as any demonstration of geometry 
can be’ (Descartes 1992, p.28).23 So, it might be a fair inference to say I  believe, and necessitate,
perceive very clearly and distinctly is true’(Ibid.).
20 Descartes asserts that those images ‘represent substances are something more...and contain in themselves more 
objective reality’ (1994, p.28). It is important to emphasise that those ideas have such objective reality that for their 
actual reality to exist it is enough to derive a reference from our thought, things with that property do not have to 
‘transfer’(Descartes 1994, p.28) any actual reality to our thought.
21 Also see, Wagner 1993, p. 120.
22 He argues that the existence of a naturally superior being in him is not possible through him as long as a naturally 
superior being cannot depend on an inferior being. Therefore, ‘it had been placed in me by a nature which was in reality 
more perfect than mine, and which possessed within itself all the perfection o f which I can form any idea’ (Descartes 
1992, p.27) and that is God.
23 From a different perspective it seems that the subtle argument is actually trying to formulate a rather formal 
justification for Descartes main works in the area of arithmetic, geometry and physics at the time o f dominating Church 
dogma. See Hatfield 1993, p.260.
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Hence God exists.24 This allows Descartes to ground his scepticism on a certainty of T  which is the 
only assured truth.
As a result, to know that God exists and T  depend on it, creates the ground for all 
knowledge that is certain and true.25 And, once T  is aware of that, ‘it is possible me to achieve full 
and certain knowledge of countless matters...[including] the whole of that corporeal nature which is 
the subject-matter of pure mathematics’ (Descartes 1994, p.49)26 As a result of this reasoning the 
knowledge claim has become a subjective ground in the sense that differentiation of the truth from 
the outside. Although Hatfields argues that ‘[mjetaphysics and physics were to proceed without 
claiming any special knowledge of God’s purpose and without presupposing comprehension of 
God’s creative power’ (1993, p.278), it is clear that the subjectivity of ‘I’ presupposes all those 
within itself. Put differently the intentionality of God becomes located in the possibility of pure 
perception by T . Therefore, any metaphysical outside subjectivity becomes redundant. This 
locating of the truth about outside into the pure truth claims of T  creates an ecological emptiness in 
terms of the existence of outside, reflected as truth in other beings, which becomes ignored as 
deceitful. At this point without analysing the anthropocentric subject by way of concentrating on the 
important aspects of Cartesian methodology, it has become clear that nature is grounded within 
possibility of being perceived in ‘I’. After this exclusion of nature a question about other beings i.e. 
animals arises.
Animals (and Humans) in Cartesian Thinking
One of the most revolutionary aspects of the Cartesian science/philosophy is ‘the explanations of 
animal and human physiology and human physiological psychology on a mechanical basis’, within
24 According to Descartes, God possessed no ‘doubt, inconsistency, sadness, and such like ... since I (Descartes) myself 
would have been happy to be free from them’ (Descartes 1992, p.27).
25 Genevieve Rodis-Lewis argues that the Cartesian project is about ‘ the progress o f moral certainty aims at 
enlarging the domain of laws established with metaphysical certainty. Science liberated from all reference to divine 
exemplarism’ (1993, p.242-43).
26 The argument is about the fact that the existence o f God has ‘at least the same level certainty as I have hitherto 
attributed to the truths of mathematics’ (Descartes 1994, p.45) therefore the things which ‘I’ am certain of have the same 
level o f truth on the fact that God exists.
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this, his goal of ‘reducing all animal (and human) functions to machine-like actions was perhaps his 
boldest innovation in the sciences’ (Cohen 1985, p. 157).
Jean-Pierre Seris shows that Descartes classifies or differentiates human and animal on the 
basis of language that is taken to be the sign of thinking(1993, p.178). But this is not the only 
category Descartes uses. He also claims that animals do not see properly (Henry 1993, p.43) 
because they are not aware of what they see. Furthermore, as discussed by Marleen Rozemond 
(1993), Descartes uses animals to define or describe the human condition and possibilities, as a 
result of which animals become mechanistic automata. Although he seemed to consider the human 
body in mechanistic terms as well, the differentiation of mind/body in human existence qualifies the 
distanciated locations of humans and animals ‘this difference counts in favour of the immortality of 
our soul, because it allows us to see better that our soul is completely independent of the body’ 
(Ibid., p. 100). It is clear that animals are robbed of their souls and become the defining Other for 
humans insofar as we can not understand their behaviour in terms of our reason.
According to George Canguilhem (1994-Delaporte ed., p.227) Descartes devalues animals
7 7in order to be able to use them. He adds that ‘this attitude is typical of Western man The 
theoretical mechanisation of life is inseparable from ‘the technological utilisation of the animal’ 
(Ibid.).What Canguilhem brings to the discussion is very important. He argues that a machine or 
conceptualisation of a machine presupposes a teleology:
the Cartesian explanation fails to get us beyond teleology. This is because 
mechanism can explain everything once we assume the existence of machines 
constructed in a certain way. There is no machine for building machines, so that, 
in a sense, to explain the workings of an organ or organism in terms of 
mechanical model is to explain it in terms of itself (Ibid.,p.231).
But an interesting dilemma arises from this. One knows that animals are machines on the basis of 
what one thinks of the sort of functions animals fulfil while one does not know why they are 
machines at all. Obviously through this reasoning it becomes clear that the Cartesian approach
27 Canguilhem refers to a letter from Leibniz which seems very interesting, in which Leibniz wrote ‘if  we must look 
upon animals as something more than machines, then we should become Pythagoreans and give up our dominion 
over the beasts’. Also see Delaporte ed.1994 Notes p.471, #6.
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makes animals machines on the subtext of God’s will. As discussed above this will is only 
intelligible to the mind of T  as a pure truth. It is not possible to have something like God’s will 
‘out there’. It is clear that in relation to animals ‘I’ becomes further distanced. The possibility of 
understanding animals as machines is premised on the, methodologically arrived at, dualism 
between mind and body. As it is already discussed, anything but thinking ‘I* is doubtful.
The argument about the mind body separation opens with the assertion that as long as my 
mind doubts I  am, I  exist. Here the question is not what am I; rather it is about existence because it 
does not matter whether I am deceived or not. In both situations it is necessary to be deceived or not 
for something to exist, no-one could argue that, that something is nothing. Descartes decides he 
cannot know ‘I’ through images created in his mind such as the body parts.28 He asserts that he 
‘seemed’ to see, to hear and to be warmed. All these different situations might be the result of sense 
imagination, but one thing is permanent that is ‘I’ who is the subject of all these different situations 
which are the result of thinking (Descartes 1994, p. 19). Through the wax experiment (Descartes 
1994, p.22) he establishes that the mind has a better understanding of things without the help of the 
senses, including bodies. Taking the understanding in terms o f its Cartesian content, it is obvious 
that this point is a point of distancing of things that used to be together, i.e. the mind and the body.
Descartes’ rejection of the sense perception is not absolute. He has a lengthy analysis of 
what ‘I’ seemed to receive from senses. Even, he goes on to say that the senses might come first 
in understanding and thought follows them. In the same way he accepts that his body exists and is 
surrounded by other such bodies. Through dreams and visual illusions, nonetheless, he is soon 
convinced once more to doubt his senses and sense perceptions. He asserts that ‘[f]or since I 
apparently had natural impulses towards many things which reason told me to avoid, I reckoned
28 The qualities o f T  are the parts o f body such as ‘a face, hands, arms and the whole mechanical structure of limbs 
which can be seen in a corpse, and which I called the body’ (Descartes 1994, p. 17). The other qualities are considered to 
be received through the senses. However, it becomes clear that actually what is received through the senses, for example 
in dreams, is not perceived through senses but thinking.
29 Margaret D. Wilson, demonstrates the persistence o f contrast between senses and so-called physical realities 
within Descartes thinking. She argues that in the Dioptrics he connects perception o f position and distance with the 
natural institution o f brute correlations between body and mind, as well as with imagination, judgment, and 
reasoning. Nevertheless, the connection she exposes, this mind/body relation with the action o f non-human beings 
and the way they are treated in the texts, suggests that the former relationship can be perceived only according to the 
human mind and the way its capacity is articulated by Descartes himself (Wilson 1993). So, it seems there is a 
relationship insofar as it is situated within Cartesian human.
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that a great deal of confidence should not be placed in what I was taught by nature’ (Descartes 
1994, p.53).
It is already established that T  understands things that are clear and distinct and that are 
supposed to be created by God. It, at the same time, means that ‘I can clearly and distinctly 
understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain that two things are distinct’ 
(Descartes 1994, p.54). This leads to the conclusion that so long as ‘I’ can think myself as a 
thinking thing, T  exist as a thinking being in essence and nothing more belongs to me. At the same 
time, it is true that ‘I’ have a distinct idea about my body. ‘[a]nd accordingly, it is certain that I am 
really distinct from my body and exist without it’ (Ibid.).30
This argument does not mean that Descartes is totally rejecting the existence of corporeal 
things. Descartes is more than happy to give them existence and the potential of truth so long as 
they are apprehensible through the means of pure mathematics. He accepts that nature taught him 
that the mind and body form a unit. However, he argues that what God has bestowed on T  leads 
me to act in the unity of mind and body such as to react to things that induce either pain or pleasure 
in different ways. ‘But it does not appear to teach us to draw any conclusion from these sensory 
perceptions about things located outside us without waiting until the intellect has examined the 
matter. For knowledge of the truth about such things seems to belong to mind alone’, (Descartes 
1994, p.57) not to unity.
The connection between the possibility of analysing animals as machines and the existence 
of the same method for human body concludes the abstraction of T . It becomes even abstracted 
from its own body, so long as ‘I’ experiences its body through the pure concepts given by God 
rather than immediate senses. Ted Benton argues that ‘the contrast between persons and animals 
implies a contrast within the person between spatially extended bodily mechanism and a self- 
conscious “thinking” substance’ (1993, p.33).
Cartesian Dualism seems, as a consequence, more about the differentiation of T  from 
nature in the sense that both are created by the same God but the former is located in a different 
position in relation to the rest on the basis of its self-conscious.31 This is central to the ecological
30 Wagner argues that Descartes’ thinking does not necessarily rule out mind-body interaction (1993, p.126).
31 Bruno Latour observes that ‘Descartes was asking for absolute certainity from a brain-in-a-vat’(1999, pp.4-5).
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• . 32discussion. As the separation is completed, it becomes clear that it is not only between mind and 
body but also between human and nature. Therefore, what is happening is actually dual separation 
and thus Double dualism. It is a differentiation from nature and through those parts of human 
beings that are readily recognisable as animalistic, hence mechanistic, from the mind. By extracting 
‘I* at two steps from what is described ecological today, Cartesian subject moves beyond nature. 
This happens ‘at the cost of rendering unintelligible the connections both between humans and the 
rest of nature and, within persons, between those aspects which are and those which are not 
distinctively human’ (Benton 1993, p.33).
Furthermore, it seems the relation between ‘I* and the possibility of God makes all 
arguments of animals and their machine-like existence depend upon ‘I’ and its clear and distinct 
idea of itself. Nature becomes only accessible through our thought, based on pure concepts in 
mind. The body follows these pure thoughts and locates itself accordingly in nature. The experience 
does not lead to thinking but becomes possible as a result of thinking.34
1 C
Here, one can see the importance of Cartesian method. His inference of God as the 
responsible super being for ideas which ‘I* finds in itself is only possible through its method.
Central to this methodology, after relationship between God and T  is established, is the concept of 
objectivity. This objectivity is defined in a very peculiar way because if one thinks what is objective 
is not about the existence of nature out there, which is waiting to be explained, but rather that there
32 It would be clearly unhelpful to expect Descartes to be ecologically concerned or sensitive. It is nonetheless 
possible to consider his philosophy in terms o f its compatibility with ecological concerns today.
33 All this can be stretched further and, it can possibly be argued that the mind/body dualism even makes the human 
body somehow the locus o f technological utilization as well.
34 Descartes by his dualism both dislocates the human subject from its location in nature, at the same time by his doubt 
and scientific methodology nature itself becomes deterritorilised. At the end Nature becomes reterritorilised as perceived 
through pure concepts in the mind o f abstract ‘I’.
35 John A. Schuster argues that Descartes’ doctrine was ‘that the spiritual or intellectual component of our human make­
up is a vis cognoscens, a thinking power, which literally sees and inspects patterns and figures mechanically inpressed 
in various brain loci' (1993, p.218).
36 Gaukroger argues that Descartes’ main concern in his thinking was to ‘provide, above all, is an account o f how our 
perceptual image of mechanistic world is formed, and how the process by which this perceptual image is constructed can 
itself be accounted for in mechanistic terms’ ( 1995, p. 146). Moreover in this aim he realised ‘I’ needs to depend on 
some being distinct from myself. According to Gaukroger this path of thinking in terms o f God ‘is nothing but 
his[Descartes’] theory o f motion according to which action or ability to move from one place to another comes from an 
external agent’ (1995, p.226-247 ). This theory o f motion only explains change from one place to another so it is 
reduced to purely descriptive analysis derived from geometrical procedures (Gaukroger 1995, p.243) that is totally 
incapable of talking about decay or growth of a being. Also see Schelling, 1994, p.42-63
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is a nature in the mind of ‘I’ on the basis of which ‘I* can explain the possible reality of the nature, 
then it is fair to say that this is a case where subjectivity is elevated to objectivity. Through this, 
nature becomes dependent on T  as a super being as T  depends on God. This distanced subjectivity 
represents the being of human subject through pure concepts rather than being in nature that is in 
the ecological system.
In this context, understanding animals is not related with our experience of animals as they 
are, but through the possibility of analysing them according to their perceived functions in our 
mind. Thus, animals become objectively functional components of outside thought through pure 
concepts in the mind. It is then possible to argue that Cartesian dualism and its methodological 
basis creates a humanised nature as it suits T .
By prioritising the soul/mind over the experience of body/feelings, Descartes unites these 
two parts in an attempt to justify reterritorialisation of nature on the basis of pure, hence certain, 
concepts. Initial dualism between mind and body becomes ‘the unison of the soul and the body, or 
feeling, guaranteed in a complex way by the cogito’ (Deluze and Guattari 1996, p. 128). This unison 
reterritorilises the nature into a new relationality. It is in this, that one can observe the powerful
38claim of Cartesian method in opening a new domain for human knowledge on a infinite horizon. 
Nature in this new domain becomes overdetermined in order to serve to T  ‘which is incomplete 
and dependent on another and which aspires without limit to ever greater and better things’ 
(Descartes 1994, p.35).39
37 See Deleuze and Guattari 1996, p. 128.
38 Descartes argues that ‘even if my knowledge always increases more and more, I recognise that it will never actually be 
infinite, since it will never reach the point where it is not capable of a further increase’ (1994, p.32). Although this 
statement sounds negative in the context o f his times, it is obviously a statement which says no authority could say that 
we have reached a final point in our quest for knowledge because it is infinite. If an authority claims that we reached to 
an absolute it is in sin insofar as absolute belongs to God. Also, this statement is full o f suggestions for the scientific 
quest undertaken in the following history. The emphasised limitedness is not about finiteness but, with a twist, about 
infiniteness.
39 As T  is created in the image of God so there is an infinite development of ‘I’, though it is impossible to reach the 
level o f God. What is happening here is that ‘I’ is located in nature differently from other beings.
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A Total Break With The Past, IMMANUEL KANT
The Kantian critique...marks the threshold of our modernity; it questions 
representations, not in accordance with the endless movement that proceeds from 
the simple element to all its possible combinations, but on the basis of its rightful 
limits. Thus it sanctions for the first time that event in European culture which 
coincides with the end of the eighteenth century: the withdrawal of knowledge 
and thought outside the space of representation. That space is brought into 
question in its foundation, its origin, and its limits.(Foucault 1992, p.242).
In this section the three criticisms expressed at the beginning of the chapter, that is, anthropocentric 
subjectivity, its impact on nature, and the consequences of this subjectivity on method, will be 
located within Kantian philosophy. The intellectual journey that was inaugurated by Descartes for 
the escape of man from the dominance of nature which imposed order and rules reached its zenith 
in Immanuel Kant’s thinking. Descartes was not able to go as far as to claim the full autonomy of 
the subject. However, his scientific methodology was the way towards it. On the other hand, Kant 
removed virtually all obstacles to the autonomy of humankind through his critique. This process, 
though, is not as straightforward as it sounds.
The consequences of the Kantian critique are multi-faceted. If the critique as a methodology 
is considered, it was, at the moment of its formation, probably the most important development in 
the history of Western philosophy for a long time. Step by step the subject was freed from its 
chains. It was no longer a passive subject who obeys its destiny which was decided out of its 
control. Throughout this process the scene seems quite in havoc. It is sometimes difficult 
differentiating what belongs to which part. The claim for subjectivity is one of the clear pieces 
which comes through this clash. However, as a result of the clash between the critique and the 
previous system, it is not clear whose subjectivity is freed.
Although the Kantian tradition in International Relations40 is focused on Kant’s political 
writings, in this section I will focus on his first critique, the Critique o f Pure Reason. For without 
considering foundations of a particular constitution of subjectivity as the grounds of his science it is
40 For an analysis o f this tradition, see Hurrell 1990. Also, Wight 1987.
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difficult to understand the ethical formulations which are adopted as an important cosmopolitan 
perspective through his political writings.41 Furthermore, it is his grounding of subjectivity in the 
first Critique which establishes the pre-ontological distancing of human from nature which is 
deployed through the political formulations as discussed at the end of the last chapter in terms of 
sovereignty.
I will discuss the construction of a particular human subject and its impact on nature 
through two steps. In the first instance I want to portray the relevance of the three critical points, 
that is method and anthropocentrism in general, to the first Critique in what it has set out to achieve. 
In other words in its aim as defined by Kant. For this will demonstrate that from the beginning the 
issue is the autonomy of human being. Then I will engage with the way this aim is carried out. This 
will be located around Kant’s ‘Copemican Revolution’ 42
Why Critique?
Kant states that his interest in metaphysics is based on the decline of this science as ‘the Queen of 
all sciences’ (A ix). From the very beginning it is clear that the Critique is about metaphysics as 
science. In order to reverse the decline in this science Kant attempts to set up a tribunal to
41 For example, see Linklater 1998. In this work the cosmopolitan ethics has been employed through a certain 
reading of Perpetual Peace without paying attention to the larger philosophical grounding. The connection between 
political and philosophical texts, nonethless, has been widely recognised. For example, Isaiah Berlin suggests that ‘the 
seeds [of it] are there, not, indeed, in his[Kant’s]political writings, but in his more significant ethical works. For it was 
his ethical views, with their uncompromising moral imperatives, that made the deepest impact on human thought In the 
first place idealisation of nation or State derives, however illegitimately, from his doctrine o f the autonomous will’ 
(1996, p.244). Also, see Walker 1993, p. 137. Some others either inform the relationship but take the conditions of  
Kantian universalism as an a priori, as a natural truth claim or do not inform the relationship and analyse the political 
writings in themselves. Martha Nussbaum (1997) seems to allude to the relation between moral philosophy and political 
writings. But she seems to analyse this relationship without problematising Kantian moral philosophy. Jurgen Habermas 
in his Kant’s Idea o f  Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit o f  Two Hundred Years ’ Hindsight (1997) seems to argue 
focusing on international law and shifting relations as regards to international without problematising the conditions of  
the possibility of a divisive system at all. And James Bohman in his The Public Spheres o f  the World Citizens (1997) 
seems to be in the same boat.
42 Cohen argues that Kant has never claimed to have a Copemican revolution the ‘Myth’ about this is the work o f  
other scholars and therefore, he rejects the importance o f this discussion. See Cohen 1985, pp.237-253. In this he 
seems to be missing the point that the importance o f Kant’s discussion —  that is, what is come to be known as 
Copemican revolution —  is as important as the Copernicus reversing the perspective about the sun in its impact over 
the way following centuries considered human subjectivity. This way of analysing the relationship between 
Copernicus and Kant was also suggested by Kant himself in the Preface to the Second Edition (Bxx iii-a).
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‘undertake the most difficult task of self-knowledge and assure to reason its lawful claims, and 
dismiss all groundless pretensions’ and he calls this ‘tribunal the critique o f  pure reason* (A xii). It 
is safe to argue that here we have the idea of critique as a new genesis of metaphysics. Therefore, 
the critique is not merely criticising the past fortunes of metaphysics as an epistemological 
variation. Nonetheless, before going further, it is important to see how metaphysics is described. 
Kant takes metaphysics to be ‘a completely isolated speculative science of reason, which soars far 
above teachings of experience, and which reason is indeed meant to be its own pupil’ (B xv). This 
speculative science of reason is about a ‘science which follows nature is called metaphysics’ (as 
cited in Heidegger 1997, p.9).43Through the Critique the possibility of science will be revealed as a 
self-knowledge of itself. Then the question becomes what is the object of this science before it is 
grounded as science (B x). Put it differently, for science to be possible its object has to be decided, 
in other words has to be objectified,44 beforehand and it is this perspective which allows Kant to 
analyse mathematics and physics. Of particular interest is his summary of Thales:
The true method.. .was not to inspect what he discerned either in the figure, or in 
the bare concept of it, and from this.. .to read off its properties; but to bring out 
what was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a 
priori, and had put into the figure in the construction by which he presented 
himself (B xi).
The critique as organ45 then is about trying to find a priori possibility of metaphysics as 
science which would reverse the method in metaphysics so far (B xxiii). Therefore, to secure the 
path of this science by adapting the above method46 ‘we can know a priori of things only what we
43 See Heidegger 1997, pp.8-13. Here Heidegger explains the journey o f metaphysics after Aristotle. He argues that 
the object o f metaphysics is the totality o f beings in general and this includes God, the world, and human beings. It is 
this science which ‘determines beings of beings’ by considering beings in general. It is true that Kant is functioning 
with this metaphysics but he is trying to overcome this by locating the possibility o f experience in human being. To 
this I will touch later in the section.
44 ‘The Genesis o f a science originates in the objectification o f a realm of beings, that is in the development o f an 
understanding o f the constitution o f the being o f the respective being’ (Heidegger 1997, p.20). So, in this there is a 
priori ontological constitution o f beings which also presupposes certain relationality.
45 See B xxxvii.
46 See B xvi where Kant is talking about imitating the procedures of mathematics and natural sciences. According to 
Heidegger ‘mathematical natural science gives an indication of the preliminary understanding o f the constitution of  
Being, ontological knowledge, as the possibility o f comporting toward beings (ontic knowledge)’ (1990, p.3).
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ourselves put into them’ (B xviii, B xix). The critique of pure reason then is a method for grounding 
the new science ‘it is a treatise on method, not a system of science itself. But at the same time it 
marks out the whole plan of the science, both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal 
structure’ (B xxiii). As it is about the whole structure of science, the Critique is necessarily about 
the object of this science as well.
As a science it will mark out or determine its object, translating a thing into an object of 
scientific inquiry. In this objectification, the relationship between the inquirer and the object of 
inquiry are necessarily related; and this relationship is based on how the object is decided as a pre- 
ontological condition of science. Considering the fact that Kant is trying to set his science up 
through the method of natural sciences,47 Heidegger argues that ‘in the sciences of beings 
something is fixed about the object before they are given to us... This preposition presents a 
knowledge of what belongs to the being called nature as a being’ (1997, pp.32-33). In this attempt 
to have metaphysics as a science of beings, Kant is trying to change what metaphysics has become, 
that is, where its a priori understanding comes from. As I have shown in the case of Descartes, the 
God provides the possibility of a priori or as pure concepts. Therefore, metaphysics was about 
supersensible and how it mediates our knowledge of nature.48 If Kant’s definition of metaphysics as 
‘the science which enables us by means of reason to proceed from the knowledge of the sensible to 
that of the supersensible’ (Kant as cited in Heidegger 1997, p. 11) one can observe a clear 
distancing from Descartes where supersensible was underpinning the sensible(if one can trust to 
senses at all). In this the location of human being is implied. At the end of the first Critique Kant 
poses three questions. He states that:
all the interests of my reason speculative as well as practical, combine in the 
following three questions: 1) What can I know? 2) What ought I to do? 3) What 
may I hope? (A 805, B833).
47 Heidegger shows that in establishing a priori given such as the principle o f permanence (B 224) and the principle 
o f causality (B 232) we are ‘given what belongs to nature as nature’ as a priori, as an experience-free-knowledge 
(1997, p.32).
48 According to Heidegger, Kant is still taking supersensible as ‘the final goal’(Kant as cited in Heidegger 1997, p.l 1).
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These questions are seen as Kant’s orientation for metaphysics of supersensible. The questions sre 
taken to be in the order of freedom, God, and immortality for the orientation of theoretical 
[speculative] reason (Hutchings 1996, p. 19). These concerns attached to each question are the 
grounds which regulate understanding. Hutchings argues that the importance of these questions 
comes with the practical. By the shift to practical reason the critique ‘moves from the question of 
how cognitive synthetic judgements are possible a priori to the question of the possibility of the 
moral law’ (Ibid).
I argue that this reading of the above questions is misleading insofar as Kant expresses that 
both reason ‘speculative and practical’ are focused on the questions, therefore, it is in the 
constitution of pure reason where the possibility of moral law rests.49 In the light of the discussion 
about science, it is not correct to consider the first Critique only as dealing with questions of 
‘cognitive synthetic judgements’. As it is applied for setting up the grounds of metaphysics as the 
science of beings, the first Critique establishes the limits of this science by establishing the limits of 
reason, self-knowledge of reason. Having said that it is also true that reason has a double role both 
as determining the limits of metaphysics, and becoming the tool of judgement within metaphysics 
itself. It is in this process Western metaphysics gets its new genesis. What is implicit in the 
questions, with which metaphysics is determined, rests on the grounds of possibility of these 
questions as the framework of the science of beings. These questions carry implicit focus on ‘I’ and 
its relationship with other beings. Kant clarifies this point in his lectures on logic by explicitly 
adding the fourth question.
[t]he field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense can be reduced to the 
following questions: 1) What can I know? 2) What ought I to do? 3) What may I 
hope? 4)What is man?
Basically one can consider all this as belonging to anthropology, because the first 
three questions refer to the last one.(Kant, Vorlesungen uberLogik as cited in 
Heidegger 1997, p.48).
It is, then, possible to see Kant as trying to establish the man as the legitimate ground of his 
metaphysics as science. The first Critique, as a result, becomes a discussion about the limits and
49 See A 842, B 870.
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extent of knowing by man!human reason. This involvement with man and the limits of him shows 
that the discussion of freedom, God, and immortality as the subject of Metaphysics is located onto a 
new ground. It is through the double movement of reason that man becomes the measure of things. 
It is this ground which makes Heidegger’s argument about Kant and his take on metaphysics rather 
misconstrued.50 Yes, Kant might, still; be interested in these supersensible subjects in his 
metaphysics but this is hardly the point.
The location of knowledge about these supersensible is the point; what explains nature as 
being is not anymore something like supersensible of which we have pure concepts given to our 
mind. This point distances Kant from the previous metaphysics(from Descartes as well), now the 
possibility of knowing is located in the experience of ‘I* (B xxx).51 Moreover, it is in this 
establishing the limits of reason in terms of human being where the pre-ontological ethics is to be 
found. Within this the relationship between nature and human being is severed, hence the human 
being is abstracted from nature. By using the critique o f pure reason as a method of setting grounds 
for new science, Kant establishes the reason as the determining factor in understanding nature; and 
by the critique of metaphysics of supersensible as determining factor he locates the possibility of 
sciences within human reason. It is this subjectivity which rests at the basis of ecological problems.
Human Being and Nature
In the Preface to the Second Edition, Kant states that:
[hitherto] it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects.
But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in 
regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in 
failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may suppose that objects must 
conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired,
50 See note 41. And ibid.
51 This also shows that not acknowledging the centrality o f Kantian concern with man and its limits of knowing allows 
the Critique to be interpreted as a text to answer What can I know? and its possibilities through the discussions o f  
judgement. This limited interpretation does not realise the importance of the first Critique in terms of its role in locating 
human being in the centre of Western thinking. For example see Hutchings 1996.
159
namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, 
determining something in regard to them prior to their being given (B xvi)52.
This methodological statement is made in order to show how new metaphysics as science should 
work. Although this articulation is about the new science, it necessarily states something about the 
metaphysics against which Kant is articulating his new science. The objection is clear it is argued 
that there is danger in the applications of Pure Reason. It is assumed that Pure Reason could extend 
knowledge beyond given material by aiming to settle in heavens (A 707-B735). Kant considers this 
to be an insecure situation. The argument, then, is about the grounds of knowledge. As discussed 
previously Cartesian system grounded itself in connection to the God given pure concepts. Put 
differently, reason established cosmological premises such as existence of a primordial being in 
order to secure the grounds of knowledge.53 It is against this idea of having external determinant 
Kant is building his Copemican Revolution which is expressed above. It is a move to replace the 
determining dominance of supersensous with the determining power built in the faculty of 
knowledge.54 What seemed to happen, therefore, is that, while Kant proved the possibility of a 
priori knowledge he relocates the sources of order, reason, into the subject (Actually he might have 
declared the death of God himself).55
According to Heidegger ‘what Kant discovers is that underlying this correspondence [all 
perception corresponds to beings] of experience to objects, to beings, there is already a priori 
knowledge upon which each empirical measurement depends’ (1997, p.39). In Kant, thus, what is 
being limited is the possibility of knowledge of objects in-themselves. Insofar as objects cannot be 
known, their meaning derive from the experiencing subjects understanding of them. As argued by
52 The standard N.K. Smith translation is used Immanuel Kant’s Critique o f  Pure Reason Trans. By Norman Kemp 
Smith, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1926[1995]. The notation follows the established convention o f using ‘A ’ for the first 
and ‘B ’ for the second editions.
53 According to Deleuze ‘in dogmatic rationalism the theory o f knowledge was founded on the idea o f a 
correspondence between subject and object, o f an accord between the order o f ideas and order o f things.. ..in itself it 
impled[sic] a finality; and it demanded a theological principle as source and guarantee o f this harmony’ (Deleuze 
1995, p. 13). This condition is clearly observed in Descartes.
54 Deleuze in this context uses the concept of ‘legislative’ power changing hands, he argues that ‘the rational being 
discovers that he has new powers’ (1995, p. 13). This is a more accurate rendering considering the use of juridical 
language through the text by Kant, for example ‘trial’ in B xvi which is important in terms setting up the Critique 
both as the mean and the source of legislating. For the use o f ‘juridical metaphors’ by Kant, see O’Neill 1989, pp. 9- 
8 and 17-20.
55 This move shifts the question about ontic knowledge to a question about the possibility o f ontology which
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Deleuze knowledge implies two things a) consciousness, belonging of representations to a single 
consciousness, and b) a necessary relation to an object (1995, p. 15). Then the question focuses on 
this single consciousness, ‘I think’, in other words on how the subject understands and what this 
means in terms of the subject’s existential location. This is also a query about the location of a 
priori knowledge which is synthetic. It is this knowledge a priori ‘which is already in each case 
necessarily presupposed by all knowledge of beings as the ground which enables the experience of 
beings as well as empirical knowledge’ (Heidegger 1997, p.56). This can be considered parallel to 
what Kant expressed himself as a ‘study of our inner nature’ (A 703, B731).
The major components of the process of knowledge, according to Kant are ‘intuition is that 
through which it[mode of knowledge] is in immediate relation to them [objects], and to which all 
thought is directed... .The capacity for receiving representations through the mode in which we are 
affected by objects, is entitled sensibility’ (A 19). The important point here is the way we perceive 
the objects seems to be located empirically in the object. Kant, however, qualifies this situation. It is 
argued that ‘all appearance is given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie already for the 
sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation’(A 
20).56 It is clear that sensitivity for appearances is conditioned a priori therefore it is possible to 
argue that objects are measured according to their a priori forms in the mind rather than things in 
themselves. This is connected with the main ground of knowledge that is intuition which grounds a 
priori forms as the possibility of perception. It is obvious that Kant is arguing for the sensibility 
which connects intuition to an object whereby it creates appearances/empirical intuition. The 
argument, then, arrives at the existence of pure intuitions in the subject which allow sensibility 
without the help of the senses. This is the first step where links with the outside begin to become 
loose. This pure sensibility based on a priori intuition is called ‘transcendental aesthetics’. It is 
based, and the principles of, on a priori intuition which are space and time.
The discussion about space and time establishes that they are the species of the subject, 
particularly space is nothing more than the sum total of appearances of the outer senses (A 26,B 
42). However, when the subject is presented with an object by the senses, it at the same time
produces such knowledge. See Heidegger 1990, pp.9-12, 24-30
56 The intuition which is related to an object is called appearances (B 34, A 20).
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establishes the empirical reality of space where that object exists. This can be temporal connected to 
the possibility of the experience of an object.57 This argument is fundamentally important insofar as 
it introduces the idea that since space is transcendental it does not exist out of itself, ‘nothing 
intuited in space is a thing in itself....that objects in themselves are quite unknown to us* (A 30). 
This fact establishes that whatever we sense as objects are by definition appearances. Time, in this 
connection, does not exist in itself, because time exists if something exists in space and through the 
alteration of that time can be observed, which is empirical. Nevertheless, considering the fact that 
nothing exists in itself what is empirically presented to the senses is an appearance based on a 
priori intuition. This is followed by the fact that every appearance necessarily requires a space and 
its motion indicates a time. Therefore, space and time are a priori intuitions existing in the subject 
which become empirically dependent upon the perception of an appearance.58 As a result, space and 
time have no objective reality outside the subject.59 According to Kant
the things which we intuit are not in themselves [nor] their relations so
constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if the subject, or even 
only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole 
constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time 
themselves, would vanish.. ..(A42).
and he adds that appearances cannot exist in themselves but only in the subject and this way of 
perceiving is ‘peculiar to all beings, though certainly, by every human being’ (B 60). The existence 
of the outside then becomes possible only with reference to the subject in an abstract space and time 
relationship which does not exist in itself and in this existence things are only appearances derived 
from a priori judgements of the subject. In this step the human subject does not only become the 
centre of the process of knowledge, but also, outside/nature has become non-entity.60 It becomes a 
part of time as an appearance of human interest. The changes in it can be observed on these basis. 
This is an important abstraction when observed from the ecological perspective. As the first step the
57 See B44,A 28.
58 In Opus Postumum Kant expresses that ‘[s]pace is not a being, nor is time, but only form o f intuition: nothing but 
the subjective form o f intuition’ (1993, p.224; 21:18).
59 See A 33,B51, B52, A 39, and B56.
60 In this connection existence o f God is also become dependent on this intuition: ‘[n]ot that the world is God, or 
God a being in the World..; but the phenomena o f causality are in space and time, etc.’ (Kant 1993, p.224; 21:18). In
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discussion of intuition establishes the pre-ontological, and nature becomes automatically assumed 
in the discussion of metaphysics as a science of beings through the Copemican Revolution. The 
long and very detailed proof of how the appearance of objects refer to their a priori knowledge in 
the subject is based on this relationship. I want to keep my engagement with the first Critique 
limited to the abstraction of the subject from nature, therefore, I shall not say anything about the 
very detailed analysis taking place through the text. But, I will briefly discus the connection 
between intuition and knowledge in order to justify my position, that is, discussing the first Critique 
in this subject oriented manner.
Boldly put, essence of knowledge is the synthesis61 of intuition and thinking that is
fsyexpressed as judgement, or pure understanding. This judgement is ‘the unity of the act of bringing 
various representations under one common representation’ (A 68, B93). Kant argues that 
understanding is discursive which relies on concepts rather than intuitive, in other words it does not 
rest on senses (A 68). Understanding judges with these concepts which are ‘based on spontaneity 
of thought’ (B 83). Therefore, concepts are not related to the objects immediately (Ibid.). So what 
happens is that they mediate the knowledge of an object which becomes ‘a representation of a 
representation’ (A69) object of which is initially presented by intuition to the subject. Then thought 
becomes ‘knowledge by concepts’ (B 94). It is the union of intuition and understanding which 
allows the thinking to become the ground of knowledge. It is a path which starts with the intuition’s 
perception of an object that becomes a thing through abstract concepts, this is a total detachment 
from the outside if one considers the relationship between object and intuition discussed above.
other words God exists/exits as appearance just like other objects.
61 Kant expresses that ‘space and time contain a manifold o f pure a priori intuition, but at the same time they are the 
receptivity of our mind-conditions under which alone it can receive representations o f objects and which therefore 
must always affect the concept of these objects. And yet, the spontaneity o f our thought requires that this manifold 
first be gone through in a certain way, taken up , and bound together in order to produce knowledge. This act I name 
synthesis’ (B102, A l l ) .
62 ‘The mind’s power o f producing representations from itself, the spontaneity o f knowledge’, is called ‘the 
understanding’ (B 76).
63 In the introduction to Transcendental Doctrine o f Elements (A50) Kant locates our knowledge on to ‘two 
fundamental sources: a) capacity to receive representations, b)power of knowing an object through these 
representations’ (B75, A51).
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Kant insists that for knowledge one needs this union but it is clear that without intuition there 
would be no object for concepts to understand, to produce the knowledge.64
This location of knowledge located in a human being changes the possibility of infinite 
possibilities when located in a supersenous being with a finitude of human existence. Through this 
move the limits of pure reason are located in the finitude of human subject, thus becomes related 
with ‘humanness of reason’ (Heidegger 1990, p. 15); the mark of this finitude is discussed on the 
basis of thinking which is contrasted with basis of infinite knowledge based on all intuition (B 71). 
This might be interpreted as self-intuition of finitude of human intuition, which then requires 
concepts to overcome this finitude based on existential limits leading to the perception of 
appearances. The question about the existence of objects then is more related with whether the 
human subject can perceive objects in-themselves or not. The reply to this is no, they can only be 
perceived as appearances through the finite knowledge.65 In Opus Postumum Kant expresses that
[ajpart from (logical) consciousness of myself, I have to do objectively with 
nothing other than my faculty of representation. I am an object to myself. The 
position of something outside me, itself first commences from me, in the forms 
of space and time, in which I myself posit the objects of outer and inner sense, 
and which, therefore, are infinite positings.
The existence of things in space and time is nothing but omnimoda 
determinatio, which is also only subjective(that is, in representation) and whose 
possibility in experience also rests only on concepts. We can know only what is 
formal, thinkable a priori (Kant 1993, p. 195; 22:97).
The finitude of human knowledge has become the source of infinite positings of outside. In other 
words, by locating the limits of reason in human being nature and beings have become dependent 
on the posited concepts within the human consciousness for their existence. This nonetheless, does 
not mean that Kant totally ignores the existence of beings, his argument is that insofar as our 
knowledge is limited with concepts we posit we would not know whether there are such beings out 
there. The human consciousness in its unity is subject matter of Transcendental Apperception
64 This also pointed out by Heidegger. See Heidegger 1997, p.57. Also Kant himself repeats more than once that ‘all 
thinking(must).... relate ultimately to intuitions’ (B 33, A19).
65 As the knowledge o f things in themselves is the subject o f absolute intuition o f supesenseous kind.
66 In empirical intuition Kant argues that sensation ‘presupposes the actual presence [Gegenwart] o f the object’ (B74,
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(A 107). It is this transcendental quality which provides the ‘pure unchangeable consciousness’ 
(Ibid.). It is this unity which underpins the concepts of objects and possible synthesis of appearances 
in relation to these concepts68 as the manifold knowledge of an object (A 109, A 110). Hence, the 
possibility of object rests in the self-knowing unity of T . Through this Kant finalised the 
abstraction of human subject from nature. The conditions of possibility of object are established as 
categories which are ground in apperception itself (A 402). These categories(which are presented by 
reason) are the unconditioned possibility of a thinking being.
Thus the soul knows in itself:
1.the unconditioned unity of relation, i.e. that it itself is not inherent but self- 
subsient.
2.the unconditioned unity of quality, that is, that is not a real whole but simple.
3.the unconditioned unity in the plurality in time i.e. that it is not numerically 
different at different times but one and the very same subject.
4.the unconditioned unity of existence in space, i.e. that it is not the 
consciousness of many things outside it, but the consciousness of the existence 
of itself only, and of other things merely as its representations (A 404).
With this Kant might be seen as declaring the freedom of thinking being. He argues that ‘the single 
representation, “I am”, governs them all* (A 405).69 At the grounds of this a setting up of the
70grounds for metaphysics as the science of beings rests the transcendental human subject.
According to Kant ‘I think’ represents the vehicle of all concepts which is always included in 
observation (B 399, A 341).71 The unity of consciousness represented in the apperception then 
establishes the unity of knowledge according to the limit set in ‘I think’.72It is argued that this
A 50). Also see A92, B 124.
67 According to Heidegger, Kant uses consciousness in a specific way. It means ‘a known knowledge o f unity’ (1997, 
p.243). This allows us to see the way the unity o f ‘I’ is presupposed.
68 Which is expressed as to be ‘objective reality’ (A 110).
69 Also see B 407, B 413.
70 Kant in Opus Postumum expresses that ‘transcendental philosophy bears this name, because it precedes 
metaphysics and supplies the latter with principles’ (1993, p.247: 21:81). Also see Kant 1993, pp. 248-50; 21:83, 
21:84.
71 “‘I think” accompanies all representations and goes along with the acts directed at extant beings, which thus would 
be a reflective act directed at the first act’ (Heidegger 1988, p.158).
72 Kant argues that ‘[t]he “I think” expresses the act o f determining my existence’ (B 158, note).
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position leads to establishing of self standing of self in turn, which brings the discussion of self­
hood, freedom and action as important categories of self-hood (Heidegger 1997, pp.258-59).
Thus far, I tried to establish that the science that is the one established by Kant changes the 
locus of reason from the supersensous to the limited human being. The self-knowledge of reason as 
a faculty of a limited T  is the pre-ontological condition of this science. This condition, at the same 
time, presents the space where the retreat of T  from nature to itself is observed. The revolutionary 
Kantian formulation of ever limited subject as autonomous results in the withering away of nature. 
It becomes an object, that is appearance, based on the horizon provided in ‘I think’. Its being can 
only be thought of as a relation of judgement position of which in terms of T  gives meaning to its 
being.73 Furthermore Kant argued that:
[That] nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of 
apperception, and should indeed upon it with respect to its conformity to law, 
sounds very strange and absurd. But when we consider that this nature is not a 
thing in itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many representations 
of the mind, we shall not be surprised that we can discover it only in the radical 
faculty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity 
on account of which alone it can be entitled object of all possible experience, that 
is, nature (A 115).
It would be argued that there is a recognition of nature as object of all experience, but then all 
possibility of experience is established by the transcendental apperception. Therefore, something 
like nature in general can be discerned but, nature as being in itself becomes impossible to know. 
This is expressed in a much clearer fashion in the Preface to Metaphysical foundations o f Natural 
sciences (1786).74 Kant explains the word nature:
[I]f the word ‘nature’ is taken merely in its formal signification (internal 
principle of everything..), then there can be as many natural sciences as there are 
specifically different things, and each of these things must contain its specific 
internal principle of the determinations belonging to its existence (1970, p.3).
73 See Heidegger 1988, pp. 177-80.
74 Translation James Ellington 1970.
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This definition is differentiated from nature as the sum-total o f  all things. Within this sense of the 
word, Kant qualifies it even further ‘the sense-world with the exclusion of all objects that are not 
sensible’ (Ibid.). It is in the first form that Kant takes it as the basis of natural sciences, his query is 
about ‘the systemically ordered facts regarding natural things(which again would consist of the 
description of nature as a system of classes of natural things ordered according to similarities)’ 
(1970, p.4). What is recognised as nature, then, is the formal nature as the possibility of an object’s 
inner principle of being which is posited by ‘I think’. Therefore, it can be argued that nature 
becomes dependent on the transcendental ontology, that is, the: pre-ontological constitution of the 
subject in order to be able think in terms of metaphysics of beings.75
Implications
This points to the fact that the possibility of ‘Copemican Revolution’ clearly rests in reversing 
nature/human relationship from human beings located in pre-ordained nature to a situation where 
the order is coming from human being toward what cannot be known as a priori existence that is 
nature. Put differently, human being becomes a priori condition of knowledge upon which 
empirical measurement depends. It is argued that to understand organisms and their functions one 
has to consider them ‘as if they had a purpose and see whether in this way we can understand them 
better’ (Paton 1967, p.149).76 Here I am making a passage from the possibility of the Kantian 
science on the basis of pre-ontological establishment of subject as a priori to the next level, that of 
moral discussion which pervades this science. The peculiarity o f  making this passage through the 
discussion of nature is important because it allows me to show that in the later analysis of human 
morality or cosmopolitan ethics, of political writings, are always already located in the pre- 
ontological establishment of human beings as abstract from nafture. As argued above, the discussion
75 H. J. Paton argues that for Kant ‘nature is the totality o f phenomena governed by law... .This law primarily causal 
law .. .Even in the understanding o f physical nature we may have to use another concept besides that o f causal law, 
namely o f purpose or end’ (1967, p. 149). It is safe to argue that this purpose or end is related with the intentionality 
o f the human being therefore, what is explained as nature intimately linked to what human purpose in considering a 
particular phenomena.
76 According to Paton, Kant ‘calls this “purposiveness without purpose” tfiiat is, without a conscious purpose’ (1967, 
p. 149, note 2).
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of natural law as reflection of all purposive nature which is considered to have a final end77 is 
already located in a framework of a relationship between gazing human being and something out 
there. The purposive gaze of the human subject creates the connection between abstracted self and 
nature. Through this link something like nature becomes comprehensible. Here, the ethical 
relationship between a purposive gaze and a thing, which becomes in connection to this gaze, is 
only possible through a pre-constituted moral standpoint as a pre-ontological possibility. The 
implication of theorising all purposive nature is that, through the Kantian framework, the gaze 
would know synthetically what this purpose is in terms of nature, that is inner principles of things. 
Therefore, when the discussion of nature takes place this pre-ontological moral significance does 
not come into the scene as it is the implicit possibility of the discussion. As a result, when the 
morality in terms of human beings is discussed it takes place in the abstracted realm of being 
human. In this, nonetheless, human nature, nature as inner principle, is considered to be all 
purposive as well.
Albeit, at a different level, ‘a good man[sic] is...seeking to obey a law valid for rational 
agents as such, binding upon him and upon others even in the absence of generous emotions, and 
indeed even in the presence of natural dislike’ (Paton 1967, p. 151). Two points take us to the 
direction of understanding the impact of moral discussion on a larger framework. First, this is 
clearly a community of rational beings, implicitly, humans are singled out as the members of this 
grouping if we consider the discussion of apperception. Second, obedience to a general law in this 
group is established as the inner principle of a good man which becomes the moral law. Human 
beings abide with this law because these laws ‘are in themselves good and because they are our 
duty’ (Paton 1967, p.152).78 According to O’Neill the moral action prescribed in the Categorical 
Imperative is targeted for ‘agents who act freely, and so may start with various proposals for 
action.. ..which agents can filter these initial proposals to check whether they are morally
77 See B425.
78 Clearly this formulations are commonly known in the Kantian philosophy as the Categorical Imperative. I shall not 
discusses this very complicated concept, but I want to stress that the Categorical Imperative guides action through two 
main formulas: a) Formula o f Universal Law and b) the Formula o f the End-in-itself
a) Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law
b) Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person o f any other, never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as and end. For a detailed discussion o f the Categorical Imperative see 
Paton 1967 and O’Neill 1989, pp. 126-62.
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acceptable’ (O’Neill 1989, p. 128). It is also reiterated by Paton that we are acquainted only ‘with 
men[sic] as rational beings therefore we are bidden to respect men as men, or men as rational 
beings’ (1967, p. 165). It is in this manner that ‘humanity’ becomes comprehensible as the collective 
of agents that are carrying ‘characteristic of possessing reason and rational will* (Ibid.). As 
discussed by Stephen Mulhall, the emphasis of possibility of the Categorical Imperative through 
rational will does not stop Kant to consider the human nature as being ‘split between an animal part 
and a rational part’ (Mulhall 1998, p.50). The split is, however, used to differentiate human beings 
as a species that are controlled by their rational side which is unique to human nature as they are 
‘capable of setting and achieving their own ends or purposes’ (Mulhall 1998, p.52), that is, will.79
The importance of Mulhall’s discussion is in the way he shows how Kant brings reason in 
and gives it the dominant position as the inherent natural purpose of overcoming the 
sensuous/animalistic nature of human beings (1998, pp.53-54).80 It is clear that the Kantian 
discussion is based on taking reason, again, as the functional human nature purpose of which is 
overcoming the animal side within human beings. By being able to set ends in itself and trying to 
perfect its autonomy by its nature, human subject’s moral life becomes framed within natural 
purposivesness of achieving human fulfilment of its capacity ‘rational agents must will the 
development of and perfection of their physical and intellectual powers as well as their freedom 
from sensuous inclination’ (Ibid. p.53). If one conceives sensuous/animal side as related with 
outside world the real nature of human beings, then, is an attempt to overcome this dependence to
o  1
outside in other words an aim toward a more autonomous existence. It is clear that the human 
nature is established as internally and externally sovereign subject. As a matter of fact, its external 
independence is the pre-ontological condition for the internal sovereignty expressed in the 
discussion above in relation to animal/sensuous side. The moral imperative set in the human nature 
is built on the possibility of reason independent of outside that is nature. Therefore, when the 
mechanic purposiveness of animals is compared with the dynamic moral purposiveness of human
79 Mulhall further argues that the differentiation based on will allows Kant to show that through the capacity o f will 
human beings set ‘purposes independently o f the dictates o f sensuous needs’ (1998, pp.52-53).
80 According to Mulhall the categorical Imperative ‘operates upon the material, the content, provided by Kant’s 
conception o f the nature o f any organic being’ (1998, p.53).
81 Kant argued in Metaphysics o f  Morals that ‘the power to set an end is the characteristic o f humanity (as 
distinguished from animality)’ (As cited in Mulhall 1998, p.53). Here the argument no doubt is related with the
169
beings, animals are presented on already-decided-criterion based on human perception, and as long 
as animals are perceived as such they fit the human a priori concepts.
One of the most important implications of these theoretical steps, and the way discussion 
unfolds, is related with the possibility of taking human being as an object of scientific query. The 
query then establishes humans as a group of species. In terms of human purposiveness(teleology) 
the above discussion represents a moral blueprint for humanity and establishes internal/natural 
relationality among humans. Therefore, the realisation of systemic whole where all ends are united
becomes an ‘empirical purpose (the preservation and development of species[of human])’ (Mulhall
82 ,1998, p.54). The analysis of human nature is focused on understanding the inner principles of 
being human similar to Kant’s description of natural sciences. Through this move it may be argued 
that the beginnings of a science of human beings is articulated. The telos established in human 
nature connects human beings on an a-historical path deriving from human nature. In this path of 
sovereign subject, the'interest is perfecting further autonomy through moral imperative for the 
species in general. As a result of this, perceiving something like nature, even as outside, is 
permeated with freedom from nature on the way to perfect autonomy.
In other words, I argued that the Kantian metaphysics as science is based on a pre- 
ontological abstraction of human beings from nature and this allowed Kant to establish the 
possibility of his ‘Copemican Revolution’. The sovereign human being in this science becomes the 
pre-ontological condition of understanding relations among human beings. It is conceivable, then, 
to argue that the collective relations of human beings understood as society is preceded by the idea 
of sovereign/autonomous human beings. In this understanding of society, nature is located as
autonomy o f setting ends independent of nature.
82 Mulhall adds that this empirical purpose is imposed by ‘reason as a duty because its neglect would amount to a 
neglect o f an aspect o f human animal nature’ (1998, p.54).
83 From the structure o f the Categorical Imperative its clear the aim is universal moral teleology. The sovereignty o f the 
subject is sovereign so far as it functions by its true nature that is based on the moral imperative. Here, one can also 
observe the background of what R.B.J. Walker notes as ‘[t]heories o f international relations express a historically 
specific account of what political life is all about. They do so by affirming a familiar understanding o f where it can 
occur’ (1995, p.306). The Kantian recognition o f individual ends and universal moral imperatives gives us the initial 
conditions o f inside/outside where theories of IR located themselves. In other words the scientific level provided by the 
Kantian discussion in terms of human relationality is taken without questioning. This does not only exclude nature but 
inherently deploys inside/outside differentiation irremovably into any discussion.
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R4constitutive excluded. In the moral relations among people in perfecting their ends for systemic 
whole nature, that is what is perceived to be nature since as the condition of this stage nature has 
already disappeared, is set as the obstacle for this aim. Therefore, within the morality established 
the moral duty is about overcoming nature; or put differently is about humanising the perceived 
possibility of nature. The ecology, thus, becomes not only invisible but non-existent realm of 
relations. There is only the society of humans among themselves, non-humans i.e. those that cannot 
be considered as persons, as discussed by Chappell (1997), are excluded from life. The society 
considers non-human nature as material to be used in its general purpose. In this there is no moral 
contradiction to exclude non-human life from the social consideration. The limit of existence for 
non-human nature is set by the way they serve to the general aim of humanity. Therefore, by 
introducing ecological life in the previous chapters in the context of oceans I have demonstrated the 
possibility of life in excess of life as foreclosed, as human life in society. This excess presented by 
the ecological life allows a transgressive move to expose the limit set by human moral purpose. 
Even the consideration of life in excess supposes some quality of being in itself. This in-itselfiiess is 
not possible through the human subjectivity coming from Kantian formulation.
Foucault suggests that ‘transgression carries the limit right to the limits of its being,.. .forces 
the limit to face the fact of its imminent disappearance, to find itself in what it excludes* (1998, 
p.75). By introducing nature as life in excess, the ultimate referent, human beings, as the limit is 
being stretched and questioned as the locus of the possibility of nature. Ever enforced forgetting of 
nature by the sovereign human subject becomes untenable. The enforced idea of life at the expanse
or
of how that life is possible becomes exposed.
The social context of life and being excluded from this as bare life was discussed. I argued 
that the move between two locations presents the political within the social relations. I also argued 
that this move, related to creating inside/outside, ignores nature in its entirety. Richard Beardsworth
841 want to point out that this term is used in order to differentiate the position unfolded here from the concept of 
4constitutive outside’ formulated by Chantal Mouffe to capture the way identities are formed or constructed through 
difference (see Mouffe 1992, p.379). In the case o f human/nature relationship, it is at the pre-ontological level that 
nature loses its possibility as outside which then moves onto the level o f sciences where morality isdiscussed in terms 
of outside constituted on the basis o f abstract human existence. Therefore, it is difficult to consider nature as the 
constitutive outside where it does not exist in itself.
851 have demonstrated this in the previous chapter in connection to how concept o f life/bare life does not include 
nature, and thus excludes ecological relationality.
171
differentiates between two concepts of politics lla politique’ and lle politique’: the first ‘as 
designating the domain or practice of human behaviour which normati vises the relations between 
subject and its objects’ and the second ‘is the instance that gathers or founds such practice as 
practice’ (Beardsworth 1996, p. 158). In this way it can be argued that the politics ‘la politique’ of 
life is itself political. I would further argue that the possibility of political 7e politique’ —  that is the 
ontological condition of ‘la politique’ — rests in a priori possibility of agents and the demarcation 
of their realm of existence. In Perpetual Peace Kant expresses that state ‘is a society of men whom 
no one else has any right to command or to dispose except the state itself (1991, p.94). It is clear 
that in order to understand this formulation of state one needs to bring the philosophical discussion 
of human beings. As Latour points out, ‘the meaning of politics has been restricted to the values, 
interests, opinions, and social forces of isolated, naked humans’ (1999, p.290). It is possible to 
argue that pursuance of human nature, in its autonomy, aimed at the ‘Kingdom of ends* (Kant 1948, 
p.95) mediated by moral imperatives, is the ground of le politique and therefore the possibility of la 
politique. At the end, in the politics of human society nature is not one of the concerns.
The politics of a society or of societies in terms of international relations derives from this 
position. Put differently, various political proposals that agents can articulate, as suggested by 
O’Neill (1989, p. 128) through their free will, can only derive from the initial position provided 
under human purposiveness in perfecting their aim while abiding with universal moral imperatives. 
Therefore, in these proposals nature becomes implicitly excluded as the condition of these political 
negotiations. The position of the study of International Relations must be considered in the same 
vein. Kimberly Hutchings argues that two main theoretical arguments within IR, Realism and 
Idealism, ‘are tied together by the same fundamental conception of the terms of international 
politics’ enshrined in ‘Kant’s concept of perpetual peace’ (1996, p.151).86 Both in these traditions87 
and in their critical counterparts (for example Critical Theory and Post-modem theories of 
international relations) the ideals or the theoretical formulations of the space where the discussion 
of perpetual peace takes place is uncritically accepted. For the realists and idealists it is not 
surprising to see the extent to which they have already committed themselves within the Kantian
86 This is also noted by Hurrell as an ambiguity (1990, p.204).
87 Kant’s critentials for cosmopolitan ethics are well known. Allen W. Wood shows the possible communitarian
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realm by combining their political analysis with ethical proposals88 deriving by and large from 
universal moral imperatives. With the counterparts, the legacy of Kantian tradition89 and the 
methodological problem inherent becomes apparent. By responding to the frames provided in the 
traditional theories, the arguments of Critical and post-modem theorists state, the international and 
the international relations become inescapable concerns.90
Here, I am not suggesting at all that these discussions would have been adopted or agreed by 
Kant himself.91 The suggestion is about the fact that the political tradition encapsulated in 
Perpetual Peace is adopted without due regard to its philosophical commitments and ethical 
conventions in relation to the larger whole.92 The political and ethical proposals,93 dealing with the 
moral questions arising from human relations, are trying to articulate new ethical frames within 
already normalised space of le politique, or life as indicated in the human society. The moral action
lineage in Kant through his concerns for the inhabitants o f newly discovered territories. See Wood 1998, p.63.
88 Although this particular discussion is much more complex, few names would allow me to show this situation. John 
Charvet combines his particularistic political proposal with the possibility o f universal, cosmopolitan ethics, see 
Charvet 1998. Also, Mervyn Frost is notable in his universalist ethical claims on the basis o f being human, see Frost 
1996. Charles Beitz also talks about moral cosmopolitanism which would be based on an impartial consideration of 
the claims of every person, see Beitz 1994, p. 124.
89 As suggested by Michael J. Shapiro the idea o f state in Kant is ‘analogues o f ethically autonomous person’ (Shapiro 
1998, p.701). Therefore, the ethical foundations of individual arguably applies to state as well. In other words states are 
supposed to set ends in themselves while doing so must bare in mind the universal moral obligations.
90 For example for the former see Linklater 1998, where a possibility o f post-Westphalian citizenship is discussed. 
For the latter see David Campbell 1998, where the disintegration of Bosnia is discussed with post-structralist ethical 
commitment to an analysis o f the situation as constructed, and deconstructed human communications. He, however, 
concludes his deconstruction with prescriptions for action —  in that by and large state action. Even Walker’s most 
important discussion about inside/outside(1993), by only showing us possibilities o f shifting boundaries at each 
deployment of concept of sovereignty, becomes trapped within the Kantian science. The idea that inside/outside 
differentiation is constantly constituted suggests a very dynamic relationship but the formulation suggests that we are 
in the presence of a sovereign subject in terms o f an autonomous entity reflecting an outside. Clearly this implicit 
understanding of sovereign subject does not question the possibility o f the binary in terms o f the constitution o f  
human subject, and.arguably assumes this inside/outside as being the natural human condition. As I tried to unfold, 
the autonomy of inside in terms o f human subject is constructed on a pre-ontological definition o f the human subject. 
It is, therefore, possible to argue that Walker, by the virtue o f not moving beyond the autonomous subject, cannot 
move beyond the ethical constraints within the sovereign subject in relation to nature.
91 As Pierre Laberge suggests Kant’s own understanding o f international relations would have been different from 
that o f later Kantians, but this precisely points to the fact that later Kantians take Perpetual Peace without its 
philosophical possibility which is implicit in the ethics therein. Having said that, Laberge falls into the same mistake 
in the discussion o f ‘Kantian Conceptions o f International Justice’. See Laberge 1998, pp.82-102.
92 In debt analysis o f this fact is given by Wood. He argues that, Kant’s intended audience was humanity at large. 
And shows the relationship between philosophical discussions about humans and the political project outlined in 
Perpetual Peace in order to argue that the text still remains as the locus o f hope. See Wood 1998, p.59-76. Clearly 
this hope can only make sense as a result o f thinking about human subject as defined in the Kantian science.
93 For various manifestations of this see, Mapel and Nardin 1998.
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which is the free will of the moral agent is based on tie initial formulation of human beings asI
abstracted from nature. The free rational action based an free will is philosophised firstly as 
freedom from nature and the possibility of a thinking jubject independent of nature. Therefore, all 
the moral philosophy discussed implicitly carries this nost important constitutive abandonment of 
nature. As a result, they are functioning in an already established universal space of human relations 
based on the moral exclusion of nature.
What I have been observing here is the fact thit Kant’s ethical constitution of human subject 
and the moral obligations in it (in relation to nature) his permeated into the study of understanding 
political relations among human beings as the methocblogical imperative to be able to understand 
these relations. Intellectual activity, then, is premised on the original ethical position between 
human subject and nature. The discussion of ethics thit takes place today is a labour within the 
space formulated by this original position. The normalty of human subject as the pre-ontological 
possibility is always asserted, that does-not allow ethics of ecological relationality to be perceived. 
In order to be able to talk about ecology and ecologicd problems, the original position between 
human subject and nature has to be altered.
Therefore, the reasons and solutions of percei\ed environmental problems cannot be found 
at the level of analysis provided by the study of International Relations. By the nature of its 
structure, IR is immunised from perceiving the problems from an ecological perspective. What is 
being perceived as political only involves autonomous human subjects and their ends, or 
autonomous states and their ends. In either case, nature does not exist in itself to be brought into the 
discussion as a party to the political process. It is clear from the Kantian genesis that, in order to be 
able to bring nature into the political debate and, thus, move into an ethics of ecology, a new 
constitution of human subject must be thought. By this rethinking at the pre-ontological level, 
possibility of a politics as an ecological relationality can be argued for. In this, relational ethics of 
belonging to the same space would challenge the politics of the abstracted autonomous human 
subject.
According to Latour the idea of humanity exists in a position from where it becomes 
‘detached mind gazing at an outside’ (Latour 1999, p.7). It is this gaze which creates the outside, 
the possibility of outside embedded in the gaze. In other words, in order to have an ecological
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understanding one has to think, first, in terms of the possibility of gaze, that of a gazing subject; 
and, second, to think in terms of how abstractedness implied in the gaze can be located back to 
nature, whereby the gazing subject becomes an ecological witness.
The first of these two points has been articulated in this chapter when I discussed the 
possibility of gazing subject and its implications for ecology and politics. Now, in the next chapter, 
I turn to the rethinking of an ecological witness.
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Chapter 5
Being a Phoenix:
An Ecological Existence
In the previous chapter, I discussed the sources of three criticisms developed through the thesis. 
The constitution of an anthropocentric subjectivity, its impact on understanding nature, and the 
methodological consequences of this particular conceptualisation on thinking about nature are 
located in the Cartesian/Kantian framework. It is argued that the Kantian attempt to establish 
metaphysics as a new science establishes the grounds of the anthropocentric human subjectivity 
that is abstracted from nature. Therefore, possibility of thinking about nature is permeated with 
this anthropocentric subjectivity. I also argued that the philosophical bind provided with the pre- 
ontological establishment of human subjectivity becomes the ground of scientific understanding. 
Ecology, thus, becomes impossible to conceptualise within this framework.1
In what follows I will present an alternative conceptualisation of human being which 
constitutes a space by thinking human as a part of nature on earth. It, thus, forms an ecological 
space. The focus of the chapter is Martin Heidegger’s thought in relation to Being (Sein) and 
Being-in-the-world-with-others.2 Heideggerian philosophy represents one of the major ruptures 
in the western thought in this century. By questioning the western metaphysics, he dislocates the 
abstracted-sovereign-subject based thinking. Through this, objective gaze of human subject over 
nature is dislocated.
1 It would be argued that ecology can be discussed in the Kantian philosophy by the way o f trying to establish, for 
example, rights and moral responsibility in terms o f nature. I agree that the Kantian philosophy is a very complex 
and sophisticated structure. Nonetheless, as I discussed in the previous chapter, even the attempt to thinking about 
nature in terms o f right based relations nature, or parts o f it, has to be considered in terms o f some attributes that 
belong to personhood. Put differently, the possibility of ecology within this framework can only be located in 
analready established anthropocentric space.
2 This term is derived from two parts o f Heideggerian terminology: Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt -sein) and 
Being-already-alongside (Schon-sein-bei). See, Heidegger 1995, for the former H 13, 41, 52-56; and for the latter H 
54, 141, 194, 329,365.
3 Heidegger attempts to distance himself from a discussion o f subjectivity and the idea o f subject as it has been 
constituted in the western metaphsysics by Descartes and Kant. Therefore avoids using subjectivity both 
linguistically and as an ideational tool. On this see Janicaud 1996.
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This might seem to be leading to a contestation of the possibility of nature tout court 
which in turn would allow poststructralist perspectives to take sway. Nonetheless, particular 
Heideggerian emphasis on the possibility of existence, only if  human being is located in the 
world by recognising the existence of other beings, has a thorough philosophical grounding, 
important bearing on the ecological discussion. It also keeps the poststructralist perspectives in 
control. The finite existence of Dasein,4 that Heidegger allows to be located in a given time/space 
juncture can be seen as it’s world.5 In this world Dasein experiences nature and its manifestation. 
Through the etymological unfolding of the meaning of ‘nature’ as physis6 the fixed idea of nature 
as something out there waiting to be discovered, is challenged. At the same time, nature as 
appearance, as emergence from concealment or manifestation of itself when it comes to being, 
allows us to attempt to see things in themselves as they are. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the 
finitude of Dasein allows only for a certain interpretation of nature and this is not all that 
different from a static relationship with nature albeit one based on temporality. This challenge 
can be responded to through the analysis of the term alethia in connection with physis. Heidegger 
argues that alethia-unconcealment has been wrongly translated as truth (Heidegger 1987, p. 102). 
He argues that this interpretation can only be correct if truth means ‘the essent is true as long as it 
is’ (Heidegger 1987, p. 102). Therefore, whatever the essent’s being is, has to be true as long as it 
is unconcealed in itself. This argument clearly is an attempt to counter objective truth about 
nature while allowing a possibility of nature being in itself open. Heidegger further argues that, in 
appearing, essent reveals one aspect of its being. Although this appearance can be realised in a 
given time/space juncture by the finite Dasein — therefore contextual — , it does not mean that 
the being of whatever has appeared is limited with that particular manifestation. Heidegger 
argues that ‘both truth in the sense of unconcealment and appearance as a definite mode of 
emerging self-manifestation belong necessarily to being’ (Heidegger 1987, p. 109).
The response through rethinking of both nature and human being, then, is an important 
one. It argues that we cannot talk about nature on the basis of fixed truth claims. At the same
4 This term will be discussed in detail later, here, it can tentatively and cautiously be referred as human being’s 
existence. ‘Being-there’ see translator’s note in Heidegger 1995, p.27, note 1.
5 ‘[o]f course Being-in-the-world is a state o f Dasein [Verfassung des Daseins] which is necessary a priori’ 
(Heidegger 1995, p.79).
177
time it does not agree with the idea that nature is a text and beyond it we cannot know, pace
• 7 •Jacques Demda. This framework can be taken as contrary to both what has been discussed in 
the previous chapter in terms of Cartesian/Kantian juncture and a certain poststructuralist 
tendency of considering everything as textuality.8
It argues that nature can be comprehended in a given context as it reveals-unconceals 
itself, but in this, a given appearance — unconcealement — must be thought of as always already 
located in a larger existence and therefore unconcealing but a part of it. This cautions human 
beings against arriving at quick truth claims about an appearance. The idea of fixing truth about 
an appearance is always related more with the perception of the human subject rather than what 
is really reflected in the appearance.
By reformulating the existential condition of human being, Heideggerian thought builds 
the larger existential context into the human beings’ possibility of Being. Therefore, in 
perceiving an appearance, human being is always already connected to the larger existence which 
is partially reflected in the appearance. Stated differently, the existential condition of being 
human, internally underpins the possibility of thinking in terms of a larger existential context 
with an understanding of other beings’ existence in themselves. This existential ethics gives an 
important role to the responsibility of the human being within its immediate context, as one 
reflects about an appearance.
The possibility of locating the ethical responsibility into the human being’s action within 
the context of the action, changes the abstract ideas of responsibility based on referent external to 
the context. Heidegger argues that
[t]he evolution of being-human as arrogance and presumption in the pejorative 
sense takes man out of his essential need as the in-cident. To judge in this way 
is to take man as something already there, to put this something into an empty
6 Heidegger 1987, p. 14-22.
7 This position can be best observed in Derrida’s o f  Grammatology. See,Derrida 1976.
8 At the same time I don’t want to exaggerate the difference between Derridian reading and Heideggerian 
philosophy. It is clear that in Derrida there is a Heideggrian thread and constant dialogue with Heidegger. Therefore, 
this criticism is more directed to those postmodern interpreters who are not paying attention to nuances of texuality 
with its ontological roots traced back to Nietzsche and Heidegger. This lineage discussed in depth by Spivak in her 
Translator's Preface to o f  Gramatology. See Spivak in Derrida 1976.
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space, and appraise it according to some external table of values (Heidegger 
1987, p. 164).
In terms of abstracted human subjectivity, this is an important challenge located in what I have 
been arguing as ecological being, expressed in Heidegger as being, located essentially in a larger 
whole as the in-cident. The definite article might raise some questions in terms human being’s 
location and arguments about anthropocentrism within Heidegger. For some his work, indeed, 
presents anthropocentrism of a sort while others might argue that he is fundamentally anti-human. 
And in this initial ambiguity the challenge of his thinking lies. Michel Haar elaborates this enigma 
very explicitly:
What is sometimes rashly termed Heidegger’s antihumanism is basically a 
radical rupture with the anthropocentrism that has been dominant since the dawn 
of modem times.. Man does not produce himself. He does not create being. He 
does not hold the ultimate condition of possibility of his own possibilities. He 
controls neither the provenance nor the secret necessity of the structures of the 
world. He can merely administer them. Only rarely and obscurely does he 
perceive the possibility of the Earth, which is embraced in art (1993, p. 184).
The tension, the paradox, which is present, depends greatly upon the fact that it presents something 
about humankind that contradicts the dominant metaphysics. Therefore, it is seen as counter 
intuitive. In order to understand this argument of paradoxical being one has to remove, suspend or 
even better, abandon the normalised normalities and naturalness created by the dominant 
metaphysics in Western thought from the understanding of what being really is. In this rethinking 
about human being, the main aim is to located it to where it belongs, to its essential home; after all 
as Rilke says ‘After the first home the second seems hybrid and windy’ (Duino Elegies VIII).
The main focus, then, is Heidegger’s book Being and Time from which I discern a 
possibility of an ecological being. There are two outcomes from this chapter. The first is the 
substantial discussion about ecological formulation of human being as relocated in nature. In this 
relocation, first, nature becomes comprehensible as life, hence the possibility of politicising 
nature. Neither nature nor human subject within it have fixed roles, definitions, or fixed 
relationally. Second, it gives a methodological reorientation. This new perspective underpins the
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methodological approach applied in the thesis as a whole. The questioning is conducted on the 
basis of the ethical concern for the others that exist in the eco-system. The observer of the 
situation is included in the questioning. In other words an objective researcher is replaced with an 
ethical concerned locator or with an ecological witness. The chapter, through its workings of 
ecological being, aims to point toward a methodology of existence that is ethically located within 
the relationality of beings in the world. In this move, the human being’s decontexualised9 
position is reversed. The concept of ethical through the context of ecology becomes an ethics of 
existence rather than an ‘ethical approach to environment’ where ‘ethics’ is considered to be 
externally decided moral values i.e. procedures for good life or rights that are supposed to be 
applied by human beings in their intervention to nature. This existential ethics is based on the 
ontological location of human beings in nature rather than an epistemological variations 
perfected to assert anthropocentric politics in which human beings superiority in the larger whole 
is implicit. Through this reversal understanding of an issue becomes a dynamic thinking process 
within a context. The aim is to change the perceptions in the way we think and try to see the 
grounds of what we perceived to be environmental and political problems by denaturalising 
concepts based on human progress without considering it’s ‘finality’ (Guattari 1995, p. 119).
It is useful to relate the Heideggerian path in terms of ecology with the ecological 
perspectives discussed in chapter 2. This aims at demonstrating the dissimilarities between 
perspectives as well as establishing a response to the question: what can Heidegger contribute to 
the discussion?
Ecology
Mary Midgley poses a big moral question, she asks that ‘what attitude creatures like ourselves 
ought to take towards the cosmos within which we are so small a part?’ (1997, p.98). The 
question, here, can be paraphrased by asking what ought to be the ground of our attitude? The 
question and the possible responses can be put into the category of Deep Ecology in the sense 
Arne Naess used the category. According to Naess it was the depth of thinking and questioning
9 Toulmin, 1992 p.21.
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which determined the characterisation ‘supporters of the deep ecology movement would argue 
from ultimate premises, philosophical or religious’ (1999a p.444). In this manner, the 
Heideggerian path may be considered under the generic of deep ecology. It is, nonetheless, 
problematical to consider this path under the rubric of the Deep Ecology10 as a substantive 
philosophy.
Naess argues that the deep ecology movement ‘is not defined through “asking deeper 
questions” and it would be very naive to say that if you question deeply enough you inevitably 
end joining the ecology movement’ (Ibid., p.445). Here, he critically differentiates the mode of 
questioning as a procedure that follows a prior state of ecological concern. The concern leads to 
the questioning at which level one can classify the endeavor henceforth. At the level of 
definition, how that definition is arrived at in a Heideggerian path presents a different 
formulation.
Naess argued that the Deep Ecologist standpoints or values ‘are intuitive, as are all 
important views, in the sense that it can’t be proven’ (Naess 1982, pp.l 1-12).11 The main 
intuition is argued to be the unity in the cosmos as opposed to dualist approaches that flourished 
within the western philosophy.12 According to Naess, this intuition arrived at a platform of deep 
ecology. He argues that it is a process of deriving fundamentals from many different 
philosophical traditions and religions at the end of which the platform must be distinguished 
from these roots (1984 201-203). He further argues that ‘[t]he fundamentals are mutually more or 
less incompatible.. ..The incompatibility does not affect the deep ecology adversely’ (Ibid.). The 
location of the intuitive approach is described as ‘[ejcological knowledge and life-style of the 
ecological field-worker have suggested, inspired, and fortified the perspective of the deep 
Ecology movement’ (Naess 1973, p.98). The wonderment in the face of nature seems to bring 
people together in the platform.13 This attempt is aiming to capture principles of deep ecology in 
varies world views.14
10 The substantive discussion is formulated into 8 central points. See Naess and Sessions 1999.
11 See the discussion o f intution in Naess 1999. On this also see chapter 2 notes 10 and 11.
12 See Devall 1980, Bohml980, and Capra 1997.
13 Peter Anker (1999) argues that the substantive Deep Ecology discussion is more related with other people such as 
Warwick Fox than Naess. He argues that Naess tries to leave the discussion open in terms o f solutions and the way 
one arrives at self-realisation. Naess (1999a) nonetheless, strongly disagrees with him that there is a strong
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Naess argued that his own deep ecological ground rests in ‘natural mysticism, oneness 
with nature and in nature’(1999a p.447). The attempt of transpersonal ecology by Warwick Fox 
(1995) reflects this perspective as a self-realisation.15 The central discussion is based on the idea 
of ‘things are’ (Fox 1995, p.251) and our amazement in the face of things. A discussion of how 
this is possible, or of what motivates individuals for self-realisation, needs to fall back on Naess’ 
argument of intuition.16 The framing of intuition in turn must be related to the perspective about 
natural mysticism. Jon Wetlesen traces the mysticism in many others among which he also 
names Heidegger (1999 p.416, note 12).
At this point the dissimilarity between the deep ecology as a substantive philosophy and 
the Heideggerian path can be discerned. In the former a question about why human beings, or 
what kind of human beings, as a source of intuitive action, stands unanswered. Therefore, 
ecological consciousness seemed to reflect an understanding as an aspiration based on 
appreciation of nature which leads to a self-realisation of locatedness in nature.
On the one hand, in the first sense of the deep ecology, as related with levels of 
questioning, the discursive space remains open to understand issues from many perspectives at 
many layers. The second, substantive discussion of deep ecology as a possibility of ecological 
intuition, on the other hand, seems to suggest a species17 based relationality with nature that 
might not acknowledge social historical context of particular way of relating to nature. The 
intuitive relationship between nature and human beings, thus, can be productively employed to
individualistic emphasis in his work.
14 According to Andrew Brennan this is an attempt to ‘deepen our grasp o f the situations in which these maxims 
apply’ (1999, p. 179).
15 According to Peter Reed this self-realisation argument is confusing on an operational level. He argues that as 
suggested by Naess and indeed by Fox this perspective suggests ‘diminishing o f individual self for realisation o f  
ecological se lf . This stems from identification o f human with nature and vice versa. Reed proposes his own 
understanding that is based on I and Thou radical othering based on Martin Buber’s theology. He argues that only 
when we are radically different from nature we can have an ethical relationship with it. See Reed 1989, pp.53-69. 
This is an interesting argument, nonetheless, it carries the religious understanding o f primacy o f human implicitly 
through the discussion.
16 Naess talks about self-realisation through identification with nature. His discussion carries the implicit argument of  
intuition. He, for example, argues that ‘[t]he feeling o f one’s own nothingness and insignificance may occur 
consistently with feelings o f nature awe’ (Naess 1989, ppl85-192).
17 This particular issue can be related to Naess’ roots in Spinoza and the discussion o f ethics by Spinoza. See Lloyd 
1980, Naess 1980 and Clark 1999.
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arrive at issues that can be deeply questioned.18 The dignity of nonhuman species and nature in 
general become related to the morality discerned from the intuitive relationship.19
The ontological implication of the process of intuitive mode presents a problem deriving 
from the vagueness of the articulation. The process defined, by Fox as ‘the deep-seated realisation 
of the fact that things are’ (1995 p.250). The only hint given is that it belongs to consciousness. 
Here lies a danger or confusing prospect which derives from the question of whether things are 
because we realise them or things have been even before our realisation. If the answer is affirmative 
for the first part, there is nothing different from the existing-Kantian-cosmology and as it is, that 
would not further the ecological thinking.20 The ethical relationship in this context seems to suggest 
that morality is preceded by compassion in the face of nature (Naess 1999b, p.430). The implicit 
meaning arguably suggests an act by the human subject.21 Naess argues that ‘[m]an may be the 
measure of all things in the sense that only a human being has a measuring rod, but what he 
measures he may find to be greater than himself and his survival’ (Naess 1984, p.270).
The assumption in this statement assumes a realisation which would nearly just happens. 
The relationship between nature and the individual seems to be considered at a primary level that
18 A polemical interpretation of Naess’ perspective on environmentalism might point in species based relationality, 
albeit implicitly. He argues that ‘environmentalism is a form of activism passionately concerned not only with life 
conditions today, but with the state o f the planet several generations from now’ (1980 p.324). The intergenerational 
perspective can be interpreted, arguably, as coming from a view where nature human relationship posed a- 
historically without considering dynamic social relations which are always mediating the context o f relationality.
19 It is clear that the way human beings are relating to nature is permeated through historical and social experience, 
Naess’ thinking seems to suggest an a-historical relationship. Even if  there is one it is important to realise that in 
order to recover such connection one has to go through the social relations. For example see Kirkpatrick Sale 1999, 
p.217-18.
20 Ariensen raises important reservations about the relevance o f intrinsic value and morality attached to this value 
implied and ascribed to nonhuman nature in the deep ecology platform. He argues that ‘it is clear that nonhumans 
cannot be offended in the moral sense.. .this is supported by the fact that we do not hold non humans morally 
responsible for their acts and we would not blame them morally’ (1999, p.424-25). His discussion is based on 
morality located in the Kantian tradition which recognises moral status o f some beings on what they are. Thus, 
distinguishes morality as a human matter. Its inherent anthropocentrism notwithstanding it points out a 
methodological weakness within the deep ecology thinking. Namely unclarified discussion o f an ethical relationship 
between human beings and nature that is established as a moral stand point. In this no ontological discussion tries to 
dislocate the view supported by Ariensen.
21 Naess addresses the location of the individual as follows, ‘Self-realisation breaks in and reinstates the central position 
o f the individual’ (1999a, p.447). It is important to realise that Naess is relying on Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy. He 
applies certain principles of Satyagraha understanding (Naess 1974). Self according to Reed in Naess corresponds to 
‘the Hindu Atman that is the notion of Absolute in Western philosophy-something completely beyond ordinary 
description but somehow basic to both God and world’(Reed 1989, p. 54, also see Naess 1974, p.41).Then the 
individual is considered to be se lf  small s), within the larger Self. From the citation it is clear that Naess is arguing
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can be seen as biological.22 Although the discussion on the level of bios is an important one, the 
suggestion that in measuring things human being may find the greatness of the ecological unity 
ignores the mediation of relationality by social context.23 A human being might realise something 
about nature but this would not necessarily be related with what Naess seems to be suggesting in 
the context of an ecological space.
On a deeper level the emphasis on the necessity of human realisation for things to be 
remains untouched.24 First, as also observed by Ariensen (1999 p.428, notel2), why the supposed 
biological links contribute to the individuals’ moral relationship with nature is not answered.25 
Second, the process from realisation to the moral stand point is not dealt with.26 Put differently, the 
reasons behind the suggested motivation to realise while measuring remains ambiguous if  not 
vague. In short, it is not clear what it (morally) means to have biological connections. On all these 
accounts, the Heideggerian path differs by locating its discussion in a framework, the end result of 
which can be seen as an ecological reconstitution of human being 27 The path I will discusses 
through Heidegger radically challenges the constitution of human being. It attempts to locate the 
relationality between human being and the larger context to something like ‘realisation of the fact 
that things are and have been’. It distances itself from discussions of biological nature and of those
that Self reconstitutes the self as the center again.
22 This stand point as biological egalitarianism has been clear since the beginning in Naess’ thinking. See, Naess 
1973, pp.95-100.
23 An important result o f not considering social context is discussed by Karen J. Warren. She discuses the conditions 
o f women in the developing world and the equation o f anthropocentrism with patriarchal social action patterns. See, 
Warren 1999, pp.255-69.
24 William F. French delivers an important critique o f biological egalitarinism. He argues that the stand point of  
equal inherent moral value o f all beings is untenable. It ignores the moral problem between for example animals and 
human beings. He further argues that actually Naess and other deep Ecologists revise this principle when there is a 
conflict o f interest ‘it is acknowledged that vital human interests may legitimately override vital interests o f  
nonhumans’. See. French 1995, pp.29-57. The suggestion o f inconsistency between the theory where equality is 
recognised and action where the moral ground o f the human being is asserted points to an important lack in the deep 
ecology thinking. By not discussing the constitution o f human being and value vested within the person Naess and 
the deep ecologists in general become vulnerable to this critique because they remain or seem to be remaining within 
the conventional conceptualisation o f human subject. An interesting manifestation o f this problem can be observed in 
the Greepeace action against Genetically Modified plants during July 1999 in Norfolk, Britain.
25 One impact of this theoretical gap is discussed by Ariel Salleh in terms o f Feminism and women’s conditions in 
the developing world. The ignoring sociohistorical context, she argues, the biological equality debate has an adverse 
effect on women within the system. See Salleh 1993, pp.225-244.
26 Overview provided by Baird Callicott witness to this point. See Callicott 1999, pp. 150-152.
27 Naess suggested with some dismay at a discussion with A.J Ayer that he was ‘quite near Heiddeger in certain 
sense’. He said ‘Yes. We are Geworfen. I feel very much that I have been thrown to the world, and that I am still
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based on sharply human consciousness at the same time. It grounds what is taken to be intuition 
into an existential state of being.28 The philosophical discussion, then, rigorously establishes a 
relational ethics which would reflect an ecological responsibility invested in human beings. It 
articulates necessarily social understanding of ecological context. Therefore, it thinks in terms of 
why and how a biological relationship is related with the moral relations. By doing so, it distances 
itself from the substantive deep ecology framework.
HEIDEGGER, A New Path?
In this discussion I am doing two things at the same time. First, I am giving a summary of
90Heideggerian thinking through the formulation of Dasein and its relationality. Second, I am 
constantly eluding to an ecological understanding. It is important to realise that the ecological 
aspect of Heideggerian thinking can only be exposed if the understanding of Dasein is 
demonstrated in its inbuilt constitutive relationality, it is the ecological aspect. The relationship 
between D ie m ’s structure and ecological context are interwoven. Therefore, I will distill the 
ecological discussion towards the end of the chapter after the structure of Dasein is clear. In his 
reversal of being autonomous human, Heidegger constitutes his understanding on a level which 
might seem very distant from the political concerns that are expressed in the present study. 
Nonetheless, it is the pre-ontological importance of this reconstitution of distinctive human being 
which allows me to conclude by politicising nature, thinking the political in terms of ecological 
ethics.
The homeless and ever-forgetful being is at the heart of Heideggerian thought. The being, 
i.e. humankind defined and totalised by the modem age, is no doubt considered to be the final point 
in the long evolution of being. This standpoint is questioned by Heidegger as missing the real
being thrown’. See Naess, Ayer, and Elders 1999, p.21.
28 The Heideggerian thinking begins with the location o f human being and attempts to rethink this position. While the 
possibility o f intuition and self-realisation which grounds a certain morality, based on intrinsic value in relation to 
nature, is not explained in terms o f relational human constitution(insofar as the view [individual centered] that the 
deep ecologists are objecting establishes itself on the level o f constitution).
29 My reading o f Heidegger will diverge from the, all too common interpretation o f him as nihilist. My contention 
will be that there is an important reversal o f human being’s existence, the ethical consequences o f which are too 
important to ignore.
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essence of being, which cannot be historicised. It is an attempt to find out the essence of being 
which is hidden, concealed, and cannot be reduced to an understanding of an epoch, from the 
modem human being in the age of technology.30 One of the important components of this 
problematisation is a call for thinking which is different from the thinking that is eventually geared 
to control and managing things.
that thinking is concerned unceasingly with one single happening: In the history 
of western thinking, indeed continually from the beginning, what is, is thought in 
reference to Being; yet the truth of being remains unthought, and not only is that 
truth denied to thinking as a possible experience, but Western thinking itself, 
and indeed in the form of metaphysics, expressly, but nevertheless unknowingly, 
veils the happening of that denial (The word of Nietzsche p.57,).
The potential implication of this new suggestion on the established concept of thinking is profound. 
It suggests that thinking is an experience, and in order to reach a truth through thinking it must be 
experienced. Therefore, it is not ‘thinking of something’ anymore but ‘thinking through’ something 
as in living through, being involved with. It is a call to understand being by turning to it, getting into 
it rather than objectifying, distancing it.31 Surely, here, a process is deeply implied in which the 
other sides involved in the process have to ‘be’ as well. As argued by Ladelle McWhorter, 
Heidegger sees this thinking as one which ‘disciplines itself to allow things to show themselves on 
their own terms’ (1992, p.2). The question of self-disciplined thought indeed sounds rather 
frustrating, as compared to modem ‘free thinking’.32 This frustration is actually the challenge and 
eventually the threat of Heidegger to western metaphysics and the modem man created therein. 
Moreover, it implies an ethic which is different insofar as it cares33 about the others in their being.
30 This attempt can be seen as a rhetorical move about ‘real’ if one considers the entirety o f Heideggerian enterprise.
It is clear that real does not entail an external, extra- existence.
31 This Heideggerian move is clearly in opposition to the Enlightenment logic of science as well as being. The idea o f  
the possibility o f Knowing through objectification and removing the impact o f senses somehow indicate, this method 
would not be about understanding things in relational terms. The observing subject always stands at a distance so it 
philosophises something which is outside.
32 It might be suggested that the idea o f free thinking is related to the free human being without any limits but the 
categorical, universal, moral imperative.
33 The concept o f care in Heidegger differs from the dictionary meaning o f the term in English. I will discusses this 
later in the chapter.
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In this process of thinking about the possibility of self-disciplined thinking rests the path for 
a new understanding of being and belonging. What is to be overcome is the ‘new epoch of the 
withdrawal is one in which being adapts itself to the objectness of objects, but which, in its essence 
as being thereby withdraws. This epoch characterises the innermost essence of the age we call 
modernity’ (Heidegger 1996,p.55). The withdrawal is referring to the condition of the modem ‘I* 
which completed its abstraction through Descartes and finally with Kant, by arriving at an extra­
natural stand as the ultimate truth. In order to dislocate this extreme anthropocentrism, Heidegger 
shows that ‘something that man himself is, and yet which exceeds him and extends beyond him, in 
each case comes into play for the purpose of determining entities as such as a whole’ (as cited in 
Haar 1993, p.xxiii).34 Heidegger attempts to understand the essence and conditions of being human, 
and so turns to the beginning of the Western tradition and tries to understand the origins of the 
essence of being in Greek philosophy, where man is understood as being that pertains to something 
from within that is common to all beings in their connectedness and which binds it with the whole.
In the next section, the essence of being as articulated by Heidegger is examined.
Frustration and disbelief are the two dominant senses as one goes deeper into Heidegger because he 
seems to suggest powerfully, and passionately, that nothing can be done in the face of problems. 
One could only watch what is happening within a social time frame in which s/he is located.
Nonetheless, behind this facade is suggestion of a possibility of action that comes from the 
deep potential of human being. This potential has its grounds in belonging to Being. The existential 
condition of being opens up a new ethics/relationality with nature, within nature. The thinking 
process is not only about allowing things to reveal themselves, but also about human beings 
realising their own existential condition within nature. Therefore, it is a possibility of action
■jr
presenting itself through consciousness of human being. The action is the process of realisation of 
self and its location in the greater existence which is supposed to result in the realisation of tension
34 This can be related to Foucault’s argument to which I referred earlier in chapter 4 about transgression. See, 
Foucault 1998, p.69-87.
35 The action here must be thought larger than the immediate limits o f this study within the environmental concerns 
in oceans as expressed earlier on. The action creates a particular outlook which would translate our relationship to 
oceans different than it is implied in the environmental problems. The possibility o f considering oceans as political 
agents can be realised. To this I will return at the end of the chapter.
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between the time-based existence of being and its ahistorical attribute of belonging to a specific 
time and place. Here the obvious dichotomy and existential condition of being is revealed.
Being & o f Being & Fulfilment
In this section, I will discuss how there in [Da]sein and Being in of the Being-in-the-world are used 
as constitutive bricks fox Dasein's existence. They implicitly, quietly, and concretely demonstrate 
the contextuality, and arguably, at this stage, social contextuality,36 within Heidegger’s 
understanding of primary Being of Dasein. This is an early gesture toward the discussion of 
ecology. It is clear that one can glimpse at the possibility of relational ethics implied in thereness 
and Being in.
Heidegger through the introduction of the concept Dasein and its articulation dislocates the 
established understanding of the human being in Western philosophy, particularly that of
'X '7‘Enlightenment man’. Dasein is depicted as an entity belonging to Being, and it is ‘this entity 
which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being’ 
(Being and Time, p.26).38 As well as ‘in each case it has its Being to be, and has its own, we have 
chosen to designate this entity as “Dasein”, a term which is purely an expression of its Being’
(p.33). Here, ‘Being’ is considered to be all-encompassing, that is in each and every entity. ‘Being 
is the transcendence pure and simple’ (62). The path to understand being is established through the 
understanding of its mode in an entity’s being. As a result of the intricate relationship between 
Being and its presence in each and every entity, the question of Being becomes an inquiry into 
Dasein and its possibilities.
It is imperative to state that Dasein etymologically means ‘being-there’ (27, notes 1). 
Therefore, Dasein as it is, implies a concept of time, space and as being a potential to be. In 
considering all these configurations Dasein understands its essence within a certain existence (67),
36 A cautionary remark is in order. Here, I am using ‘social contextuality’ loosely. The suggestion is not about 
‘social’ as in the study o f Sociology. Heideggerian idea can only be considered as a philosophical argument which 
leads, may be, to something like a sociology. But, in this pre-ontological stage the only aim is to suggest Dasein 
exists in relationality, in the world without any implications coming from Sociology.
37 Arguably abstracted and autonomous human being.
38 Unless otherwise is stated, hereafter, all the numbers in parentheses are references to Being and Time by Martin
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and as possibilities it has within that existence. Thus, Dasein presupposes a certain understanding 
of Being in its existence as given with its potentialities.. It is stated that Dasein has Being in itself as 
such, but it does not change the fact that how Dasein understands that Being is dependent upon the 
ontological existence of Dasein i.e. ‘in its own understanding of Being, the way the world is 
understood is,.., reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein gets itself interpreted’ 
(37). What happens here is that Being and its mode of being are differentiated according to the 
subjectivity of Dasein. Being is interpreted by Dasein as something parallel to its subjectivity. By 
this process Being as it is becomes hidden, covered or veiled within Dasein without disappearing.
The state of being of Dasein and its relation to Being is considered on two states, ‘authentic’ 
and ‘inauthenticity’. They imply two states of approaching, or being of Being (68). Put differently, 
they are the mode of Being of Dasein. By being in these states, possibilities, Dasein faces choices, 
deriving from the existence o f Dasein. The decision about choices is actually a decision about 
Dasein to ‘win itself or loose itself (Ibid.). In this decision, authenticity and inauthenticity are not 
related to more or less of Being for Dasein. Being is not something that might be abandoned as 
such. Dasein is in its possibilities of Being in either case. The concepts are rather about the level of 
awareness of Being that Dasein embraces through its choices. Nevertheless, in this embrace, 
inauthenticity is underpinned by the forgetfulness (69; also see 220-223) of Dasein which implies a 
certain ontology which presents Dasein* s image of its existence, not the existential condition of 
Dasein* s being.
Without further ado, the concept of ‘Being-in-the-world’ should be included in the 
discussion.39 ‘Being-in-the-world’ is the constitutive element of Dasein (78) but it is not the 
property of Dasein which can be disposed of at will (84). As shown previously, Dasein exists in 
different modes with regard to authenticity, and all these modes are grounded and only possible in a 
state which is expressed as Being-in-the-world. Moreover, Being-in-the-world is presented as the
Heidegger; Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (1962)1995, Blackwell Publishers, London.
39 The concept o f ‘world’ is explained in reference to ‘to exhibit the Being o f those entities which are present-at-hand 
within the world’ (Heidegger 1995, p.91). Here, it seems that to be present-at-hand (Ibid., p. 121) manifests things with 
certain invested value. The things are invested with values because o f their ‘Being of Things o f Nature’ (ibid.). At the 
same time it is also asserted that Nature is something encountered within the world (Ibid., p. 92).
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essential state of ‘Being of Dasein’ (80).The concept of ‘world’ is not clear in this context.40 It is 
not expressed overtly whether ‘Earth’ is implied as in nature. Although entities supposed to be in a 
space and that space, supposedly, is ‘world’, the entitiness of ‘world’ is implied as well. In a way 
what is implied is the necessary existence of Being-in-the-world for a ‘world’ to be. However, this 
remains to be seen in later works of Heidegger that will be discussed in a later section.
The primary concern at this point is Dasein and its experience of Being by Being-in. What 
is strongly stressed is the fact that Being-in-the-world implies a state of physically Being-in 
something (79), being absorbed. At the same time Being-in is essential of Being from this entity 
itself (170). With this any misunderstanding that might derive from common usage o f ‘by* implying 
alongsideness is cleared up. It is expressed that such alongsideness requires prior understanding of 
Being-in-the-world (81). It is argued that the entity which is constituted by Being-in-the-world is 
itself in every case its ‘there’ (171).
The ‘there’ is the fundamental condition of Dasein. This means that Dasein in each case 
‘there’ discloses itself to itself. Therefore, Dasein carries ‘there’ at every instance which indicates a 
disclosedness of a ‘world’ at each instance. And in each instance of disclosedness, ‘there’, Dasein 
is. ‘This disclosedness we have called understanding’ (182). What is being understood at each 
‘there’ of Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Because this understanding of Being-in-the-world, and 
hence the world as such, is something that happens at each ‘there’ of Dasein, it is an existential 
rather than a conventional concept of understanding as grasping at will. This almost instantaneous 
understanding presents Dasein with its potential of Being (183). This potentiality derives from the 
‘throwness’ (Geworfenheit) o f Dasein through itself by its state-of-mind i.e. mood. Throwness 
means ‘the facticity of its being delivered over’ (174).
Considering the fact that every mood has its understanding and every understanding has its 
mood, there is a possibility of Being conceived on the basis of not one ‘there’. By this, the 
mutability of Dasein in its possibilities can be discussed. The contexuality implied in ‘there’ also
40 The articulations o f ‘world’ do not clarify the meaning of the concept. They rather form an ambiguous understanding 
o f ‘world’ based on the concepts ‘ready-to-hand’ and ‘present-at-hand’. See, Heidegger 1995, pp.97,99-100. In the 
middle of this obscure deliberation with ‘world’ there is an unpronounced concept o f being not alone, but with other 
things. Heidegger in his preliminary discussion of the ‘Being-in’ section o f the Being-in-the-world expresses that: ‘By 
this “in” we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended “in” space have to each other with regard to 
their location in that space’ (Ibid., p.79).
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indicates possibility of change, motion; in other words, possibility of moving away from fixed 
referent, for example in understanding nature. In its throwness Dasein is being delivered to ‘there’ 
and conceives ‘that is and has to be’ (173) in which ‘whence’ and ‘whither’ becomes either an 
enigma or a mis-interpretation (175). What is important to see at this point is the fact that Dasein 
found itself in its throwness and conceives ‘that is’ on the basis of this ‘there’ which is understood 
on the basis of a mood. Therefore, once more one has to deal with the concepts of authentic and 
inauthentic which become disclosedness as a result of understanding’s involvement with Being’s 
possibilities at every case.
Understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that 
is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its 
world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily into the 'for-the-sake-of- 
which'; that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding either authentic, arising out 
of one's own Self as such, or inauthentic (186).
In this process of understanding, the critical concept is ‘projection’ (Entwurf) (185) through which 
the process reflects Dasein either on itself or upon significance (as one of Being’s possibilities) as 
Being ‘in its current world’ (Ibid.). But again this projection is different from the conventional one, 
i.e. projecting something from an already thought-out concept. What then is this new projection? It 
must be seen in relation to Dasein’s being. Dasein is already reflected on itself as Dasein within its 
worldliness. Therefore, projection is not a process posterior to Dasein’s being but rather coincides 
interiorly with Dasein’s becoming in its world at ‘the disclosedness of the “there”’ (187).41
Heidegger argues that Dasein has two reflective possibilities through which it can reveal its 
many possibilities of Being and insofar as it is all wrapped by Dasein, to differentiate those two 
modes seems not to be reasonable. Or is it?
The two modes of reflection must be put into the context of the everydayness 
(Alltaglichkeit) of Dasein. Considering the fact that Dasein is in a ‘world’ at every ‘there’ in which 
experience of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand are constitutive elements of Dasein. Also, the
41 Within the becoming ‘Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility. The Being- 
possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways o f its solicitude for Others and its concern with the “world”’ 
(Heidegger 1995, p. 183).
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other entities in their Dasein are encountered within ‘world’. None of these encounters are 
happenings of ‘Being-by’ them. They are the result of Being-with-others (156) reflected by Dasein 
into its world by Being itself. Nevertheless this does not mean the others are mere reflections. 
Heidegger asserts that these encounters are possible within the process of work (ibid., also 148), 
through which the others reveal themselves according to Dasein's — being ‘there’. Thus, Being-in- 
the world is required as a precondition of such disclosing, and only in such a structure is Dasein. 
The everydayness is Dasein's ‘fascination with its world’ (149). This fascination, at the same time, 
is its road to leave or forget its authenticity (eigentlich).
Dasein's everydayness, fascinated Dasein, is considered as ‘falling’ (Verfallen) 
characterised by ‘idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity’ (218). This fallenness is about the inauthentic 
(uneigentlich) being of Dasein as one of its possibilities.42 In this condition Dasein is fallen from 
Being-it-Self in authenticty. It has become involved only immediate ‘there’ by forgetting its 
possibilities of Being, it becomes fixed. In the state of fascination Dasein is absorbed in its world 
which becomes its reason of being.
The concept of Being-there-with-others requires communication of some sort. In this case 
this requirement seems to be fulfilled by ‘talking or discourse’ (203). Insofar as talking is 
communicating, Dasein's understanding of it presupposes a certain state of mind as well as a 
certain Being ‘there’ that is naturally internalised in the talk. Therefore, ‘talk’ might be seen as the 
encapsulated knowledge about a Dasein, its world and how it is articulated. The aim of the talk is 
‘bringing the hearer to participate in disclosed Being towards what is talked about in the 
discourse[expressed]’ (212). However, Heidegger suggests that in its fascination with its world and 
Being-with-others Dasein becomes more interested in what is talked about rather than what is 
expressed in relation to Being and Being-in-the-world in those communications (212). In this 
context, arguably, the condition of human being thought and, thus, asserted as autonomous by 
which the understanding of nature is mediated through, can be observed. By so doing Dasein 
distances itself from oneSelf and Being-in-the-world.
42 Heidegger explains extensively that this term does not have any negative evaluation. See Heidegger 1995, section 
38.
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Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached;...To be uprooted in this manner is a 
possibility-of-Being only for an entity whose disclosedness is constituted by 
discourse as characterized by understanding and states-of-mind-that is to say, for 
an entity whose disclosedness, in such an ontologically constitutive state, is its 
‘there’, its ‘in-the-world’ (214).
However, this distancing is not about becoming devoid of those possibilities but only about a 
hiddenness of those as a result of a process through which Dasein closes them off. Moreover, the 
closing off period creates an impression of false grounding for communication, and results in 
‘groundless floating’ (221) within the understanding process of Dasein. In this process ‘idle talk’
(211) is not alone as its being is connected with the genuine attempt to perceive things, i.e. 
curiosity, that are encountered as well (214). It must be clear by now that this has an ontological 
base. Insofar as ‘idle talk’ has a decisive influence on curiosity, what is to be perceived becomes 
confined to the world of Dasein. This surrendering to idle talk causes curiosity of its Being-in-the- 
world, that is its orientation based on ‘concern’ (216) about the Being in what is disclosed at each 
‘there’. Any attempt to question the grounds of Dasein's everydayness is permeated by this.
It is safe to say that curiosity becomes obsessed with the world through the uprooted Dasein 
and floats within groundless idle talk by enhancing the hiddenness of Being-in-the-world. Also in 
the process, possible-Being of Dasein within Being-in-the-world is diminished to Dasein's world 
by the false impression of understanding everything without perceiving any closedness, veiling, or 
hiddenness therein. It is possible to argue that in abstracted being, the state of abstractedness 
becomes the normality by the closing of other possibilities of Being and being-with. This can also 
be seen as a methodological closure as discussed in the previous chapter, in Kant a relationship with 
nature is possible only at one level of human interest (according to fixed ‘there’), after human 
subject is established as the moral agent. Heidegger by pointing out this normalising process also 
demonstrates what is at stake in this process which can be described as the ‘fleeing of Dasein in the 
face of itself-of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self (229).
In this falling what happens is that Dasein is tamed not to question the possibility of Being 
in Being-in-the-world; it is the fascination with its world that ‘turns away from itself (ibid) that 
Heidegger calls ‘tranquillising’ (222). It is imperative to consider this condition as one in which the
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activity of Dasein becomes more seduced by itself-in-its-world rather than as a state of no action. 
Clearly human beings do function in the world, in nature, but the action, the politics, do not 
consider nature as a political component and as such, nature hides ever more. Hence, the 
transformation from ecological to environmental. Actually, idle talk and curiosity based on the 
assumption of understanding everything they are involved with, enhances the Dasein1 s intercourse 
with the world for more Knowledge, a knowledge mediated by das Man (they).43 Although this is 
the everydayness of Dasein, a level of inauthenticity is implied, Heidegger takes das Man as one of 
the important conditions of Dasein44 Thus, even inauthentic Dasein is located among others. 
Nevertheless what is understood in the idle talk, via das Man, has nothing to do with the relation 
between Being and what is understood as its existential condition.
When Dasein, tranquillised, and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself 
with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost 
potentiality-for-being is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world is not only 
tempting and tranquillising; it is at the same time alienating (222).
At this juncture, consideration will be given to what has been discussed so far and why it has been 
discussed. In locating Dasein within ‘Being-in-the-world’ as an essential condition o f Dasein1 s 
existence, Heidegger presents a new unitary ground for human being to be within. Moreover, by 
attempting to understand the Being through Dasein which is ‘is’ only in Being-in-the-world where 
other entities exist, may be in a present-at-hand, ready at or not involved but still be there, he 
enhances the existential unity among all that exists.
Nonetheless, in this unity Dasein exists in the middle of tensions; tensions which come 
from the depths of Dasein. It is perhaps here that Dasein1 s strangeness is explored for the first time 
(what is later depicted as ‘the strangest of all*, in the Introduction to Metaphysics, explored into its
43 Heidegger pp. 166-68. The larger discussion about das Man-they will be pursued later in the chapter.
44 It is argued that '[ajuthentic Being-one’s Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition o f the subject, a 
condition that has been detached from the “they”; it is rather an existentiell modification o f  the “they "-of the “they” 
as an essential existentiale ’ (Heidegger 1995, p. 168 original emphasis). The strong emphasis in the last existentiale 
clearly indicates that Dasein exist among other beings if it has to exist at all, authenticity in no way means nihilistic 
self-realisation. It rather implies a reconstitution of ethical relationality. Frederick A. Olafson renders this nuance by 
emphasizing the fact that Heidegger considers Das Man to be an ontological condition rather than an ontic one. See 
note 22 in Olafson 1998, p.36.
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strangeness for the first time). The existence of Dasein is possible as being in its potentiality-for- 
Being as it-Self within Being-in-the-world. This authentic self-oriented becoming is always in 
opposition to Dasein* s being ‘there’ to its world. In this instance, a unity of opposites is achieved as 
a structure of Dasein which is involved with its Being in both conditions. Through this structure 
Dasein is recognised as having the potential to reach within itself to potential-of-Being. It sounds 
very individualistic and subjective, and indeed it is. It argues that, in order to become, Dasein has to 
turn into its Self by distancing itself from its ‘world’. Here, Heidegger somehow presents the 
beginnings of a new understanding of ‘Being’ as ‘potential-of-Being’ together with a new concept 
of subjectivity which could only reach to the unity of Being through itself. So this is a subjectivity 
which tries to transcend Dasein* s ‘there’ to reach the constitutive existential structure of Dasein.
But this overcoming of ‘there’ should not be mixed with the Kantian ‘subject’ *s abstracted 
existence presented in the previous chapter. Because, here, Dasein is trying to overcome idle talk of 
‘there’ and locate itself to its existential condition i.e. ‘being-in-the-world’ so this is necessarily a 
‘descending’ step rather than an ‘ascending’ one. At this moment it seems that the discussion is 
becoming a new ground for being in opposition to the Kantian understanding of constituting human 
being, initially as an abstracted self, then locating it in a moral environment where no outside and 
hence no moral relation outside humans is perceivable. Dasein in its constitution, and possibility, is, 
has to be, located in-the-world.
As for the new concept of ‘Being’, what seems to be emerging is a concept of an ongoing 
process, in a way of becoming in continuum. Therefore, the implied beingness seems to be best 
associated with ‘fluidity’ which is all-encompassing but not rigidly dictating how to become; rather 
it is ‘potentiality-of-Being’. So far, Dasein has been discussed in the context of its potentialities of 
authenticity or inauthenticity as always becoming as potential-of-Being. The human being discussed 
in connection to Descartes/Kant represents a fixing of Being in the structure of Human being (some 
would argue that as a replacement of God, as a referent). Human being has arrived at ‘Being’ in 
Kant-Being is human being. By doing so the ethical relationship between nature and human being is 
fixed on a permanent basis without any possibility of change. It is implicit in this ethical state that 
change has become possible only for human beings (and this change is not a change in the 
understanding of what the Beingness of human being is at all) in the abstracted state while nature is
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preserved as a ‘tool box’. So change is not-becoming. Therefore, the discussion of becoming/Being 
presents an important opening for an ecological discussion. The question ‘does Dasein ever become 
Being?’ will unravel the importance of temporality for ecological thinking by grounding a concept 
of responsibility. The next section will explore this issue.
Humanity and Finity-Finitiude
Does Dasein ever become Being? Yes, according to Heidegger it does. Dasein only becomes Being 
at its death. But is it not death that implies something like ceasing to be in its very factuality? It 
does; something that is death is no more.45 Life, as it were, is a continuous becoming in various 
potentialities, and it is difficult to realise one’s being while one is still becoming 46 Dasein is in an 
existential state of uncertainty about its Being until facing its death. Heidegger presents the concept 
of ‘care’. It is the totality of ‘Dasein’s structural whole’ (279). In this totality in each case Dasein 
exists for it-Self which means turning to its potentiality-for-Being. Therefore, in every case Dasein 
is turned toward its potentiality i.e. Dasein is never itself, is not Being, but always is in its 
potentiality-for-Being. And this is described as D re w ’s being ‘ahead-of-itself (ibid.). By Being 
‘ahead-of-itself in its potentiality-of-Being Dasein is never Being as an entity, because there is 
always a potentiality of Being. This would not be so when Dasein is no more i.e. when there is no 
potentiality-for-Being as is the case in death. Also, insofar as potentiality-for-Being belongs to 
Dasein's existential structure, unless death belongs to the same structure Dasein cannot be47. So,
45 However, the very common feeling expressed by those who have survived a grave illness or accident ‘O! all my life 
passed through my eyes as if I was in a movie’ is the articulation which happens existentially in the face o f an imminent 
threat o f dying. The threatened person takes a pause and tries to understand what s/he has been in his/her life. What is 
more s/he tries to asses what s/he is at the very last moment o f their becoming, because death sets a limit at which there 
is a last chance to see for Dasein to its Being as Being-in-the-world before it actually ceases to be. This experience is 
very much in tune with what Heiddeger tries to argue with the concept o f potentiality-of-Being.
46 John Baylis expressed a similar thinking. He says ‘You don’t really know until it is over, what it has been like’.
See interview with Baylis in the Guardian August 31 1999.
47 This point seems to be missed by Luce Irigaray and O’Brien. Barbara Adam in her reference to Irigaray’s (1983) 
‘L’oubli de l ’air. Chez Martin Hiedegger’ and O’Brien’s ‘Resolute Anticipation: Heidegger and Beckett’ in 
Reproducing the World: Essays in Feminist Theory’ argues that ‘Heideggers “Being unto death” best signifies the 
masculine approach to time which is rejected by these scholars as an inappropriate perspective on human temporality 
and the human relationship to nature. ..because it excludes birth and the time-generating capacity o f procreation’ 
(1996). All this discussion misses the main point of considering birth-death as one process, as a necessary condition 
for meaning in either side’s possibility. So, to analyse this process as expressing a binary exclusionist concept is most
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Dasein, by turning to its potentiality-for-Being actually turns to death. This also means that Dasein 
carries Death in itself as ‘ahead-of-itself.48
Jacques Derrida provides an useful interpretation of this state. He calls it ‘keeping-vigil-for’ 
(1995, p. 14). He argues that keeping vigil for one’s own death ‘constitutes the relation to self of that 
which, in existence, relates to oneself (Ibid.). The originary, existential relation to one’s self, then, 
derives from death. By the awareness implied in vigil human being recovers its temporality as the 
ground of its life experience 49 Dasein's potentiality-for-Being rests in its temporality.
The experience of the death of others is not a substitute for Dasein's understanding of its 
own death.50 In other words, death cannot be represented as a reflection of others’ experience in 
Dasein (283). Since in death Dasein through its possibility-of-Being faces its wholeness, in every 
death the issue is the being of the one experiencing. Therefore, since each one has to experience it 
in its being, it is a non-representational state (284). Death is represented as the irreplaceable 
character of Dasein. In death there is the promise of Being, one’s life in one’s world.51 Simon 
Critchley emphasises that in Heidegger ‘death is something that one has to project freely in a 
resolute decision... the human being must become mortal-“werde was du bisf" (1997, p.25
inappropriate.
48 This can be related to the discussion o f transcendence in Heidegger’s 1928 treatise On the Essence o f  Grounds. 
Here Heidegger gives a new meaning to transcendence by relating it to the ‘subjects’ —  Dasein's essence as subject. 
He argues that ‘[cjertainly, human Dasein as existing “spatially” has the possibility among others, o f spatially 
“surpassing” a spatial boundary or gap. Transcendence, however, is that surpassing that makes possible such a thing 
a existence.. ..What is surpassed is precisely and solely being themselves, indeed every being that can be or become 
unconcealed for Dasein, thus including precisely that being as which “itself’ exists’ (Heidegger1998, p. 108). It is 
important to see the relationship between being-ahead-of itself in Death and this new definition o f transcendence as a 
condition o f approaching to other beings. In both cases Dasein reaches out to others by indicating that ‘the 
surpassing in each case intrinsically concerns [also] beings that Dasien “itself’ is not’ (Ibid. emphasis in original)
49 Derrida argues that ‘[p]hilosophy isn’t something that comes to the soul by accident, for it is nothing other than 
this vigil over death’ (1995, p. 15)..
50 In Dasein's ‘being-with-Others’ it experiences death through others as termination to be ‘there’ o f others(Heidegger 
1995, p.281). However, as a result o f being-in its ‘world’ Dasein can experience those others that might be represented 
as Being-no-more-in-the-world in representing them in its world. That is creating a sense o f Being-in the same space 
despite the factual absence of the deceased (Ibid., p.282). This state reveals the impossibility for the Dasein, that is left 
behind, to experience the Death as such in others.
51 Heidegger argues that ‘[n]o one can take Other’s dying away from him. O f course some one can “go to his death 
for another”. But that always means to sacrifice oneself for the Other “in some definite affair’” (1995, p.284). Even if  
one dies for someone it is still ones death and ones dying which would not replace that someone else’s death as its 
existential condition. One has to face it in any case. Therefore, turning to one’s own death can be seen as taking 
one’s own responsibility in becoming.
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emphasis in original).52 It is in turning to this, authentic potentiality for Being can be approached. It 
is, therefore, possible to consider care, Dasein's structural totality, as care of self that becomes the 
ground of responsibility of one to recover one’s being-ahead of one’s self, face one’s temporality. In 
this irreplaceable condition of one’s death, one’ s potentiality-for-Being, Dasein faces an 
irreplaceable responsibility to itself as care ‘[i]t is thus also the very context of the Eigentlichkeit 
that, by caring, authentically relates me to my own possibility as possibility and freedom of the 
Dasein’ (Derrida 1995, p.44).
Particularly in the everydayness of Dasein, death remains something generally happening 
within-world. It is considered to be something ‘indefinite, which above all, must duly arrive from 
somewhere or other, but which is proximally not yet present at hand for oneself, and therefore no 
threat’ (297). The everydayness, in idle talk, Dasein distances it from its potentiality-for-Being by 
representing death as something which is not Dasein's existential.54 Death is more related to non- 
being i.e. non-life in the context of ‘world’, than Being. Therefore, ‘[o]ne knows about the certainty 
of death, and yet “is” not authentically certain of one’s own’ and as a result, everydayness evades 
the certainty of Death ‘this very evasion attests phenomenally that death must be conceived as one’s 
ownmost possibility’ (3 02).55 Heidegger by relating the possibility of Being both to lived life and to 
death, without which lived life has no meaning, attempts to remedy the attribution of Being to lived 
life. This move opens up a space where life becomes a process where human being is not equated to 
Being, and therefore, the abstraction of human being from nature becomes untenable. The ethical 
certainty based on ‘reason and the will’ of the human being as a permanence in thinking about other
52 Critchley also shows that this way of understanding is argued for by Maurice Blanchot. He quotes from Blanchot’s 
1949 La part du feu. Blanchot argues that ‘death is the greatest hope of human beings, their only hope o f being 
human’ (Critchley 1997, p.66). For the larger discussion on Blanchot see Critchley 1997, pp.31-83.
53 Dasein tranquillised in its everydayness through the experience o f Other ‘flees in the face o f death’(Heidegger 1995, 
p.298) by objectifying death through idle talk in which dying becomes something actual (Ibid., p.297) and a rather 
inconvenient (Ibid., p.298) happening.
54 Clearly, the experience of death as Being-no-more is not experienced in the way it is experienced by the deceased. 
Dasein's experience is limited with being-alongside (Heidegger, p.282) in the sense of being an observer in a change 
rather than the subject o f the change. This change represents a loss from D ie m ’s life in its ‘world’ whereas for the one 
that is no more it is an existential state which can only be considered in relation to Being-in-the world.
55 Nevertheless, this does not mean that Dasein in its inauthenticity does not experience death. Both as authentic and 
inauthentic Dasein dies. In the latter, Dasein arrives at Death as something that terminates life, ‘there’, in other words, 
death is approached in its outsideness, whereas, in the former, death has been within Dasein at every case all through its 
becoming as Being-towards-the-end through which potentiality-of-Being is experienced. In this experience what is 
always reminded by death is Being-not o f Dasein, just-yet.
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beings is replaced with the idea of constant becoming which challenges foreclosed ethical 
relationality. Put differently the discussion of morals, located at a level of abstracted human being 
in Kant, is relocated back to an existential level of relations with nature in a process of negotiating 
rather than ordering.
It has already been suggested that by death or towards to be death, it is in no way an actual 
death, or pondering about how it would arrive in its all possibilities, that is implied. As for Being- 
towards-death the suggestion is about understanding it ‘as a possibility, ....cultivated as a 
possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility’ (306). Heidegger suggests to approach this 
possibility as ‘anticipation’ (vorlaufen) (ibid.).56 What is anticipated is the possibility of death 
generated from Dasein’s possibility as potentiality-for-Being. In other words, if Dasein is 
potentiality-for-Being, it is, at the same time essentially, potentiality-for-Death. With this step, 
Dasein comes closer to death as a possibility.
The step taken by anticipating Death opens up the potentiality-for-Being to Dasein in its 
‘ownmost’ (eigenst) possibility. As long as Being-towards-Death means Dasein is open to its 
potentiality-for-Being authentically, Dasein is able to gaze at something like the possibility of 
authentic existence (307). Also, the fact that the possibility of death belongs to each being in itself, 
can not be transferred or substituted, Dasein seems to be individualised (308) in the sense that it 
realises it has to reach its own possibility alone. This, however, does not imply a nihilistic 
withdrawal from ‘there’ at all; ‘there’ is the constant threat for Dasein as an utter impossibility out 
of which Dasein has to emerge as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, not by concealing that 
impossibility, but by constantly staring at that motivated and constantly presented as ‘that is there’ 
by anxiety (310) i.e. its own state of mind.
Also, the constitutive structures of Dasein as concemful Being-alongside and solicitous 
Being-with are also required for Dasein’s authenticity. Through this, Dasein has ‘some 
understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others’ (309) by having been projected itself on its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the first place. In all this, what seems to be the fundamental point 
is that Dasein has to involve with itself as it-Self. The possibility of an end reveals Dasein as 
possible but, Dasein has to anticipate the possibility of Death to start with. By anticipating Death,
56 On the translation see note 3 in Heidegger 1995, p.306.
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the anxiety created is about the state of the possibility of Dasein within its utter impossibility, so 
once more it is all about revealing potentiality by an individual. In its engagement with itself for its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being Dasein obtains a certainty of Death, certainty of its ownmost 
possibility and with these certainties it faces another existential certainty ‘it is certain of Being-in- 
the-world’ (ibid). The world of this Being-in-the-World indicates Dasein’s location, whatever the 
particular ‘thereness’ might be as the constitutive element of Dasein. Temporaryness implicit in 
Death and being-toward-Death allows the human being to escape from the location given to 
him/her by the idle talk, das Man, Knowledge. Through this the human being can realise a life 
beyond what is being described as life under its abstracted state.
The concept of death that has been explored is not about the final point of life but about the 
essentiality of death for the possibility of life. Moreover, it is not so much as an essential in its 
factical (faktisch)57 happening when it happens, but in its existence within ourselves as a possibility 
of happening in our lives. In other words it is the internalisation of Death as something which 
makes life possible, by being there so long as we are. This, also, indicates the fact that finiteness 
(<endlich) is the original state of Dasein. And it is not finiteness that is being forgotten in 
everydayness but finiteness staring in our face as long as we are.
What, then, is the importance of knowing one is finite? To know existence in life is a 
passing state rather than a constant state, which has to be expanded, unavoidably in some 
approaches, beyond that in the facticness of death, means one could fulfil its passing, temporal life, 
more by approaching its ownmost potentiality. Otherwise, the image of infiniteness results in 
unfulfillment while you are, but the possibility of fulfilment projected to when you are not, in other 
words, after death. This concept of extension takes different shapes in different discourses. For 
example, most of the monotheistic religions promise a life after death which depends on our being- 
of-a-certain-kind-of-Being; in otherwords, we have to fit a definition of Being. This definition 
varies, in the discourse of Modernity, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, our possibility of 
Being is defined as belonging to ‘Humanity’ which requires a certain kind of Being through 
‘reason’. In this, Humanity as the common ground of humans acting in universal imperative
57 It is related to facticity (Facktizitat) as different from factual (tatsachlich). For this differentiation see sections 12 
and 29 in Heidegger 1995.
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CO
(Paton1967, p. 165) is considered to be the reflection of Being human being and transforms it into 
species of Being which extends towards the future as an overarching, never-ending possibility of 
becoming for individual’s, within which the concept of Humanity’s becoming is arguably more 
important than the individual’s. Zygmunt Bauman argues that ‘[d]eath is the scandal, the ultimate 
humiliation of reason. It saps the trust in reason and the security that reason promises’ (1992, p. 15). 
Death is established as a point of biological-end which is not an issue for the human-reason.59 The 
attempt of human being, hence humanity, is to transcend this through its reason and carry itself 
beyond mere death, thus overcoming finitness. Bauman argues that
[n]o wonder that the legal and political order, which founds the only human 
togetherness recognised by the Law and serviced by Politics, has neither time nor 
place for [it]. Burdened with the greatest gifts, ‘the human’ stands outside the 
Law and Politics; in the legal and political sense, the human(the truly human, the 
moral human) stands outside society (Ibid., p.200).
In other words, the existential possibility of human is obliterated. The life at the base of the political 
does not address the human condition of becoming, or address it by constantly turning it to a life 
based on obligatory freedom under the law of human reason. The very reason in which nature 
escapes us relentlessly. Therefore, by creating a potential which is infinite, the ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being of individuals is eradicated by the illusion, that by not realising their potential 
and factically dying unfulfilled, they are becoming part of everlasting Humanity—  and its success 
is projected as their becoming. Also, with this the existential Being-in-the-world is suspended, 
abandoned, and forgotten. The ethics of being, the relationality, is articulated according to the 
contribution of ‘subject’ to the hope of Humanity’s becoming in future —  one can read universal 
imperative here. Put differently, the ethical life is defined according to life established as human 
beings’ concern. By paraphrasing Massimo Cacciari, the story of human being’s Being is the death
58 Paton locates Kant as a philosopher ‘o f humanity’(1967, p. 198).
59 It is important to remember in this context what I have discussed as biopolitics in relation to life/mere life in 
chapter 3. It is precisely this point that allows us to see how biopolitics actually distances death or life as becoming 
from the political. Life as becoming is reduced to procedures of dealing with issues. Therefore, existence in the space 
o f  Being a certain kind.
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of potentiality-for-Being, becoming.60 Also, in the story of autonomous human being, the account 
o f death of nature is explicit as a subservient to the former. By facing its own death, Dasein is 
relocated within-the-world, into its relationality with time.61
Dasein in its realisation of its potentiality in the face of death, in the face of its time, ‘it 
makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others’ 
(309). This articulation of a realisation is very different from the Kantian articulations about 
‘subject’, whose possibility of freedom and existence are recognised under civilised law based on 
reason, which in turn is guaranteed by the possibility of universal categorical imperative that 
underpins the general moral law. In other words, in an argumentative gesture I would argue that, the 
existential possibility of being is .brought under the moral law. Here in Heideggerian discussion 
what is important is to realise Other’s as being in the same path of temporality and potentiality-for- 
being underpins a different concept of responsibility, hence a morality that is not a law —  which 
will be discussed in next section. In facing death, Dasein in its authenticity is structured by concern
f tJ(Besorgen) as Being-with and solicitude (Fursorgen) as Being-alongside (308). In a way it 
becomes disillusioned from the idle talk of ‘they’ das Man i.e. thriving to elevate itself to infinity. 
So it is possible to suggest that in this state Dasein could get closer to something like ‘knowing’ 
Others, whereas in a state in which each human being exists in infinity, by trying to become 
something defined, one would never know Other as expressed so profoundly by Rilke:
Lonelier, now, wholly dependent 
on one another, without knowing one another, 
we no longer lay out the paths as lovely meanders, 
but straight... (Sonnet 24).
60 Cacciari argues that ‘[experience takes place before the story begins. The story (or narrative) is singularly the 
account of the death of experience’ (1996, p.94).
61 Clearly this stand point might create a question: does this mean that in finiteness Dasein in its individuality becomes 
so involved with itself that it does not care what it encounters? The second one follows that: does it suggest that to fulfil 
one’s potentiality one could do anything within its individuality. I will respond to these in the following sections, it is 
suffice to state here that one needs to think o f the individuality of Dasein in the way it is constructed as relationality.
62 It is imperative to realise the warning by the translators o f Being and Time that there is an important connection 
between 'Sorge’ (care), ‘Fursorge’ (solicitude), and ‘Besorgen’ (concern) which is clear in German etymology but 
cannot be rendered in English. See note 4 in Heidegger 1995, p.57). This relationality can be seen as used 
intentionally by Heidegger, who seems to suggest that both solicitude and concern as practical active modes are the
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Although the positive location of Death has created the finiteness, we are originally in our lives das 
Man, it is still important to understand how Dasein comes to anticipate and, thus, becomes anxious 
about dying, and therefore reveals its potentiality-for Being to itself, thus showing a way to fugitive 
Dasein to come home.
Jumping into Chaos
According to Heidegger, Dasein's Being arrives at a state of anticipation as a result of ‘voice of 
conscience’ (313). Conscience (Gewissen) discloses a state as a result of which Dasein comes to 
anticipate Death and thus potentiality-for-Being. Obviously Dasein in its disclosedness is its ‘there’, 
in its ‘world’ where Self is diverted from itself to ‘they-self by public discourse of idle talk. In 
other words, Self is concealed. In order to be conscious of this state, Dasein has to be conscious, 
somehow, of this everydayness in which Dasein escapes from it-Self as well.
According to Heidegger, this ‘voice of conscience* is a ‘call (Ruff (314) to Dasein in its 
throwness, to the Self that is lost in they-self (319) to turn its-Self into its own most potentialities 
(318). Here, the important issue is to understand the origin of such a call. It is argued that the call 
originates from Dasein itself and reaches Dasein in its everydayness. So long as Dasein is not a 
free-floating existence but is its facticality (321), the call is from within, from Dasein's Being 
thrown existentially Being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that ‘[t]he call points forward to 
Dasein’s potentiality-for Being, and it does this as a call which comes from  uncanniness’ (325, 
emphasis in original).63 The call, then, is related to (the)world but it can be heard because of its 
contrast to what is being perceived by das Man as normal, heimlichkeit. As argued before, within 
this throwness Dasein flees its potentiality-for-Being which implies its impossibility of existence. 
Therefore, both who appeal (anrufen)64 and who are appealed to are the same, it is Dasein. Here, 
once more this Heideggerian twist between the story of idle talk and that which is Unhemlichkeit
conditions o f care, hence, located in Dasein as essential conditions o f it.
63 ‘Der Ruf weist das Dasein vor auf sein Seinkonnen und das als Ruf aus der Unheimlichkeit’ (1995, p.325 emphasis in 
original). I think here I want to draw attention to the word Unheimlichkeit. Arguably, by thinking through its 
components, it expresses a fact that does not common within a given established relationality, not close to home. It is 
more expressive in German in terms of the intentions of the text than the English uncanniness conveys..
64 As ‘to call to’ see note 1 in Heidegger 1995, p.314.
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provides an ethical relationality for Dasein to turn to its own potentiality-of-Being. The 
Unheimlichkeit represents .a potential for Dasein to be different than it is, whereby a new ethical 
relationality is implicated. Nature, therefore, as an Unheimlichkeit in human society and the 
political, can provide us with a possibility of thinking in terms of an ethical that is not fixed to the 
human being.
What is being communicated is not something verbal as in talk; it is a silent communication 
which motivates the understanding that ‘summons Dasein into its reticence’ (318).65 The call, by 
appealing to Self that is concealed within ‘they-self, makes possible Dasein's involvement with 
itself as Self. It challenges Dasein to move to a different level, provoking for its potentiality. It also 
represents an exclusion, an existential exclusion from das Man. Nevertheless, there is always a high 
possibility of absorption of the call into ‘they-self which necessarily represents the factual 
existence of Dasein.66 Thus, understanding stands as the important determinate in perceiving the 
call. Voice of conscience as call fox Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being summons Dasein ‘to 
its ownmost Being-guilty’ (314). The anticipation of an existential ‘guilt (Schuld)’, in the 
understanding, in the face67 of Un(heim)lichkeit creates a space where the idle-talk of das Man and 
Dasein's potentiality-for-Being meet. The question about being-not-belonging to home as described 
by ‘they’ becomes an issue. I argue that nature and the ecological relationality within it summons 
human being to this space where human being’s ecological existence meets the idea of ever 
progressing autonomous human being. It breaks up the eschatology of Human’s Being.
Although formally Heidegger defines ‘Guilt’68 as ‘Being-the basis for a lack of something 
in Dasein of an Other, in such manner that this very Being-the-basis determines itself as “lacking in 
some way” in terms of that for which it is the basis’ (328), he distances this definition from the 
directly implied Being-with-Others.69 The definition in its appearance seems to imply that Dasein
65 Here again, summon (aufrufen) as ‘to call up’, as ‘challenging him or “calling” him to a higher level o f  
performance’ (Ibid.). It must be noted here that all these forms are related with call (ruf).
66 This understanding which negates the call in itself presents ‘a definite kind o f Dasein's Being’ (Heidegger 1995, 
p.324).
67 Here I am not suggesting a ‘ face to face ’ relationship used by Emmnauel Levinas for his ethics o f  responsibility.
68 Guilt should not be necessarily equated to something like committing a crime. The word in German as schuldig, 
Schuld, has many other derivatives to say ‘indebtedness’ and ‘responsibility’. All these nuanced meanings seems to 
be lost in translation to guilt. See translators note, note 1 in Heiddeger 1995, p.325).
69 Mitsein. The particular discussion of Mitsein can be found in Olafson. Although his account is very interesting, he 
seems to read philosophical treatise with a touch o f sociological analysis o f human relationality. See Olafson 1998.
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within its world, by causing a lack of something in Other, is guilty; in other words, it is guilty in 
relation to Other within an accepted set of rules, ‘ought’ or certain laws, knowledge. Nevertheless, 
in the ‘guilt’ what Heidegger is trying to establish is existential. It derives from Dasein* s being in a 
‘there’ as a result of which Dasein is always in its this possibility, not that one.70 Therefore, there 
are always other beings, which are not in this ‘thereness’, but still by the fact of Being-in-the-world, 
are in the potentialities.71 It is a guilt that is Dasein*s Being.72 It might be true to argue that this guilt 
is necessarily related to Dasein in its fallenness as a Being ‘there’ where Dasein has become the 
entity of the ground.
By becoming aware of the exclusion of other beings from its there Dasein realises his 
potentiality and impossibility of it at the same time. It is impossible so far as in every ‘thereness’ it 
realises some beings will be but, nevertheless, excluded but it is the fact of realising that puts 
Dasein into constant questioning of das Man. In the other being’s Being, in themselves, Dasein* s 
potentiality of Being is reflected, the relationship represents the close relationship between D^ez/j’s 
becoming for its potentiality of Being and the being of others. Dasein, is indebted to other’s 
existence. The indebtedness(guilt) is to the other being’s being as transformed into a responsibility. 
The responsibility(guilt), then, represents an existential ethical relationship whereby Dasein can 
only be as long as other beings are in themselves, beyond das Man. It is clear that the Heideggerian 
discussion is an analysis of a guilt deriving from Dasein*s everydayness which, at the same time, is 
the existential condition of Dasein.
By being tranquillised through public idle talk most of the time in its world, this guilt 
remains closed off from Dasein. In order to realise this guilt consciously, Dasein has to understand 
its state of Being-guilty. In other words, it has to understand the call. Heidegger argues that ‘the call
70 As Dasein is in fallenness and creates its own basis without looking at its possibility before such a basis, existentially 
it becomes null. In choosing, Dasein always leaves something behind ‘in having a potentiality-for-Being it always stands 
in one possibility or another: it constantly is not other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projections’ 
(Heidegger 1995, p.331).
71 Here, the analysis nearly sounds Kantian, but this is because I have not introduced the conceptualisations o f earth 
and existence o f other beings in themselves. After I introduce these in the rest o f the chapter, it will become clear that 
here an ethical responsibility different from that implied in Kantian morals is grounded.
72 So, he defines this as ‘Being-the-Basis for a Being which has been defined by a “not”’ (Heidegger 1995, p.329). and 
this ‘not’ is qualified as ‘Being-the-basis o f a nullity’ (Ibid.).
73 They questioning o f as that which ‘has already restricted the possible options o f choice to what lies within the range of  
familiar, the attainable, the respectable —  that which is fitting and proper’ (Heidegger 1995, p.239).
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is the call of care’ (332). It is possible to locate the discussion in relation to Death. By Being toward 
death, by caring for itself, Dasein realises, it is in one of its possibilities whereby care dislocates the 
dominance of human’s Being as only one possibility. In this move one can observe the recovery of 
the indebtedness(guilt), responsibility, within. In the context of the present study, this juncture 
arguably brings the possibility of considering other beings within an ecological context.
The structural whole of Dasein described as ‘care’ implies that ‘Being of Dasein means 
ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the- 
world)’ (237). Dasein is always concerned with the issue of Being. In that care in its being-ahead- 
of-itself presents freedom to become through possibilities of potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger 
considers care(sorge)74 within the concepts o f ‘carefulness (Sorgefalt)' and ‘devotedness 
(HingabeY (242-243) as the ‘primordial’ (244) essential condition of Dasein. These concepts are 
the yardsticks of Dasein in its concern and solicitude, either with itself in its authenticity, or with its 
world in its inauthenticity.
Therefore, it is important to consider the call as the call of care. It means that Dasein in its 
Being is concerned with itself, calling Dasein to come to its-Self in its potentiality-for-Being from 
its lostness in ‘they’ (333). Hence, the call of care tries to summon Dasein to its disillusioned state 
of throwness, to its disclosedness (342). This enables Dasein to see its potentiality-for-Being. Then, 
Dasein could reflect itself as its ownmost possible existence. It understands its Being-guilty that is 
not closed-off by the manipulative measures of ‘they’ from itself. It is guilty(indebted) and 
responsible by being only one of its potentialities as its existence (that can be remedied by 
constantly disclosing one’s thereness). The guilt does not derive from Being in a higher moral 
imperative, Kantian, but experiencing another being’s Being in the temporality of becoming.
Nevertheless, in this summoning to Being-guilty, the call has to be acknowledged by Dasein 
to be heard by itself which is usually engrossed in ‘they’. Only as a result of such a will to have a 
conscience allows Dasein to understand the call, ‘wanting to have conscience is rather the most 
primordial existentiell pre-supposition for the possibility of factically coming to owe something’ 
(334). This is also meant to be ‘readiness for anxiety’ (342) Dasein allows itself to face the anxiety 
of facing its nullity, and hence the real state in which it exists as throwness.
74 Heidegger locates care as cura as discussed by the ancients. See Heidegger 1995, pp.241-244.
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The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted 
by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon 
one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as[silent] reticence. This 
distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its 
conscience — this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in 
which one is ready for anxiety — we call ‘resoluteness’ (343).
In resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) Heidegger arrives at the authentic possibility of Dasein within its 
impossibility. Resolute Dasein discloses its whole possibility of Being-in-the-world. Resoluteness 
is ‘resolution (Entschluss)* (345) and also it should be considered as ‘re-solution’. Dasein can only 
disclose its authenticity in resolution which is the ‘projection and determination of what is factically 
possible at the time’ (ibid.). This indicates that resoluteness exists always within a given time 
determined by Dasein’s ‘thereness’. Nevertheless, the timely possibilities do not indicate some 
choice on the basis of determination o f ‘they’ in ‘there’ but, on the contrary, an indefinite possibility 
which might exist despite ‘they’ either as closed off or disregarded. So, resoluteness summons 
Dasein from its lostness in ‘there’ without disregarding its location in ‘there’ and its relations, and 
considers the authenticity of Dasein within the actualities of its world. This space of authentic 
Dasein within ‘there’ is called ‘Situation’ (346) which is not comprehensible for ‘they’. The 
formulation of Situation points to the fact that the call is not for some potentiality-for-Being 
detached from Dasein's world as floating ideal existence ‘but calls us forth into the Situation*
(347). It is there which is presented to the re-solution. The presentation of Unheimlichkeit in which 
‘there’ is implicitly exposed. Here, once more, timeliness of authentic Dasein and its resoluteness as 
potentiality-For-Being is stressed as opposed to some transcendental existence.
The anxiety of Death, care of self, is transformed into an anxiety of experiencing 
nothingness in nothing as a consequence of Dasein's lostness in ‘they’. Therefore, anxiety 
communicates nothingness to Dasein. The awareness of this anxiety comes to Dasein*s view 
through the voice of conscience which is considered at the same time to be the call. Heidegger re­
defines the concept of conscience. Conscience, as shown in the articulations, is about one’s being. It 
belongs to the existential condition of Dasein. Therefore, it is ahead of Dasein* s facticality and by
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that it is already in each case of Dasein’s facticality as well. Therefore, at each case conscience 
relates Dasein's Being to its origin as Being-guilty.75
Heideggerian conscience is the call, as care-cwra, which is the structural totality of Dasein's 
Being. The understanding of conscience summons Dasein to its Being-guilty, and on the face of it 
to its anxiety which allows Dasein to turn towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-in-the- 
World-with-Others within its time, and this is resoluteness. This might sound like an extreme 
individuality, a flight from one’s own ‘there’, but, it is not. If conscience is seen as the important 
determinant of one’s moral standpoint in the world, it is obvious that a conscience that is referred 
back to one’s existentials presents a very deep concept of conscience which does not relate itself to 
some definite deed in its lostness but to its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world-with-others. It is a 
relationship between self and other in one’s own possibility of existence; it is, in other words, a 
flight towards other through one’s own self. As a result of such morality, a certain transcendence as 
going over to , Dasein resists tranquillisation and persists in the state of anxiety for the resolution 
of each Situation, rather than applying a neutral out there definition to others according to the 
common concept which does not consider Situations but perceives a general situation within the 
everydayness of ‘they’ without ‘reaching the authentic potentiality-for-being’ (335).
Dasein's temporality, discussed in relation to Death in its becoming, is the possibility of 
resolution as Dasein's disclosedness (Erschlossenheit). The re-solution is based on time and space, 
it is not possible to have an overarching a-historical resolution. The time-frame implied is 
represented in each resolution insofar as each resolute decision takes Dasein to its past, to its 
throwness, where Dasein faces its Being-guilty, and at the same time as ahead-of, as being toward 
death, it also presents the future. So, the time is limited by Death in the future and by throwness in 
the past. This existential state, expressed in relation to time, is existential finiteness. This finitude
75 This concept is fundamentally different from the common understanding o f conscience that requires an experience of  
a priori fact to have conscience. The common understanding follows the act to have some sort o f conscience. Moreover, 
because it is post facto  acquired conscience, it is conditioned and has to submit itself to ‘they’. In doing so, conscience 
becomes ‘the’ conscience which is out there as something ‘encountered as an arbiter and admonisher’ (Heidegger 1995, 
p.339). Therefore, conscience is differentiated from Being and has become something like a formalised social 
justification, a reference point.
76 This is discussed in relation to transcendance and surpassing in Heidegger’s On the Essence o f  Ground: 
‘[tjranscendance [then] means: belonging among the other beings that are already present at hand, or among those 
beings that we can always multiply to the point where they become unsurveyable’ (1998, p .l 10).
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reveals itself as limits in resoluteness. By realising its extreme limits, Dasein arrives at a resolution 
about Situation. As Haar argues, ‘resoluteness reaches out to recover the whole stretching of time 
between birth and death’ (1993, p.45).
As a decision, resoluteness is about the present. But, as anticipatory resoluteness on the 
basis of anxiety, it summons the past expressed as Being-Guilty, Being-with-others and its death in 
the resolution which is about the future. In resolute decision Dasein arrives at a view of its 
becoming in a given Situation, at present for the sake o f  future. In the anxious Dasein, a decision 
about something to come, hence the death of itself is observable, at the same anxiety implicitly 
Being-guilty(indebted) is included as the condition of being anxious. Therefore,(the) present is only 
possible through (the)future that is reflected from Dasein*s thrownness i.e. (the)past. The present 
situation opens up an opportunity tor Dasein*s potentiality-for-Being which indicates a process of 
becoming. The process at the same time is only possible by the realisation of authentic Dasein in 
relation to death. This leads to temporisation of the present as a result of the constant nature of 
Being.77
Present as temporised means that in each Situation, Dasein as resoluteness presents a new 
present resolution-re-solution. As being so, Dasein is exposed to its possibilities of potentiality-for- 
Being-in-the-world. In its anxiety in each Situation, Dasein*s decisions are made through a process 
in which Dasein's being is the issue as it is toward death at each case. Therefore, each resolution is 
the reflection of Dasein* s approach to its existentiality as potentiality-For-Being through which the 
idle talk of das Man, a knowledge claim is being pushed away. Questions about how far there is a 
repetition of a past resolution can raised. It is true that there is a repetition, but it is not about the re-
n o
solution. What seems to be repetition is the permanency of Being-Guilty; in other words, the 
permanent referral to the existential structure of Dasein i.e. care. Therefore, resolutions are always 
different according to the Situation of Dasein but the ground on which those resolutions are built is 
the same, existential possibility of Dasein itself — not a grand resolution expressed in universal 
morality... the men who exhaust fish, a life form in the oceans, must think according to their own
77 As authentic through death, Dasein's being is temporised (Heidegger 1995, pp.376-78) and by facing this as a 
reflection in its finite future resoluteness temporises the present.
78 Olafson argues that ‘[b]y virtue o f being the kind of entity we are, we do constitutionally owe something - 
something is due from each of us’ (1998p.47).
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relationship with the sea not according to what is legislated as the law in which fish is the thing to 
be used fo r  development... a life form which escapes us constantly by showing a possibility o f a 
different being, being ethical...
Responsibility
The implication of these arguments is realised within the considerations of ‘responsibility’, as every 
decision carries moral grounds with itself. The Heideggerian approach seems to create a concept of 
morality which is not empty in the sense that one cannot escape it or justify oneself through public 
discourse by giving the account of his/her behaviour accordingly. According to Reiner Schurmann 
‘responsibility means response’ (1990, p.263). In this understanding ‘to be responsible means to be 
able to “respond to”. . .the ever new modality in which the world unfolds things and in which things 
give configuration to or “bear” the world’ (Ibid.). It would be argued that every action becomes a 
response and hence a responsibility in facing the world.
Now it is established that in responsibility, responding to, the past of Dasein as its 
existential and its facticity as its ‘thereness’ where the situation arises are assumed. The implied 
concept of responsibility is arrived at in each case through making one’s ‘being’ the issue, in other 
words in each Situation Dasein''s becoming its potentiality-for-Being is called for. Derrida argues 
that
if decision-making(responsibility) is relegated to a knowledge that it is content to 
follow or to develop, then it is no more a responsible decision, it is the technical 
deployment of a cognitive apparatus, the simple mechanistic deployment of a 
theorem (1995, p.24).
This is related with the case of facing79 the Other in one’s own being or escaping to the fixed 
morality, escaping to become in taking the challenge presented by the Unheimlichkeit. Insofar as 
one’s being is only possible by the being of other, to be able to respond to one has to think about 
one’s own possibility of Being. Therefore, one cannot differentiate an action, that is justified on the
79 Here, I repeat my caution again. See note 65 .
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basis of public discourse, das Man, and its Being as human, to escape a moral responsibility 
anymore. So, at each response one carries the responsibility of Other within itself there and then, /  
am indebted(guilty), and responsible. Responsibility must be free of dominating claim as to what is 
it to be responsible. It has to become responsible according to each Situation in each ‘thereness’. If 
it becomes ready made applicable theorem, it leaves existential responsibility behind which
O  A
becomes irresponsibility. I observed this tension in deep ecology, in the way that moulded 
responsibility based on a foreclosed idea of human being’s Being, overrides the vital interests of
O 1
nonhumans in the cases of conflict. It is therefore, the responsibility expressed in existential 
terms represnts an ecological responsibility that is not foreclosed by the definition of Being.82
It is also through resoluteness that Dasein's action represents a deep identification with 
one’s existence and, thus, full responsibility for the action which makes the false morals of ‘they’ 
redundant. By locating responsibility on existential grounds, as in Heideggerian terms, something 
like a personal (not person as in personhood) responsibility for the future, an ontological 
responsibility, that is prior to the action or decision, is established as well.
Furthermore, through the analyses, something like ‘freedom’ emerges as an intelligible 
concept. It might be seen as freedom ‘to be’ without being intimidated by a normative tribunal, 
perhaps Kant s scientific tribunal, to give an account of one’s actions according to ‘they’ o f human 
beings framed in the Categorical Imperative. This articulation seems to suggest that resolution is 
the only possibility of something like freedom, as freeing oneself from tranquillised and normalised 
public discourse. Through this, Dasein freely decides about a Situation in its Being as an existential 
responsibility-to-Other rather than applying what is required, or given as only possible in the idle 
talk, which reflects a false image of its Being human whose nature expressed as reason and will to 
aim represents a-historical ethical relationality. Therefore, this is to be free from being melted in a
80 Derrida argues that ‘thematization o f what responsibility is or must be is also an irresponsible thematization.. ..In 
order to be responsible it is necessary to respond to or answer to what being responsible means’(1995, p.25). Here, it 
can be argued that Derrida is pointing out the importance o f experience in responding according to the experience 
rather than understanding the experience according to our responsibility. To be able to ask what is my 
responsibility/response to this relationality here and now.
81 See note 23 and French 1995, pp.29-57.
82 In the case of Naess, it is clear that his orientation owes a lot to Spinoza’s idea o f things and their relation to God. 
See Naess 1980.
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public discourse, which means being free from becoming a part of and lost in a public discourse by 
losing one’s existential possibilities.
Also, it implies that freedom is possible within one’s potentiality-for-Being in its 
temporality. Any objection to such freedom on the grounds that such subjectivity is an invitation to 
a state of chaos would be ill-founded considering the existential structure o f Dasein'& Being as care 
formulated as ahead-of, along-with and with-in its concemful solicitude.
In order to understand the impact of the Heideggerian approach, Dasein as explained so far 
has been considered in itself by silencing its existence with others within-the-world. In doing so I 
attempted to show that Dasein's constitution is the condition of an ecological thinking. In order to 
see the whole vision of the above arguments such as responsibility, action, and freedom in an 
ecological perspective, it is imperative to see the holistic approach of Heidegger in relation to Earth 
and the things in it. Although in locating Dasein back to world in the middle of other beings a 
gesture towards a larger context is made, the understanding of earthy and other beings therein gives 
the full-scale of Heideggrian approach both as a critique of Cartesian/Kantian understanding and a 
way of thinking about ecology. This is considered in the next section.
Earth or World?
In Being and Time Heidegger does not explain clearly his understanding of Earth, in other words, 
he does not openly articulate what is indicated by World, as in ‘Being-in-the-world’. Nevertheless, 
it becomes clearer in the general context of the text that when Dasein's world is mentioned 
something like its social environment is thought of, so by differentiating its world from the ‘world’ 
as the totality he implies that the latter is more than what is seen as social environs. Moreover, by 
explaining other things around Dasein on the basis of present-at-hand, ready-for-hand or Other in 
the sense of other Dasein for whom their being is issue, the world in Being-in-the-world becomes 
intelligible. It is not based on the natural world as a biological earth. He is implying a World that is 
there at Dasein's throwness just before its falling, perceived in its relations Dasein's throwness as
possibilities before it becomes lost in idle talk.
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Within this structure nature is seen as ‘Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible 
entities within-the-world. Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein 
discover entities as Nature’ (94). Here, argument implies that objective nature, which is usually 
applied in ecological discourse, is impossible, if similarly a deep ecology perspective is taken into 
consideration nature and human being relationship suggested carries a certain permanence, an a- 
historical relationship, that becomes untenable through Heideggerian perspective. This perspective 
adds a new depth to the discussion about nature. This is important for two reasons, while 
recognising the existence of nature as such, human relationship to it is established as becoming. 
Thus dynamic, not only in its use it but in meaning, leads to a realisation of potentiality-for-Being, 
where a relationship, a communication between the two becomes perceivable.
It is now established that nature is in the possibilities of Dasein; therefore in Being-in-the- 
world without necessarily meaning nature corresponds to the world in this. What nature seems to be 
is just one of the possibilities of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Therefore, nature is not something 
permanent and always there as it is perceived. On the contrary, nature is temporal and thus, 
historical and subjective to Dasein* s world. Moreover, the perception of nature is only possible 
through the mediation of Dasein* s world which makes it always a derivative of present-at-hand or 
ready-for-hand(99-101). Remember here that Dasein’s world as its ‘thereness’ is always related to 
its Being-in the-world. This indicates that even nature expressed within ‘thereness’ implies 
something larger. The only access to this than becomes the issue of Dasein* s realisation of its 
potentiality-for-Being that is becoming.
The new dimension created by the above argument creates a curiosity about the possibility 
of a common ground within something like all-encompassing nature. Such a possibility emerges 
from Heidegger's work The Origin o f the Work o f Art. It is argued that:
World and Earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never 
separated. The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts itself through 
world (1996, p. 174).
So, every world is necessarily a representation of earth but it is only ‘a’ representation. In order to 
understand, the essentiality of earth for world is imperative as long as world is only one of the
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possibilities of earth. Considering that nature is always about Dasein"s world and therefore 
somehow subjective, how is it possible to detect the earth as the ground of world in the subjectivity 
o f it? Or, how is it possible to consider a wider grounding for a seemingly obvious world which 
does not seem to have any grounding apart from itself? According to Heidegger ‘it is through the 
work of art as essent being that everything else that appears and is to be found is first confirmed and 
made accessible, explicable, and understandable as being or not being’ (1987, p. 159).
The realisation and the understanding of something like earth is only possible within the 
context of a work of art. The earth communicates itself towards Dasein's world through the work of 
art. The process of this communication is central to the understanding of Heideggerian thought in 
general. Heidegger in his work An Introduction to Metaphysics (1959/1987) establishes that in 
translating the Greek word physis, which by today’s understanding negates the concept of nature 
given through the Latin translation as natura indicating what is physical out there, the possibility of 
understanding the essence of being itself is eroded (Ibid., p. 13). The word in its original Greek form 
‘denotes self-blossoming emergence, opening-up, unfolding’ (Ibid., p. 14). Heidegger emphasises 
the ‘self of the emergence as ‘rising in-itself (1996, p. 168). But this is not an emergence which 
should be seen as a process of nature, in other words a process that is recognised within nature as an 
already established fact; Heidegger argues that ‘the Greeks did not leam what physis is through 
natural phenomena, but the other way around’ (1987, p. 14). They discovered that in emergence 
what is coming out is about the essent of being, it is showing itself through unfolding. At the same 
time, this emergence implied that before the discovery they were hidden ‘whereby the hidden is first 
made to stand’ (Ibid., p. 15). This concept of Physis is the manifestation of the concept of earth as 
well. Physis ‘illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this 
ground the earth...Earth is that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as 
such’ (1996, p. 168). In order to comprehend this earthiness of every arising, the concept of 
appearance must be brought into the articulation; ‘the realm of emerging and abiding is intrinsically 
at the same time a shining appearing’ (1987, p.101). The essential possibility of being, its essence, 
is appearance; unless it appears it is difficult to talk about being. Here, it is imperative to understand 
alethia. As long as the essence of being is emergence, unfolding i.e. physis, the manifestation of 
unfolding is appearance. It is probably safe to take this as how this manifestation is perceived by
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Dasein, in that what appears is a way for something to emerge from its hiddenness and this 
unconcealment is alethia (Ibid., p. 102). In other words, alethia is ‘the emergence of being into the 
unconcealment of its Being’ (1996, p. 161).
What alethia indicates is called truth. In the attempt to establish this unconcealment as truth 
Heidegger is distancing himself from the common usage of truth in relation to correctness. Truth is 
about unconcealment but at the same time it is about what is concealed in that unconcealment as 
well (Ibid., p. 177-79). If unconcealment is considered to be related to truth as the knowledge of 
something that has unfolded, the above discussion guarantees that it is not the full story; there is 
always something more which is inaccessible, concealed. In order to unconceal this concealment, 
there is a never-ending strife between earth and world (Ibid., p. 180). This state of strife also implies 
that any truth is temporal or it is as long as unconcealment stands, ‘in each unconcealment o f beings 
there already lies in each case an unconcealment o f their being’ (Heidegger 1998, p. 105 emphasis 
added). It is in this move that one can observe an argument against the Kantian understanding of 
nature as inner principle of things. Contrary to Kantian nature, here being of things in themselves 
can be observed. It is also methodologically diverting by understanding nature as within itself 
revealing rather than a teleological assumption of functions reflected as inner principle of a thing.
After touching on these central concepts ofphysis and alethia, it is appropriate to see earth 
and how it is in physis through the work of art. Every work, in reference to producing, uses some 
material to shape it into a certain form. Therefore, in every work there is an inescapable 
communication between material and form. If the form is identified with the aim of the work, it 
means that matter has to be formed into something defined by ‘world’. Therefore, the identity of the 
matter, or what it might reveal as a formed matter is subsumed under the aim. These forms are 
usually categorised as equipment or utensils. Would these reveal earth; do they unconceal 
something about earth?
83 Heidegger differentiates between ontic and ontological truths. The former he argues ‘occurs in our finding 
ourselves[Sichbefinden], in accordance with our attunement and drives, in the midst o f beings and in those ways of  
comporting ourselves toward beings in accordance with our striving and willing that are also grounded therein’. 
Ontological truth, the latter, he argues ‘ Unveiledness o f  being first makes possible the manifestation o f  beings. This 
unveiledness, as the truth concerning being, is termed ontological truth’ (1998, pp. 103-107 emphasis in original). He 
then argues that Dasein in its comportment to things can understand this distinction as a result o f its own essence 
(Ibid.). The indication here is Dasein's ontic and ontological existence as its ‘thereness’ and being-toward-death.
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Utensils obviously have earthly grounding, which Heidegger calls ‘the silent call of earth’ 
(19*96, p. 159). Nevertheless, this silent call gets lost most of the time in their usefulness. Before 
they reveal their origin, they are melted into their equipmentality. In contrast to this, the work of art 
stands alone without any relatedness to usefulness as in equipment. Therefore, it reveals, brings out 
a knowledge ‘brings about being in an essent’ (1987, p. 159). Furthermore, the work of art is about 
truth in relation to the essent of being. It discloses the truth about the piece under consideration, 
then it is ‘the truth of Beings setting itself to work’ (1996, p.162). The real difference seems to be 
about the attitude that is taken towards the process of making equipment an art form. Equipment is 
the result of production, in which the issue is not about truth as to what is disclosed but is about the 
use of it. No matter what the truth is in equipment, it is released to be used up without finding that 
truth (Ibid., p. 189). The work of art is the result of creation in which something is allowed to 
emerge as from itself which means bringing forward a knowledge in relation to the essent of Being. 
One should not confuse the concept of creation with God’s creation out of nothing. The creation 
here is related to the work; it is not creating what is disclosed or emerged from the work i.e. earth.
In the process of creating a work of art a space is opened up for earth to emerge. Therefore, creation 
is opening up a space or enabling earth to emerge in unconcealment as truth (Ibid., p. 186-87). In 
this openness ‘each being emerges in its own way’ (ibid.).84
In all these discussions, earth emerges as the essent of being manifested in all truth and, 
including in a state of being an equipment, in its silence. Also, with the concept of non-subjective 
preservation,85 Heidegger elevates earth to a position of the ahistorical i.e. a state from which all 
work derives and on which all ‘world’s are grounded. As such earth than is the common ground of 
existence where the ecological relationality is grounded.
Earth appears as the dwelling (1996, p. 172) on which Dasein establishes its world, worlds. 
The dwelling is ‘the way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we are on the earth as a
84 This creative activity is not confined to the term ‘art’ in the modem sense. Heidegger brings the Greek understanding 
o f Techne which covers all making that brings forth knowledge (Heidegger 1987, p. 159 and also 1996, p. 184). Techne is 
about having a relationship with the process which does not hide ‘the being that surges upward, growing o f its own 
accord’ (1996, p. 184), so work is the medium between the being as unfolding and its unconcealment as truth.
85 The other important component of the work attributed to it is ‘preservation’ (Heidegger 1996, p. 192). It means 
standing-within the unconcealmeant; in other words, it is knowing, realising what is unconcealed as truth. Here, the 
crucial point is about knowing, what is known is not about the world and worldliness o f truth but its relation to earth as 
the original essent of being.
216
mortal’ (Ibid., p.349). It means that with the truth of earth, Dasein grounds its world on that truth. 
Heidegger describes earth as ‘Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in 
rock and water, rising up into plant and animal. When we say earth, we are already thinking of the 
other three — sky, divinities and mortals — along with it’ (Ibid., p.351). Before concluding this 
journey into Heideggerian thought, it is imperative to go back to Being and Time and see the 
possibility of truth and earth as the possibility of Dasein defined as care.
The primordial relationship established between Dasein and the concept of Care is very 
important for the whole discourse. Care is seen as the primordial structural totality of Dasein (1995, 
p.238). This means that care is existentially present in all the possibilities of Dasein. The important 
thing about care as a structural totality is that, by definition, it is in every state of Dasein and by 
being present as concemful solicitude it enables Dasein to reach its resolution. What then does care 
imply?
Care signifies a .Dasem’s being as ‘ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in[the-world] as Being- 
alongside [entities encountered within the world]’ (1995, p.237). And this state is not a special 
condition but the essential of Dasein's being. As a result, in each case Dasein's being exists within 
and alongside others.86 Resoluteness as authenticity in ‘they’ does not change the content of ‘world* 
or things in ‘world’. As concerned and solicitous Being ‘[they] are given a definite character in 
terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves’ (Ibid.). In their-Selves they allow 
Dasein to become in its potentiality-for-Being. The connection here, is what I have been refering to 
as ecological relation throughout the thesis.
This is fundamentally important. Considering the fact that in resoluteness Dasein faces its 
potentiality-for-Being and in that Dasein's existential state, as care, is represented which means 
that, in order to become Dasein has to face being-in-alongside-with as the essential condition. In 
other words,
when Being-in-the-world has been disclosed to itself and understands the Being 
of that entity which it itself is, it understands equiprimordially the Being of 
entities discovered within-the-world, even if such Being has not been made a
86 This means that Dasein is concerned even in its authenticity as ‘concemful lostness in the they’ (Heidegger 1995, 
p.344). In this, Dasein can become conscious o f its lostness through resolution.
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theme, and has not yet even been differentiated into its primary modes of 
existence and Reality (1995, p.371).
Therefore, Dasein's becoming itself is not something which is isolated in itself at all. Its Being is 
essentially its ‘belonging*. Dasein is a being for whom its being is an issue for itself, and this being 
is only possible as being-already-in and being-alongside. Therefore for Dasein the issue is also this 
being-already-in-alongside-with which implies something like earth as the all-encompassing 
totality. In each resolution what is disclosed is Dasein's being belonging to ‘already-in-alongside- 
with’ as well as in earth. In other words, in becoming anxious in its lostness what is at stake is 
Being without belonging without which Being cannot be. So anxiety is about the absence of the 
sense of Belonging; in other words alienation from the totality of Being. Dasein's being is always in 
earth by virtue of the fact that world cannot be without earth. Therefore in its experience Dasein 
constantly experiences earth even as its unconcealed truth represented by ‘they* in Dasein's 
everydayness, as conflated in ‘a* world. As a result, Cartesian/Kantian assumption of human 
existence based on human beings cogito87 is replaced with existence connected to belonging, to an 
ecological relationality.
If resoluteness is considered to be self-emergence of Dasein's being potentiality-for-Being 
through the process of anxiety, then what is questioned is the communicated truth by ‘they* about 
its world to Dasein, for example, thematisation o f Being as human being reflects a world where 
human being exists alone. In questioning this truth Dasein's being turns towards it-self which is 
about belonging to what is disregarded in its world reflected by ‘they*. So, in resolution, Dasein's 
Being is able to understand, becomes conscience of, its belonging and the location, or temporality 
of its world on something permanent and most of the time withdrawn.
Heidegger argues that ‘truth essentially occurs only as the strife between clearing and 
concealing in the opposition of world and earth’ (1996, p. 187). This means that world tries to 
unconceal earth while each unconcealing is a concealing of earth as well. If world is considered to 
be the space of Dasein, firstly, unless it is in its state of resolute worldliness, it would not go so far 
as to attempt to unconceal earth because it would not perceive or understand a possibility of
87 Critchley argues that ‘Kant is methodologically, but not metaphysically, Cartesian. The Kantian subject is a cogito 
without an ergo sum '(\991 , p.88).
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something like earth; secondly in its resolute worldliness, Dasein1 s being is in one of its 
possibilities, therefore there are other possibilities in which Dasein is not, and thus earth is 
concealment in its unconcealment.
What this constellation indicates is the importance for Dasein to be in its resolute 
worldliness, in other words, in its readiness to be anxious about itself and its world about the truth 
of them. In its resoluteness Dasein could perceive itself as dwelling on earth and its world as 
grounded on earth. The concept of dwelling is important because, in that, Heidegger establishes or 
rather enhances the concept of the belonging of human being to earth and it’s position in it. 
Heidegger considers the position of mortal’s dwelling as ‘character of dwelling is safeguarding’ 
(1996, p.3 52).88 He further qualifies this:
Mortals dwell in that they save the earth — taking the word in the old sense still 
known to Lessing. Saving does not only snatch something from danger. To save 
means to set something free into its own essence. To save the earth is more than 
to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and 
does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from boundless spoliation (Ibid.).
In order to safeguard in the above sense, Dasein has to understand its being as belonging to earth 
with everything therein as opposed to be interested in things as a result o f conscious intentionality 
expressed in the Kantian science*9 Obviously this comes with the resoluteness o f Dasein. 
Therefore, through resoluteness Dasein comes to its home as well. The understanding of locating 
human being in earth establishes a relational contract based on affirmation of human being’s 
‘whereness’. In responding to a question human being implicitly acknowledges a relationship with 
somewhere which allows the question to be asked at all. By paraphrasing Derrida,90 the question
88 Opposite of which expressed as Flesh, brutality o f ‘they’ in the face o f that which is Un(heim)lichkeit, ‘flesh is a loss 
o f contact with Being’ he says it is the ‘unbecoming o f the world.... Flesh is what becomes of us when we are deprived 
of Being, world, language, and truth. Flesh is ... bmtal unbecoming’ (Caputo 1993 p.211). The theme clearly suggest 
how being that which is not in ‘world’ is brutalised. His usage of ‘us’ must be taken as a reference to a larger context of  
nature in the light o f his previous suggestion Also, the resonance with potentiality-for-Being, that is lost in not 
responding, with the loss of heteronomy is interesting ‘[t]he disappearance and destruction o f species in which the 
modem world is engaged is an undoing of flesh and o f its heteromorphic possibilities’ (Ibid., p.210).
89 Simon Glendinning observes this point in relation to the concept o f everydayness. He argues that ‘everydayness is 
precisely not a context in which an isolated subject has an intentional consciousness o f some object present-at-hand’ 
(1998, p.63).
90 See Derrida 1994 .
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about/according to human being can only be legitimated, authorised by the ‘whereness’ and the 
ethical relationality expressed within it. I argued in the previous chapter that human subject’s 
‘whereness’ in the Caretesian/Kantian framework is established in the abstract, in its detachment 
from nature. The questions asked by human subject reflects this abstract space, the responses also 
legitimated implicitly by this space. By shifting existential ‘whereness’ of human subject from the 
abstract to earth that is experienced in every ‘thereness’ — authentic or inauthentic, Heideggerian 
path allows the questions of ecology to be posed by the acknowledgement of ecological relations of 
human being. Earth becomes the possibility of responding with concern to the homelessness of 
Un(heim)lichkeit. For there is no homelessness but Un(heim)lichkeit in ‘they’.
Conclusion: ‘Ecological Being/Witness’
The constitution of Dasein as discussed in its temporality together with its location on earth frames 
the Heideggerian contribution to ecological thinking. It is a reversal of abstracted human being.
This reversal provides a possibility of an ecological existence. It is nonetheless by understanding 
the position of human being in relation nonhuman beings which allows an ethics of ecological 
relationality to be observed. It also, responds to the claims of anthropocentrism of Heideggerian 
thinking.
Heidegger throughout his thought establishes a new way of understanding what the human 
being is all about. Through this approach he might be seen as anti-humane or as a different sort of 
anthropocentric according to one’s perspective, particularly through the perspective of the 
Cartesian/Kantian human being. This is the crucial point in understanding Heidegger —  his attempt 
is not about trying to innovate the concept of human — humanity within the dominant metaphysics 
of the times. Yes, he is anti-human insofar as the understanding of humanity is based on 
Cartesian/Kantian premises, and he is also anthropocentric, but this orientation is not about the 
centrality of humanity for the rest to exist.
In his Letter on Humanism he argues that ‘[b]ut if man is to find his way once again into the 
nearness of Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless’ (1996, p.223). Here, Heidegger’s 
question is manifested in a coherent way. His question is about Being, and human kind is able to
220
become near to it but this becoming is not possible through claiming to be Being. It is rather 
possible through becoming located within many other things which are parts of Being as well.
In Being and Time, and also in his later thoughts, Heidegger establishes that Being is always 
out of reach: in Dasein, Being is only realised through becoming but it is never possible to reach 
Being; in works of art one becomes aware of Being but it is always incomplete in the sense that 
Being is always more than what it seems. This means that Being for humankind is becoming91 
which cannot be reduced to one possibility of it. Therefore, to define Being in its entirety as 
something comprehensible is an illusion which uproots humankind from its becoming and reduces 
it to a state of non-humanness.
It is very clear that, in Heidegger, Humankind is considered to be the only entity which 
experiences becoming, which means its own Being is an issue for humankind. He reiterates this
• * 09understanding in his Letter on Humanity (1946) on various occasions. Also, his lecture series of 
1929-30 under the title of The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics: World-Finitude-Solitude 
1995 [1983] has the same inclination. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply that he was 
another anthropocentric as claimed by Simon Glendinning, “‘[m]an”, for Heidegger, remains the 
entity that is absolutely privileged: the centre of the “being there” of the world as world’ (1998, 
p.70). This interpretation seems to be ignoring the main assumptions I discussed in the context of 
Being and Time. It is clear that if the ontological framework is ignored, as he accepts, for an 
epistemological interpretation this would contradict the aim behind the whole Heideggerian project.
91 According to Martha C. Nussbaum this becoming process is ‘to wait somewhat passively for the revelation o f  
Being, the way a poet waits for the voice of inspiration or believer for the voice o f God’. See, Nussbaum 1997.
Also, according to Dominique Janicaud, the politics o f later Heidegger is “‘une politique de l ’attente”(a politics o f 
awaiting), that is a politics based upon the realisation that human action cannot transform the world and that we must 
wait for the transformation to come from within Being itself as cited in Simon Critchley 1993, p.85. Both views 
seem to have a very problematic approach to Heideggerian understanding. For Nussbaum, it seems very interesting 
to locate something like becoming at each situation to a passive mode which practically reflects a contradiction in 
terms. For Janicaud, it seems the stand taken is an interesting interpretation of how Heidegger concludes his essay on 
‘The Question Concerning Technology’(1977). He writes that ‘The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly 
do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become’. This is obviously about the 
possibility o f change through questioning. And it would not be misinterpretation to take this questioning as the 
questioning o f mode of being; in other words, a process o f becoming through the angst o f  technological existence.
92 Whose target was mainly Jean-Paul Sartre and his way o f interpreting humanism, as he combined some parts o f  
Heideggerian existentialism with strong Cartesian/Kantian understanding o f human being. Heidegger was trying to 
clarify his position and distance himself from this particular interpretation as existentialism. See Sartre 1948.
93 Glendining argues that in ‘Being and Time, Heidegger presents the epistemological problematic and skeptical 
questioning which characterize the modem philosophical inquiry’ and suggests that Heidegger ‘is trying to reframe
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According to David F. Krell (1992) the Letter on Humanism in which Heidegger talks about 
the separation of human beings and other animals with an ‘abyss’ (Heidegger 1996, p.230) indicates 
a failure or rather strongly emphasised anthropocentrism in the thinking of Heidegger94. He argues 
that ‘Heidegger is careful to reserve selfhood to Dasein. Indeed, the bulk of his analysis set the 
selfhood of human Dasein in relief against the realm of mere animality’ (Krell 1992, p.9). And he 
tries to show that Heidegger fails to bridge the gap created by this abyss earlier in his attempt 
through the lecture course ‘[w]hen Heidegger tries to separate Dasein from the animal, or to dig an 
abyss of essence between them, he causes the whole of his project to collapse back into the 
congealed categories and oblivious decisions of ontology’ (Ibid., p. 105). But clearly in the lecture 
course Heidegger qualifies the possibility of abyss:
it is not simply a question of qualitative otherness of the animal world as 
compared with the human world, and especially not a question of quantitative 
distinction in range, depth and breath — not a question of whether or how the 
animal can apprehend something as something, something as being, at all. If it 
cannot then the animal is separated by an abyss (Heidegger 1995, p.264).
Here, it seems that Heidegger is attempting to see animality as being within itself. There is no 
attempt to define their being or having a world according to some ontological definition of human 
being and its world as an established animal world. Nevertheless, the discussion which continues 
about being in a circle or ring, poverty-deprivation and captivation (Ibid., p.201-70) in relation to 
the animal world, seems to create a misunderstanding which he clarifies through
[thus] our entire preliminary investigation suddenly takes on a new function. The 
task is to reveal the significance of what we acquired there in its entire import for 
the question concerning the manifestness of beings as such, a manifestness 
which was indeed supposed to constitute one moment of the essence of world. In 
this connection we should remember this: animality no longer stands in view 
with respect to poverty in world as such, but rather as a realm o f beings which
this skepticism’ (1998, 43-47). By ignoring the ontological aim and the approach o f the questioning in Being and 
Time, and elsewhere in the Heideggrian writings, Glendinning is starting his analysis with a misreading(m«/earfwg) 
which then allows him to claim that Heidegger’s aim was to clarify the concept o f Dasein —  man in the general 
structure o f metaphysics.
94 See, for example, p. 130 in Krell 1992.
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are manifest and thus call for a specific relationship toward them on our part, 
one in which at least initially we do not move (Ibid., 276 emphasis in original.)
and he describes that
the ring that encircles the sea-urchin is quite different from that of the bee, and 
that of the bee different again from the great tit, and this different from that of the 
squirrel and so on. But these encircling rings belonging to the animals, within 
which their contextual behaviour and instinctual activity moves are not simply 
laid alongside or in between one another but rather intersect with one 
another.. ..When we consider that in every case of such encircling struggle the 
living being in turn adapts something from nature itself into its own encircling 
ring, then we must say: What manifests itself to us in this struggle o f encircling 
rings is an intrinsically dominant character o f living beings amongs beings in 
general, an intrinsic elevation [Erhabenheit] of nature over itself, a sublimity that 
is lived in life itself’.(Ibid., p.277-78 emphasis in original.).
One of the most important aspects of the recognition of sublimity that is lived in life is, as also 
agreed by Krell, that Heidegger opens up the possibility of death and therefore recognises ‘the 
capacity to be’ (Krell 1992, p.105).95 In this space, nature and things in nature can be considered as 
life and a move toward including those lives in the political life. It is the possibility of life 
recognised in its own way, and located within the political, which seems to respond to what John D. 
Caputo96 argues in terms of Flesh, ‘brutal unbecoming’ (1993, p.211)....the flesh o f marine life 
choking to death in waters poisoned by oil and toxic chemicals is no less flesh than human 
flesh... (Ibid., p. 210).
This possibility of recognition is not very clear in the Heideggerian text (1995, p264-70) 
and it led Krell to conclude that ‘[m]ind equine tears, the watershed —  the water shed over the 
impossible, impassible, abbysal watershed that Heidegger, like most philosophers before him, 
hopes will segregate human beings from the animals’ (1992, p. 134). Although the insistence of 
Heidegger on the different ‘rings’ would justify this pessimistic ever existence of a watershed, his 
thinking about the different rings in terms not only of death but ‘the question concerning the
95 Also see p. 128-129 in Krell 1992. Here, Krell seems to argue that Heidegger’s effort to disprove the poverty o f the 
animal world is a failure which, it seems to me, is a rather rushed opinion about the discussion put forward in the 
lectures o f 1928-30.
96 See note 87.
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essence of life in relation to the question concerning the essence of death is just as essential as the 
question concerning the essence of life in relation to the essence of organism’ (Heidegger 1995, 
p.266) elevates the whole argument to a different stage. The question of life, he seems to suggest, is 
related with the essence of organism that is reflected through itself not as an attributed to it in 
relation to humans. So, in this sense it is not about a discussion to exist in watersheds and mourn 
for not becoming together, but it is rather about recognising and trying to understand the essential 
differences of organisms and take them as in themselves, not comparing them to human beings and 
measure their potential qualities according to a definition o f ‘personhood’. One could still accuse 
this perspective as being anthropocentric, for example, Jacques Derrida seems to go in both 
directions — for and against:
The Difference he is talking about between poverty and wealth is not one of 
degree. For precisely because of a difference in essence, the world of the animal 
—  and if the animals poor in world, and therefore in spirit, one must be able to 
talk about a world of the animal, and therefore of a spiritual world — is not a 
species or a degree of the human world. This poverty is not an indigence, a 
meagreness of world. It has, without doubt, the sense of privitation 
[Entbehrung], of a lack: the animal does not have enough world, to be sure. But 
this lack is not to be evaluated as a quantitative relation to the entities of the 
world. It is not that the animal has a lesser relationship, a more limited access to 
entities, it has a other relationship97,
and he adds that ‘[i]t respects a difference of structure while avoiding antropocentricism. But it 
remains bound to reintroduce the measure of man’ through ‘this meaning of lack of privation’ 
(Derrida 1989, p.49).
At this point it is central to see all this discussion about the ‘animal’ and anthropocentrism 
in relation to the move Heidegger makes in articulating the possibility of Dasein. The structure of 
Dasein as discussed earlier in the chapter shows that it no longer exists in the conventional binary 
location, in opposition to nature. In this, the concept o f ‘care’ and the conceptualisation o f ‘death’
97 Wittgenstein suggests in his Philosophical Investigations that ‘[i]t is sometimes said that animals do not talk 
because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: “they do not think, and that is why they do not talk”. But-they 
simply do not talk. Or to put it better: They do not use language-if we except the most primitive forms o f language- 
commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part o f our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, 
playing’(1997, p.l2e-paragr.25).
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are very important (Also, by bringing the death as the necessary condition of caring Dasein to be. 
The whole existence and the relational possibility of Dasein is fixed into an existential ethics of 
other that is in Dasein). It is the existential possibility of being as throwness which might safely be 
translated as one’s state at its birth as grounded in care. Here, humankind, in order to be at the 
beginning, has to be already-within-alongside-with, which means that, when human is, it carries all 
these things with itself. So, existentially, it belongs. There is no way that human existence can be 
thought of without these essentials of its being. They are not attributes. It is not that because it exists 
it is in relation, but rather in order to exist it has to belong. What this belonging achieves is 
existential identification with others as belonging to the same Being.
Having these existential essentials in the cement of its being, the human is able to find out 
its belongingness even if it is lost. In resoluteness by becoming anxious about the standing truth of 
its being in each Situation the human being discovers this belonging. Therefore, in each resolution 
the human being is conscious of its origins as belonging and also conscious that it is becoming, not 
Being, which indicates, further, that its own being is an issue for itself through which his belonging 
is questioned as the anxiety about truth in one’s own world. Caputo argues that ‘[b]eing touched is 
a transformation from autonomy to the heteronomy, a reconfiguration of an autonomous agent into 
a heteronomous one’ (1993, p.217), it is the openness to Unheimlichkeit that brings the Dasein’s 
potentiality-for-Being...
In becoming, humankind is facing its past and its future in which its own way of being is 
projected. In other words, it becomes through itself at the glimpse of Unheimlichkeit. Through this 
process the human being realises that it only understands itself through its becoming from itself as 
having other in one’s self. Therefore, the others become understandable as well, insofar as they 
manifest their being from themselves. The implication of this argument is that the truth humans 
attribute to themselves as the location of Being for themselves and by that ordering of others 
become untenable as the only truth. It can be only one of the possibilities in ‘they’ where the idle 
talk of Being expunges the other possibilities at the expanse of other being’s, nonhuman being’s 
unbecoming.
Therefore, in order to understand others, human beings refrain from attributing things to 
them that are not reflected by them. This manner of being human is nothing more than being a
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member of all beings. As all beings have differences apart from their existential essentials, humans 
differ in their ability to question their being. They realise their becoming and by being conscious of 
their being they choose from their possibilities of potentiality-for-Being. This seemingly human- 
centric view within the general framework ofHeideggerian thought suddenly becomes the 
possibility of conscious ecological being.
The rethinking of human being is about a being whose interest with its surroundings is not
Q Q
based on utility of things for itself. The interest of ‘ecological’ being comes from its belonging. It 
is not totally based on possibilities for its own and own kind’s sustenance for generations. 
Ecological being’s consciousness is working through the fact that we are because they are, rather 
than we are and therefore they are. This difference is very important, ecological being in each 
Situation retreats into its own consciousness of belonging which implies a state of responsibility in 
each decision about understanding the other entities involved in themselves as the truth which is 
one of the components of one’s being. Put differently it locates itself within the context as a witness 
rather than above the context as an authority that gives order to things. As a witness, it does not 
compare other entities to itself and measure them according to itself, the measure of things is in 
themselves for ecological being. In making a choice about a Situation through this process, it comes 
realise a possibility of potentiality-for-Being enriched by the feeling of truth about belonging with 
others. This condition also makes human being at home.
Does this Heidegerian reinstitution of human as an ecological being help to approach 
ecological problems in the real sense? Or does it give us a romantic reflection on antiquity where 
people lived in the harmony of chaos?
In a way of conclusion there are two main points to make. The first one is related with the 
importance of time and space in this approach. The second one has two levels a) the importance of 
reconstitution of human within ecological understanding for politicising ecological life, and b) the 
methodological consequences deriving from the way the discussion is built.
98 Attfield argues that ‘[I] believe that the conclusion that species lack interests is correct, at least if  it means that a 
species has no interests over and above those of its member’ (1991, p. 150) and discusses the possibility of moral 
standing for such non-human species. According to this classification o f non-human is a being interested in only its own 
species, the humans’ approach to nature puts them into the category of non-human species as well.
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First, although Heideggerian thought draws on pre-Socratic thinking, it is in no way a 
suggestion about recovering the past into the present. Heidegger is very aware of the time and space 
based (in which something like social can be observed) existence of human beings. By being 
grounded on Earth and, then, located within a certain there-world, human being is infinitely time 
and space based. In this particular finite time and space it encounters nature and other beings. It is in 
this encounter that it realises potentiality-for-Being. Therefore, human being becomes, in its 
authenticity, within a certain time and space according to which it exists, Da-sein. The discussion of 
potentiality-for-Being does not imply an originary past, Arcadia, which if recovered would solve 
the problems here, today. The insistence on Dasein1 s relation to ‘there’ both authentically or 
inauthentically presents that the thinking about Being is related with one’s time and space. This 
locatedness is strongly argued in The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger 1977)." The 
argument is about how in technology beings become things and what is being revealed is a process 
of unbecoming.100 Therefore, it is an attempt to take how discourse on technology establishes there 
in this age and try to see its essence in terms of beings rather than things. This is not an anti­
technology stand but rather a conscious thinking/questioning of how we become in the age of 
technology without loosing sight of becoming in the midst of beings rather than things. As a result, 
the thinking about Being or becoming warns or works as a methodological corrective that reminds 
human being that it exists in the midst of other beings on earth so that other beings existence can be 
accommodated in this age.
Second, I argued that the Heideggerian move locates human being back into its location as 
an existing being among other beings. This reverses the Cartesian/Kantian frame where human 
being is abstracted to a space where things exist as a result of conciseness of human being. With the
99 Heidegger argues that ‘[t]he question concerning technology is the question concerning the constellation in which 
revealing and concealing, in which coming to presence of truth, comes to pass’ (1977, p.33).
100 ‘As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather exclusively as 
standing-reserve, and man in the midst o f objectlessness is nothing but the orderer o f the standing-reserve, then he 
comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve’(Heidegger 1977, p.27). Here, the idea 
o f what is important in technology is questioned. To take technology as one o f the abilities o f human essence is 
challenged. It is argued that humankind no longer encounters its essence, because, technology has claimed his own 
reason that is not related with the essence of Dasein. This seems very suggestive o f Jean Baudrillard’s discussions of  
Simulacrum developed as an important variation of postmodern social critique. Having said that, the relationship 
must be considered as far as motif o f changing essence of technology goes. In Heidegger, the question is grounded in 
his general ontological investigations. For example see Baudrillard 1983.
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move, beings attain possibility of their existence in themselves. It is true that one can observe the 
existence of nature within Dasein's world. It is possible argue that this fact still locates the nature 
into Dasein's gaze. The crux of the discussion is not about the absolute nature that exists.101 Even if 
it does Dasein, human being, cannot experience it a-historically.
The crux, then, is the fact that Dasein encounters nature in its world. It is not anymore a 
‘spectator, even a constituting spectator, Dasein is in world as someone taking part, as a party 
possibly challenged by that which it meets’ (Marion 1996, p.86). Put differently, nature and Dasein 
are located on the same ground, they share it. This would result in considering nature and other 
beings as party to Dasein's, human being’s, existence and vice versa. It is with this realisation that 
the importance of Dasein's difference from animals and their differences themselves become clear. 
The Dasein contains concern and responsibility as its own condition of becoming. Its becoming 
follows its concern. Therefore, it is Dasein who must be concerned about other beings Being in 
themselves. It does not have to see qualities of personhood in nonhuman beings to care for their 
being. The discussion of rights and the impossibility of granting rights to nonhuman beings because 
rights means obligations in terms of nonhuman relations to humans, becomes untenable. Rights and 
obligations must be related with every beings becoming in itself.102 Here, I am gesturing toward the 
political where nature has a voice and a party to the discussion. It is the possibility of this gesture 
which is the most important contribution of the Heideggerian path. Life becomes all inclusive, it 
gives voice to life which has been biological fact,flesh.
This active responsibility for life deriving from existential state of being goes beyond the 
concepts of aesthetics or ‘awe’ discussed by deep ecologists. It disagrees with the fact that in nature
101 Which seems to be one line o f discussion to counter Cartesian/Kantian frame. It fails so far as it assumes a fix 
relationship between nature and human beings over time therefore carries a tone o f recovering the times o f  
undisturbed nature that have never existed in terms o f ecological relations. Some level o f biologism is expressed by 
Glendinning in his discussion o f animality. He tries to counter a Heideggrian stand point by introducing equality 
based on biology. See 1998, pp.73-75. But clearly existential argument, as it brings the issue o f responsibility seems 
to be more persuasive.
102 Luc Ferry documents such relationship between people and animals, insects in France around 16th and 17th 
centuries. See Ferry 1995. In which he observes that tiny beasts were considered in their way o f life and judgment 
based on this rather than considering them as pests and damaging beings per se. There is a clear resonance between 
this and contemporary discussions o f ‘fox hunting’ in Britain. Having said that the latter argument seems to be based 
an anthropomorphic understanding o f a fox rather than what it is in itself
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everything is the same.103 It accepts human beings are in nature which become through an 
ecological communication. In this, the ecological is the recognition of a process of active 
relationship/shaping between each and every agent, a dynamic relationship. Earth is the location 
therefore, the relationship turns to the possibilities of different ecological communications, 
potentiality-for-Being. In short, it refutes the ever existing, constantly similar, relationship between 
nature and human beings, either as implied in the transcendental human being of Kantian thinking 
or mystical deep ecology’s human being. It is this refutation via becoming that allows us to address 
changing ecological questions and problems. It is not only this relation to Earth as home, on which 
beings dwell that makes ecological problems comprehensible. The structure of the thinking and 
questioning as a methodology is an important part of the process. The thinking approaches Dasein 
as its in its ‘there’. I would argue that Heidegger understands this initial ‘there’ as the state of 
abstracted human subjectivity which reached its zenith in Kant’s thinking. Therefore, questioning 
by trying to understand the conditions of this existence is an attempt to establish a relational 
understanding of human being.
By bringing human being’s Beingness under questioning, an important step is taken toward 
uncovering its relationality with other beings. By questioning the Beingness of human being the 
grounds of present ‘normal’ or ‘tradition’ is brought under scrutiny. Within this questioning the 
importance of Death, temporality of human being, comes from its temporalisation of thinking in 
terms of any given a-historical discourse. The temporalisation of thinking keeps methodology away 
from becoming a substantive core of what is being questioned. Put differently, the correctness of 
questioning is not related with ‘the truth’. Truth of a relationality derives from the context.
In this the ethical orientation can be observed. Critchley points out that ‘Heidegger 
reconceives ethics in terms of ethos, that is, as human dwelling thought of openness to the event of 
the truth of Being’ (1997, p.90).104 The challenge of ethos to the traditional ethics o f ‘ought’ comes 
from its structure as a methodological relationality. It questions traditional ethics as located within 
certain ‘there’ as a result of which it has become blind to becoming other than what is established as 
‘ought’. It expresses a dynamic responsibility in the face of Unheimlichkeit, rather than an ethical
103 That is either because of their biology or an idea based on theological equality as being part o f God’s creation. Both 
o f  these can be observed within deep ecology movement as I discussed earlier in the chapter.
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that has become closed. The question posed by ethos allows light to be shed over what is being 
expressed in the ethical as relationality. It, thus, contradicts the idea of objectivity insofar as ethos 
of the ethics shows subjective location of human beings. Put differently, ethos questions the ethics 
in terms of a relationality implied in dwelling thought. Caputo argues that ‘[a]n obligation is a call 
we receive to which we must respond, a prescriptive to which we must keep an open mind’ (1993, 
p.26). Ethos is this existential obligation to ecological relationality. The questioning of Beingness of 
Dasein allows this ethos to become operational. With this one can see the dynamic active side of 
this thinking in terms of a political as well as in relation to the study of this political. This 
ecological both as a substantive relationality to Earth and other beings in it and as a methodology 
becomes active as a result of questioning the location of human being. By establishing its position 
through ecological thinking, it aims to overcome the position of abstracted human subject and 
deriving understanding of relations — social, international, or otherwise.
It does not put the structure discussed so far as a blueprint for a new configuration, or 
immediate replacement by a stroke of a pen. What is asked here of human beings is to become a 
Pheonix, to lose themselves in the face of their anxiety and become once more within themselves 
dwelling in the world with others. This appeal is about taking action which is based on one’s 
existential possibility and responsibility. Therefore, it is the most profound action that one could 
possibly project on its world. The consequences of being an ecological witness who asks 
fundamental questions in the face of ‘they’ is profound. Particularly in terms of the subject of 
present study. The closed thinking process of International Relations in terms of its understanding 
of environment becomes untenable. The discussion of ethics within the discipline also becomes 
destabilised if not deconstructed. I will conclude the study by turning to these profound 
consequences in the Conclusions.
104 Heidegger clarifies this in his Letter on Humanism. See Heidegger 1996, pp.213-66.
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Conclusion: Ecological Ethics and Existential Method
The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; 
my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them in any single direction 
against their natural inclination .—And this was, of course, connected with the 
very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field 
of thought criss-cross in every direction (‘Philosophical Investigations’, the 
Preface Wittgenstein 1997).
This thesis has sought to respond to the question posed in the introduction: Can International 
Relations understand and address the ecological call? In doing so the thesis has gone through 
three stages. From the initial empirical case of ocean management in the South Pacific it moves 
to the possibility of understanding ecological problems, or producing knowledge, in general, in 
IR and then locates this possibility of knowing to the larger philosophical framework. By doing 
so, it responds to the original question in the negative: IR cannot understand and address the 
ecological call. The reason for this is given at the philosophical level. I argued that in order to 
respond to the question, the philosophical rethinking of the human nature relationship is required 
in order to consider an ecological ethics as the ground of the political and the methodology of 
understanding.
In this study ‘thinking’ means to locate oneself within the question, rather than to exercise 
an abstract control of the issue as the objective enquirer in questioning. Therefore, the thinking 
process does not prioritise one of the parties, rather it takes everyone as part of a multiplicity that 
is being faced. To be able to think about an issue within its complexity, one has to unfold the 
complexity without being inhibited by the habitual necessity of exclusionist categories. Within 
this process, the second dimension of questioning, then, tries to reflect on, and eventually bring 
together, ‘what is near that has been lost in the naturalness of the common’ (Heidegger 1968, 
p. 129). The biological life of ocean species, their habitats and their life dynamics are now 
important components of thinking about international ecological problems presented in the 
oceans. But, at the same time, this is an unfolding of what is being disregarded in what is seen as
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‘common’ or ‘natural’ at present. It also follows that by including these components of ocean life 
into the consideration of the political, the process that disregarded them so far cannot be, 
anymore, presented as natural or common. Therefore, this process deconstructs1 the apparent 
naturalness of the stand taken by International Relations in the face of ecological challenge 
through building a dynamic thinking about the present in its complexity. At the same time, this 
process of bringing ecological concerns into the analysis creates a philosophical outlook in which 
ethical and epistemological concerns are grounded through this ecological understanding.
In conclusion, two questions might be asked. The first is how this analysis can inform 
studying ER/environment? The second is how this analysis can help to address the actual problem 
of environment articulated?
The first question goes beyond the immediate question about the particular environmental 
problem. It allows the study to articulate the problem on an ontological level, as a question of 
methodology. At the level of methodology the empirical question becomes a question of 
understanding and conceptualisation within IR.
It is at this level that I have discussed the inefficiency presented by the discipline. The 
empirical study is employed to show that responding to the initial question of ecological call, 
answered in the empirical framed in the disciplinary understanding, would remain silent to the 
call. The response adopts the question to the limits of understanding within IR whereby 
ecological problems are persistently reduced to the question of management of regimes. 
Therefore, rather than formulating a response as a policy formulation and concluding the study 
within the ontological limits of IR, considering the problem as an ethical issue, the ethical 
position implied and deployed through IR is questioned.
The ecological ethics is a challenge to the study of International Relations which, in its 
different schools, considers a world a priori that can be understood and thus, as a given area to
1 The dynamic thinking is not a linear process where the idea o f deconstruction implies a vindictive process o f  
annihilation. The concept in this study indicates a process that deconstructs through building a new possibility in the 
process o f de-legitimising the common one. In this process, ‘why’ questions are central to each step, insofar as they 
relate the issue to a larger whole; at the same time they deepen the level o f thinking about the question o f the 
possibility of the ‘common’ in the present circumstances.
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be studied. In their differences, nonetheless, most of the schools consider the world, that can be 
understood, according to the overarching international/sovereignty based framework, in which a 
fundamental ethical position is implicitly applied.3 In its different variants either as a ‘problem 
solving theory’ or a ‘critical theory’ IR also remains within the boundaries of anthropocentric 
ontology.4 This pervasive ethical position then becomes the guarantee for the method used in 
understanding international relations. By arguing the question of environment to be foremost an 
ethical question and not a managerial one, the grounding ethical assumption of International 
Relations is questioned.
The morality of the abstracted sovereign individual in relating to the other is scrutinised. 
As the location of first abstracted, and then radically individuated, human being is questioned,5 
the possibility of a fixed delimitation of a disciplinary locus can be contested as well. In 
rethinking an ethical relation between nature and human being, in terms of belonging, a new 
space is opened up. This rethinking contests the ideas of fixed ‘the international* and the agents 
of action within it. The ecological ethics by introducing a larger relationality shows that the 
world that can be studied in IR, as the domain of knowledge in international politics, is 
deceptive. Therefore, in unsettling the grounds of justification of the conceptual plain that can be 
studied, the ecological ethics does not only address the environmental issue but targets a problem 
within IR as a discipline.
2 The structure of IR based on states, sovereignty and the international reflects a knowledge claim which in turn 
underpins the methodology o f studying international relations. Creating the concepts as the ground o f thinking about 
international allows the discipline o f International Relations to privilege ‘the procedure for obtaining knowledge 
itself (Szerszynski 1994, p. 114).
3 The methodological framework through which IR produces knowledge is justified and validated through the 
epistemology of the ‘state’ and ‘the international’ (Booth 1996; p.333).
4 As I discuss in Chapter 4, different schools in the discipline can be observed in their explicit or implicit adherence 
to the ontological IR framework o f international/sovereignty which is underpinned by the anthropocentric outlook. 
The epistemological differences prevalent in the discussions about the nature o f the International or about the role o f  
states in the international do not go beyond the ontological framework o f IR. See for example Keohane 1994, 
Krasner, 1983, Kratochwil, 1995, Adler 1997, Wendt 1999, Linklater 1998, Campbell 1998. For the typology o f  
‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theories see Cox 1981.
5 This context is best represented by Descartes and Kant. Ferry talks about ‘the Cartesian position, according to 
which nature, including the animal kingdom, is entirely deprived o f rights in favor o f the human subject, the unique 
pole o f meaning and value’(Ferry 1992, p.28).This position has been augmented by the Kantian elaboration on the 
conditions o f Human being. According to Ronald W. Hepburn in this Kantian understanding there is an invitation ‘to 
accord unconditional value only to the bearers o f freedom and reason, and to downgrade phenomenal nature save as 
it hints at a supersensible..’ (Hepbum 1997, p.69).
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Ecological Ethics and IR
The possibility of the political as an ecological process can be grounded on the position of human 
being. The ethical responsibility of being with others obliges human being to think ecologically 
and think about the claims of those beings whose lives are not necessarily clear to us, the 
Unheimlich.... It locates human being as a part of the ecological context in contact with beings.... 
The meaning of ‘ecological’, then, is not strictly limited to the issue area of so called 
environment but to a larger relationality where human beings are located with others. It is in the 
relationality of being-in-the-world that human beings face each other and other beings. The 
discussion of Dasein's being constituted as being there, as always situated within a certain 
context, and by locating its potentiality for Being, in other words its becoming, to the concept of 
care, responsibility...to other beings with which Dasein is in-the-world-on earth, establishes the 
pre-ontological condition of understanding relationality and morals constituted for epistemic 
disciplines, sciences.... The original ethos as an ecological relationality is based on an 
unprivileged location of human being on earth in the midst of other beings. Nonetheless, this 
ethos does not reduce the natural human capacity to influence its surroundings. By recognising 
the human ability to change, it attributes human beings with the responsibility of care for other 
beings. In doing so, the being of others becomes an existential issue lor Dasein. It is in 
responsibility, in responding to the ecological call, that Dasein faces its potentiality for Being.
The tension between Da, there, of Dasein and its ecological being, Dasein's authenticity 
as its potentiality-for-Being, can be seen as the location of the political. It is in the overcoming of 
the limits established by everydayness, thereness, that Dasein politicises its being. Judith Butler 
observes that ‘to claim that politics requires a stable subject is to claim that there can be no 
political opposition to that claim’ (Butler 1992, p.4). The decision about who is the subject of the 
political forecloses the political space. In its everydayness, Dasein is then constituted among 
agents that are already established, human subject. Dasein's ecological relationality is reduced to 
the relationality limited by the everydayness, the political that is foreclosed. The constitution of 
Dasein as the subject of politics robs it of its ecological context. In other words, in the
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everydayness Dasein is excluded from the larger context in which this thereness is located.
Within it, politics is restricted with the boundaries of a foreclosure. As the limits of the political 
are represented in the agents, political contestation remains within the foreclosure. Those who are 
disqualified or ignored in the constitution of the political cannot become parties to the discussion. 
Problems related with those identities are either ignored or reduced/translated to the problems of 
the agents of political. By thinking in terms of an ecological context and Dasein, as located in 
this context, the methodological bind represented in the human subject as an agent of the political 
is unsettled.
By attempting to realise its potentiality for Being, its authenticity, human being/Dasein 
recovers its place as a contingent being in the larger ecological context. This recovery, then, 
contests the limits of politics established as the normality. It tries to relocate the abstracted 
human subject back to its ecological location. It attempts to overcome the idle talk o f the normal. 
In its relational structure, anxious Dasein recognises its responsibility to the other that is ignored 
within the foreclosed political space. As a result Dasein is forced to transgress its limits deployed 
by everydayness, as a state o f unquestioned normality. Through an existential relationship with 
Unheimlich, the foreclosed political is forced to its limits. The established agents and their 
political discussion are problematised by the ecological relationality. Here, a methodological turn 
can be observed.
By understanding the political according to the relations implied within the ecological 
context of a question, this move breaks the bind of analysing a problem according to the 
foreclosed space of the political where already decided concepts reformulate the problem. In 
other words the political does not dictate the definition of what is political in terms of agency. 
But, it becomes a dynamic process where what is political is decided according to a given 
situation and ecological relations reflected within it. Since political contestation is taken out of 
the closure of normality the political can be questioned in terms of its ethos. As a certain political 
settlement and the ethical relations within it might, it become contested by an ecological context. 
The political is secured by the ecological ethics rather than an abstracted resolution that fixes the 
possibilities of political to limited subject positions. At the end, this turn shows a methodological
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move where a question that is analysed within an ecological context might come up with a new 
configuration of the political.
The methodological contention of the study of international relations (IR) in explaining 
the political through ‘the international’ as the space of politics and, states and other institutions as 
agents of this politics, has foreclosed the discussion of politics within IR. Since political has been 
articulated as a matter of relations between states6, possibility of political objection to this 
framework within IR is limited to the discussions of the role of states and international 
organisations. By deciding the subject of the political IR ignores those issues that cannot be 
accommodated within its structure. It also means that it ignores the impact of these politics on 
those areas that are structurally ignored such as the subject matter of the present study. Since 
those identities are not in the domain of the politics, a question about the ethos of ‘the 
international’ as a political space cannot be brought within the discourse, political opposition 
(Butler 1992, p.4) to ‘the international’. ‘The international’ is established as the everydayness 
that creates the boundaries o f the thinking. The limits of the space combined with the stable 
subjects of the political give substance to what is political. The substance of the political is 
always considered according to the stable subject positions. The relationship between the stable 
subjects represents the ethical relations and the political concerns.
The ecological context presented in this study unsettles this stable internalised perspective 
of IR. It shows that what is being ignored is, nonetheless, implicated in the discussions of ‘the 
international’. The foreclosure of the political and subsequent indifference to the context does not 
invalidate the existential relationship. By revealing this connection and showing the limited 
understanding prevalent in IR, the political cohesion represented in ‘the international’ is 
questioned. The definitive authority of ‘the international’ on the political has been delegitimised. 
What is political becomes an issue related with a particular question and the relations presented 
in it.
The ethos of questioning within the foreclosed political sphere of IR is criticised. In so 
doing the ecological ethics systematically counters the grounding assumptions of IR. In locating
6 The objection to this can be made in terms o f international organisations and institutions but, one has to be careful 
in considering these identities separate from the general statecentric structure o f the international.
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the political in relation to the attempt of recovering the ecological relationality, the method of 
understanding and questioning becomes a dynamic process. This points to a politics of becoming 
and contestation rather than an affirmation of a foreclosed space. Therefore, a disciplinary 
boundary as an essential, secure, ground of understanding represents an impasse.
This attempt, also, questions various critical proposals to discuss ethics within the 
discipline. The renewed interest in ethics within the discipline7 suggests a turn for IR. 
Nonetheless, as the discussion of normative questions are aimed at the political defined within 
IR, the ethos of IR as a framework becomes obscured. Ethics seems to be considered as a 
prescriptive performance in which certain political behavior is established as correct, without 
considering the general perspective of the political within which this prescription is located.
From a philosophical point of view, an ethical discussion presents a new relationality between 
the subjects as well as introducing new subjects and the resulting political proposal may not 
necessarily resemble to the political expressed in the international. Attempting to keep the 
political resolution of the international intact and to discuss ethics therein represents an 
questionable method. A plethora of philosophical positions is imported into the discipline 
without considering the ontological assumptions of these concepts necessary to reformulate the 
conceptual frameworks. Put differently, ethics expressed as relationality is not allowed to 
reformulate the questions but applied to explain already posed questions within the international 
as a posteriori analytical tool. The problem is not only that this a posteriori approach bans the 
mutability of thinking, but the problem is also related with the issue of how far the ethical 
positions imported are compatible with the ethical position implicit in the formulation and the
Q
problematique o f ‘the international’.
The method of existential/ecological questioning exposes this methodological bind within 
the discipline. It shows that the understanding of IR represents an ontological bind that is 
reiterated constantly through its application of international/sovereignty binary. The method of 
understanding both in conventional and critical variance perform a thinking based on the 
permanence of everydayness without questioning the fundamental assumptions implicit in the
7 For some examples see Frost 1996, Neufeld 1995.
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location of subject in its thereness, in ‘the international \ The subject of the political exist in the 
idle talk of the international politics where the codified positions obscure the possibility of 
vigilance for those identities representing the limits of the political. The inability for vigilance, 
the loss of political imaginary represents the abandonment of existential responsibility. The 
disciplinary method exercised as a boundary maintenance mechanism overdetermines the 
possibility of thinking. The ecological ethics, discussed as an existential method, on the other 
hand, remains as a method based on the philosophical thinking of relations through ecological 
ethics rather than a method based on a foreclosed domain of politics.9 By pointing out a 
relationality, by being vigilant to the life of Unheimlich, it remains a methodological tool of 
resisting the closure of the political to contestation.10 This position represents the political that is 
both transformative and ethical.11
Fish
It is important to go back and see the methodological importance of discussing marine ecology 
and the introduction of fish as party to the problem beyond the considerations of stock 
management. This will constitute a way of concluding in terms of the empirical study while 
demonstrating the limits of this approach in an empirical study. It is also a gesture to the fact that 
empirical/existential questioning, a question about being, is a necessary condition of thinking, 
thinking different than it is given in the normal....
The conventional analysis of the South Pacific fisheries regime has shown that the 
institutional innovations and the efficiency of the cooperation among member states reflect a
8 Most important example o f this can be observed in the discussions of post-positivist approaches and those 
discussions related with the debates o f foundations.
9 The formulation o f this point through thinking in terms o f the existential location of being pace  Heidegger can also 
be observed in Michel Foucault. In his formulation o f ethics that is ‘the kind o f relationship you ought to have with 
yourself, rapport a so i, . . .’ (Foucault 1983, p.238) the existential lineage is noticeable.
10 This philosophical lineage can be seen in Jacques Derrida’s discussion o f a democracy to come. His attempt is to 
keep the boundaries o f  democratic settlement open to contestation by those identities that were not originally parties 
to the settlement. The ethical concern here can be seen in concordance with an existential ethics. In his case the 
migrants and refugees in France exemplify the importance o f this move. See Derrida 1997.
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success story. In this success story, however, the ecological context, that is the relationship 
between what is considered to be the stocks and between stocks and human beings beyond their 
market value for the party states, remain hidden. The indifference to the ecological relations 
creates another aspect of the problem, but this aspect is beyond the concerns articulated as 
efficiency and sustainability of resources for global markets under the label of environmental 
concerns, hence politics. In the international environmental politics, the natural components of 
the ecological equation is politically considerate insofar as a human interest can be established in 
terms of resources. The ‘political’ of the international environmental politics is more about 
human beings and the way they incorporate nature as resources than the political that can be seen 
in the larger context of ecological.12 It, rather, represents a large depolitisation of ecological 
relations where the components of the system transformed into things without rights, existential 
relations and prospects.
The methodological style of the study can be seen as a way of questioning, thinking,
wondering about an existential relationality implied in the initial question about the ecological
• • • • 11call and the responsibility. The structure of questioning represents a transgressive
methodological move.14 The limits of understanding what the environmental issues involve in 
oceans and how they can be thought of are reached, in the empirical study, by introducing those 
beings/4 agents’ that are excluded from the formal method of thinking in IR,famillia Thunnus, 
mare .... This move disrupts the limits of understanding environment within the given framework 
of ER. The discussion can be considered as a process of unconcealment which recovers those 
identities fish, Thunnus alalunga, ecological human being... and spaces, oceans, eco-systems, 
habitats..., which are disqualified from being the subject of ethical consideration, even that of 
‘ethics of exclusion’ (Walker 1995).
11 By being vigilant to the existential context, Dasein realises its becoming in different possibilities o f  its Being. It is 
through this attempt o f Dasein to realise its ecological relationality in each position that the political space is kept 
open for other beings and at each position the possibility o f losing oneself in the idle talk o f thereness is resisted.
12 A parallel point is made by Donna Haraway in the larger scientific research context. She argues that ‘the appeal to 
other organisms ‘ inviolable, intrinsic natures aims to limit turning all the world into a resource for human 
appropriation’ (Haraway 1997, p. 218).
13 John D. Caputo argues that ‘[tjransgression is a passage to the limit (passage a limites), the crossing o f a well- 
drawn border that we all share, giving something staight a new bent or inclination or twist’ (Caputo 1997, p.81).
14 It questions the post-Cartesian epistemological and metaphysical assumptions that underpinned ‘the Western 
ethical attitudes toward environment’(Chappell 1997, p.2).
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The impact of this study on nature in general and the ocean ecology in particular can be 
seen in its politicisation of the members of ecosystem as they become party to the political 
contestation in which their rights to life should be considered as worthwhile as those of human 
beings. Furthermore, the domain of the political is expanded from life as the social life of human 
beings abstracted from nature, where the codes of moral relationality are located, to an existential 
space where life means existence and the moral relations are based on ecological ethics of 
existential responsibility. In discussing the aspects of marine ecology as a salient location of the 
environmental politics, fish are transformed from merely a material resource to a life that exist in 
a system of relations. Elaboration of the ecological context and exposition of it from the 
perspective of ocean life reveals that the life of fish is interactive and dynamic. Besides, that it is 
not necessarily or merely a material source for human sustenance. By introducing the perspective 
of marine ecology in which individual fish species and their larger ecological relations are 
considered a) the constitution of fish(nature) as life and b) the reversal of depolitisation are 
accomplished.
As I argued in relation to lifelmere life as the representation of the political, the ecological 
context of nature first has to be conceptualised as a form of life before it appears as a political 
agency. The way I approach to this can be observed in the introduction offish and its ecological 
location. The claim for life is represented in the existential condition of species by the fact of 
their living. This step is a political one, both on the methodological level as it disrupts the 
conventional analysis, and on the practical level as the aspects of an ecological system become 
political agents with claims deriving from their existential position in the ecological system. This 
politicisation is furthered by the discussion of the specific ecological condition of different 
species, Thunnus in particular. It has revealed that the ocean ecosystems present interactive and 
fluid relations. Each species has different ways of life and these lives present many different 
dimensions.
Through this exposition, nature, the large singularity that is taken to be the subject matter 
of international environmental politics can discard the uniform cloak put over it by the inherent
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illusions of human being and its abstract location.15 The process of combining marine ecology 
and IR has pointed to a rupture in the structure of ethics in which the latter is located. The 
appearance of natural life prompted the question of how is it possible to have a methodology that 
does not ignore the ecological context. It is in responding to this question that the conditions of 
ecological understanding is grounded in the ecological ethics.
It is in this particular point that one can also locate the limits of the study in addressing 
the actual environmental problem that is articulated. It can be argued that the method works at 
the level of questioning, and in rethinking the issue within a larger space which then, according 
to a given context, would be expected to develop a contextual rethinking and restructuring, either 
as solutions, or as a rethinking the reasons for constituting it as a problem. In otherwords, this 
method tries to break the methodological foreclosure in questioning and the fixed location of 
agencies within a discussion, it does so by engaging with the empirical issues, phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, this engagement does not mean that the method produces a solution at the empirical 
level. It only creates a dynamic thinking process, out of which, the given context could produce a 
relevant conclusion for a given empirical issue. Therefore, the present empirical study allowed 
me to question grounds of constituting a question about South Pacific fisheries in terms of 
regional cooperation based on UNCLOS ID within IR. By questioning in this way, it has become 
possible to articulate a new space for a discussion in which certain new identities are included in 
the discussion, though the questioning has refrained from prescribing any ex cathedra political 
solutions.
not about concluding...
In this study, then, I observed the international and IR as the thereness, everydayness, of the 
subject. The philosophical discussion and the methodological move have questioned the ethical, 
implied in the area, without observing the limits put by thereness of ‘the international*. In this,
15 With the politicisation of fish, the species o f Thunnus, the institutions and international regulations such as 
UNCLOS III can be questioned from the perspective o f the species of Thunnus as they are party to these regulations. 
The ecological context of their life juxtaposed with the institutional arrangements delivered by the political divisions
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the questioning located itself in the ecological ethics and the concept of responsibility implicit in 
this ethical argument, being-with-others-in-the-world. The move revealed that the discipline 
cannot consider the ethos of its own formation and guarantee its legitimacy through its 
methodology based on a priori knowledge of what can be studied. The philosophical constitution 
of human being as a becoming within ecological context, an ecological witness, does not 
foreclose the relationship between human beings and other beings. An ecological relationality 
remains dynamic, and thus, political and thinking about political are connected to a perpetual 
thinking process about an ecological context. As grounded in this existential ethics, the method 
remains a methodological tool for both thinking politically and acting politically without being 
foreclosed. It keeps the political discussion open without overdetermining the substance of it. 
Therefore, it does not try to arrive at a ground/tribunal from which the substance of the ethical 
and of the political can be legislated. Although this method arguably becomes limited with its 
language, it provides an important way of looking at those questions which are foreclosed under 
the concepts used in a way of intellectual “commonsense”, such as refugee, international health, 
security, by demonstrating the impact of the limits imposed on those beneficiaries of the policies 
defined by these concepts Thus, a new space is opened. Since this move of looking at an issue 
opens up a new process of questioning, it is far from being a romantic reflection on a theme of a 
metaphysics.
In this spirit, the study concludes as a discussion of an existential methodology, which 
leaves the political open to be determined by a given ecological context, constituting itself as a 
perpetual methodological move in resistance to normality.
among human beings creates the ecological call whereby the salience o f regulations to the ecological context o f the 
target species is contested.
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